NOT TO BE ISSUED
OUT OF THE LIBRARY.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
TOWN HALL, BOMBAY.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 16 January, 2016

NAPOLEON

AND

THE GRAND ARMY

IN RUSSIA,

OR A

CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF THE WORK OF

COUNT PH. DE SEGUR,

BY

GENERAL GOURGAUD,

LATE PRINCIPAL ORDERLY OFFICER AND AID-DE-CAMP TO THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

32533

"Render to Cesar the things that are Cesar's."

LONDON:

MARTIN BOSSANGE AND Co., 14, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET;
AND G. B. WHITTTAKER, AVE MARIA LANE.

1825.

347.07
Gou/Nap.
32533

ADVERTISEMENT.

FOUR editions of the work we are about to examine have already appeared, and our remarks upon it, though long since prepared, are only now emerging from the port-folio. Why has their publication been so long delayed? and why are they published now? To these enquiries, which the reader may not unreasonably make, we will reply in a few words.

The size of Mr. de Segur's work, its high price, the portraits and embellishments which have been successively added to it, seemed to warrant the belief that its circulation would be confined to a class of readers who, by their acquaintance with the men and facts treated of, would be enabled to judge of it correctly for themselves. We had remarked also, that those journals which had spoken of it in the most flattering terms, had examined it chiefly in a literary point of view: that they compared it *to the fictions of the illustrious Scotchman*; that, in reading the History of the Grand Army,

the name of Walter Scott had spontaneously proceeded from their pen. This species of merit, ascribed to Mr. de Segur, was not what we were desirous of disputing. It signified but little that his work was *greater than the Iliad;* that the *quorum pars magna fui* had been applied to him, as if to a marshal of the empire; that he was extolled for *having forgotten nothing connected with that momentous period but his own services:* the irony was too evident to require notice. The public, to whom the four editions had been presented, was, by that very means, put upon its guard; and could hardly take for a history, what was offered to it only as a romance.

But we have just learned that a fifth edition is preparing; that it will be of small size, without ornament, and of such a price as to put it within the reach of those numerous classes which are too far removed from the sphere of the events recorded, not to be drawn into errors which the readers of the first editions must have escaped. We have, therefore, thought it incumbent upon us to present the public with our labors; which, however imperfect they may be, will no longer be without utility.

An analagous case presents itself to our mind.

Courtilz de Sandras published (in French) towards the end of the 17th century: *The conduct of France since the peace of Nimeguen; The Life of Coligny; Memoirs of Count De Rochfort; The History of the War with Holland from* 1672 *to* 1677; *The Life of Marshal De Turenne*; *&c. &c. &c.* "His prolific and frivolous pen, says the *Nouveau* "*Dictionnaire historique*, produced a multitude of "novels published under the designation of his- "tories, which were the more mischievous be- "cause the fictions he invented passed for realities "by virtue of a little truth with which he blend- "ed them."

These tales acquired a remarkable degree of celebrity. For a long time no one condescended to refute them; and Sandras was even looked up to as an authority.

"His name is mentioned here, merely for the "purpose of warning Frenchmen as well as "foreigners against relying.....upon these "fictions under the appellation of history."— (Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV.)

The parallel is obvious: we shall add nothing to what we have quoted.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF THE WORK OF

COUNT PH. DE SEGUR.

A man who is about to write a history, should, after having made himself thoroughly master of his subject, and even before the plan of his work is fixed, collect from the aggregate mass of facts he is about to record, the moral tendency of his book; unless, indeed, he proposes to adapt those facts to a particular purpose. And those readers who intend to form a judgment of his work, should endeavor to make out which of these two courses the author has pursued.

Mr. de Segur's predominant object is rendered manifest by his very first chapter. He is about to exhibit *Napoleon engaged in the vast project of making himself sole master of Europe.* It matters not to him that, by this imputation, he becomes the echo of those superficial and malevolent spirits who have judged a great man after

his fall; or of those enemies who, during his prosperity, used it as a weapon for his destruction. He is sure of pleasing one of those classes of persons, and of not displeasing the other. He flatters party spirit, and contemporaneous mediocrity: he will be read, and admired.

This is not all. After exhibiting *so great, so universal* a genius, as wantonly involving himself in a mad enterprize, he will endeavor to prove that, if *his temerity was not crowned with success,* the cause of his failure is to be found *in the premature decay of his health;* and that the great man was an ambitious mortal who grasped at more than the physical powers of his nature enabled him to secure. Such is the author's object.

As for his plan, we flatter ourselves with being able to shew that he has none: that he writes almost at random; blending unconnected facts, and relating them without order; confounding with the events of one epoch, those belonging to another; disdaining to justify his accusations or his praises; adopting without examination, and without that spirit of criticism so indispensable to the historian, the false views of prejudice, of rivalry, or of enmity, and the exagerations of spleen or malevolence;

ascribing actions to some, and words to others, equally incompatible with their situations and characters; quoting no witnesses but himself, and no authority but that of his own assertions.

He treats, both successively and conjointly, of politics and of military facts.

Politics! who made him acquainted with them? A stranger to public affairs, having never approached the cabinet, the council, or the statesmen of the day, with whom his duties at head-quarters never connected him,—whence did he derive his information? From the pamphlets or the conversations of Napoleon's detractors.

As for the military facts, they consist of a series of inaccurate statements; distorted pictures; little anecdotes, for the most part fabricated; and of copies, often literal, of writings almost invariably dictated by malevolence.

It is true, that it would be unreasonable to require from Mr. de Segur, in a military point of view, more than his book affords. He certainly holds the rank and title of general; but how should he have acquired the experience of one? Each successive step in rank he obtained by the exercise of civil functions, to which the usages of the palace annexed embroideries and epaulettes.

Originally *Adjoint* to the *Adjudans du palais*,* he became *Maréchal-des-logis* when this new title was applied to the office he held :† he exercised no other during the Russian campaign, and filled it jointly with Mr. Ernest de Canouville, *Auditeur au Conseil d'état.* Mr. de Segur, who from being colonel of light-horse in the parisian national guard, had become a *Maréchal de camp*,‡ discontinued, it is true, on his return from Russia, his duties of *Maréchal-des-logis*, but did not, on that account, enter upon active military service. He was nominated *gouverneur des pages*, a civil employment which had nothing military about it but the dress. Being afterwards entrusted with the organization of a regiment of *gardes d'honneur* forming at Tours, he was indebted to that circumstance for the advantage of making the campaign of 1814 with that corps, and of having an opportunity of tendering the fidelity of his guards to the Prince of Bénévento (Talleyrand), whilst the Emperor was yet at Fontainebleau.§

* 6th October, 1802.

† 24th September, 1806.

‡ 22nd. February, 1812.

§ Extract of Mr. de Segur's letter to the provisional government.

"I, this day, offer my 1,600 guards, and myself to the "successor and descendant of the kings of my ancestors.—I

The foregoing details are by no means superfluous. A new generation which had but just emerged from childhood, when the days of our glory terminated, and the court party for whom that glory has been but an annoyance, on reading on the title page of a work, upon which the journals lavished their fulsome encomiums before it had any other reader: by *General Count de Segur*, may have concluded that the general who had thus exalted himself into a judge of the great man, had fought by his side; whilst he was in fact only employed in preparing his lodgings.—They may have regarded him as the competitor or rival, or at least as the comrade of those old generals whose blood and whose atchievements during the last thirty years have rendered so many fields of battle illustrious. They may have taken him, upon his word, for one of those *veterans of the grand army* whom he has designated as *his companions* in his dedication; without considering how very slender are his claims to a connection with that illustrious fraternity. —It is useful to apprize the readers of Mr. de Segur, that

"swear fidelity to him, in the name of my officers, of all my "guards, and in my own name, which is a security for my oath."
Moniteur of Monday, 11th April, 1814.

his pen is not that of a military character; although his sword, on the few occasions upon which it has seen the light, has been that of a brave soldier: and it is but just to absolve him from the blame of numerous errors which a more experienced officer would not have committed.

But it may perhaps be asked whether the military knowledge in which Mr. de Segur is so deficient, might not have been supplied to him by his situation at head-quarters, and by the connection with the public service in which he was placed by the civil duties he had to perform during the campaign of 1812? In order to reply to this question, which has been already touched upon, we will in a few words explain the nature of those duties.

On commencing a march, the *maréchal-des-logis* received from the *grand-maréchal du palais* or his representative, instructions to precede the arrival of the imperial head-quarters at the point where they were to be established. There, having under his orders two quarter-masters, who constituted the entire *personnel* under his command, he caused the lodgings of the Emperor and his suite to be prepared; superintended the departments of health, of the table, of the offices, and of the

stables. These duties fulfilled, M. le Comte de Segur had an opportunity of observing, during his leisure hours, what general officers arrived at, or quitted the imperial head-quarters; of collecting the various reports that were circulated, and the conjectures that were formed among the officers sent upon or returning from missions; and of noting down the conversations, more or less animated, and the frequently indiscreet clamors of the *salon dè service,* where many officers solaced themselves for the fatigues of the day, by venting their spleen upon both men and things. These then are Mr. de Segur's witnesses, his authorities, and the sources from which he has derived his information. A circumstance which has led a very clever man to describe his book as *the written record of the gossip of head-quarters.*

So important and difficult an expedition as that to Russia required for its historian a man, who, possessing discernment as well as an accurate knowledge of facts, should have been inaccessible to all foreign influence; who, placing himself in an independent situation, should have seen nothing but the times and circumstances of which he had to treat; and who should have been capable of rising superior to the effect of any new

relation in which he might be placed. Being destitute of these indispensable qualifications, Mr. de Segur has merely succeeded in producing an ill-digested romance, which he has embellished with the title of a history. Dazzled by the success of his own sounding phrases, he has overlooked the inconsistencies into which he has fallen. That grand army, with whose glory the young veteran aspires to connect himself, appears beneath his pen but as a horde of pillagers. The great man, whose grateful admirer he would wish to be thought, and who lavished upon his grandfather, upon his father, and upon himself the treasures of his favor and munificence*, is a madman blindly rushing upon his own destruction. That stupendous genius who invested his own head with so many laurels, and signalized his name by the reconciliation of parties, and by the general prosperity of the country, is represented as a weak, uncertain, irresolute being, without energy or

---

* M. Phillipe de Ségur was presented by the Emperor, on the 24th September 1806, with an annuity of 10,000 francs upon the great book, on the occasion of his marriage.

The 15th August 1809, presented with a further annuity of 10,000 francs.

The 1st January 1812, a further gratification of 4000 francs, &c.

courage, borne down by fatigue and disease, and who died before his time!!

However, in a few months he repaired all his losses; his creative hand reorganized that army which, under his command, was victorious at Lutzen, Bautzen, and Dresden. Reduced still more recently to a small number of brave followers, he kept in check, on the plains of Champagne, the combined forces of all Europe; and when at length he fell, through treachery, it was to the sound of the cry of victory at Champ-Aubert and Montmirail. A year had scarcely elapsed from the time of his fall, when he re-established himself by an enterprise, of which the conception as well as the execution will be the amazement of future ages. But, again forsaken by fortune, he for six years presented to the world, upon the rock of St. Helena, a memorable example of heroic firmness, and a character invincible.

Will Mr. de Segur inform us, by what miracle it occurred that this extraordinary man, whom he has described as already in a state of decrepitude, still preserved that energy and power, which were so long afterwards the terror and admiration of his enemies? Had he written such things immediately upon his return from the Russian campaign,

the circumstance might have been attributed to the influence of a disordered imagination, and of a gloomy, spirit excited by the aspect of such great disasters as had just occurred: had he written them directly after the events of 1813, 1814, and 1815, he would already have been inexcusable: and it is in 1825 that his work appears! If he had published, before the death of the hero, his book, greeted as it is by a host of ephemeral suffrages, doubtlessly an eloquent protest against it, arising from the midst of the Atlantic, would have thrown an overwhelming counterpoise into the balance; and posterity, which will preserve the recollection of Napoleon's words as well as of his actions, posterity, we say, with which *the Historian of the Grand Army* will have no accounts to settle, would one day have known that the author and the work had existed. Mr. de Segur has, however, shrunk from this kind of celebrity: and our criticisms will not obtain it for him. It is to our contemporaries only that we aspire to address ourselves.

Having held the appointment of orderly officer to the Emperor during the campaign of 1812, the orders we had occasion to transmit, the discussions at which we were present, have left us in posses-

sion of abundant reminiscences; but it was most especially at St. Helena that we had facilities of collecting historical documents. There, we lived for three years, in the habitual contemplation of the past; there, we were enabled to collect from the conversations of the great man, to whose intimacy we were admitted, the most valuable information.

By these considerations, and still more by our admiration of the Emperor, we have been induced to undertake the present work. It is surely fitting, when a detractor presumes upon the silence of the grave, that one voice at least, however feeble it may be, should proclaim the accents of truth.

We have also had recourse to the memory of our friends, and have been especially assisted in our labor by a man, who, occupying a place in the cabinet of the Emperor, from the peace of Amiens till the conclusion of his reign, was constantly honored with his confidence.

NOTE.

This Critical Examination was made upon the first edition of Mr. de Segur's work: our subdivision into Books and Chapters has reference to his.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

THE author of the pretended *History of Napoleon and of the Grand Army* commences by a serious error, and a gratuitous supposition.

"The Emperor had, by the treaty of Tilsit "attacked the honor and the interest of Russia."

If Count de Segur had read this treaty, he would have seen that never was victory less abused. Russia had been thrown back upon her own territory, part of whose inhabitants had hailed our approach. She issued from a disastrous contest, a greater and a more powerful nation than at its commencement; to the moderation of the Emperor Napoleon she was indebted for the glory of having re-established a kingdom of Prussia after it had entirely disappeared. In what way then had *the honor of Russia* received a blow from the treaty of Tilsit?

As to her *interests*, she judged rightly that they would suffer by the adoption of the continental system; but she also judged that the continental system was the only means of forcing a peace upon England; and as the interest of Russia was in a peace, upon this interest she rested her stipulations at Tilsit. "I am no less the enemy of England than you are," was the expression of Alexander to Napoleon, when he entered the bark on the Niemen. This feeling instantly brought the two sovereigns together; and the peace was concluded.

"France had alienated from herself the nations "of Europe by her conquests, and the monarchs "by her revolution and her new dynasty."

Italy, Belgium, the Rhenish provinces enjoyed the benefits of her administration; the inhabitants of those countries still feel an attachment to what has been left untouched by the policy of their sovereigns.

With respect to *the revolution*, it was not the act of Napoleon. He had reconciled the monarchs to its results; this could never have been achieved by the republic. The Emperor and the new dynasty had calmed the fears they entertained of the destruction of the monarchical system in Europe, a destruction which the republic had proclaimed. This and the following assertion, *that France could no longer look forward to have friends, but merely subjects*, have for a tendency to

establish, at the very outset, that Napoleon could rest his power upon nothing short of universal dominion; a false imputation (be it said by the way, and once for all) the injustice of which has already been partly attested by the experience of the last ten years, and by the working of time that moderates the violence of the passions, and removes all obscurity from truth. We begin to blush at being the echo of foreign cabinets who have designedly filled Europe with their clamors against the ambition of Napoleon, because he used every means at his command towards defending and securing France against their own ambition, a duty which the revolution had bequeathed to him. The Emperor had recourse to war for the purpose of forcing a peace upon England; and England, in order to keep up the war, excited against him the continental sovereigns. Subsidized by her gold, they became her mere instruments.

Was Napoleon to remain upon the defensive with means inadequate to repel the attack? In so doing he would have betrayed the national hopes, and compromised the glory and the prosperity that had been confided to his safeguard. Wielding as a man of genius the resources which France placed at his disposal, he triumphed over her enemies, who could not forgive his having raised her to so elevated a rank, though they concealed their resentment under an exterior of submission. In order to secure the future welfare of the nation;

it became necessary for Napoleon to obtain the pledges of peace, and the means of effecting interchanges on the occurrence of that event, whilst he deprived his enemies of the power of annoying him. "Napoleon had so much difficulty in concealing this gigantic project (of universal monarchy), that hints of it began to escape him in all directions."

There is much of the imposing in the description of the immense preparations called for by so gigantic an undertaking; but no period is assigned for its being carried into effect. A conclusion might be drawn from this, that Russia had until then felt perfectly secure, in the faithful performance on her own part of the conditions of the treaty, and experienced no anticipation of the storm which was gathering around her; whereas it is established, by the admission of Colonel Boutourlin, aid-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander, in his *History of the Campaign of* 1812, that Russia was the first to make preparations for war.*

* "Austria did not stir; Prussia no longer existed; the "Swedes too weak to afford their allies any assistance, could "with difficulty maintain themselves in Stralsund. England, "placed in difficult circumstances, did not seem disposed to "carry on the war with activity. These considerations induced "the Emperor of Russia to urge a reconciliation with the enemy. The famous interview upon the Niemen terminated in "the treaty of peace signed at Tilsit." (Page 21 of the first volume of *the Military History of the Russian Campaign in* 1812, by Colonel Boutourlin, aid-de-camp of his Majesty the

After having dwelt upon the necessity of an alliance with Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey, Mr. de Segur goes on to say: *Austria voluntarily entered into his plans; she however did not act blindly.* She plunged into them with

---

Emperor of Russia, Paris, 1824.) "The Emperor Alexander "could not but be aware of the spirit that guided those dispo- "sitions (of the treaty of Tilsit); but in the unfortunate cir- "cumstances in which Europe was involved, it behoved him at "all hazards to avoid a war. The essential object was to gain "the necessary time for preparing to maintain with due effect "a struggle, which it was well known might recommence at a "future period." (Vol. i. page 24.)

"The sacrifices which the treaty of Presburg had exacted "from Austria were too oppressive to be patiently borne by the "cabinet of Vienna. But the disorganized state of her armies, "an unavoidable consequence of the repeated checks they had "suffered, had until then prevented her from attempting to rea- "lize the plans which she secretly cherished. The Emperor "Napoleon was sincere in his wish of avoiding a fresh war that "would have operated as an untoward diversion in Spain. But "all the steps which he took to bring about a reconciliation "were considered by the Austrians as an avowal of his weak- "ness. She (Russia) could not refuse her aid to France, with- "out an open violation of the engagements entered into with "that empire, the sacredness of which had received from Na- "poleon no infraction. Supposing, however, that the cabinet "of St. Petersburgh, waving those moral considerations for the "sake of the highest political objects, had decided upon giving "its support to Austria, it could not have accomplished it more "effectually, owing to the distance of its armies then engaged "with the affairs of Sweden and of Turkey." (Vol. i. pages 35, 36, and 37.) "The indications of a coldness that began to "shew itself in the intercourse between France and Russia

the hope of aggrandizing herself.* This was not owing to vague promises, but in consequence of a treaty signed on the 14th of March, 1812. Austria had long felt uneasy at the enormous increase

---

" could not escape the Emperor Alexander's penetration.(a) He " felt that the alliance concluded at Tilsit and cemented at Er- " furth, being no longer conducive to Napoleon's interests, " would not be of long duration. From that time he applied " himself to organizing in secret every means of defence which " the immense resources of his extensive dominions enabled " him to dispose of, in order to maintain a struggle, &c." (Vol. i. page 45.)

" The cabinet of St. Petersburgh did not disguise from itself " that under these circumstances it ought to use every means of " compelling the Turks to make peace, in order to direct her " undivided exertions to a war on the western frontier of the " empire." (Vol. i. page 46.)

(a) The only indications of coldness alluded to by Colonel Boutourlin, consist, as he pretends, in the circumstance that *Napoleon had felt shocked at the difficulties thrown, at St. Petersburgh, in the way of his marriage with one of the grand duchesses, and anxiously sought an opportunity to revenge himself, by making the Emperor Alexander feel all the weight of his overwhelming power.* He alledges no other indication.

* " We sought it (the alliance of Austria with France), and " have reflected well before bringing it to a conclusion." (Mr. de Metternich's expressions to Mr. Otto, quoted in the dispatch from this ambassador to the minister for Foreign Affairs, dated Vienna, the 15th of February, 1813.)

" The Emperor Alexander thought it necessary to assume a " defensive attitude without further delay, by collecting the " greater part of his forces upon the western frontier of his em- " pire. A division which had remained in Old Finland, ever " since the last war with Sweden, received orders to march " upon the Dwina. The army of the Danube, which, at the end " of 1810, was nine divisions strong, was reduced to four divi-

of the Russian power, and had caused representations to be made at St. Petersburgh on the sub-

---

"sions; the remaining five were marched upon the Upper "Dniester." (Vol. i. pages 56 and 57.)

"On the day following the signature of the treaty with Prus-"sia, Napoleon sent it to St. Petersburgh, with the proposal of "combining their united endeavors in order to remove the "grounds of the misunderstanding between them."

"It was too well understood by the Emperor Alexander that "the avowed grievances rested only upon objects of an acces-"sory nature; but that the real grounds of the misunderstand-"ing which divided the two empires, could only be removed by "a recourse to arms." (Vol. i. page 71.)

"The Emperor Alexander instantly quitted St. Petersburgh, "and repaired to Wilna, at which place the head-quarters of "the grand army were established; he also sent orders to "Prince Kourakin, the Russian ambassador at Paris, to make "known to the French government that the preservation of "Prussia, and its independence of all political compact directed "against Russia, were the more indispensable to the interests "of the Emperor Alexander, as a solid and permanent good "understanding with France could only be established upon "the basis of there being between her and Russia a neutral "country which would not be under the occupation of the troops "of either power; that the basis therefore of all negotiation "was to be the formal engagement for an entire evacuation of "the Prussian States, and of all the fortresses in that country, "whatever might have been the period or the grounds of their "occupation by French or allied troops. Russia further de-"manded the reduction of the garrison of Dantzig to the footing "on which it stood previously to the 1st January, 1811." (Vol. i. page 72 and 73.)

"Previously to his departure for Dresden, Napoleon had sent "his aid-de-camp, General Count Narbonne to Wilna with pro-"posals of peace. The answer he brought back to Dresden

ject of the armaments on her frontiers; but Russia had taken her determination; the remonstrances were not attended to. Austria dissatisfied, entered into a treaty of alliance with Napoleon; and foreseeing the possibility that the result of the war might bring about the re-establishment of Poland, she demanded the Illyrian provinces as an indemnity for Gallicia; this was conceded to her.

By the same treaty Austria engaged to furnish thirty thousand men. According to Mr. de Segur *she clandestinely prepared prudent instructions for their guidance.* When a fact of this nature is stated, some proof should be exhibited; but there exists no other than his bare assertion. The Austrian general may have been instructed to keep as near as possible to Austrian Poland. What would have become of those *prudent instructions,* if actuated by a feeling of mistrust so foreign to his nature, Napoleon had brought

---

" was, that the Emperor of Russia referred entirely to the com-
" munications made at Paris by his ambassador, and that he
" could only consent to treat upon those preliminary conditions."
(Vol. i. pages 74 and 75.)

" The brilliant fêtes given on this occasion (the meeting at
" Dresden), continued until the return of Mr. de Narbonne from
" Wilna. On the following day, 17 (29) May, Napoleon left
" Dresden, and took the road to Thorn, where he arrived the
" 24th of the same month (5 June). He resolved not to delay
" the campaign any longer, in order not to waste away in fruit-
" less negotiations the most favorable season for military ope-
rations." (Vol. i. pages 76 and 77.)

into Russia the corps of prince Schwartzenberg, and left the Polish army in Poland? No other engagement was entered into than that the Austrian corps should not be divided, and that it should remain under the orders of its own generals, though acknowledging absolute obedience to the immediate orders of the Emperor Napoleon. If a fault was committed in leaving this corps too independent and too near its own frontiers, it was the effect of generosity and of confidence. The same fault might be urged in regard to Prussia; it proceeded from a kindred principle.

"The success of the war in no degree depended "on the cession of Gallicia, or the difficulties "arising from the Austrian jealousy of that pos- "session; Napoleon, consequently, might, on his "entrance into Wilna, have publicly proclaimed "the liberation of the whole of Poland, instead of "betraying the expectations of her people, as- "tonishing and rendering them indifferent by ex- "pressions of wavering import.

There was no necessity for obviating *Austrian jealousy*, since the treaty was a formal one, and since Austria had never given a more complete assent. In case the kingdom of Poland should have been re-established, Austria willingly ceded a considerable portion of Gallicia, with the view of recovering Illyria. The first of these provinces was an acquisition which was the ground of self-reproach to her. Illyria, on the contrary, was an

ancient hereditary country, the loss of which had given to Austria deep regret; this wound was, at all times, fresh to her. Napoleon, faithful to his treaties, could only claim Gallicia in the event of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland as a consequence of the war, in other words, on the conclusion of a peace. He would have been wanting to Austria his ally, who had already felt alarm at seeing an ambassador to the confederation of Poland, if, at the commencement of the war, he had given a sanction, by his expressions, to the re-establishment of that kingdom, an act which would have occasioned the insurrection and forcible re-union of Austrian Gallicia. He was far from temporising, when he allowed the nature of things to take its course, and equally so from yielding to the wishes of the Poles, and saying: *the kingdom of Poland exists*; this would have been equivalent to an acknowledgment of that kingdom. But Napoleon's object was not only to remove from his ally every ground of uneasiness; peace was the aim of war. He would have compromised this aim, had he taken a determination which would have rendered peace impossible. The author shortly after quotes certain expressions of the Emperor possessing this tendency; it was needless therefore for him to seek elsewhere the grounds of his opinion.

The Emperor, generally speaking, feared nothing so much as pledging his future actions, because none knew better the importance of allow-

ing events to grow to maturity; one of the most signal features in his policy was to be always in readiness to take advantage of events at the moment of their occurrence.

Mr. de Segur makes it a reproach to Napoleon that he "neglected to clear the southern Polish "provinces of the feeble hostile armies which "kept the patriotism of their inhabitants in "check."

Could it have been his wish that the Emperor, with all the Russian forces in his front, had extended his right into Podolia, where the Russians were engaged against the Turks? This inadvertency is too striking to require a serious comment.

There is as little correctness in the following sententious reflection, that "such is the weakness "of great men, that they are always led by imita- "tion either of others or of themselves."

Observation on the contrary, had hitherto demonstrated that what stamps the character of *great men*, is the resource of their genius, and that inexhaustible fecundity which always furnishes them with fresh means, either for extricating themselves out of difficulties, or for securing a rapid success.

The author adds in support of his sentence, that "Napoleon committed himself to the fortune "of battles; that he expected every thing from "victory; that instead of sacrificing every thing "to obtain victory, it was by that he looked to "obtain every thing; that he made use of it as a "*means*, when it ought to have been his *end*."

We will not follow Mr. de Segur in the development of this singular opinion which he has sufficient difficulty in presenting in a clear light. We will ask him, however, whether at Wilna, when the sword was drawn, it was not necessary to commit the event to the fate of battles, and whether in war there is any other arbiter of fate than victory? What was it necessary to sacrifice in order to secure this victory? *To sacrifice every thing* is a very vague idea. Does the author well know what he wishes to say? Let him explain himself. Did he wish for a sacrifice of the time which was requisite to complete the insurrection of Poland? He ought to have said so; and since he reasons upon such important events, it behoved him to examine why Napoleon decided to attempt the accomplishment of his expedition in a single year, instead of effecting it in two campaigns. The question is a serious one. It did not even strike the author's mind.

"Success would have probably crowned the "expedition, if the premature decline of his health "had left to the physical constitution of this "great man all the vigour which his mind still "retained."

The excellent health enjoyed by the Emperor at this period could never be doubted for a moment. Independently of the time he gave to business, he bestowed four or five hours in the day to the chase, to reviewing the troops, &c. How are we to qualify this caution on the part of the author, who, fearful of openly attacking the genius of Napoleon, sup-

poses a premature decline of his health, as his own justification for ascribing faults to this great man which he had never committed? He stretches his hero upon the bed of Procustus; and contrary to the custom of historians who delight in elevating the subject of their history, he detracts from the merit of his own hero, places him in faulty, or ridiculous situations, and with the view no doubt of lowering whilst he excuses him, he afterwards pleads illness in his favor. Is this done also in order to acquit the authors of his premature death? Napoleon exhibited in the campaign of Russia as much superiority and activity as he afterwards displayed in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. His constitution must have been very strong, since it was able to withstand during six years the pains of Prometheus.

There are few men possessed of the capacity, the courage, and the time requisite for judging of things as they are and by their effects. It is thought much easier to adhere to received notions. Mr. de Segur who was favored on the one hand with those natural qualities which are particularly inherents in our variable character, and on the other by the influence of a name which his father has illustrated by his talents and by the exalted function confided to him, has determined to write two volumes respecting the Emperor, well assured that the very title of the work would recommend it to many. Those who read with due reflection have easily discovered that he took

for the basis of his system a course entirely at variance with that of writers who have declared themselves the open enemies of Napoleon. With the help of a few oratorical precautions, which he uses as a shelter from the observations of all parties, he began by laying down that all the faults of the Emperor had their origin in his habitual state of ill health.

CHAPTER II.

We run rapidly over the commencement of this very obscure chapter, and over the reflections which the author ascribes to the Emperor, concerning the policy of Prussia with regard to the French republic; we will, nevertheless, examine this subject.

"Whenever he (Napoleon) followed with "his finger the traces of the Prussian fron- "tiers upon the map, he felt angry at seeing them "still so extensive, and * exclaimed: Is it pos- "sible that I have left this man so large a ter- "ritory?"

---

* As Mr. de Segur always aims at creating an effect, it has appeared to him that the word *to exclaim* is more sounding than the ordinary expression, *has said, said;* he therefore makes a constant use of it throughout his work.

Who can have given this information to Mr. de Segur? where has he learnt it? The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace was not in the Emperor's confidence; he never entered his closet. Had he sometimes heard Napoleon conversing about Sovereigns, he would have learnt that he never used such unbecoming expressions towards them; that he never said of a crowned head: *that man*. This expression is indeed of common use in certain societies, when they allude to the Emperor Napoleon. The application he makes of it to the King of Prussia is no doubt the effect of recollection. This prince driven beyond the Elbe, with his estates bordering upon the Baltic, as far as the mouth of the Niemen, was vulnerable in every direction, and it cannot be discovered how he could be an object of Napoleon's envy.

"This aversion to a mild and pacific monarch "was surprising. It is worth while to examine, "the cause of it."

If the King of Prussia was always inclined towards peace, he was equally prepared to make war. Napoleon knew this; he felt therefore but little confidence in this prince, though he had no aversion to him. The author however points out two causes of aversion; the one was the *refusal* given by Louis XVIII. to the proposals made to him through the intervention of the King of Prussia. In 1803, the Prussian cabinet felt that the withdrawing the princes of the house of Bourbon from their existing situation would be con-

ducive to the repose of Europe. With this view he took upon himself to send instructions to Mr. Meyer, the president of the regency of Warsaw, in which city Count de Lille then resided. This prince returned to the proposal in question a noble reply, which is known to every one. How could Napoleon have felt resentment at a proceeding that had not originated with him, to which he had given his consent out of mere deference to his ally, and which, at any rate, could in no manner compromise his authority, since there was not any question as to his rights to the crown of France? Napoleon, however, attached but little importance to that negotiation; the love of Frenchmen and the national interests appeared to him sufficient for the consolidation of his power.

With respect to the other cause, the remonstrances of Prussia on the arrestation of Mr. Rumboldt; this agent, as well as Messrs. Wickham, Drake, Spencer, Smith, etc., availed himself of his character of British Resident in the Hans Towns, in order to foment conspiracies against the first consul. Napoleon had nobly proclaimed his indignation at the violation of the rights of nations in the persons of Irish refugees, who were delivered up by the senate of Hamburgh. He shewed his regard for the same right of nations, by consenting to restore a diplomatic agent to liberty, at the solicitation of the King of Prussia. The proceeding of this monarch, in no manner at variance with the acknowledged principles of the

Emperor, could afford no ground of enmity. If it were not well known that aversion never had the smallest share in the policy of a man so gifted as Napoleon, one might ascribe this feeling to two very different causes; the projects and engagements of Prussia previously to the battle of Austerlitz, and the aggression of that power in 1806. But Mr. de Segur, who writes a history, appears ignorant of all this.

"At the beginning of 1805, however, Russia, "Austria, and England, made ineffectual attempts "to engage Frederick into their third coalition "against France."

A third coalition took place. England persuaded Russia and Austria to join in it. Her object was to drive the French from Germany and Italy, to restore Piedmont to the King of Sardinia, and to deprive France of her allies. The means of the coalition appeared gigantic; five hundred thousand men and immense fleets were to support those pretensions which vanished before the sun of Austerlitz. Thus was dissolved the third coalition, three months after its formation; Austria was compelled to sign a peace; and to the generosity of the conqueror, the Emperor Alexander was indebted for the safety of the remains of his army.

Prussia, who by the treaty of Berlin signed a few months previously to the battle of Austerlitz, had taken part in the league, was indebted to the

talent of Haugwitz her minister, for an offensive and defensive alliance concluded with France.

"The possession of Hanover at first tempted "Frederick; but when the treaty was to be "signed, shame caused him to hesitate. Napo- "leon had no idea of such timid policy." "What," said he, "does this monarch dare neither to make "peace or war, etc.?" Seeing the Emperor only when he crossed the ante-room, and only hearing him occasionally in his public audiences, does the author draw from his imagination or from his recollection the expressions which he attributes to him? If, from recollection, they must have been used in public; and this was not the case.

"It is asserted that at the same time there were "persons, either treacherous or deceived, who "persuaded Frederick that Napoleon was obliged "to shew himself of a pacific disposition, because "that warrior was averse to war; they added that "he was perfidiously treating for peace with Eng- "land, on the terms of restoring Hanover, which "he was to take back from Prussia."

These are the negotiations to which the author seems to allude:

The death of Mr. Pitt had thrown the administration open to Mr. Fox. The ambition of the latter was to restore peace between France and Great Britain; and he took the first steps towards this measure. In February 1806, an active correspondence was set on foot between the two cabinets. There was felt a common wish of opening

negotiations upon honorable basis; but the mode of negotiating was the occasion of misunderstanding. England was desirous of treating conjointly with Russia; and France, considering the third coalition as dissolved, would only treat with England. This difficulty was removed. England gave way, upon the proposal made by France, of adopting as a preliminary basis of the negotiation that each power might intervene in all maritime or continental affairs. This circumstance, and the arrival of Mr. d'Oubril at Paris, on behalf of Russia, determined Mr. Fox to send Lord Yarmouth, with the powers requisite for treating. This Lord held regular conferences with the French cabinet. Every thing was agreed on; England was to keep Malta and the Cape, and to restore every other colony. But, at the moment when the treaty was about to be signed, Fox fell dangerously ill. His dissolution was foreseen, and Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris to retard the negotiation and to break it off. This lord had scarcely arrived when he demanded his passports, unless France would immediately acknowledge the false and novel assertion, that the *uti possidetis* was the basis agreed upon with Lord Yarmouth, with the single exception of Hanover. England would in this manner have preserved all her conquests, and France, who held only Hanover as a conquest upon England, would no longer have been left with any.

Notwithstanding the threats of Lord Lauder-

dale, France refused to acknowledge this basis. During the several conferences, the general principle of the said basis was laid aside, in order to enter fully into the question. But at this time England no longer desired peace, for she entertained hopes of creating a fourth coalition. Already had she by her intrigues prevented the Emperor Alexander from ratifying the treaty signed by his envoy (Mr. d'Oubril), and provoked a misunderstanding between the cabinets of Berlin and of the Tuileries. The mission of Lord Lauderdale, a man of violence, of dexterity, and of little scruple, had chiefly for its object to force a declaration from France regarding Hanover, which might be made available in exciting Prussia against her. The fourth coalition was formed and terminated the negotiations. The enemies of France entertained great hopes from a junction between Prussia, Austria, and England. The Prussian troops had preserved their reputation unimpaired.

In a final conference the French plenipotentiaries urged upon Lord Lauderdale, the following argument: "Suppose Prussia should be beaten, "as Austria has been, and that the Emperor should "be in Berlin three months after the opening of "the campaign, as was the case at Vienna. Will "it not be a source of regret to you, that you "should have allowed the destruction of this "bulwark which was a protection to Hanover, to "Holland, and to the mouths of the Elbe and the

" Weser, all of so much importance to your com-
" merce ? Now the Russians are yet far off; be-
" fore the middle of October, the encounter will
" have taken place between the Prussian army
" covering Berlin, and the French army that de-
" sires to enter it. If, as it is probable, the Prus-
" sian army be defeated, it will be destroyed as
" was the case with the Austrian army; and the
" Russians will not be able to do more for Prus-
" sia after her defeat, than they could do for
" Austria, a monarchy possessed of much more
" ample resources."

Lord Lauderdale felt the justness of these observations. He foresaw so well that the fourth coalition had expired in its very birth, because it ought not to have declared itself until the arrival of the Russians between the Vistula and the Oder, that he asked, " Whether, in case England should " make peace, the Emperor would not march " against Prussia?" He was answered in the affirmative. But the British council of ministers only saw the new risks that France was about to run, and did not calculate the probable issue of the campaign: war with Prussia took place.

Mr. de Segur blames Napoleon *for not having dismembered Prussia.*

A question of so grave a nature, which is disposed of by the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace, with so much facility, would call for a long investigation. If Napoleon shrunk from that dismemberment, he was no doubt actuated by considera-

tions infinitely more important, than the frivolous motives which the author assigns to him, such as *the effect of Alexander's presence, etc.* If the weakness to which Prussia was reduced had the effect of producing in that kingdom so great an exaltation, what would not have been the effect created by its entire dismemberment?

"This vast conspiracy was that of the friends of "virtue. Its head—was *Stein*. Napoleon, perhaps, "might have gained him over to his interests; "but preferred punishing him."

Baron de Stein was an enemy; Napoleon knew it. But he likewise knew that a man of that stamp was above corruption. No choice was left to him; he required that an enemy should be removed from the court of a friendly prince.

"In 1809, the first who had ventured to raise "the standard of independence against Napoleon, "were Prussians. He sent them to the galleys."

Major Schill had infringed the law of nations. In the estimation of the writers and honorable men of every country, Schill and his companions, overrunning a part of Germany, and plundering and destroying the French, at a time when Prussia was at peace with France, were guilty of robberies and murders. Their's was the crime of pirates, who, without letters of marque, or in the stillness of peace, direct their attacks against the vessels of a friendly power. The Emperor *did not send them to the galleys*; they were tried and condemned by legally constituted tribunals. Prussia owed this satisfaction; Prussia herself afforded it.

markable upon this subject. If Alexander chang-

"On the approach of the year 1812, Frederick "uneasy and tired of his subservient position, was "determined to extricate himself by an alliance "or by war. In March 1811, he offered himself "to Napoleon as an auxiliary in the expedition "which was preparing."

No expedition was preparing at this time. Russia was arming herself, and collecting numerous forces upon the Dniester; Prussia who saw that the storm was gathering, sought to shelter herself from danger under the protection of a powerful ally. But France had not yet taken a warlike attitude; explanations were demanded respecting those armaments; negotiations were carrying on. To have accepted the alliance of Prussia would have been an indication of hostile intentions; it would have been a political error. Napoleon therefore did not accept, though he did not refuse it; he kept the good intentions of Prussia in reserve for a favorable occasion.

That Prussia in her anxiety should have secretly treated with Alexander, as is afterwards stated by the author, would prove no more than that the King of Prussia had not understood how much was imposed upon Napoleon by the dictates of prudence.

The author reveals to us a singular anecdote; that ever since 1810 Alexander had been prepared to make a sudden attack upon Napoleon; and Mr. de Segur even tells us something very re-

ed his determination, it was owing to *his anxiety to have* DIVINE JUSTICE *and the opinion of mankind on his side, by not appearing the aggressor.* Mr. de Segur may well suppose that the instigator of the holy alliance intended to deceive mankind; but it was rather too much to suppose that he intended to deceive heaven!

If, when the King of Prussia tendered to the Emperor Alexander his fortified towns and his alliance, he was rejected by that sovereign, as is alleged by the author, what must have been the result? that he would earnestly press his alliance upon France; but this was not the case. It might thence be inferred that the *inferior witness* who quoted the Emperor Alexander's reply to Frederick did not speak the truth. For, we repeat it, had Russia refused the alliance of Prussia, the latter would have perseveringly pressed it upon France. No sooner, however, did Napoleon discover that, in spite of his endeavors to effect a peace, there was every probability of a war, he had to make a choice of two alternatives: the alliance or the destruction of Prussia. He determined upon the alliance with more readiness than Frederick himself. The author allows that this prince hesitated; and he connects with this circumstance the occupation of Pomerania, and the order given to the Prince of Eckmühl *to hold himself in readiness to take immediate possession of Prussia, and to seize the person of her sovereign.*

The occupation of Pomerania was an impolitic act, not resulting from any combination, but simply from the character of the general who undertook it, and from his exaggerated zeal to give effect to the continental system. He believed, upon false reports, that numerous vessels laden with colonial produce had entered Stralsund, and the harbours of the island of Rugen. He saw the opportunity of taking the Swedish government by surprise, and of giving, at the same time, a deep blow to the interests of England. Marshal Davoust invaded those Swedish provinces, without any other orders than his instructions against the British commerce. His acts were not disavowed, because the mischief had been done; a disavowal had afforded no remedy; his excessive zeal pleaded his excuse.

This operation was not in any manner connected with the measures to be taken in order to fix the determination of the court of Berlin. It is not known what are the motives of Mr. de Segur for supposing that an order was given to seize the person of the King of Prussia. He ought to have recollected that after the defection of Yorck's division, Napoleon had twenty thousand men in Berlin, and as many at Potsdam; that the political bias and the spirit of agitation in Prussia might, at this time, have afforded him just grounds for seizing the king as hostage; that he had not so done, but had, on the contrary, given orders to

Augereau, who commanded at Berlin, to shew the highest deference to this monarch.

The Prince of Eckmühl had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to enter Prussia, if the treaty of alliance should not be signed. It was in fact requisite that, in circumstances of so critical a nature, Prussia should be our friend or our enemy, and a refusal of forming an alliance with France ought no longer to leave a doubt of the existence of an intercourse between that power and Russia, the timely prevention of which was called for by the most common prudence, on the eve of an impending war.

"This submission (from Prussia) did not altogether satisfy Napoleon. To his strength he added artifice; his suspicions still led him to covet the occupation of the fortresses, which he was ashamed not to leave in Frederick's hands. He required that every sort of arms should be taken from them which might be of use in an insurrection; he pointed out every thing of the kind, even to the smallest weapon."

We quote this passage merely to shew in what spirit Mr. de Segur has written his work. We will not animadvert upon the words *artifice* and *shame*, used towards a man so powerful as Napoleon, whose character always recoiled against the adoption of such contemptible means. Should even the correctness of those assertions be taken

for granted, prudence would justify that excessive precaution towards a power which afforded no reliance on the sincerity of its friendship. The course of events has demonstrated on the contrary that Napoleon had trusted too much to Prussia when he allowed her to retain a numerous army in Silesia ; and a proof that he did not take any thing away from her, *even to the smallest weapon,* is afforded by the rapidity with which she armed one hundred thousand Landwehr with *reserve* muskets, when Yorck's treachery broke out, and provided them with the requisite artillery.

It was quite natural for the Emperor Napoleon to refuse the twenty-five millions demanded by Prussia at this time through Mr. de Hatzfeld, since that power still owed to France a sum approaching to eighty millions, and was not besides looked upon with any confidence. With respect to the numerous magazines which, by her treaty of the 24th February, she placed at Napoleon's disposal, this was entirely owing to the impossibility she felt of delivering them up to the Russians, for whom they were originally intended.

Those are the facts. The author, for want of knowing them, loses himself in conjectures ; this is the case of every writer who pretends to speak of what is not known to him, and of course of Mr. de Segur who treats of diplomatic subjects without any knowledge of negotiations, and who, for the rest of his work, will speak of the science of strategy, without any knowledge of military tactics.

CHAPTER III.

"RUSSIA commands the heights of Europe; "her government can only with great difficulty "be driven into a straight, and forced to submit "in an almost imaginary space; without the con- "currence of Turkey and Sweden, Russia is less "vulnerable."

If by these expressions the author means to say that Russia can only be attacked by a power in alliance with Sweden and with Turkey, this will be our reply:

Great advantage would no doubt have been derived from an alliance with Sweden, as affording the means of threatening Russia with a dangerous diversion from the north. By the alliance with Turkey an important object would have been attained, that of still keeping her at war with Russia; this war would have operated as a powerful diversion in the south: such was the true nature of the assistance which it would have been important to secure. Whatever the author may allege upon the authority of unfounded reports, nothing was neglected that could effect this object.

When Mr. de Segur says afterwards, that *the most simple soldier in our ranks expected to hear of*

the march of the Grand Vizir towards Kief, he shews himself to have been one of the number. As the Grand Vizir was in front of a Russian army, he must have defeated it repeatedly ere he could march upon Kief. Independently of the treaties concluded with Austria and Prussia (which were the most important), and with the princes of the confederation of the Rhine, negotiations were also carrying on with Sweden and Denmark. With Denmark they succeeded, but not so with Sweden. The negotiation failed with this power, because she imposed a condition, of which honor forbade the acceptance. Success, wherever it was possible, attended our political endeavors. Our alliance with Constantinople was in full force; our only object was to keep it up; and this was effected. It was not an offensive alliance as respects Russia, because England's influence prevailed in the Grand Vizir's camp by a happy stratagem, at the very moment when, in the divan, we appeared certain of success. The Sultan Mahmoud was in the interests of France; he was still in those sentiments, when the news reached him that peace had just been signed by the Grand Vizir. He hesitated a long time in giving his ratification to it. The English had deceived the Grand Vizir, and persuaded him that Count de Narbonne, who was sent to the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, was a negotiator prepared to sign a treaty by which the Porte would be placed at the mercy of Russia. Assurances to that effect, and

even proofs were afforded by British craft; the deceived Vizir deceived the Sultan in his turn.

"The Turkish ambassador was treated with the "greatest distinction in the French camp; he "accompanied Napoleon in all his reviews: the "most flattering attentions were paid to him; "and the Grand Equerry was already treating "with him for an offensive and defensive alliance, "when a sudden attack by the Russians inter- "rupted the negotiation. The ambassador re- "turned to Warsaw, &c.

Mr. de Segur, who is but imperfectly acquainted with facts, who is led on by incomplete notions, and by recollections which are inaccurate and rarely his own, and who besides was at this period a prisoner of war in Russia,* has heard of an ambassador who came from the east to our head quarters. He only names a Turkish ambassador, to whom he ascribes the well merited reception given to another. Had he taken the pains to inform himself previously to recording a circumstance, he would have learnt the following facts:

Mirza Rizza, a man of eminent merit and of the highest distinction at the court of Tehran, arrived at Finkenstein on the 25th April, 1807, in quality of ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor Napoleon. The Duke of Bassano was

* He was taken prisoner in December 1806, whilst preparing quarters for the Emperor, in the village of Nasielk.

commissioned to negotiate with him the conditions of an offensive and defensive alliance between France and Persia; and the negotiation was brought, after a few days, to a successful issue. This was the ambassador who *accompanied Napoleon in his reviews;* to him it was that *the most flattering attentions were paid.* On the 7th May, he departed on his return to Persia. The circumstance of a Persian embassy, was sufficiently novel, and an alliance between France and Persia sufficiently important to deserve some mention. The event engaged the attention of all Europe, with the exception of Mr. de Segur, who neither found any impression of it in his historical knowledge, nor turned for information to cotemporary documents. Had he but read the bulletins, which should, at least, be consulted by an author who gives an account of a war, he would have discovered that omission*. This fact proves Mr. de Segur's inattention in writing history. Some persons having noticed how unfavorably, in the course of his work, the author treats the minister who was, at that time, commissioned to negotiate

* Sixty-third bulletin. Elbing, 8th May, 1807. The Persian ambassador has received his audience of leave; he brought splendid presents to the Emperor in the name of his sovereign, and in exchange he received the Emperor's portrait which was most brilliantly set. He returns to Persia direct. He is a personage of great consideration in his own country, and a man of great wit and discernment. His return home had become necessary, &c. &c.

with Mirza Rizza, imagined that he refrained from alluding to the Persian ambassador, in order not to name the French negotiator in a circumstance which afforded no opportunity for saying any thing in disparagement of him. Had this mission been confided to the Grand Equerry who for a long time bestowed his protection upon the *marechal-des-logis* of the palace, by whom he is now protected in return, Mirza Rizza might have been honored with some notice.,

Three weeks had elapsed since the Persian ambassador left the head quarters, when the Turkish ambassador arrived there (the 27th May).

Early in the year 1807, the Porte sent Emin Wahib Effendi to conclude a treaty of alliance with France. This envoy was for a long time engaged at Warsaw in fruitless negociations with M. de Talleyrand. The Emperor, anxious to bring about some result, made this ambassador come to Finkenstein, where he arrived eight days after the Emperor's departure from those head-quarters. The Duke of Vicenza was instructed to confer with him, but could not succeed any better in the negotiation. The Emperor determined to speak to him ; but feeling vexed at the limited understanding of this envoy, and having no time to spare for useless conferences, he sent him back to Caulaincourt.

The Emperor quitted Finkenstein, and the ambassador followed the Duke of Vicenza and the minister for foreign affairs to Dantzig. After three

days of conferences in this city, as unproductive of any result as the preceding ones, the Duke of Vicenza left Dantzig to rejoin the head-quarters, and Emin Wahib was sent on to Paris.

The mission of this Turk, who proved to be a man of no capacity, and the choice of whom, there was reason to suspect, was owing to Russian influence, had for its object to obtain that France should bind herself not to enter into any treaty with Russia without the concurrence of Turkey. In vain was it represented to him that France could not bind herself in this manner; that nothing but obstacles and difficulties could spring out of such a complicated policy; that, from the friendly intercourse subsisting between the two empires, Turkey ought to rely upon France for the protection of her interests: Wahib Effendi remained unmoved. Napoleon finished by telling him, at a private audience: "You are wrong; the "Emperor Alexander has already caused propo- "sals of peace to be laid before me. If you will "not come to some arrangement, I will make "peace with him and leave you out of the ques- "tion." This was the only thing that the Ottoman envoy appeared to understand. He offered to dispatch a courier to Constantinople for instructions; but the events were hurrying on; and the victories of Heilsberg and Friedland were soon followed by the peace of Tilsit. The Emperor was anxious to draw closer the bonds of alliance between Turkey and France, since he had desired

to have the Turkish ambassador near him, and used all his endeavors to bring the negotiations to an issue. If they proved unavailing, the cause can only be found in the selection of the envoy.

The alliance with Russia, moreover, and the deposition of Selim, which occurred at the same time (29th May), gave a new direction to Napoleon's policy, and were sufficient reasons to create a coolness on his part towards Turkey.

"But a deputation had just come from Wilna, "soliciting the restoration of their national inde- "pendence, and professing the same devotion to "his cause as had been shewn by Warsaw, etc."

The Prince of Eckmülh entertained those deputies; and the Duke de Bassano, to whom they were referred by the Emperor, acted the part of an honest man towards them, in preventing their being observed by the Russians, in undeceiving them in respect to the hopes they had formed, and persuading them to return back in all haste to their constituents, who, in consequence of a proceeding unattended with any result, would have exposed themselves to the resentment of their sovereign. In the year 1812, they loudly avowed the gratitude which they owed to this minister.

"The Emperor of France continued, there- "fore, to negotiate with Russia; and the Turkish "Ambassador, neglected and forgotten, wandered "about our camp, without being summoned to "take any part in the negotiations which were "about to terminate the war. He returned to

" Constantinople soon after, in great displea-
" sure."

No Turkish Ambassador had remained in our camps. The one who had returned to Paris was soon apprized of Sultan Selim's deposition, and took the road back to Constantinople. The death of a prince puts an end to the powers of his ambassador. The latter could not feel dissatisfied with the French government, since the loss of his powers was wholly independent of France. It is well known to every one that this is always the case. Selim was deposed on the 29th May; he could not, on the 7th July, have had a plenipotentiary as a party to the treaty of Tilsit.

" If we must even tell the whole truth, it is as-
" serted that, at the interview at Tilsit and sub-
" sequently, a treaty for the partition of Turkey
" was under discussion."

In writing a history, an author should undoubtedly disguise nothing; but he ought not to repeat any assertions that are devoid of foundation; now it is false that there ever was any question at Tilsit respecting the partition of Turkey.

" So much is certain, that, shortly after the
" interview at Tilsit, Alexander's ambition was very sensibly moderated."

What is certain is, that ideas of partitioning the Ottoman empire were broached long subsequently to Tilsit, and discussed between France and Russia. France renounced them entirely as soon as a misunderstanding began to spring up between

the two countries. The words attributed by Mr. de Segur to the Emperor, are either invented by himself, or by those persons whom he consulted.

The same obversation applies to the speeches quoted in the following pages. General Sebastiani who is made to perform a part, and Napoleon, knew the geography of Europe too well, to draw the partition in the manner stated by Mr. de Segur, or to observe that the *Emperor Alexander would be allowed to take possession of Turkey as far as the Danube*; as if Wallachia and Moldavia were in Turkey, and as if Turkey were not altogether on this side of the Danube.

Mr. de Segur has the laudable custom of following the example of the great historical writers of antiquity, who put speeches into the mouths of their heroes which are justly admired for their elegance and brilliancy; he has thereby acquired, with a few complaisant friends, the surname of the Thucydides and the Tacitus of modern times. This is assuredly a great and an uncommon eulogium; but according to us, not a well merited one. Independently of the eloquence and elevation for which their harangues were remarkable, those historians took especial care to state what was founded upon truth, justice, and sound reasoning, as well as appropriate to the character and the position of the personages in their history. Mr. de Segur does not appear to have profited by the study of his models.

In one of those private conversations, which the

author attributes to Napoleon, after supposing to him the intention of uniting Spain to France, he makes him use these expressions: *As for Joseph, I will indemnify him.* Does the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace endeavour by this insinuation to convey a belief that Napoleon intended to seize upon Austria, in order to assign it over to his brother?

"The congress of Erfurt took place just after "this. Napoleon was therefore anxious to make "sure of the disposition of Alexander, to conclude "an alliance offensive and defensive with him, &c."

Such, according to the author, would be the motives of the interview at Erfurt, which he calls a congress. It had been positively agreed upon between the two sovereigns at Tilsit, that they should meet again after the expiration of a twelvemonth. That interview was rendered the more necessary, owing to the bombardment of Copenhagen by the English, the events in Spain, and the fresh encroachments made upon the independence of neutral flags by the British Orders in Council (of November, 1807) Its object was purely to come to an understanding as to the means of compelling England to make peace; this was the constant aim of Napoleon's efforts.

"Obliged to keep terms with Alexander, sen- "sibly grieved at the death of Selim, and full of "detestation of the barbarity of the Mussulmans, "and of contempt for their unstable government, "Napoleon had not for three years returned a re- 'ply to the Sultan, and appeared not to acknow-

"ledge him. He was in this position.....when "all of a sudden on the 21st March 1812, etc."

It would appear that Sultan Mahmoud was not acknowledged by Napoleon, and that *for the last three years up to the 21st of March* 1812, *no reply had been returned to him.* And yet there was a French embassy at Constantinople, and an Ottoman embassy at Paris. How will Mr. de Segur account to us for these friendly relations between sovereigns who did not acknowledge each other? Can he inform us how it happens that no answer should have been returned for three years to a government which was treated with by the means of ambassadors?

Mr. de Segur was not with the army in 1807, when the Persian Ambassador was seen by every one at Finkenstein. In Paris, his functions of *maréchal-des-logis* did not require of him any service at the palace. A stranger to what was going on, whether in the cabinet or in the circles of the Tuileries, it is quite excusable that he should be ignorant on the most simple points. He cannot, however, be excused for having neglected to inform himself of them, when he assumed the task of writing a history. If he had but taken the trouble to open the almanack, he would have found in it that we had General Sebastiani at Constantinople in 1808 and 1809, and Mr. de Latour Maubourg in 1810, 1811, and 1812; and that Mouhib Effendi was ambassador at Paris during the above period. The latter did not succeed

until the early part of 1812, in obtaining his recall, which he had himself solicited. Having received every mark of attention in France, his feelings towards us, which, in the first years, had been unfavorable, were so entirely changed at the time of his departure, that, upon his arrival at Constantinople, he proved, in the Divan, the zealous supporter of the closest union between the two powers. His political views were so well known, that Sultan Mahmoud, who likewise entertained them, gave him admission into the council, in which the ratification of the treaty of Bucharest was discussed, although, notwithstanding this assistance, the influence of the Mufti and of the Janissaries prevailed.

" It can hardly be supposed that Napoleon was " ignorant of the invariable custom of the Mus- " sulmans, which prevented the Grand Signor " from ever appearing in person at the head of " his army."

What could not have been *supposed* is the ignorance of the author on a historical point which it was so easy to clear up. If he had taken the trouble to open the history of the Ottoman empire, he would have found that from Otman, first emperor of the Turks, down to Mahmoud the reigning sovereign, fourteen sultans have commanded in person their armies (*), and that a sultan per-

---

(*) Otman I, in 1299 Selim I, in 1512
Orchan II, 1325 Soliman I, 1520

forms, according to his faith, a meritorious action, which raises him in the estimation of his subjects, when he tears himself away from the pleasures of the seraglio, in order to lead his troops against the infidels.

Every thing that is stated by Mr. de Segur regarding Turkey is as correct as may be expected from a historian who is even ignorant of what may be found in almanacks.

CHAPTER IV.

This chapter, which has reference to our relations with Sweden and with Bernadotte, contains some correct facts. But as the author possesses no positive information upon any subject, and only writes from hearsays, without taking the trouble to enquire into them, he frequently falls into mistakes. And yet when an author is relat-

---

Amurat I,	1359	Mahomet III,	1595
Bajazet I,	1389	Osman I,	1617
Mahomet I,	1413	Amnrat IV,	1622
Amurat II,	1421	Soliman II,	1687
Mahomet II,	1451	as far as Sophia in Bulgaria	
Bajazet II,	1481	Mustapha II,	1695

ing contemporary facts, it is not expecting too much of him, that he should, at least, make himself tolerably acquainted with what has taken place.

"In the course of the same night, ten de-
"puties of the council of five-hundred, held a
"secret meeting at the house of S——; thither
"Bernadotte repaired. They agree that, at nine
"o'clock on the next morning, the council should
"open its sittings, to which those only should be
"invited who were of their own way of thinking;
"that it should be therein decreed, that, in imita-
"tion of the council of ancients, which had pru-
"dently named Bonaparte general of its guard,
"the council of five-hundred selects Bernadotte
"to command theirs; and that the latter, properly
"armed, should be in readiness to be summoned
"to it. It was at S——'s house that this plan was
"formed. S—— himself immediately afterwards
"ran to Napoleon, and disclosed the whole. A
"threat from the latter was quite sufficient to keep
"the conspirators in order; not one of them dared
"show his face at the council, and the next day
"the revolution of the 18th brumaire was com-
"pleted."

It was on the 18th, and not on the 17th, that the council of ancients conferred upon general Bonaparte the command of the troops of the first military division, which included the guard of the legislative body. The council of five-hundred had no private guard, any more than the council of ancients. There existed, therefore, no command

to be bestowed upon Bernadotte. Mr. de Segur is even ignorant of the date of an event which formed the foundation of the power of Bonaparte, of whom he has constituted himself the historian.

After speaking of Bernadotte's conspiracy in the west, he adds: "This time Bernadotte was lost, "had Napoleon been able to convict him of it."

The first consul was possessed of more proofs than were necessary for putting Bernadotte upon his trial. He kindly yielded to the entreaties of Joseph and his wife; he forgot every thing. As for Bernadotte, he could not forgive to Napoleon this act of mercy. There are men who can only feel hatred, and a desire of doing injury, in return for the favors conferred upon them.

"Fortune favored Bernadotte, who was already "at Rochefort, by delaying his embarkation* un- "til the war with England was renewed. He "then refused to go, and Napoleon could no longer "compel him."

Fortune helping to delay an "*embarcation*," what a style! it is no doubt for the sake of a rhetorical figure that the author substitutes small vessel for *the act of embarking*. It is exchanging the cause for the effect. We must also no doubt ascribe to a mere figure of rhetoric, his assertion that the British declaration of war took away from

* The expression in the original is "*embarcation*" (which literally means a large boat or a small vessel). It should have been *embarquement*.—TRANSLATOR.

Napoleon the power of enforcing the obedience of one of his generals. The truth is, that Napoleon, seeing that the war was springing up, felt the necessity of retaining general Bernadotte in France, and would not, by sending him to America, expose him to be captured by the enemies who were already spread over the sea.

"Napoleon was soon heard to reproach Bernadotte with his envious and treacherous inaction during the battle of Auerstadt, his order of the day at Wagram...Bernadotte, on his part, demanded why Napoleon had placed him in so dangerous and false a position; why the report of that victory had been so unfavorable to him? etc."

Placed by the Emperor at Dornburgh, on the occasion of the battle of Auerstadt, Bernadotte, from a jealousy against Marshal Davoust, and without any motive in which Napoleon was concerned, would not assist his colleague in gaining the victory; and in this manner he compromised the fate of the battle. By an order of the day, at variance with the truth which had been witnessed by the whole army, he bestowed extravagant praises upon the Saxon corps under his orders at Wagram, although it had exhibited a timorous conduct. Napoleon contented himself with correcting the misrepresentation of facts; this was his duty; he ought even to have punished so insolent a conduct. He had not placed Bernadotte in a more false position than Massena. They both

occupied the left, where, through the fault of the Saxon troops, a sudden manœuvre of the enemy was on the point of succeeding. Napoleon, by a change of front along the whole line, came to the assistance of Bernadotte and Massena, and succeeded in restoring order.

" Bernadotte also felt that he owed his crown to " chance, which made him of the same religion as " the Swedes."

Who can be ignorant that in France Bernadotte openly professed the Roman Catholic religion, and that he was compelled, on his arrival at Gottenburgh, to make abjuration of it, and in a solemn ceremony to adopt the Lutheran religion. The following expression is even attributed to him: " Henry IV. consented to go to mass in order to recover a kingdom; I may well do without mass in order to acquire one."

There is a want of accuracy in the details given by Mr. de Segur concerning Bernadotte's elevation to the throne. The truth is as follows:—At the time of the evacuation of Pomerania by the Swedes in 1807, the two brothers, Mörner, officers in the regiment of that name, having been taken prisoners, were presented to Bernadotte, who assigned his own residence for their prison, and after the lapse of about one month sent them back to Sweden. In June 1810 one of those officers, at this time a colonel, causes himself to be announced to Bernadotte, who resided at Paris, in the rue d'Anjou, requests a private conversation

with him, and communicates that a few Swedes have fixed their views upon him, to replace the Prince Royal who had just died of apoplexy. Bernadotte receives this overture with a smile, and without attaching any importance to it; and until it be communicated to him in a more serious manner, determines not to take any steps towards the French government on the subject. He is visited four or five days afterwards by the Swedish minister in Paris (baron Lagerbielke), who confirms what colonel Mörner had said to him, and solicits his answer. This was on a Saturday; Bernadotte proceeds on the following day to St. Cloud, previously to the levy, and communicates all that had passed to the Emperor, who said to him: "I know every thing; I leave you at liberty to refuse or to accept, and will agree to whatever you think proper. I certainly had other views, and had commissioned Alquier to propose a regency, and wait for the issue of events. The son of the late king might have been recalled at a later period; but Sweden will no longer have this family. Accept, therefore, the offer made to you; I prefer seeing you there than any one else; you shall have the support of my consent. Take your measures accordingly." Bernadotte dispatches to Stockholm a young man, a relation of Signeul the Swedish consul, to confer with his adherents, and authorises to promise any sum of money that may be required. Nothing however was given; the fifteen hundred thousand francs advanced by

the Emperor, and the loan of about a million from General Gerard, were the only sums that were lodged by Bernadotte into the bank of Sweden, instead of the fourteen millions which had been promised by him.

In conclusion, the choice of the Swedes was not promoted by any intrigue; they fixed their thoughts upon Bernadotte, only because he was allied to the Emperor, because they were ignorant of the secret misunderstanding which the envious disposition of this general had created between him and the Emperor, and because they thought of securing in this manner the favor and protection of the French sovereign.

"At the reading of a letter conceived in this "new and unexpected style, Bonaparte was seized "with rage and astonishment. He exclaimed, "striking violently on the letter, and on the table "upon which it lay open: He, the rascal! he pre- "sume to give me advice! to dictate the law to me! "to dare propose such an infamous act to me! "etc. From that moment his instructions to his "minister bore the impress of that disposition; "the latter, it is true, softened the bitterness of "them; but a rupture became inevitable."

When Mr. de Segur talks of negotiation, he confounds every thing. The language which he attributes to the Emperor is absurd. The measures he ascribes to his cabinet are not those that were resorted to. He places at the commencement of the negotiations, the proposal of the cession of

Norway, which was only the last act of it. It would appear to have reached the Emperor whilst he was in Paris, whereas he only received it upon his departure from Dresden for the expedition to Russia. It is well known to every one that the diplomatic communications of the minister for foreign affairs were accompanied by others of a confidential nature, of which the princess royal, with a truly French feeling, consented to be the channel. She wrote under the minister's dictate, and she had for couriers the very officers about her person. A final letter which, after fresh exhortations, announced all the wished for concessions, was forwarded to Sweden in the care of Mr. de Signeul, Swedish consul general at Paris, who was selected and dispatched on the occasion. This agent, on his return from his mission, gave an account of it to the minister, at Dresden, on the 29th May. He had brought back a note dictated by the prince royal, who made the alliance of Sweden depend solely upon the guarantee of Norway to her. Bernadotte was thus deceiving Alexander, with whom he had concluded a treaty two months before this period. Napoleon was in his closet, when he received the letter from his minister: "I will not purchase a doubtful ally, at the expense of a faithful friend." This plain statement is perhaps more interesting, it is certainly more true, and less at variance with probability, than the violent anger of which Mr. de Segur has so well invented the effusions.

We cannot dwell too strongly upon the author's evident ignorance of the temper of the Emperor, whom he always represents to us as giving vent to an ungovernable passion in indiscreet and misplaced expressions. It is repugnant to our feelings to suspect Mr. de Segur's good faith; we willingly believe that, if he had approached this prince, and heard him converse with his ministers, he would not have made a violent madman of him who had every command of himself in matters of importance, and whose profound penetration shed over a question a sudden light, the effect of which was to present the question in its true and proper colors.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

" NAPOLEON meanwhile was still at Paris, in the "midst of his great officers, who were alarmed at " the terrible encounter which was preparing."

We will now find the great officers remaining silent, and immediately afterwards the same officers speaking, or rather made by Mr. de Segur to speak out. How could he have heard them? He could neither have access to the cabinet nor to the councils; his place was no further than the anteroom of the palace.

The first person brought forward is Cambaceres, who wishes that Napoleon should, before undertaking any other measure, *subject and partition the states immediately around him*;' he probably means the confederation of the Rhine, and a part of Prussia, with which an alliance had just been contracted. Such language directed to the Emperor could only be supposed to proceed from a madman, and to be addressed to a person as little gifted with wisdom; but Mr. de Segur is not at all impeded by these difficulties. He as-

cribes a reply to Napoleon which the latter could neither have uttered nor have dreamt of; that *such had been his project in* 1809, *but that the misfortune of Essling had deranged his plan.* True it is that, after the *misfortune of Essling*, Napoleon must have bestowed all his attention to repairing his losses and defeating the enemy. But, on the day after the victory of Wagram, the plan was much more easy of execution than on the eve of the battle of Essling. That victory was complete; the Austrians had only the remains of an army left; their dispersed landwehr refused to return to their arms; the Archduke Charles was thrown back upon Bohemia, and the Archduke John upon Moravia; their communication with Hungary was about to be entirely intercepted, and a battle might drive them to their extreme western frontiers; disaffection had rapidly gained ground; and the people of the Austrian dominions, fatigued of so many wars undertaken without necessity and carried on without glory, had reached such a state of indifference as to behold intuitively and without dread the dissolution of the monarchy by a separation of the states which composed it. Such was the internal situation of Austria: externally, she was without allies upon the continent. The day, however, which followed the battle of Wagram, the Emperor consents to an armistice, because there has been too much effusion of blood, and because he desires

peace *. He had, therefore, no wish to *subject and partition the states immediately around him*, and he could not have said in 1812 that in 1800 he had entertained this plan.

" At the time of the peace of Tilsit he had, by " the intervention of Murat, endeavored to con- " nect himself with Russia by marriage; but the " refusal of the Russian Princess, and her preci- " pitate union with the Duke of Oldenburgh, had " decided the Emperor upon marrying an Aus- " trian Princess."

Murat's influence was useless. If Napoleon, whose intercourse with the Emperor Alexander was soon upon a footing of intimacy, did not think proper, in their long conferences together, to throw out any hints respecting a family alliance, he had with him the Prince of Benevento, who, by his close acquaintance with Prince Kourakin, was the fittest man for exploring the subject. But the Russian Princess was not refused at Tilsit, where she could not have been asked in marriage; for, at this period, there had not yet been any question of divorce. It was only a long time afterwards, that a daring attempt of Fouché excited some suspicions about it in the public mind. It was not spoken of in 1809, on the occasion of the *precipi-*

* In front of Znaim, at the moment when Prince John of Lichtenstein came to propose an armistice, Bessières strongly urged Napoleon to give battle: No, replied the Emperor, enough of blood has been shed; and he signed the armistice.

late marriage of the Grand Dutchess of Oldenburgh, a precipitancy not at all connected with any contemplated marriage of the Emperor Napoleon. He was acquainted with the resolute character of this princess, which would have been sufficient to oppose his entertaining any idea of uniting himself to her. If, besides, he had had such a thought, there was nothing to prevent his making the proposal at Erfurt, at a time when the intercourse of the two sovereigns had generated a friendship between them.

When the divorce was decided upon in 1810, Napoleon turned his thoughts to the Grand Dutchess Ann. To suppose, that if the Grand Dutchess Catherine had been refused to him, he would have solicited the hand of the sister, is to form a very false idea of his character. The negotiation, which was set on foot at this period, had not a successful result. The Emperor Alexander asked for some delay to obtain his mother's consent; but another negotiation commenced at the same time with the Austrian ambassador at Paris, had completely succeeded. In this manner the evasions of Russia brought the Emperor to marry an Austrian princess.

"The pride of Napoleon was still wounded by "the refusal which Russia had made of his hand "in 1807; since he had exposed himself to a war "by dispossessing the Russian Princess of Olden- "burgh of her duchy."

There are as many errors as words in this alle-

gation. We have explained what credit is due to that pretended refusal; it is needless we should point out the ridicule of supposing that Napoleon was induced by an exasperated feeling to include Oldenburgh in the thirty-second military division. The author himself adds immediately afterwards that "all those passions which so despotically "govern other men possessed but a feeble influ- "ence over so firm and comprehensive a genius. "(Napoleon's)."

What, then, can be the meaning of the preceding passage?

The geographical position of the Duchy of Oldenburgh made it necessarily share the fate of the Hans-Towns by which it is circumscribed. The continental system, established by the treaty of Tilsit, could only prove of effectual annoyance to England, in so far as it was carried into complete effect by closing every port against British commerce; and yet the whole of Germany was supplied with English merchandize by the Baltic and North Seas. The possession of Oldenburgh having been guaranteed to the Duke by the treaty of Tilsit, the Emperor offered as an indemnity for it the principality of Erfurt and the Seignory of Blankenhayn; but this exchange was refused on the plea of its not being an adequate equivalent. Russia eagerly seized this fresh pretence for a rupture, and addressed to the ministers of the courts of Europe a protest, which, in its form no

less than in its real tendency, was a serious offence offered to an ally.

Nothing, besides, could be more easy than to come to a fair understanding in respect to the Duchy of Oldenburgh. But Russia, instead of frankly meeting the question according to the spirit of the system that so closely united the two empires, availed herself with eagerness of this opportunity, to disguise her intention of coming to a rupture with France, and of yielding to the influence of England.

"An obvious fact, was enough to hurry him, "sooner or later, into that decisive struggle—that "was, the existence of an empire, which rivalled "his own in greatness, etc. It was evident that "war alone could decide this awful contention— "this great and eternal struggle of the poor "against the rich, etc."

The author had already stated that the origin of the war had reference to England, and to the necessity of maintaining the continental system, as the only means of forcing the British cabinet into a peace. If to this real cause he added that the result of such a war would be productive of advantage to Europe and of glory to the Emperor, whom it would proclaim as the defender of civilization against barbarism, he would be understood by men of candor. But when such important interests are under discussion, what can be the meaning of that vague, and rather silly declama-

tion, notwithstanding its philosophical pretention; that this war was *the struggle of the poor against the rich?*

"The Grandees who formed the court of Napolion were alarmed at this additional war."

Those great officers are the ministers of the treasury and of finances, whom it was rather strange to confound with the courtiers. The author, conformably to his plan, causes them to speak out. The one Count Mollien, says that *his finances required repose;* a very insignificant expression from so exact a man. The other, the Duke of Gaeta, declares that never *had the state of his revenues been more flourishing.* How are the two opinions to be reconciled? To be sure, the Duke of Gaeta, who understood his business so well, is going to speak about rations of bread and forage like a minister of war, and of tar, masts and tow, like a minister of marine. How admirably contrived! But the best invention is that of which the author gives all the credit to the Emperor. His allies, and not his enemies, shall be made to pay the expenses of the war. The nature of the invention may be easily perceived, and no less so its absurdity. The allies of Napoleon were Prussia, who still owed him considerable sums, and from which he had nothing to ask, Denmark, who had nothing to give, and Austria, who would have resisted any attempt.

"It was that perhaps which drew upon him the reproach of availing himself of a method he had

" rejected in the Austrian war, and of which the " celebrated Pitt had set the example in 1793."

Does the author mean thereby to insinuate that Napoleon reckoned upon a measure which, although sometimes resorted to in politics, is disowned by morality? History no doubt reproaches the memory of Frederick the Great and of Pitt, with their want of scruple in this respect. In our days we have seen certain agents who, unknown to their employers, have carried on those dark practices. Napoleon's proud character always recoiled at the exercise of similar frauds. If he had intended to circulate false Russian bank notes in Russia, nothing could have been more easy to a man who held one half of Europe at his disposal, and who had more than one point of contact with the Russian dominions. The author who shortly afterwards says that Napoleon did not resort to this measure, was therefore perfectly free to leave the subject unnoticed. One might be inclined to believe that he was unwilling to lose the opportunity of aspersing the hero of his history.

CHAPTER II.

"PRINCE Poniatowski, however, to whom this "expedition appeared to hold out the prospect of "a throne, generously united his exertions with "those of the Emperor's ministers, to demonstrate "its danger. He depicted Lithuania as an im- "practicable desert; its nobility as already be- "come half Russian, etc."

The opinion of Prince Poniatowski was entirely different from that which the author attributes to him. He must have been quite unacquainted with Lithuania, had he described it as a desert and rugged country. What a desert in fact is the rich and fertile Samogitia, which forms part of the government of Lithuania! Had not the author made the campaign of Russia, he might then have credit for sincerity. The prince knew too well that the whole of Lithuania had remained heartily attached to Poland as the mother country; and Mr. de Segur himself notices the arrival at Tilsit *of a deputation from Wilna* coming *to solicit of him* (Napoleon) *the restoration of their national independence, and professing the same devotion to his cause as had been shewn at Warsaw.* It is not surprising that the *maréchal-*

des-logis of the palace, having only vague notions, should alternately contradict his own assertions. But since he pretends to write history, how does it happen that he should not have endeavoured to know the truth, and especially to avoid falling into repeated contradictions with himself?

"He once more addressed himself to three of his great officers."*

The author gives us in this place the minutes of a kind of council of his own invention, where the actors he exhibits are made to speak according to his own fancy. This will be found to be an indifferent copy of a passage in the dialogue between Eucrates and Sylla, which he uses without stating from whence it is derived; and which is certainly the most entertaining of this part of the work. When he afterwards causes one of his three personages to speak out respecting the bad condition of the army, he does not record any answer of Napoleon on so essential a subject. No doubt he thought that the Emperor had sufficiently answered it by the result of the first battle. The reader, however, may easily appreciate the importance which Mr. de Segur endeavors to ascribe to the advices of those three personages. One of them, the Duke de Frioul, had twice performed the journey from St. Petersburgh to Memel with dispatches. Allowing the possibility of knowing

* The Duke de Frioul, the Count de Segur (the author's father), the Duke de Vicenza.

a country by travelling express through it, the Duke de Frioul could have only become acquainted with Esthonia, Ingria, and Livonia, which, properly speaking, are no part of Russia. Another, the Count de Segur,* must have known the Russian monarchy and its politics in the days of Catherine; but his ideas, belonging as they did to a period so remote, were not applicable to existing circumstances. As for the third personage, (the Duke of Vicenza), he had been residing at St. Petersburgh many years; his opinion would have carried more weight, had not Napoleon been well aware of his predilection for the Russians.

After endeavoring to establish the resemblance between the expedition of St. Louis to Africa, and that of Napoleon to Russia, the author adds: "the "latter was indispensable to the completion of a "great design on the point of being accomplished; "its object was not out of reach; the means "for reaching it were not inadequate." Strange conclusion of a chapter, the whole object of which was to prove the contrary. *The great design on the point of being accomplished,* was to force a peace upon England by the continental system. To say that *its completion was indispensable,* that *the object was not out of reach,* that *the means for reaching it was not inadequate,* is tantamount to a justification, in every point of view, of that great undertaking. This, nevertheless, is not Mr. de Segur's motive for writing his work.

* The author's father.

CHAPTER III

We have just seen Napoleon at variance with his great dignitaries, his ministers, his great officers; we will now see "*that mysterious man,* giv- "ing *to his features, so formidable to multitudes,* "the expression *of a mild and affecting benevolence,* "yielding *to the impulse of the most frank and con-* "*fiding disclosure,* addressing you *with a caressing* "*voice,* exercising *a kind of magnetic influence* "*over the military man, over a minister* of high* "*rank under the ancien regime, cutting matters* "*short with superficial and inexperienced indivi-* "*duals, before whom he neither wished to explain* "*himself nor to dissemble, and saying to them:* "*You understand nothing of all this; you are ig-* "*norant of its antecedents and its consequents.*"

We would be inclined to believe that the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace reckons himself in the number of those who assisted at the council; for the latter expression cannot apply to any one more appropriately than to the author of the campaign of 1812.

Next in turn come the princes of the empress Josephine's family, and cardinal Fesch who is se-

* Count Molé.

verely rebuked for his obstinacy in refusing to see a star at mid-day.

These personages are made to speak according to the fancy of the author, who attributes speeches to Napoleon which no one heard him utter, and he less than any one, since he rarely approached the Emperor. This prince always unmoved at the sight of the greatest dangers, and more indefatigable than ever, is represented in this chapter, as being pre-occupied with the idea of his own death, and as already experiencing so great a decline of strength as to have a difficulty in enduring the *shortest field sports, even the gallop of the most gentle horse.*

At the moment of telling us "that one great inquietude possessed Napoleon: *it was the idea of* "*his death,*" the author shews us "the emperor's "intellect as both too strong and too enlightened "to permit such vast events to depend upon a "weakness."

Whilst he exhibits him as determined upon a war "to consolidate the fabric of the great empire, "by driving back the Russian power beyond the "Boristhenes," and makes him say "that peace "was to be conquered at Constantinople, that is "to say at the extremity of Europe," (take notice of this charitable insinuation), he represents him as adding, "*that in going to Russia it was the* "*English alone whom he meant to attack; that the* "*campaign would be short; that afterwards France* "*would be at rest.*"

Whilst presenting to our view " his precipita-
" tion in commencing this dreadful war," he shews him as *making up his mind to it only after a course of painful hesitation,* and when he breaks out in the audience of the 3rd August, 1811, " that burst " of indignation, which was the presage of war, was " an additional proof of his repugnance to com-" mence it—and a menace by which he imagined " he might arrest the preparations of Alexander."

The reflecting reader will hurry over those pages which afford him no information, except that the author does not even know to what opinion he is to adhere.

In order to conclude by an attractive incident, he relates that singular dialogue between Napoleon and an ambassador just returned from the seat of his mission, where he had not observed the preparations made by Russia, although they commanded the attention of all Europe. " And you too have " become a Russian. You have been seduced by the " Emperor Alexander—Yes, Sire, because I view in " him a Frenchman." Napoleon would have been justified in charging M. de Vicenza of being a Russian, had this minister thought like Alexander; but is it probable, that the minister should have confessed that *he had been seduced,* and that, during his stay at St. Petersburgh, he had found a French Emperor in the Emperor of Russia? The author, however, who does not feel sensible of the improbability and the ridicule of the anecdote, fancies that he is writing a history.

CHAPTER IV.

In a chapter of five pages, devoted to the negotiation which had in view to bring the two parties together, and to prevent a war, the author exhibits Napoleon as *preserving the secret of his own embarrassment;* and does not perceive that he who deliberates has not come to a decision of being the aggressor. The Emperor, whom he has hitherto represented to us as so ardent in the prosecution of his undertaking, who, two pages farther on, is found to dream only of Moscow, discovers all of a sudden what he had not yet suspected, that the state of his affairs does not allow him to engage in the war. His reverses in Spain, his disputes with the pope, the checks experienced by the Turks, the uneasiness he felt respecting the means of subsistence of France, which now reckons only "old "men, children, wives, and mothers in tears, and "bowed in sadness to the earth, which but for "them would remain uncultivated."* All this is revealed to him in one "of those long winter "nights when its star seemed to shine upon him in

* The census of the French nation, made after Napoleon's downfall, the result of which shows that the population of France had augmented by five millions, affords a victorious refutation of this charge.

" all its brilliancy." *The different ruling genii of the vanquished nations* appear in threatening attitudes before him. Perplexed at this airy vision, " he became thoughtful and agitated. He collect- " ed accounts of the actual condition of the differ- " ent powers of Europe; * he ordered an exact " and complete summary of them to be made."

In perusing the foregoing phrases, we lose all trace of the genius of Napoleon, in whom boldness was so much tempered with circumspection, who approached no question without examining it under every aspect, who carried his conceptions into rapid execution, only because he had long and deeply meditated them? Was it the author's intention to write a melo-drame or a history? Napoleon felt an anxious desire to bring the affairs of Spain to an issue. He regretted being compelled to neglect them, in order to repel a powerful enemy raised against him by the indefatigable hatred of England. He would not have run the risk of compromising his work, for the dazzling, but unseasonable glory of adding the surname of *Russian* to his other titles as a conqueror, unless he be supposed of unsound mind. If this is not what Mr. de Segur desired to prove, such, however, is the morality to be deduced from his work.

He places himself by the side of the Emperor, as a witness of his agitations " in the midst of those

* What can be meant by the actual condition of the different powers of Europe?

" long wintry nights, when individuals are left " more than usually to their own reflections," and forgets that Napoleon's nights, during which *he was left to his own reflections* were uninterrupted by witnesses; and yet the author has seen him " reclined on a sofa, start up convulsively, fancy- " ing he heard his name, and exclaiming: who " calls me?" Not unlike the Orestes of Crebillon, or the drunkard from whom the tragedian borrowed that sublime movement.

So far there is no negotiation; we now come to it.

" On the 25th March, 1812, Czernicheff was " the bearer of new proposals to his sovereign. " Napoleon offered to make a declaration that he " would contribute, neither directly nor indirect- " ly, to the re-establishment of the kingdom of " Poland." He had given his consent a year before to this declaration, and precisely in the same terms.

On the 1st of January, 1811, the Duke of Vicenza had signed with Mr. de Romanzoff a treaty, which was sent to Paris with the Emperor Alexander's ratification. France, by the first article, engaged *that the kingdom of Poland should not be re-established.* Many other articles were extremely favorable to the views of aggrandizement entertained by Russia. But Napoleon was particularly offended at the first article. " I cannot command fate," said he, " all that I can do is to engage not to contribute, directly or indi-

rectly, to the restoration of the kingdom of Poland." The first article having been thus modified, the Emperor made no other alteration in the others. He signed the treaty, and sent it to St. Petersburgh. Alexander expressed himself mortified at Napoleon's refusing to give a pure and simple ratification to a treaty which he, Alexander, had ratified. These discussions, the increase of the Russian army on the frontiers of the dutchy of Warsaw, Russia's insisting upon receiving Dantzig in exchange for Oldenburgh, all tended to confirm the suspicions of Napoleon as to Alexander's intention of availing himself of the obstacles which France had to encounter in Spain, in order to seize upon Poland.

Negotiations had therefore been going on for a twelvemonth; and Mr. de Segur, who wishes to compress the subject within a page and a half, sees the opening of the negotiation on the 17th April, with the view of bringing it in a few days to a conclusion. In those few lines he certainly exhibits the Emperor as always ready to treat, the Russian Emperor evading negotiations, and *the Russian Ambassador, almost at the same time, delivering the ultimatum*, or, in other words, a declaration of war from his master. The author, who is not easily at a loss, still represents Napoleon as the aggressor. He will not fail, however, to inform us in another place, that unable to draw the Ambassador out of the circle of Popilius, Napoleon causes his Minister to write a letter to

Count de Romanzoff, in order to attempt a reconciliation through that direct channel; that for the same purpose he sends Count de Narbonne to Wilna with a letter to the Emperor Alexander, that not discouraged by the failure of his pacific endeavors, he orders his ambassador, Count de Lauriston, to demand admission to the Russian head-quarters, in order to renew his solicitations, and proposals, and that not until after the inutility of those repeated attempts, does he acquire the certainty that his enemy cannot be disarmed, and that since negotiations were out of the question, peace could no longer be obtained but through a war. Goaded by the Emperor Alexander's conduct, Napoleon at last takes his departure; he proceeds against his will to a struggle, which his persevering efforts were not able to avert, and against an enemy who had, for the last two months, declared war against him.

CHAPTER V.

Mr. de Segur bestows six pages to this chapter, which is to bring all the negotiations to an issue; he might have been more concise, for there is not a word of negotiations in it. It is replete with trifling anecdotes which have no reality, and are

collected in order to afford an opportunity of bestowing praise upon many persons in whom the Emperor reposed some confidence, and of throwing out unfavorable insinuations with respect to one of them.

First of all Mr. de Talleyrand, " was to be sent " to Warsaw; but the jealousy of a rival and an " intrigue again involved him in disgrace. Na- " poleon, deluded by a calumny, adroitly circu- " lated, believed that he had been betrayed by " him. His anger was extreme; his expression " terrible. Savary (the only protector of Talley- " rand) made vain efforts to undeceive him."

The author omits nothing that will enable us to guess who he means by this jealous and intriguing rival; it was the Duke de Bassano. The anecdote is as true as the imputation cast upon the character of that minister. It had in fact occurred to Napoleon to entrust Mr. de Talleyrand with an embassy to bring about the revolution of Poland. He hesitated yet, and this intention was still a secret, when he learnt by private accounts from Vienna that the secret was already known. *He did not believe that he had been* betrayed; *his anger was not extreme; nor was his expression terrible;* the matter did not deserve so much notice. He gave up his plan, and that was all. A letter was written by Mr. de Talleyrand to Wilna at a later period, and Napoleon did not, as is alleged by the author, " *compel* his secretary to send that letter to the very minister who stood most in

dread of Talleyrand's influence. Was it necessary to *compel* Napoleon's secretary to send a letter upon political matters to the minister who was at the head of that department, because the said minister would have dreaded the influence of Talleyrand, who had entirely lost it for many years? What has history to do with such idle trash?

Next comes another anecdote on the subject of the same minister. "He was heard to repeat, that "the Emperor was not sufficiently great; that it "was necessary for him to become greater still, in "order to be able to stop." By whom was he heard? was it by Mr. de Segur? Mr. de Bassano may have often treated him with kindness; but no one will believe that he ever communicated his political ideas to him. It is very possible that ministers may have been known to approve loudly of the Emperor's plans, and to blame them in a low voice, when the events had pronounced against them. Others have been found to give a courageous opposition, though in the hearing of Napoleon only, to resolutions that were in contemplation, but refrain from blaming them, as soon as they had been decided upon, and had become a *decree of the sovereign*. The latter were performing a double duty. But they have probably not boasted of it; and it is easy to conceive, that Mr. de Segur, who had no intercourse with ministers, except when he was invited by them to a dinner or to a ball, should not have penetrated very deeply into ministerial secrets.

He knows, however, as he says, that one minister *remained silent;* that if another *flattered* the Emperor, others *did not* withhold the *truth from him;* the one *sighing,* the other *turning pale,* a third *reddening with anger;* that the ministers and aids-de-camp of Napoleon "have frequently "been seen to put an end to those discussions, "by bluntly retiring from his presence, and clos- "ing the door with violence after them." *

Can the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace, who has, perhaps, had an occasional sight of the outward door of the closet, have witnessed those fine sights, when no one else had noticed them? Mr. de Segur, nothing daunted, adds General Rapp and General Lauriston to this list of opponents. There is but one difficulty in the way; the first was at Dantzig, and the other at St. Petersburgh. It is, however, well known to all, that the ministers and aids-de-camp were too well bred, and Napoleon too sensible of what was due to him, to admit of the possibility of such insults. One might almost believe that the author never approached Napoleon, his ministers, or his aids-de-camp.

"He has entered into these details, because "they are imperfectly known, because Napoleon "in his closet was quite different from the Em- "peror in public, and because this portion of the "palace has hitherto remained a secret."

If it has remained a secret, how has it come to

* These words are omitted in the translation of Mr. de Segur's work.—TRANSLATOR.

the knowledge of Mr. de Segur, who, whether as adjutant, or as *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace, never could, upon any plea, have access to its interior. The idea which the author pretends to give of the court of the Tuileries, is, in fact, a novel one, and will certainly upset that which Europe had hitherto entertained of it.

" In that new and serious court, there was little " conversation."

In that new and serious court, the Emperor was always spoken of with becoming respect, and no secrets were intrusted to those, who, by the nature of their duty, had no business to known them.

" All were rigorously classed, so that one *salon* " knew not what passed in another." How then could Mr. de Segur have become acquainted with what was not known to the ante-room?

" It is difficult to comprehend the great events " of history, without a perfect knowledge of the " character and manners of the principal person- " ages." By this reflection, the author criticises the picture he has drawn; but he is confident of its correctness. Let us congratulate posterity for having such a guarantee.

" Meantime a famine threatened France—Na- " poleon was compelled to suspend his departure " ....that war, in which the loss of every hour " was irreparable, was delayed for two months " longer." The author will tell us, in the following phrase, that those hours were not lost, since " the delay allowed time for the new crops in

"Russia to grow." But what matters it; Mr. de Segur will again tell us, at the beginning of the first chapter in the following book, that Napoleon, immediately after he received the *ultimatum* of the Russian Ambassador, quitted Paris on the 9th of May. In fact, that delay of two months had no more existence than the cause of it. So far back as the 15th of August, 1811, and in the midst of the rejoicings on that day, Napoleon, being informed that the harvest did not present a favorable appearance, had, on a sudden, with the aid of several of his privy councillors, who were brought to St. Cloud by the festivals of that occasion, assembled a council, the object of which was to consider of the future provisioning of France. On that day he decided upon precautionary measures, the successive development of which was productive of abundant resources against the apprehended calamity. Those measures were so effectual, that, at the end of that very year, he had secured to France all the supplies of provisions which it might stand in need of; so that long before he quitted Paris, his directions had had their complete execution. This was done at an expense to France of only twelve millions; and the evil was averted. This fact deserved perhaps a place in history: but it conferred too much honor upon Napoleon's government!!!

If the author is of opinion that Napoleon ought to have left Paris sooner, instead of discovering an imaginary motive for the delay, he might have found a much more simple one in the advantage

of allowing to Austria and Prussia sufficient leisure for preparing to carry into execution the treaties signed in March; in the necessity of allowing time for the troops upon the Oder to reach the Niemen, and of not neglecting the last hopes of effecting a reconciliation. Whilst a reply to Prince Kourakin was delayed, because it could not have been done without accepting the alternative of war, the minister for foreign affairs communicated directly in writing with Count de Romanzoff. The answer of that minister was expected. It was hoped that he would disavow Kourakin's hostile injunctions.

Mr. de Segur, however, has decided within himself to let Napoleon leave Paris, but he alleges that he went in quest of a battle. "Such were his "anticipations....says our historian, such was "Napoleon. Those founders of empires, he adds, "are arrested neither by wars, nor earthquakes, "nor all the scourges which Providence permits, "without deigning to explain their salutary pur- "pose to its victims?"

Upon this common-place reflection, which assumes to be a philosophical one, and which, from its nature, belongs rather to a sermon than to a historical work, we will merely observe, that *the founders of empires, the scourges and earthquakes* to which our *maréchal-des-logis* alludes, have had no fatal consequences either to himself or to his family.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

NAPOLEON, on his road through the French departments, was intoxicated with the proofs of confidence and devotion which he received; but, says Mr. de Segur, *he met with less affection in Germany*. This reflection will not, perhaps, be deemed uncandid.

In the meeting at Dresden, which, for an historian worthy of the name, would have originated in serious and important motives, Napoleon, according to the *maréchal-des-logis*, had no other object than *to display and to enjoy his power*. But he soon afterwards changes his mind, when he makes the Emperor say to General Desolles: *Since the meeting of Dresden has not had the effect of persuading Alexander to make peace, war alone can accomplish that object*. This meeting at Dresden must therefore have arisen out of weighty considerations. A person so well informed as Mr. de Segur, might have afforded us some less trivial information respecting that important circumstance in the life of the Emperor. For, of course, Mr. de Segur is a man of universal information; at Paris, he penetrates into the councils, and pro-

nounces his opinion upon political matters and upon men; he *sees* every thing; he attends the meeting of sovereigns, their banquets, their most private conversations; he penetrates into the inmost recesses of hearts; therein he discovers the workings of humiliation, of resentment, and of hatred. The very secrets of Empresses are confided to him: the one is envious of *her step-daughter's attire;* the other *weeps* if Napoleon beseeches her to retrench a part of her ornaments, in order to spare her step-mother from humiliation. The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace thus becomes a mediator between the Empress and her husband.

"Meantime, from the very first days of the "meeting, surprise was expressed at the absence "of the King of Prussia from the imperial court: "but it was soon understood that he was in some "measure prohibited from coming. This prince "was the more alarmed in proportion as he had "less deserved such treatment. His presence "would have been embarassing. Encouraged, "however, by Narbonne,* he resolved upon "making his appearance. His arrival is an"nounced to the Emperor, who, in a moment of "irritation, refuses to receive him. What did "this prince want with him? Was it not enough "to be importuned with his letters and his inces"sant complaints? Why persecute him also with "his presence? What did he come to ask of him?

* Mr. de Narbonne was at Wilna at this period.

"Duroc insists; he reminds Napoleon of the ne-
"cessity Prussia is to him against Russia: in-
"stantly the doors of the Emperor are thrown
"open to the monarch, etc."

The author, according to his practice, omits nothing, quotes the very expressions, names the witnesses. Those witnesses, long dead, will certainly not contradict him; but we stand in no need of them; the naked facts are sufficient to shew that, in all those five pages, there is not one word of truth.

Napoleon was expected at Berlin; the palaces which were destined for him were prepared. He gave up this journey; but, desirous as he was to please the King of Prussia, he hastened to communicate to him the motives which had obliged him to alter his intentions, and to invite him to meet at Dresden the illustrious guests of the King of Saxony. Mr. Benoit, who was attached to the department for foreign affairs, was sent to Berlin with a letter from the Duke of Bassano to the king, and with dispatches for Mr. de Hardenberg and Mr. de St. Marsan. These letters met with a most eager welcome. The king hastened to accept of the invitation; he proceeded to Dresden, and the reception he met with upon his arrival, was such as was to be expected from what already had taken place. In the warmth of his feelings, he offered his son to Napoleon as his aid-de-camp, and presented him to the Emperor's aids-de-camp, soliciting their friendship for their illustrious companion.

What becomes of that intervention of Count de Narbonne, and of the resistance of the *irritated Emperor*, who refuses to see the King of Prussia? What becomes of the opposition of Duroc tasking his master, and of the charitable insinuation that the King of Prussia *was the more alarmed in proportion as he had less cause for self-reproach?*

CHAPTER II.

The object of Mr. de Segur, in this chapter, seems to be to represent the army as a host of plunderers. He goes so far as to say that some of the leaders set the example, " that there was a " positive emulation in evil." The author describes Napoleon as always threatening, but to no purpose, and unable to command obedience. He pretends that " he might reproach himself as the " cause of the disorders which provoked him." What does Mr. de Segur understand by this? Does he wish to insinuate that they are encouraged by the Emperor, or that he has neglected the means to prevent them? Assuredly not, since he states that Napoleon *is desirous to maintain order*; that he gives a smart rebuke to a foreign prince, the king's son, on account of the disorders committed by his troops; " that immense quantities

" of provisions, adequate to the immensity of the " undertaking, were accumulated; no detail had " been neglected. The active and impassioned " genius of Napoleon was then entirely directed " towards that most important and most difficult " department of his expedition; in that he was " profuse of exhortation, orders, and even money " .... His days were employed in dictating in- " structions upon the subject; at night, he fre- " quently rose to repeat them, etc."

What inference are we to draw from these contradictions? How could Napoleon direct these reproaches to himself, when he is represented by the author as blameless?

Not content with exhibiting the army as in a state of disorganization, previously to the opening of the campaign, he presents the Marshals as at variance with each other. He fancies a warm altercation between Davoust and Berthier, whose hatred for each other is, according to him, of many years' standing.

" In 1809, he says, Berthier was Davoust's " chief for some days, during which the latter " gained a battle, and saved the army by disobey- " ing his orders. Hence arose a terrible hatred " between them." Here again the author is grossly mistaken respecting facts which are known to every one. In 1809, the Emperor arrived at the army in the night of the 16th to the 17th April. The Austrians had crossed the Inn, and were marching towards the Iser. No battle had

taken place; there had been nothing more than a few skirmishes between the Austrians and the Bavarian troops. Napoleon did not approve of Berthier's arrangement up to that time; and he hastened to send orders to the several corps of his army. The execution of those orders gave rise to the engagements of Paffenhoffen and of Tann on the 19th, of Abensberg on the 20th, of Landshut on the 21st, and to the battle of Eckmühl on the 22d. In Napoleon's estimation, the engagement of Abensberg, the manœuvre of Landshut, and the battle of Eckmühl are amongst the boldest, the most scientific, and most brilliant of his operations. How then can the author assert that *Davoust gained a battle and saved the army by acting in disobedience of Berthier's orders*, since, as we have just pointed out, there had been no battle until the Emperor's arrival, and since those that took place were fought by his own orders, and under his immediate command? And yet he makes Davoust accuse Berthier of treachery, with a view to introduce this incredible exclamation of Napoleon:—"It sometimes happens that I entertain doubts of the fidelity of my oldest companions in arms; but at such times my head is bewildered with grief, and I hasten to repel so cruel a suspicion." It requires a head organized like that of Mr. de Segur, to invent such ideas. It is very clear that his work was written since the year 1814.

Something more extraordinary is forthcoming. Davoust's army is completely provided with every thing. "He had anticipated every want; all "means of supplying them were ready." The author continues: "Such great exertions ought "to have given satisfaction; they had a contrary "effect." How are we to characterize such a reflection? What! could it be possible to displease Napoleon, by obeying his orders?

"This marshal, the Emperor was told, assumes "to have foreseen, directed, and executed every "thing. Is the Emperor, then, to be no more "than a spectator of this expedition? Must the "glory of it devolve upon Davoust?" Who would not expect that the Emperor would check the man who could hold this language to him. Such, however, is not the case. The gentle Napoleon, as if struck with a ray of light, exclaims in perfect simplicity: "In fact, one would think that it was "Davoust who commanded the army."

To speak plain, all this empty talk is quite absurd. Napoleon felt himself much beholden to Davoust for the skill which he displayed in leading his troops and in providing to their wants; he held up the administrative talents of this general as a model; and those who really approached the Emperor have often observed with what complacency he dwelt upon such praises. Davoust possessed a peculiar merit on this point; it has never been contested to him; and it would have

been very strange if Napoleon, to whom he rendered such indispensable services, had expressed dissatisfaction in return for them.

CHAPTER III.

This chapter opens with a faithful description, upon which the reader delights to rest, as a relief from the painful feelings that have oppressed him from the very commencement of the work. These pages inspire us with regret that the same stamp of truth should not have marked the whole of Mr. de Segur's production; but he hastens to abandon this plain and candid course, and to fall again into the crooked road of conjectures and wanderings.

He presents a very incorrect account of the strength of the army. It is proved by official documents in our possession, which are covered with annotations in Napoleon's own hand writing, that the army reckoned, at the passage of the Niemen, 325,000 fighting men, namely: 150,000 Frenchmen, and 170,500 allied soldiers, and 984 pieces of cannon.

Mr. de Segur estimates at 445,200 men the number of troops that entered Russia on the opening of the campaign. This exceeds the amount laid down in the statement procured by Mr. de Czernicheff for the Russian staff, through

the bribery of a person employed in the war department, who lost his life by that treasonable act. This statement exhibited only 414,600 men; and if it be borne in mind that each corps is therein laid down at its full complement, if we take into account the losses which they must necessarily have experienced on their marches towards the frontiers of Russia, there will be no difficulty in accounting for the great exaggeration in Mr. de Segur's statement.

In the subtile and metaphysical analysis of the sentiments with which the army is inspired, we vainly seek for those sentiments most familiar to Frenchmen, honor and the love of country, names not even mentioned. Is this a mere omission? Or is the author so unfortunate as not to have felt their charm? He mentions impulses as frivolous as they are devoid of elevation. "To "these," he says, "must certainly be added the "hope of plunder; for the exacting ambition of "Napoleon had as often disheartened his soldiers, "as the disorders of the latter had tarnished his "glory. A compromise was necessary: ever "since 1805, there was a sort of mutual under-"standing, on his part to wink at their plunder, "on theirs, to yield to his ambition."

How could a French soldier be found to assign the hope of plunder as an incentive? How odious is the act which he dares to present to our ideas!! On perusing those lines, which we feel a repugnance in quoting, the French veterans will indig-

nantly reject the dedication the author makes to them of a work in which he offers them so grievous an affront. Our bitterest enemies have never ventured upon an accusation so disgraceful to French renown. It was reserved for the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace to load himself with the responsibility.

Have we not all witnessed the Emperor's anxiety to repress every disorder in the army? Eager to be made acquainted with the truth, he questioned the inhabitants as well as his officers. Whenever he was approached by any one coming from a division or corps of his army, or from the road which the troops had marched over, his first questions were directed to ascertaining what was taking place in the rear. No sooner was the truth made known to him, than he instantly took his resolution. He formed moveable columns; he wrote to the generals, to the commandants of towns on the route of the army; he threatened with his displeasure, if the disorders were not immediately checked. He constantly repeated that plunder disgraces an army, and destroys the resources of a well disciplined soldier. If we are to select an occasion when his anxiety was more particularly displayed, we take up the very period pointed out by the author as that of the disgraceful occurrence by which he endeavors to tarnish the glory of the chief, of the army, and of France. Mr. de Segur was ignorant of all this, because Mr. de Segur has neither witnessed, nor

had it in his power to witness any thing. The opportunities for his petty observations were confined, by his inferior situation, within too narrow a sphere. How does it happen, however, that he is unacquainted with the severe orders of the day dated at St. Poelten in 1805, etc. etc.? How, is he not aware that, amongst other examples, the Emperor caused a grenadier of the guards to be tried and shot at Berlin in 1806, as well as two soldiers of the light troops also belonging to the guards, when at Madrid in 1808, because they had been convicted of plunder? etc.

How are we to reconcile the odious imputations in page 109, with what the author says in page 112, which contains this remarkable disavowal? "We love to see in him the companion of our "toils, the chief who led us on to renown; our "self-love was flattered by the wonder and admi- "ration which he inspired—period of intoxication "and prosperity, during which the French sol- "dier, lord of every thing by victory, held him- "self in greater estimation than the ruler or even "the monarch whose estates he was traversing! "To him it appeared that the kings of Europe "only reigned with the permission of his chief and "of his armies."

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

"NAPOLEON satisfied, now declares himself."

Such is the beginning of this chapter. The author forgets that, in the preceding pages, he has represented the Emperor as being constantly "irritated and dissatisfied." What, then, can give him satisfaction, now that all attempts at a peace have proved unavailing, and that he is compelled to have recourse to arms? Has the object of Mr. de Segur been to insinuate that Napoleon's eager desire for peace was assumed with the hope of obtaining war? If it had been his wish to write an impartial history, he would not have passed unnoticed an important fact which was known to all Europe; namely, that the return of Mr. Prevost, the secretary of legation, who arrived at Gumbinen on the 19th of June, brought the first intelligence to the Emperor, that the order given to General Lauriston to repair to the presence of the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, could not be carried into effect, in consequence of his having been refused passports; and that the last hope of maintaining peace was consequently destroyed. The Emperor's proclamation to

his army was not issued until three days afterwards.

"At Tilsit," said Napoleon, "Russia swore "an eternal alliance with France, and war to "England. She now infringes her oath. She "refuses to afford any explanation of her extra-"ordinary conduct, until the French eagles shall "have re-crossed the Rhine, and thereby left our "allies at her mercy."

Such were the true motives of the war, and they are candidly laid down. The author alludes to the Emperor Alexander's proclamation, merely to give it the advantage over that of Napoleon; he finds it both *candid* and *moderate*. Candid! When the Emperor turns a political war into a war of religion and fanaticism. Moderate no doubt it was; but why was it so? because this prince was frightened at the false position in which he was placed.

Ever since 1810, all his actions had for object an invasion of the Dutchy of Warsaw. The arrival of the Russian divisions from Moldavia to the frontiers of Poland; the extraordinary recruiting effected throughout the Russian empire, at a period when, with the exception of the garrisons in the Prussian fortresses, there was no other French army in Germany than a small corps at Hamburgh; the dark intrigues carrying on with the cabinet of Berlin, such were the indications of the projects of Russia. If any doubt could be entertained on the subject, the distribution of

the Russian armies, ranged along the borders of Prussia and of Poland, the immense stores collected at Wilna, Minsk, etc. would carry conviction to the mind of the most sceptic.

Had Alexander merely intended to hold himself upon the defensive, assuredly he would not have stationed his troops along a range of frontiers sixty leagues in extent, nor would he have established such immense magazines on his first line. Having been taken unawares by the skilful manœuvres of the Emperor, and by the rapidity of his marches, he found his centre driven back, and the safety of his left wing brought into imminent danger. We must add, that, whilst he was issuing his proclamation, he sent Balachoff, his minister of police, to Napoleon's head quarters, with a view to arrest the progress of the French army under the pretence of negotiations. To these causes is to be ascribed the moderate tone of Alexander's proclamation.

CHAPTER II.

We are now come to the passage of the Niemen.

"Napoleon," says the author, "who had travelled thus far in a carriage, now mounts his horse." Does Mr. de Segur mean to insinuate

that Napoleon disdained to share the fatigues of the common soldier, and comfortably seated in his carriage, conducted the war in this manner? Those who have known him are aware that when no object of importance required his attention upon the road, he afforded himself, in a carriage, that rest which his various engagements otherwise prevented him from enjoying. It more frequently, however, afforded him an opportunity of continuing his occupations. "Napoleon recon- "noitred the Russian river (the Niemen) without "disguising himself, as was falsely asserted." As Mr. de Segur attaches some importance to being thought well informed of a fact which in itself is very trifling, he ought to have made himself better acquainted with it. He would have been correct had he stated that on the 23d of June the Emperor, accoutred in the cloak and police cap of a Polish light horseman belonging to the squadron of his guard upon duty, proceeded to reconnoitre the Niemen. Napoleon did not go *under cover of the night;* first, because the obscurity would have prevented his selecting a spot from whence he might cross over; next, because, in this country, it is already day-light at two o'clock in the month of June

How can Mr. de Segur assert that Napoleon, in this reconnoitring, *crossed* the frontier, when it was only on the 23d, at ten o'clock at night, that the army began to cross over? Did he make that incorrect assertion, merely with the view to pre-

sent the following coincidence: "that five months "afterwards Napoleon was only enabled to re- "cross this frontier under cover of the same ob- "scurity;" a fact as incorrect as the intention is unfriendly.

The author's description of the passage of the river, and of the night during which it was effected, would lead one to suppose that he had never slept at the bivouac. What a strange idea military men will form of him, when they read his lamentations at having passed a fine summer's night under the canopy of heaven! Fortunately the French soldiers had not suffered so much in their *moral* by that night in a bivouac, as was the case with Mr. de Segur. It had not cooled their courage, "since their ardour was so "great that two divisions of the advanced guard "contended for the honor of being the first to "pass, and were near coming to blows." Soon afterwards he stations Napoleon at the entrance of the bridge, which he crossed over *without hesitation, in order to encourage the soldiers with his looks.* These are the very soldiers he has just been describing to us as on the point of coming to blows. "They appeared more animated than "he did; whether it was that he felt oppressed "by so great an aggression, that his enfeebled "frame could not support the weight of the ex- "cessive heat, or that he was already amazed at "finding nothing to conquer."

Mr. de Segur does not know that when it is

question of crossing a river without the knowledge of the enemy, the manœuvres are carried on in such a manner as to avoid meeting them on the opposite side. When this object has been accomplished, how can there be felt any *amazement at finding nothing to conquer?* The only existing obstacle was the river itself; and that had been conquered.

Mr. de Segur, however, is unconquered. He has more than one reserve at hand: *the enfeebled frame of Napoleon could not support the weight of an excessive heat.* So that a general who so often braved the climate of Italy during the dog-days, who, in the midst of the sands of the desert, had patiently borne the heat of a Syrian sky, now, on the banks of the Niemen, was unable to endure the heat of the north of Europe on the 24th of June. The reader is almost inclined to suppose that another Napoleon is alluded to. And, in fact, the picture drawn of him by Mr. de Segur, and exhibited throughout his work, no more resembles the general of the army of Italy than it does the general who conquered at Lutzen, Champs-Aubert, and Montmirail in the following years.

Our author admits that what he relates appears improbable; but this does not at all embarrass him. Napoleon is no longer affected by the heat; he ceases to be amazed at finding no enemy; a moral cause operates upon him: *he feels oppressed by so great an aggression.* The phrase is not a French one; the sentiment is less so. Mr. de

Segur forgets that, in his preceding chapters, he has represented Prince Kourakin *dictating an ultimatum* which left no other alternative than that of war; he forgets that the Russian army had been collected together long before the French army, and that the Emperor Alexander *was at the head-quarters of the grand army*, before Napoleon had even quitted Paris on his way to Dresden; he forgets those proceedings which are related by himself, and are connected with the refusal to remain at peace. By introducing the conjunction *although*, and the often repeated alternative *whether*, figures to which he strongly adheres, he presents enigmas to his reader, and leaves him to unravel them. But unfortunately amongst the many solutions which he suggests, he never points out the true one.

"All at once he dashes across the country into "the forest which girts the bank of the river. He "was riding on at full speed; in his ardour he "appeared as if anxious to come singly into con-"tact with the enemy, etc."

How can a writer, who holds a military rank, presume thus to parody into an extravagance worthy of Don Quixote, the very natural act of a commander-in-chief who is reconnoitring the ground upon which his operations are to be carried on? The Emperor was not guilty of the folly ascribed to him by Mr. de Segur, of riding alone through the woods. He headed a strong recon-

noitring party of cavalry, and sent others in various directions, in order to obtain some intelligence of the enemy. But the *maréchal-des-logis* is ignorant of all this; he had probably remained near the tents, where his functions retained him.

This chapter, generally speaking, is written with a view to create an effect; the author appears accordingly to have placed great dependence upon it. It presents materials for a melo drame. First we find the Emperor reclining in his tent; *deprived of all strength, in the midst of a breathless atmosphere and a suffocating heat.* The night followed: a few sappers cross the river in a small boat; they only find *an officer of cossacks, who enquires of them who they are*—*Frenchmen* was their reply—*What do you want, rejoined the officer, and wherefore do you come into Russia?* A sapper briskly answered: *to make war upon you? to take Wilna! to deliver Poland!* Upon this *the cossack flies back into the woods; three musket reports are heard; this was the signal of the commencement of a mighty invasion.* The French columns now debouch. "The genius of conquests kindles our imagina-" tions. Napoleon is seen hastening to plant his " foot on the Russian territory, and taking without " hesitation this first step towards his ruin." The genius of conquests is succeeded by the genius of storms. Omens are not forgotten by the author. " Napoleon's horse stumbles—the day " becomes overcast, the wind rises, a storm comes

"on as great as the enterprise in which we were "engaged." The army would not recognize in this accident *the reprobation of so great an aggression*. The bridge over the Vilia is broken down; Napoleon is exasperated *against it:* He is another Xerxes ordering the Hellespont to be chastised. "He affects to despise this obstacle, like every "thing else that opposes him, and orders a Polish "squadron to swim across the river." They all perish. This conclusion of the melo drame substitutes a feeling of abhorrence in lieu of the ridicule it had hitherto created. The author casts upon the memory of the Emperor, the imputation of having sacrificed so many brave men to a senseless anger. Now for the real facts.

When Napoleon came up to the Vilia, he found that the bridge was broken down. Being desirous to obtain intelligence of the enemy, he ordered a squadron of the regiment of Polish light horse, belonging to the guards,* to swim across the river, as was the practice of the Cossacks. Some men, who were inferior in horsemanship to the rest, were separated from the squadron; the only one who perished was a light horse lancer of the first company, named Trzcinski. An officer of the same

* This was the first squadron, commanded by Kozietulski, and consisting of the first company, Captain Zaluski, and the 5th, Captain Szeptycki. General Krasinski, who commanded the regiment, plunged into the river in order to save one of his soldiers.

squadron, Count Joseph Zaluski, then a captain, and now aid-de-camp to the King of Poland, having abandoned his horse, was on the point of being drowned; he was saved by some sappers and soldiers of the light infantry. What becomes of Mr. de Segur's lamentations? What becomes of that feeling of *mingled horror and admiration* which he attributes to the army?

The case is the same with respect *to the storm as great as the enterprise;* it must be reduced to a plain shower of rain. The error into which our historian has fallen, originates in his having read in Labaume, that a storm fell at the moment when the corps of the Viceroy was crossing the Niemen on the 29th of June. He makes it occur when the Emperor passed the Niemen at Kowno on the 24th, without reflecting upon the interval of five days that intervened between the two operations. But Mr. de Segur is not so particular. Besides, by presenting this storm as occurring on the Emperor's passage of the river, he gave to his narrative a much more dramatic coloring, and found an opportunity of grouping together round this pretended phenomenon, the mystical reflections which are so much in accordance with his peculiar turn of mind. It was only after the torrents of rain to which Labaume has alluded, that a great number of horses perished, owing to a sudden change of the atmosphere to cold.

Such is the account of the passage of the Niemen, which is now said to be written in a roman-

tic style, because it is overloaded with descriptions and with trifling details related with high-sounding expressions. We can only qualify it as extravagant; for such ought to be the designation of a history in which truth comes in for the minor part.

CHAPTER III.

The author carries us to Wilna, which he represents as given up to all the transports of joy; but he takes care to inform us, that this "enthu-"siasm, unreflecting in some, and the mere effect "of excitement in others, was of short duration." That *unreflecting* enthusiasm is presented in the same page as the effect of a *patriotism still burning;* now a long existing patriotism cannot be an unreflecting sentiment. According to our author, that enthusiasm was *excited;* and yet he says that it displayed itself in a general effusion. But an excited sentiment can be nothing more than factitious. Mr. de Segur should inform us in what way it had been kindled. Did the police of Paris precede the advanced guard, in order to prepare applauses for the army on its entrance into Wilna?

The Emperor receives here an address from the diet of Warsaw, to which he returns an answer.

Mr. de Segur hastens to accuse him of having damped the zeal of the Poles, by the reply which he made to them. "They were unable," he says, "to comprehend the cause of its circumspection; "they began to doubt of the intentions of Napo- "leon—even those around him asked each other "what could be the motives of a prudence which "appeared so unseasonable?"

If by those around Napoleon are to be understood the *maréchaux-des-logis* of his palace, and a few officers who only saw in this campaign the deprivation of the enjoyments of Paris, it is very immaterial to history, that it should be known what was asked of each other by those *around* the prince. These gentlemen were very far from possessing at that time the importance to which they now lay claim; and the Emperor will not be judged according to their opinions.

Does the reader wish to know why the Emperor avoids saying "the kingdom of Poland exists," as the deputies from the confederation of Poland solicited him to do? This is the reason. The Emperor had many interests to reconcile, many duties to fulfil. To obtain a peace was his first duty; his first interest was to enter into no engagement that might bind him to other interests besides those of France. *If Napoleon, whose every word was a law,* had said: "The kingdom of Poland "exists," he could not have laid down his arms until it had been actually in existence. *If that kingdom* owed its existence *to the* unanimous

efforts of a population covering countries so distant and so extensive, the obligation of not acknowledging it, could not have been imposed upon him, any more than the obligation of destroying it when once in existence. It was one thing for him to be pledged by circumstances, and another to be so of his own free will. He had obtained the consent of Austria to the cession *of a part of Gallicia, merely in the event of the kingdom of Poland being re-established, as a consequence of the war*: (these were the terms of the treaty of alliance.) What had been understood by *a consequence of the war*? Such a peace as, in bringing war to a termination, would have set Poland free. An insurrection could not be meant, which, when the war was scarcely commenced, would, at the bare utterance of these words, *Poland exists*, spread itself in Austrian Gallicia, a province containing as many hearts devoted to the country, as those provinces in which the most enthusiastic feeling of independence was prevalent. Austria knew this, and was not without apprehensions.

Was Napoleon so situated at Wilna, as to be justified in pronouncing the solemn expressions which would have realized the fears of that power, or in avoiding those which were alone calculated to quiet her? Are his duties, his interests, and his conduct sufficiently explained? The above are not mere conjectures or reports at head-quarters; they are the substance of the instructions given to Count Otto at the time. In the campaign of

1806, against Prussia, when Prussian Poland alone was in question, Napoleon had maintained the same reserve, because then, as well as now, peace was, with him, the only object of war.

Mr. de Segur, after explaining to us the politics of the ante-room, describes the "coldness of Li-"thuania, to the public feeling of which province "a forced direction was given, which placed it, "as well as Napoleon, in a false position, wherein "every thing terminated in errors, contradictions, "and half measures."

To crown all, it is added that Napoleon permitted the formation of a provisional government, the "selection of which was in some respects un-"lucky, and displeased the jealous pride of an "aristocracy at all times difficult to satisfy." It is a pity for the historian, that no part of this statement is founded on fact. The Lithuanian government, composed of seven members, reckoned six amongst them of the highest nobility; they were Count Soltan, Prince Alexander Sapieha, Count Potocki, Count Sierakowski, Count Prozor, and Count Tysenhaus. The seventh, Mr. Sniadecki, had been appointed representative for the celebrated university of Wilna, of which he was president. The above selections were received with unanimous applause.

"Napoleon calculated upon four millions of "Lithuanians; he was only seconded by a few "thousand." The whole of the population joined his cause, and gave it every support.

"A guard of honor," says Mr. de Segur, "had "been decreed to him; only three horsemen fol- "lowed him." Napoleon had left Wilna upwards of a month, when Prince Sapieha offered him a guard of honor, of which he sent him the list; the Emperor, who was not inclined to accept the offer, refused to receive more than fifty men. This guard was soon considerably augmented, and by Napoleon's orders, it became the nucleus of a second regiment of Polish light horse of the guard; and the command of it was given to the brave general Konopka. Mr. de Segur has not seen them; he has not even heard of their fate; otherwise he would no doubt inform us that several hundreds of those young men, belonging to the most distinguished families of Lithuania, were surprised at Slonim, by a division of cavalry under the orders of General Czaplitz, aid-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia, and fell into the hands of the enemy.

This event should not have escaped the historian, who keeps an account of three Polish gentlemen who followed the head-quarters, and whom the Prince of Neufchatel had attached to his staff in quality of interpreters. There are few pages in his history, that do not exhibit similar mistakes.

We say nothing of the warm discussion between the Polish generals who accompanied the Emperor, and some of the officers doing duty near his person. According to the author's system, these conversations have been prepared in his imagination, merely to afford proofs of the indifference of the

Lithuanians. The sacrifices, and the misfortunes of that noble and devoted country might have suggested inspirations of a more elevated nature.

"This victory, which was so eagerly sought for, "was postponed in consequence of the retreat of "the enemy. The Emperor might have waited "for his convoys. But he did not wish to forego "his advantage. He pushed forward on the "track of the Russians four hundred thousand "men, with twenty day's provisions (how anxious "the author is to add this, lest any praise should "be bestowed upon such activity,) into a country "which had been unable to maintain the twenty "thousand Swedes under Charles XII."

The plan of the Emperor had completely succeeded. At the very opening of the campaign, he had separated the left wing commanded by Prince Bagration, the corps of Doctoroff, and the Russian division Dorokow,* from the centre of the Russian army, which was compelled to fly towards its camp at Drissa, in the direction of the Dwina, and to abandon the immense supplies it had accumulated in Lithuania and in Samogitia, leaving us in possession of those two provinces.

* This division forming the advanced guard of Count Schouwalof, was posted at Orany, where it had been left unprotected, owing to the confusion created at head-quarters by the Emperor's movement. It was under the necessity of following the movement of Bagration upon Smolensko. Doctorow's corps only, was enabled to return to the camp at Drissa, by abandoning its baggage and a great number of stragglers.

On his arrival at Wilna the Emperor did not *push forward* four hundred thousand men upon the track of the enemy. He caused the first and fourth corps to manœuvre in such a manner as to prevent a junction, upon the Dwina, of the divided corps of the Russian army, whilst he marched in person upon Barclay de Tolly with the main body. The result of these operations might have been the destruction of Bragation, who, foretalled by Marshal Davoust, having the viceroy upon his flank, and pressed by the King of Westphalia at the head of upwards of sixty thousand men, could not have passed the Dnieper, without fighting a battle against forces that would have overpowered him by their great superiority of numbers.

CHAPTER IV.

Mr. de Segur allows himself an ample range in this chapter; he enumerates the plunders, the conflagrations, the disorders, the wretchedness which he pretends to have marked the passage of the army. We will offer but one remark, which is, that in the wars during the brilliant epoch of the reign of Louis XIV, in those of Marshals de Saxe and de Broglie, in the glorious campaigns of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram, a writer who would have amused himself in minutely describing whatever took place in the

32533

rear of the army, might have presented pictures similar to those of Mr. de Segur, and have created the same emotions in the circles and the *boudoirs* of Paris. That historian delights in scenes of disorder and plunder; he has really the vocation of a *painter of calamities*. We subjoin, however, a specimen of his style in this character, which will probably not open to him the doors of the academy. In order not to fatigue our reader, we will make our extracts from a single page.

"Excesses were brought on by so critical a po-
"sition.

"These rude men with arms in their hands,
"when assailed by wants so numerous and im-
"moderate, could not keep within moderate bounds.

"They revenged themselves of the proprietors
"by destroying their property.

"There were some who put an end to their ex-
"istence, *rather* than proceed to such extremities.

"But many became hardened; one excess led
"them into another, just as anger is often in-
"flamed in the act of inflicting blows.

"In the midst of so inauspicious an aspect of
"nature, the feelings of nature became blunted.

"They imagined that their own sufferings jus-
"tified their infliction of sufferings upon others."

Faithful to his practice of always contradicting himself, Mr. de Segur shortly afterwards informs us, "that these disorders were, however, of rare occurrence in Lithuania."

He then supposes that a marshal comes to communicate to the Emperor that several soldiers

of the young guard have died of hunger. He represents Napoleon as abruptly interrupting the report, and makes him exclaim (for the Emperor never speaks, he always exclaims): "This is im-
"possible! where are their twenty days provi-
"sions? Soldiers well commanded never die of
"hunger."

This reply was very just; but the officer of the palace attributes it to *the wish of avoiding distress of mind, by disbelieving the reports.*

We are next favored, as usual, with the pretended gossip of head-quarters. We ought to have the names of those to whom the marshal, just returned from Spain, went to make his complaints, and who were no doubt authorised to listen to them. It is a question whether they would confirm the language attributed to them. As to those conversations made up after the event, and in which it was stated "that the health of
"their leader was impaired—that he made light
"of difficulties—in order to preserve the energy
"of mind necessary to surmount them; that
"already disturbed and fatigued by the new and
"critical situation into which he had thrown
"himself—he was about to push his army for-
"ward, always forward, in order to bring matters
"sooner to a termination." They are only worthy of remark as displaying the natural incoherency of ideas in a writer who does not exactly know what he intends to say.

He closes the chapter by saying that the ar-

rangements of Napoleon "were dictated by the "most prudent foresight, but that he suffered "himself to be hurried away by habit, by the ne- "cessity of short wars, rapid victories, and sudden "treaties of peace." This is an ill-founded reflection. When a question of moment occurred to the mind of Napoleon, he examined it under every aspect, with that extraordinary quickness of perception which, as applied to genius, is like the glance darted from an eagle's eye; he had no sooner discovered its advantages, than his decision followed with the rapidity of thunder. It is that promptness of execution which led superficial observers to imagine that he was carried away by the violence of his passions, and trusted too much to chance.

CHAPTER V.

The Russians are retreating in every direction. Mr. de Balachoff, the bearer of terms from Alexander, makes his appearance at Wilna. "Bala- "choff, however," adds Mr. de Segur, "presented "no fresh overtures, either verbal or written— "Napoleon did not hesitate. He had found it "impossible to stop when at Paris; could he retreat when at Wilna?"

The author appears not to know that Mr. de Balachoff came to propose to Napoleon the con-

clusion of an armistice, and to enter into negotiations for a peace, on condition that the French army should recross the Niemen. The Emperor *did not hesitate*, and ought not to have hesitated, in rejecting those proposals. His anxiety however for peace, induced him to answer, that he would willingly negotiate without concluding an armistice, each army retaining possession of the country which they occupied. Would the *maréchal-des-logis* have wished Napoleon to recross the Niemen with all his troops, and abandon the advantages which the success of his plan of campaign had secured to him, thus allowing time for the Russians to form a junction in the direction of their entrenched camp at Drissa?——The acceptance, however, of the proposals in question would have been attended with the above results.

The author has found out, in the mission of Mr. de Balachoff, what *no one* but himself *had* hitherto *discovered*, "that Alexander could no "longer address Napoleon, nor even return an "answer to him." Mr. de Segur appears to have only one object in view, which is to represent our enemies in the most favorable light, and to cast upon us the reproach of the aggression. The injurious expressions he ascribes to the Emperor, when he is made to speak to Mr. de Balachoff of Alexander and of his generals, carry with them their own refutation.

Then pointing out Caulaincourt to the Russian minister, "There," said he, "is a knight of your

" Emperor; he is a Russian in the French " camp."——We next have a long debate between Caulaincourt and Napoleon. The details of it must be incorrect, for it is quite indecorous, and no individual about the Emperor's person would have presumed to fail in the respect due to him. How are we, besides, to account for the pretended anger of the Duke of Vicenza, at being called a *Russian* by the Emperor, since, according to Mr. de Segur, this duke when accused by Napoleon of having become a Russian, and of having been won over by the Emperor Alexander, had *boldly* replied to him: *Yes, sire, because I believe him a Frenchman.* It does not seem likely that Mr. de Caulaincourt should have refused at Wilna a title of which he had felt proud when at Paris.

After a superficial sketch of the march of the King of Naples towards the Dwina, and of our right against Doctoroff and Bagration, Mr. de Segur thus expresses himself: " Several " persons have pretended that there was too much " circumspection, or too much negligence in this " first movement of the invasion, etc."

The author therefore reproaches Napoleon with being dilatory; he forgets that he had, until now, accused him of precipitation.

Not unlike those who, to give more weight to their assertions, present details and circumstances which originate in their own fancy, Mr. de Segur, in order to convince his reader that he

has carefully studied the Emperor, both in his physical and in his moral capacity, describes him at Wilna, "as extended over his maps, which he "was obliged to examine in this manner, on ac- "count of near-sightedness, a defect in which he "resembled Alexander the Great and Frederick "the Second." Napoleon was not near-sighted. The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace is not aware that it is necessary to look very closely upon a map, in order to examine it in a military point of view. We should not have noticed this error, unimportant as it is, if it did not afford a fresh proof that Mr. de Segur has never seen the Emperor in the interior of his closet.

CHAPTER VI.

Our right wing was in presence of "a general "and a country equally difficult to conquer." And yet, since the opening of the campaign, this *general so difficult to conquer*, endeavors to retreat upon the centre of the Russian army, from which he has been separated. His endeavors being baffled by the skilful manœuvres of Napoleon, he has no other resource left, than to enter the marshes in his rear, in order to reach the Dnieper before the French shall have come up. If Davoust on the one side, and the King of

Westphalia on the other, carry into effect the orders they have received, all the issues from those marshes will be closed against Bagration. From one moment to another, Napoleon is in expectation of intelligence that the Russian general has surrendered with his forty thousand men. He remains at Wilna, with a strong reserve, and prepared to receive the reports from his right and left corps, as well as an account of the movements of the enemy in his front. He could not leave that central position so long as Bagration might threaten to attack it, and whilst he remained in ignorance of that general's proceedings. He is engaged in the meanwhile in organizing the government of Lithuania, in erecting fortifications round its capital, in acquiring a thorough knowledge of the enemy's plans, in hastening the arrival of his pontoon carriages, his parks of artillery, and his numerous convoys of provisions; and lastly, in keeping up the enthusiasm of the Polish nation.

To these powerful motives for the Emperor's sojourn at Wilna, Mr. de Segur thinks proper to add that of a pretended decay in his health. This opinion, which he incessantly repeats, and which suggests to him the cause of the errors he attributes to the Emperor, is, as we have already observed, entirely devoid of foundation. He makes those who approached the Emperor say, that, *a vigorous constitution no longer seconded, as heretofore, that mighty genius; his corpulancy, the baths*

which he used, are to them so many grounds *of regret* and of sad reflections.

From his early age, Napoleon was in the habit of taking baths, " not as an indispensable relief " from a bodily ailment of an alarming character, " which his policy took pains to conceal." But, in the first place, because his constitution stood in need of them, and, in the next, because the unremitting labours of the closet, and the fatigues which he had to endure, rendered them necessary to him. *The man has no more been wanting to the hero, than the hero to the man.* The author often sacrifices truth to the wish of introducing a brilliant antithesis.

The failure of this expedition, which he had until now represented as unseasonable, and which he now characterises as *perhaps the most useful for Europe*, was not to be ascribed *to a stormy day*, or *to a sudden attack of fever.* Whatever was within the power of man has been attempted and accomplished. The battle of Moskwa has had all the success that could be expected. The failure of this European enterprise is no more to be attributed to the state of ill-health of the chief of the French army, than to the skill of the Russian generals; a premature cold was the only cause of it.

By his forcible description of the Beresina, the author seems to think that he cannot communicate too soon the misfortunes which our army experienced there on its return. The geographical knowledge which he displays on the occasion is

likewise defective, when he states that "all the "rivers, which in this country run in the direction "from one pole to another, have their eastern "bank commanding the western, as Asia com- "mands Europe." Europe in its northern part forms an elevated plane, of which Moscow may be considered the centre. Beyond this capital the slope of the plane has therefore the contrary effect of making the eastern banks of all the rivers in that quarter less elevated than their western banks.

CHAPTER VII.

As soon as Napoleon ascertained that Bagration had it no longer in his power to reach Wilna, and that the army of Barclay de Tolly had concentrated itself in the entrenched camp at Drissa, he directed his march to the central position of Glubokoé. The Russians, on being apprized of this movement, became apprehensive that Napoleon would arrive before them at Vitepsk, where they hoped to form a junction with Bagration; they therefore hastened to reach this city. When Napoleon was informed of the evacuation of the camp at Drissa, he guessed their plan, and marched in that direction.

The Emperor Alexander being compelled to abandon the extensive depots he had formed upon his line of operation through Pskow, left his army to repair to Moscow, and to muster up fresh resources in men and money. The proclamations which he issued at this time, are not remarkable for that spirit of moderation which was so much praised by Mr. de Segur, when he spoke of the proclamation published at Wilna. Are we to infer from this, that the character of Alexander had undergone a change? If, as our historian says, the first afforded evidence of his character, the latter must have borne the same stamp. " Therein Napoleon is designated by the name of *Moloch,* and the French are compared *to a host of locusts which dry up the earth, and which the earth will reject, as oppressive to its defiled bosom.* To what are we to ascribe this difference." Might it not be that the Emperor Alexander had no longer the same occasion for disguise? They are the arrows which were shot by the Parthians in their flight.

Napoleon directs his central force towards Bezenkowiski. He repairs to Kamen, " always tra- " velling at night in a carriage, either from neces- " sity, or, perhaps, with a view to keep the army " in ignorance of the inability of its chief to share " in its fatigues."

Those insinuations would prove that the author is entirely ignorant of the details of the Emperor's life during a war, or that he was always inclined, through a spirit of injustice, to present the Em-

peror in an unfavorable light. We cannot better reply to his allegations, than by stating how Napoleon's days were employed when he was with the army.

The active life he led in camps was always in harmony with the military operations. Habitually he kept up with the army at a slow pace, when close to, or following the enemy. When the army was performing grand manœuvres, and the operations took place, he waited until the corps that were marching had nearly reached the positions assigned to them. He then remained at his head-quarters. There he bestowed his attention to the internal administration of France, and answered the reports that were daily addressed to him from Paris by his ministers. For he governed the empire, at the same moment that he directed the operations of the army. Sparing of his time, he calculated the epoch of his departure, so as to be at the head of his army at the moment when his presence became necessary. He travelled to it in a carriage, with the greatest rapidity. But, even during the journey, he did not allow himself rest. His time was taken up in reading his dispatches, and he generally received in this way the reports of his officers, and instantly returned answers to them. He was sometimes overtaken, at the same moment, by several estafettes from Paris. By the aid of a light which had been contrived at the bottom of his carriage, he was enabled to work at night as if he had been in his closet. His aids-

de-camp and orderly officers rode on both sides of the carriage, and a brigade of saddle horses followed with his escort.

He had thus staid at Wilna whilst some corps of his army were directing their march towards the Dwina. He did not quit that city until the 16th, at 10 o'clock at night.* Early on the 17th he reached Swentziani, and upon receiving here the intelligence that the enemy had re-crossed the Dwina at Druia, and surprised the cavalry under Sebastiani's command, he dispatched fresh orders to the several corps of the army, and arrived, in the midst of his troops at Glubokoé on the 18th at mid-day. He marched in this manner upon Kamen and Bezenkowiski, where he arrived at the same moment with the corps which had been ordered to march in that direction.

Such was the peculiar organization of this man, so extraordinary in every thing, that he could take an hour's sleep, be awakened to issue some order, fall asleep again, be awakened a second

* It has already been observed, that the corps of Marshal Davoust was marching towards Minsk. It arrived there on the 8th July, and left on the 13th, always outflanking the left of Bagration; passing through Ygumen, the division crossed the Beresina at Beresino, reached Mohiloff on the 20th, and thus prevented the junction of Bagration with Barclay's army upon the Dwina. On the 7th, the corps of the Viceroy left Neutroki, in the vicinity of Wilna, and passing through Ochmiana, arrived at Dokszitzi on the 17th. Marshal Mortier with the guard and the Bavarian cavalry, arrived at Glubokoé on the 16th.

time, without any injury to his rest or his health. Six hour's sleep was sufficient for him, whether he enjoyed them at once, or whether he took them at various intervals in the twenty-four hours.

On those days which preceded any great battle, he was constantly on horseback, reconnoitring the strength and position of the enemy, studying his field of battle, going through the bivouacs of the several corps of his army. Even at night, he went over the line in order to satisfy himself again of the strength of the enemy by the number of their fires; and he fatigued many horses in a few hours. On the day of battle, he took a central position, from which he could see whatever was going on. He had with him his aids-de-camp and orderly officers. He sent them in every direction to carry his orders. At some distance in his rear were four squadrons of the guard, one of each class; but when he quitted that position, he only took one troop for his escort. He generally pointed out to his marshals the spot which he had selected, in order that he might be easily found out by the officers who might be sent to him. As soon as his presence was called for in any quarter, he proceeded to it at full gallop.

How can Mr. de Segur be so simple as to say that *it was no puerile vanity* that induced Napoleon to cross the Dwina? To whose mind could such a puerile notion have occurred? The Emperor crossed the Dwina in order to reconnoitre in person, and in order to ascertain whether

Barclay de Tolly's army had already passed that point on its march upon Witepsk; he accordingly ascertained it.

After eulogising the precision in the marches of all the corps, which after a month's separation, and though at a distance of a hundred leagues from the point where they had separated, arrived at Bezenkowiski *on the same day* and *at the same hour*, Mr. de Segur gives us an exaggerated description of the tumult occasioned in the town by that junction. He cannot, however, but be aware that every army in the world presents the same picture, when a great number of troops arrive at a given point. Is this a circumstance quite peculiar to our soldiers, or is it the author's wish to exhibit them as an undisciplined horde?

"On the 25th of July, Murat proceeded to-
"wards Ostrowno with his cavalry. At the dis-
"tance of two leagues from that village, Dumont,
"Du Coetlosquet, Carignan, and the 8th hussars
"were advancing in columns."

On perusing this passage, would it not be imagined that Messieurs Dumont, Coetlosquet, Carignan, were at least general officers, since he names them, as he does Murat, without designating them by any title? This would be a great mistake; those gentlemen were merely officers of the 8th hussars, and if we enquire what they now are, we will easily discover why they are singled out by the author.

The corps of Osterman attempts to defend the

defiles of Ostrowno; a brisk engagement takes place. Mr. de Segur does not perceive that he is arraigning the honor of one of our brave regiments (the eighty-fourth of the line) when he says that many soldiers "under the plea of supporting "the wounded, or of being wounded themselves, "successively abandoned their ranks." This would be casting a gratuitous stain upon French glory. The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace was not present at this action. He can as little assert that he saw Murat at the head of a regiment of Polish lancers charging against his inclination, and pushed forward by "the Polish lances which "were ready couched and condensed behind him." The author's knowledge of military science should be sufficient to inform him that the interval between the squadrons would have enabled the King of Naples to retire, had not his personal bravery led him to take a share in the charge.

We come to another assertion, which again attacks the fame of a French regiment. The Russians were defending a wood; "the 92nd regiment "astounded at the heavy fire issuing from it, and "bewildered by a shower of balls, remained mo-"tionless, neither daring to advance nor to re-"treat, restrained by two opposite fears—the "dread of danger and the dread of shame—and "unable to escape from either." How can the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace take upon himself to expose in this manner the honor of our regiments? As he was not present at the engage-

ment, he ought to have read Prince Eugene's reports; therein he would have found that the Prince, in alluding to this regiment, expresses himself as follows: "The success of so difficult "an attack required nothing less than the valor "of the troops and the perseverance of the general "in command."

CHAPTER VIII.

The French army, after defeating the Russians at the engagement of Ostrowno, continues its march upon Witepsk. On the 27th, the Russian army is discovered in regular order of battle near that city. The French advanced guard prepares to approach the enemy; the presence of the Emperor increases the ardor of the troops.

"The King of Naples, who was intoxicated at "being an object of so much attraction, yielded to "his impetuosity, and made the chasseurs of the "16th rush upon the whole body of the Russian "cavalry. All eyes beheld with terror that feeble "French line, interrupted on its march by the "deep ravines which intersected the ground, and "advancing to attack the enemy's masses. These "unfortunate men, feeling that they were sacri-"ficed, proceeded with hesitation to certain death.

"Consequently, on the first movement made by "the lancers of the Russian guard, they took to "flight. But the ravines, which it was necessary "to pass, obstructed their flight, etc.; they were "thrown into these shoals, where many perished."

This statement is related to the advantage of the Russians, with as much correctness as partiality. We regret to perceive what little justice is rendered in it to a handful of brave men.

After crossing the small bridge which separated us from the enemy, the 16th chasseurs, preceded by two companies of *voltigeurs* of the 9th regiment of the line, was to form itself in order of battle in advance of the defile, with the view of facilitating the passage to the other corps that were coming up. The left of the 16th chasseurs was supported by the *voltigeurs* who had reached the banks of the Dwina. The 16th did not advance under the command of the King of Naples to charge the enemy, but merely to gain ground, and to prevent any obstruction upon the bridge. This was the moment when the cavalry of the Russian guard, protected by the fire from a battery of twelve pieces of cannon, charged that regiment which had General Piré at its head. The 16th chasseurs attempted a manœuvre which had often proved successful; it stood the charge without moving, and at the distance of thirty paces commenced a fire from its carbines. The speed of the Russian cavalry could not be arrested by this fire, which had no other effect than to throw

the ranks of the 16th into confusion. This regiment was forced back upon our infantry; but its loss was inconsiderable, and much inferior to that of the Russians. The latter lost many men in attempting to carry off the two companies of *voltigeurs*, who had been left behind, and who raised a rampart of men and horses by the fire they maintained against the enemy. Where, then, can our officer of the palace have found that the brave chasseurs of the 16th, *feeling that they were sacrificed, proceeded with hesitation to certain death, and took to flight on the first movement of the Russians?* Such pusillanimous sentiments find no place in the hearts of conquering French soldiers. In a work dedicated to the veterans of the French army, and which contains so many trifling details, Mr. de Segur ought to have mentioned the names of two brave officers who commanded the companies of the 9th (Captains Guillard and Savary.) It is true that these are plebeian names.

The author represents Napoleon as hesitating to attack the enemy in the position they occupied. "The soldiers, he says, were astonished at this "inactivity, at the moment of overtaking an "army." He shews us Murat unable "to make "his chief decide on an attack, and rashly pro- "ceeding to pitch his tent almost in the midst of "the enemies." That our soldiers, fired at the sight of the Russians, should have expressed the strongest desire to attack them, may easily be conceived; but to suppose that the King of Naples

should urge the Emperor to attack an army of one hundred thousand men in its positions, with the scanty forces which he had in line, is to attribute words and opinions to that Prince which his habits of war could not have suggested to him. The most skilful man, the man most gifted with experience, genius, and activity, cannot take less than a day to reconnoitre effectually an army occupying more than a league of ground. The first reconnoitring conveys only a general idea; a second, in the middle of the day, is necessary to settle the plan of attack; and a third, at night, assists in confirming the arrangements already made. Then, only, he issues his orders for the following day; the night is employed in determining, by the situation of the fires, whether the enemy's line has undergone any change.

General Barclay altered his determination, and, during the night, the Russian army retired in every direction.

Let us attend to Mr. de Segur's description of the Russian camp: "Every thing about it exhibited the science of war; its advantageous "position; the symmetry of all its parts; the "exact and exclusive nicety in the use to which "each of them had been destined; the order and "neatness which was the result—there appeared "more order in their defeat than in our victory, "etc. etc."

It seems that Mr. de Segur, whose functions called him to Witepsk, to prepare the imperial

quarters, did not see this boasted camp. We, who were instructed to examine it in all its details, could discover nothing but great filth, great irregularity, and such a state of disorder as to render it impossible to estimate the number of men and animals that had bivouaked on the spot.

As to the lessons which the *maréchal-des-logis* pretends to have been given to us by the Russians in their flight, we only allude to them in order to shew what spirit appears to have dictated his work, and what nation he endeavors to gratify.

"As soon as the Emperor had made up his "mind, he returned to Witepsk with his guard. "There, on the 28th of July, when he entered the "imperial quarters, he ungirded his sword, and "abruptly laying it upon the maps with which "his tables were covered, he exclaimed: here I "must stop, here I must look around me, take "some repose, rally my army, and organize Po-"land. The campaign of 1812 is over; that of "1813, will do the rest."

The Emperor, when he marched with rapidity upon Wilna, had the double object in view of reaching that city before Barclay's army, and of preventing Bagration's junction with that army. As soon as he was informed of Barclay's precipitate retreat upon Smolensko to unite himself to Bragation, who had escaped from the pursuit of the fifth and eighth corps, it behoved him to stop.

The motives for that repose to which Mr. de Segur makes allusion are very natural; but, as if

consistency were too great an effort for the author, he ascribes these words to the Emperor: "*The campaign of* 1812 *is over; that of* 1813 *will do the rest.* He develops this idea in the following chapter.

It never would have occurred to the mind of a military man that the taking up his winter quarters in the month of July could have been contemplated by Napoleon.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

" LITHUANIA once conquered, the object of the " war was attained." Has the author then forgot what he stated in the first chapter of his work, that a war was about to be carried on against England in the heart of Russia; that the Russians were to be driven back into Asia; *that this expedition was indispensable to the completion of a great design on the point of being accomplished; that its object was not out of reach; that the means for reaching it were not inadequate.*

The real object of the war was to compel the Emperor Alexander to make peace, and return to the alliance he had sworn with us against England. But Mr. de Segur commences his chapter in the above manner, merely to introduce this consequence: *the Emperor is to stop at Witepsk.*

After speaking of the various establishments formed in that city, he adds: " Utility was not " alone attended to; embellishments were also to " be sought. Some houses obstructed the square " of the palace; the Emperor ordered them to be " pulled down." Might it not be believed, on

reading this, that Napoleon was seriously intent upon embellishing the town of Witepsk? If he has had old houses thrown down, which obstructed the square in front of his residence, he did so in order to pass his troops in review. There is, besides, some utility in preventing any interruption to the approaches to head quarters.

Murat comes to apprize Napoleon that "the "Russian army was panic-struck; that his light "cavalry alone was sufficient to put it to flight." To that ebullition of ardour Napoleon is made to return this serious reply: "Two great rivers "mark out our position; let us raise block-"houses along that line; let our fires cross each "other in all directions; let us form in a square "battalion, with cannons at the exterior and on "its angles. Let the space within contain our "cantonments and our magazines."

The author ought to have afforded us some explanation of *this grand square battalion, with its fires crossing each other in all directions.* He seems, however, to understand well those arrangements, since he adds: "Thus his genius conceiv-"ed every thing in masses; his eye embraced an "army of 400,000 men as it did a regiment." Mr. de Segur now represents Napoleon as giving no orders, except for laying siege to Bobruisk (a fortress in the midst of swamps) *by means of cavalry.* Such absurdities fall of themselves to the ground. The division Dombrowski which the author supposes to be reduced to twelve hundred

men, consisted of twelve battalions and a brigade of light cavalry, amounting together to nine thousand men. It was destined to watch the Russian division of General Hœrtel and the fortress of Bobruisk. With his infantry General Dombrowski was to invest this fortress, which was in a bad state of defence, and his cavalry was to scour the neighbouring country. He was provided with twenty pieces of cannon. The author says in another place that *Macdonald received neither instructions nor the means of obtaining possession of Riga*, whilst he had at his command the numerous battering train from Dantzig, and that before quitting Wilna, the Emperor had made him acquainted with his intentions.

Our *maréchal-des-logis* soon forgets what he has related of Napoleon's determination to *plant his eagles* upon Witepsk, and yet he bears in mind that prince's exclamation upon entering it: *Do you imagine I came so far merely to conquer these huts?*

Mr. de Segur, who delights in descriptions, ought to have presented us that of the imposing ceremony which took place on the reception of the new colonel of foot grenadiers of the guard. But he dwells so lightly upon this, that one might suppose it to be the reception of an ordinary officer, instead of one of the most distinguished generals, holding one of the first commands in the army. The author, who has so often named ordinary officers, might well have mentioned General

Count Friant, less known, no doubt, than they are, in the *salons*, but so much famed among the brave. He ought to have stated that the Emperor drew his sword, received him in person, and embraced him, saying: "This is the reward of your "brilliant and worthy services; but I still have "need of you. Continue to command your divi- "sion during this campaign; you are more use- "ful to me there than at the head of your grena- "diers, who are always under my own eyes."

Who could recognize the Emperor in the following picture: "Napoleon grew impatient.... "he is observed to grow restless....The image of "captured Moscow besets him....a great irre- "solution affects his whole person....he is seen "wandering about his apartments, as if pursued "by that dangerous temptation....he walks a- "bout without an object, inquires the hour, "watches the weather, and stops completely ab- "sorbed; he then hums a tune with an absent "look, and continues his walk....enquiring of "those he meets: well, what shall we do? shall "we stay where we are, shall we move forward? "etc."

Mr. de Segur at one time represents him in bed; at another in his shirt; and after the fine reasonings in the preceding chapter, on the necessity of remaining at Witepsk, he tells us that "the same "danger which perhaps ought to have recalled "him to the Niemen, or kept him upon the Dwi- "na, urges him on to Moscow....that having at

"last formed his determination, he suddenly "arises, full of the fire which his mighty con- "ception had kindled; that he appears possessed "by the genius of war, that his voice grows deeper, "his eyes flash fire, and his countenance dark- "ens; that his attendants withdraw from his pre- "sence with awe."

The historian of the grand army has no doubt taken his model from Charenton.*

CHAPTER II.

Mr. de Segur, without alluding to the new circumstances which may have occurred to operate a change in the views of Napoleon, represents him as solely occupied with the idea of leaving Witepsk, and of marching forward.

"His resolution once taken, he was anxious "not to create discontent among those around him; "it was by their sentiments that he was enabled to "judge of those of the army: he felt ill at ease, "when surrounded by disapproving looks." We ought from this to conclude that his intentions met with general disapprobation; that he stood alone against all. Napoleon's thoughts were but

* A suburb of Paris, containing a receptable for insane persons.—TRANSLATOR.

little bestowed on those *around him*. He neither had the weakness to feel uneasy at *disapproving looks*, nor the folly to *judge of the sentiments of the army* by those of individuals, who owed all their self-consequence to the duties he had entrusted to them as connected with the service. With a single frown, he would have caused the *disapproving looks* to give way. As to the discontent, it sometimes existed; but it seldom broke out. Was not Napoleon well aware that courtiers are murmurers by nature? Did he not likewise know what allowance ought to be made for human weakness? And if he felt indulgence for the ill-humor created by fatigues and privations, if he was too just to be offended at it, he was also wise enough not to take it into account in forming his determinations. He was wise enough especially, not to judge of the real sentiments of the army from the sentiments of those who held no command with the troops, and who did not live with them. Napoleon knew how to appreciate men and things, a knowledge to which our officer of the palace is an entire stranger.

The author renews here the scenes which he has caused to be represented in Paris, and he does so by means of the same actors. If we are to believe him, the Emperor has had mere idle talkers, or men without education, in his train.

Notwithstanding the observations that are made to him, " he determines to march upon Moscow " and St. Petersburgh at the same time, in order

" to destroy every thing in the one, and preserve " every thing in the other." This is a strange distributive justice! It is unfortunate that the Duke de Frioul, to whom such a secret was revealed, should be no longer in existence to explain to us its originality. This conversation with Duroc is designed to introduce the Emperor's reply, that " if the war in Russia should not hold out any " advantageous prospect, he would turn his arms " against Prussia, and make her pay the expenses " of the war." How are we to suppose that, whilst the Prussians were marching under the banners of Napoleon, he was meditating their ruin! General Yorck may have said so to excuse his defection; but what motive can Mr. de Segur assign for this invention! He makes Mr. Daru say, that the war is not a *national* one. Mr. Daru cannot have held such a language. The liberation of Poland rendered that war more *national* than any other of Napoleon's enterprises. After the war respecting the limits of the Rhine, it was the most *national* of any that could have been undertaken.

Throughout this chapter, the author exhibits to us Napoleon endeavoring to convince the *great officers*, to combat their opposition, and to obtain from them that they would make a last effort to proceed as far as Smolensko. Napoleon cajoles them; when interrupting them, he does so by " subtle reasonings.... His deportment is remark- " able for ease, simplicity, and good nature, etc.

"all which sufficiently explains why, after so "many misfortunes, he is still beloved by those "who were on terms of intimacy with him." The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace has not lived with him upon this footing of intimacy; he proves it by the spirit which dictated his work.

If this be a faithful picture of those who were about Napoleon's person, it must be admitted that the Prince was attended by servants not remarkable for their devotedness to his person, and strangely obstinate in their resistance. No general engaged in a distant country, can succeed when he meets with so much opposition. The very soldiers say, that they only saw him on the day of battle, *when they had to die for him, but never when it was question to supply them with the means of existence.* What becomes of that minute care which the Emperor takes that the soldier may be fed, and of *those stores as immense as the enterprise,* which he has caused to be collected.

The magic wand of Mr. de Segur performs every metamorphosis; all the masks are changed; we no longer recognize any one.

Napoleon has no longer a will; he can no longer command obedience.

Berthier is no longer the anxious executor of his orders.

Mouton is no longer that proud military tribune, whom Cæsar has compelled to yield.*

* When Count de Lobau was colonel of the third regiment of the line, his vote was opposed to Napoleon's elevation to the

Caulincourt is no longer that exact and correct servant, who lays aside his own feelings, and knows nothing but his duty.

Duroc is no longer the discreet confident, who retains the secret entrusted to him, when it is not indispensable to repeat his master's words.

Mr. Daru is divested of his real character as a laborious and rigid administrator; he is converted into a political talker, in presence of the man who commanded all his respect.

CHAPTER III.

The second corps obtained, on the road to Sebej, an important advantage over a Russian brigade, and repulsed it upon the Drissa. Mr. de Segur states the loss of the enemy upon this occasion at only two thousand men and eight pieces of cannon, whereas it in fact amounted to three thousand men and fourteen pieces of cannon. A Russian general, who was killed in this affair, furnishes the author with a theme for pompous eulo-

---

imperial throne. The Emperor who had at heart to bind to his service an officer of so much distinction, sent for him: a short conversation won over to him that colonel, who was soon named his aid-de-camp.

gium: *his death,* he says, *was heroic.* He then enters into elaborate details upon the subject, which could have been furnished to him only by the Russians. Without meaning to make the praises bestowed upon our enemies by the officer of the palace a matter of reproach against him, we cannot but observe that the loss of the French generals who fell in this campaign is far from inspiring him with similar sentiments of regret: he scarcely mentions their names.

The author supposes that it was not till towards the conclusion of his stay at Witepsk that the Emperor became acquainted with the proclamations of Alexander, dated Polosk the 18th July, of which we have already spoken. He says that Napoleon was *hurt* at the gross abuse which they contained. He is mistaken; it merely excited his smile.

Whilst stationed at Witepsk, Napoleon entertained hopes that the enemy's armies, which were collected in the neighbourhood of Smolensko, would make some injudicious movements, of which he might take advantage. The attack made by the Russians upon General Sebastiani at Inkowo, presently confirmed him in the idea that Barclay's entire army was quitting the environs of Smolensko for the purpose of attacking him. His decision was immediate, and Mr. de Segur is right in saying that it *was great and bold as the undertaking.* He conceived the idea of gaining, by a rapid movement, the left bank of

the Dnieper; and by following the course of that river, proposed to reach Smolensko before the Russians; a movement which would place us upon the flank or rear of the enemy's forces; four days sufficed for him to remove to Liadoui the detachment under Davoust as well as the troops that accompanied himself. The boldness of this manœuvre, which even the Russians have admired,* and the rapidity with which it was executed, triumphantly refute all that the author has said about the indecision and apathy of the Emperor.

---

* *See L'histoire militaire de la Campagne de Russie, en* 1812, by Colonel Boutourlin, aid-de-camp to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. (Vol. i. page 252.)

BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

The author, who is no enemy to repetitions, again relates to us Napoleon's masterly manœuvre, of which he spoke at the end of the preceding chapter. That movement, which is represented by our enemies as one of the finest military operations of Napoleon, nevertheless furnishes the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace with a subject of censure: so sparing is he in the distribution of of his praises, and profuse in the application of blame! In this instance the subject of his lamentations is a division *which an ill-written order occasioned to wander for four-and-twenty hours in the woods:* a circumstance of no importance, and which a judicious historian would have abstained from mentioning. But when the Emperor furnishes the author with no matter for criticism, he directs his attacks against the army, which he represents as marching in a state of general confusion.

CHAPTER II.

In our advance to Smolensko, along the left bank of the Dnieper, we met at Krasnoi with the Russian division Newerowskoi, which it is difficult to imagine why the Russians had placed there. This division was on the point of being completely overpowered; and Mr. de Segur supposes that the circumstance of its not having been so in fact, was owing to the tardiness of Grouchy. The truth is, that, from the rapidity of its flight, it was impossible to overtake and attack it, except by the cavalry. The artillery, which had been retarded in passing the defile at Krasnoi, could not be brought to bear upon it, notwithstanding all the author has said upon the subject. If it had arrived in time, that division would have been entirely destroyed. Our historian, in conformity with his general system, omits to mention, that, in one of the brilliant charges of our cavalry, Colonel Marbeuf was mortally wounded.

On the occasion of the 15th August, Prince Eugene came to compliment the Emperor, who observed to him: *Every thing is preparing for a battle; I shall gain it; and we shall see Moscow.* Eugene, according to our historian, *was silent;*

but on retiring, anxiously remarked to Marshal Mortier: *Moscow will be our ruin.*——*Duroc the most reserved of all*, said, *he could not foresee the period of our return. So that*, adds the author, *disapprobation began already to be manifested.* It would seem, however, from all he has stated in the preceding chapters, that the commencement of this disapprobation was of much earlier date.

CHAPTER III.

NAPOLEON had availed himself so dexterously of the hesitation and injudicious movements of the Russian generals in their march towards Witepsk, that it was only at Smolensko that they became aware of the danger which threatened them. This place was on the point of being taken. Mr. de Segur represents Marshal Ney as having been *inflamed* at the sight of this town; and reproaches him with having endeavored to obtain possession of it immediately. "A ball struck him on the "neck. In the moment of irritation he ordered "a battalion against the citadel—the Russian "walls were alone able to arrest the progress of "his men." Marshal Ney was too much habi-

tuated to balls, to be irritated at receiving one in his clothes: it was not therefore in order to revenge himself, that he ordered a battalion of the 46th to advance, but for the purpose of compelling the enemy to retire within the citadel, and in order, at the same time, to reconnoitre it. It is to be regretted that he did not persevere in his first intention, and make a vigorous attack upon the place; as it would infallibly have been taken: the citadel was merely flanked with earth. The officer of the palace, who pays but little regard to military operations, gives no exact account of the position of the French army round Smolensko. The following is his description:

"Davoust, and afterwards Count de Lobau de-
"ployed to the right of Ney, the guard at the
"centre, in reserve; and farther on, the army of
"Italy. The place of Junot and the Westphalians
"was marked out; Murat and Poniatowski formed
"the right of the army."

The author should have informed us what corps Count de Lobau commanded, since Marshal Davoust had taken from him the divisions which had been confided to his direction. Shortly afterwards he adds: "The French army, being thus placed,
"was backed by defiles and precipices: but the
"means of retreating occupied but little of Na-
"poleon's attention: he thought of nothing but
"victory." The *maréchal-des-logis*, who seems desirous of giving the Emperor some lessons in military tactics, should have known that the re-

treat of our army was secured by two high roads; that the fourth division, (that commanded by Prince Eugene) as well as the Pajol division had been stationed at Goritnia, to clear the banks of the Dnieper to our left; and that our right was flanked, a little towards the rear, by the corps of the Duke of Abrantes. Mr. de Segur, who appears so well acquainted with the plans and disposition of Barclay de Tolly, should also have informed us why he sent Bagration, not to Elnia, as stated by our historian, but to Dorogobouje, and why he remained with his army at Smolensko. Either Barclay desired a battle, or he did not: if the former, he should have united his forces; if the latter, he should have evacuated Smolensko. The officer of the palace assigns as a reason for Barclay having remained in that town, "That, having before "him a colossal enemy, he must naturally have "expected gigantic movements." We confess our inability to understand this: if Barclay had to do with a colossal enemy, could he think to increase his forces by dividing them.

CHAPTER IV.

NAPOLEON, having ascertained that a portion of the Russian army had quitted Smolensko and taken the road to Moscow, resolved to attack it.

Then is brought forward the brave "Murat,

" who was all prudence when not stimulated by " the presence of the enemy, combating this reso- " lution." The author even assures us " that he " threw himself at the feet of his brother, and con- " jured him to pause—for that Moscow would be " our ruin.

Mr. de Segur has not the talent of diversifying either the ideas he ascribes to his personages, or the mode of expressing them. Murat merely repeats here, what was attributed a few pages back, to Prince Eugene. To describe the King of Naples as expressing himself in this manner, is to represent him as a very inexperienced general. How could the Emperor stop before Smolensko? Would the officer of the palace have wished him to retrace his steps? There was nothing else to be done but to take the place. Besides, having passed a part of the night with the King of Naples, and in the tent of the Emperor, we are enabled to affirm, that the conversations reported to have taken place, are untrue. Every one was anxious that Smolensko should fall into our hands. The attack once resolved on, Napoleon caused the town to be invested both above and below the bridges, for the purpose of storming those passages, and so determining the enemy to evacuate it.

It was in one of the batteries constructed with this view, (that to our right,) that Mr. de Segur represents Murat, in despair as to the issue of the war, as anxious to be killed.—A most complete absurdity.

The author who has no precise ideas of military movements, tells us that "Napoleon was desirous "that the artillery of the guard should, at the "same time, open a fire upon the great wall with "its twelve-pounders. The artillery refused to "obey." This charge of disobedience would be disgraceful to the guard, were it well founded; but it is not. The Emperor, at the same time that he was vigorously cannonading the bridges, directed a few twelve-pounder shots to be fired upon the wall, in order to observe the effect they would produce; and having ascertained that it would require too much time, and ammunition to effect a breach, he ordered the engineers to undermine it.

"In advancing to the assault, our columns of "attack left a long and broad train of wounded, "of blood, and of slain." To the assault of what, *M. l'officier du palais?* There were no out-works; the suburbs were merely guarded by troops, and not intrenched. There was therefore nothing to assault.

"The fault which Ney had caused to be com-"mitted the day before by a single battalion, "was now repeated by the whole army." Who would believe that a man invested with the title of General could write such things! What possible way could there be of taking the place, except by first expelling the enemy from the suburbs?

"Count de Lobau, having made himself master

" of the *fossé*, directed bombs to be thrown into " the town..... So great a disaster, which he regarded as his own work, alarmed Count de Lobau."

Here we have two difficulties to unravel. The first is to make out what corps Count de Lobau commanded: for, by the author's own shewing, we find round Smolensko, on the left, Ney, whose right extended to the division of Davoust, who had his right supported by Poniatowski. Where then was Count de Lobau's corps stationed? Mr. de Segur should have informed us on this point. In the second place we have to enquire how it happened that Count de Lobau, after ordering shells to be thrown into the town, was *alarmed* at their having set it on fire. Is the *maréchal-des-logis* ignorant that this is the effect which shells must be expected to produce?

The brave Polish General Grabowski, was killed on entering the town: a circumstance which the author has not mentioned.

CHAPTER V.

The Emperor traverses the field of battle;—" a " sad review of the dead and dying; a melancho- " ly account either to make or to render." Upon

this point Mr. de Segur gives us to understand that care was taken to bury our dead, in order to obviate unfavorable impressions upon the minds of our soldiery. But could such facts be easy of concealment when the whole army was present? Does he mean to intimate that French soldiers fear death? The little vanity of shining by verbal amplifications, is, with him, paramount to every other consideration. He represents Napoleon, surrounded as he was by Ney, Davoust, Mortier, Duroc, etc. as holding a conversation, as it were, *aside;* and adds that it was "from "the necessity he experienced of unburthening "his heart of the solicitude which oppressed "him ..... that he indulged in the most vio- "lent declamation against the general and the "army of the enemy; as if he could vanquish "by argument, what he had been unable to sub- "due by force ..... That his words served but "to shew his dissappointment, &c."

All the asperity of invective against the Russians thus ascribed to the Emperor, has been mentioned merely to introduce the sounding eulogium upon that people which the author has thought proper to oppose to it: "The Russians," he observes, "are just at that point in the scale "of moral advancement, at which all the primi- "tive virtues are retained, and some of the ac- "quired virtues have already been added to "them." Presently afterwards an aid-de-camp comes to announce that, at our right, Regnier and

Prince Schwarzenberg had obtained an important advantage over Tormasof, and had driven him back into Volhynia. Napoleon is represented as immediately exclaiming "Do you see! The ani- "mals! They suffer themselves to be beaten "even by the Austrians." Is it probable that the Emperor should have the impurdence to insult the Austrians, at the very moment they were entitled to his praise? Connecting this exclamation with the design ascribed by the author to Napoleon at Witepsk, of *directing his operations against Prussia, and making that country defray the expenses of the war, in case the Russian campaign should hold out no prospect of a favorable issue,* might one not be tempted to believe that our historian was anxious to justify beforehand the conduct afterwards adopted by those two cabinets, and so to diminish the odium of their defection?

He represents some of the generals that were the nearest to Napoleon's person as having said that: "If Europe were to rise against him, his "soldiers would become his only subjects, and "his camp his empire; and that even of these, a "third part consisting of foreigners would become "his enemies." Was it possible that such ideas should arise at that epoch in the mind of any one? This anachronism is a further proof that the romance we have been examining is written in the spirit of new opinions, and not founded upon recollection.

The author then exhibits to us some scenes of

murmuring, which are but a repetition of those at Wilna, Witepsk, etc. etc. Surely his inventive genius might have furnished us with something newer.

CHAPTER VI.

How unfortunate is the Emperor Napoleon! It is not enough that he should hear in every direction the incessant lamentations of Murat, Caulincourt, Daru, Berthier, Ney, Lobau, etc.; he must now have to do with two new murmurers, Rapp, and Lauriston. Rapp speaks on the occasion; he comes from Dantzig; but this circumstance does not prevent his giving an account of the disorder prevailing among our soldiers in Germany, from the Elbe to the Oder, and from the Oder to the Vistula. He concludes by saying that the troops complain *of being kept constantly marching*. Not content with affording to Rapp the aid of his eloquence, Mr. de Segur himself presents of our soldiers the following picture: "Agitated by a vague inquietude, they marched "on amid the dull uniformity of the vast and "silent forests of dark pines; They crept* along

---

* Does the author mean to say that our soldiers climbed the trees.

"these large trees, bare and stripped to their very "tops, and were affrighted at their weakness "amid this immensity. They then conceived "gloomy and absurd notions."....

The most daring authors of melodramatic performances on the *boulevards* would have hesitated to make their buffoon give utterance to so grotesque a description.

The declamations against the soldiery on the departure from Wilna are still borne in mind. We now have another frightful picture of the number of victims which were left scattered along the road, and whom the author does not estimate at less than one fourth of the French, and one half of the allied armies.

Rapp is not sparing in his details; but the Emperor does not enter into any explanation with him; another general is more in possession of his confidence; this is Sebastiani, who reminds Napoleon "of his having declared to him, at "Wilna, that he would not cross the Dwina: he, "like the rest, laid great stress upon the state "of the army. Its condition is dreadful, replied "the Emperor: from Wilna half of it consisted "of stragglers; now they form two thirds; there "is, therefore, no time to be lost." It is evident, according to this calculation, that the march ought to be rapid, if Napoleon wishes that any of his soldiers should reach Moscow. For, even at Smolensko, where scarce one half the distance has been performed, there would only remain one

third of the army fit for active service, a ridiculous assertion which carries with it its own refutation.

Mr. de Segur finds that the Emperor contradicts himself in the words he addresses to his generals. The evil is no doubt contagious; for, in the preceding chapter, Count de Lobau, on his entrance into Smolensko, is made by that historian to say: "What a fine head cantonment! this was "the same thing as advising him to stop there; "but the Emperor returned no other answer to "this counsel than a stern look." And yet a few pages afterwards, Napoleon is made to repeat Count de Lobau's expressions in the presence of Davoust and of his generals. *He considered Smolensko*, he said, as an *excellent head cantonment, &c. Now*, continued he, addressing Davoust, *my line is well covered; we will stop here!* He however sends him at this time to join Ney and Murat in pursuit of the Russians. He wishes to avoid from henceforth *any serious affair*, and he commits the pursuit of the enemy to *the two rashest of his officers. Unknown to Davoust, who is the prudent Marshal, he places him under the command of the impetuous King of Naples. Thus*, says our author, *the contradictions of his words seem to be communicated to his actions.*

It is easy for Mr. de Segur to ascribe contradictions in words and in actions to the imaginary personages of his own creating. But history will not form its judgment of Napoleon upon frivolous

prattle. This prince never said that he would stop at Smolensko, for he never entertained the thought of doing so.

CHAPTER VII.

As soon as the bridges are restored, Marshal Ney passes the Dniester in order to follow up the enemy; but not, as is alleged by our officer of the palace, *with anxious eye and attentive ear.* How can the author assert that, when they found no enemy, those brave troops, led on by an equally brave commander, *were relieved from the weight of a great apprehension?* Let him bestow praise upon the Russians, when it is well merited; nothing more proper. But at least let him not say that the French soldiers dreaded them. The campaign, however disastrous, has sufficiently proved the contrary.

It has been seen in the preceding chapter, that, as early as the 17th August, the corps of Bagration was sent by General Barclay in the direction of Dorogobouje. Barclay de Tolly himself abandoned Smolensko on the 18th at day break, and moved along the road of Poreczie, from whence he marched his corps in two columns, by cross

roads, so as to fall into the road from Smolensko to Moscow, the left column at Prouditchi, the right at Loubino. They were both in this manner to march over the arc of a circle, the cord of which was formed by part of the road from Smolensko to Moscow; a very imprudent movement; for, independently of the long winding which Barclay had to take, and the bad condition of the cross roads which he had to travel over in order to gain the road to Moscow, the latter offered no other impediment to our march, than four regiments of cossacks, left there by Bagration, under the command of General Karpof. To this weak rear-guard alone was thus committed the duty of covering the two outlets through which the two columns of Barclay's army were to fall again into the high road. The Russian General had no sooner entered those defiles, than he discovered the danger that threatened him. He sent in all haste an advanced guard, under the command of General Touczkof to recover the high road by forced marches, and to proceed afterwards in the direction of Smolensko, with the view of affording assistance to the cossacks under Karpof.

"At length, says Mr. de Segur, after an ar-
"duous march, the head of the enemy's convoy
"came in sight of the high road at the moment
"when, in order to reach that outlet, the French
"had only to force the height of Valontina, and
"the passage of the Kolowdnia. Ney had just
"succeeded in carrying that of the Stubna."

Marshal Ney, after passing the Dniester, had continued his march between the two roads of St. Petersburgh and of Moscow, in the direction of Gorbounowo, and his light troops drove out of it some detachments of Baggawouth's corps (belonging to the right column) which they met in the town. The Marshal now ascertained that the Russians were proceeding towards the Moscow road, and followed them in the same direction. The enemy, as already stated, having retained towards Smolensko, no other troops than cossacks upon this road, Ney met with few obstacles until he arrived at Valontina. "But Korf, driven "back upon Valontina, had summoned to his aid "the column which preceded him." This fact is not correctly laid down. After defending the suburb of Smolensko against Ney, General Korf, who commanded Barclay's rear-guard, took the road towards Paloniewo (that of Poreczie) in which Barclay had preceded him. He did not therefore make his retreat, as the author represents it, by the high road to Moscow,* neither did he fight at Valontina.

Towards eleven, Marshal Ney attacked the enemy's corps which he met on the Moscow road,

* When the troops of Marshal Ney attacked Gorbounowo, they cut off the rear-guard, and Barclay sent to its relief the division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, which retook Gorbounowo, at the time when Marshal Ney was proceeding in the direction of Valontina.

and briskly drove them beyond a swampy brook, where fresh Russian divisions had come up to their assistance. the enemy obstinately maintained their ground. General Barclay felt of what importance it was to arrest the progress of the French at all hazards. He repaired to that position, and successively brought up other divisions, in the order in which they debouched from the cross roads, and entered upon the high road.

The Emperor being informed that Ney met with some resistance, sent Gudin's division, which he placed under the orders of that Marshal.

This division approached the scene of action towards four in the afternoon. Having formed itself into a column by platoons, it marched up to the enemy, who occupied a height that intercepted the road, and was protected by the swampy brook, with a small wooden bridge over it, which it was necessary to cross before an attack could be made upon the height. This narrow defile was battered in all directions by the Russian artillery. The seventh light infantry, with arms shouldered, and General Gudin at their head, took the lead to force the pass. Each platoon, as it crossed the brook, answered the numerous cannon shots of the Russians by the enthusiatic cries of *long live the Emperor*. That regiment was followed by the twelfth, the twenty-first, and the hundred and twenty-first; but at this moment the brave General Gudin had both his legs shattered by a cannon ball. Count Gerard took his place. The en-

gagement became very brisk. The French, however, reached the opposite height. Four times the Russian columns rushed upon them; four times Gerard drove them back. The whole corps of Baggowouth, the divisions of Alsuwief, and of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, had come up to the engagement which lasted until ten at night. The enemy being unable to recover the position, which Gerard's division had taken from them, now began their retreat.

"There was almost as much glory in their defeat as in our victory."

Having been present at this engagement, we know that the Russians fought with the utmost bravery; but the author should say that, besides a superiority in numbers over the corps of Marshal Ney and Gerard's division, the enemy held an excellent position, and that their numerous artillery had an advantage over us so much the greater, as we were prevented on our side, by the nature of the ground, from making a full display of our own. In spite, however, of all these obstacles, the attack of Gerard's division succeeded in securing to us that formidable position, which none but French troops could have carried. We do not fear to be contradicted by any military man, when we affirm that this engagement was one of the most glorious exploits that our armies have achieved.

"One of the enemy's generals, the only one left "unhurt on this field of carnage, endeavored to

" escape from among our soldiers, by repeating " the French word of command. He was recog- " nized by the flashes of the fire arms, and " secured."

It was not the effect of mere chance that General Touczkof was made prisoner, as the author would seem to insinuate. In one of the last attacks, a heavy column of Russian grenadiers charged with the bayonet a battalion of the seventh light infantry, and another of the twelfth regiment of the line; the shock was very violent, but the enemy were thrown back with great vigour. In the encounter, a lieutenant of light troops of the twelfth regiment of the line, named Etienne, rushed upon the Russian general, and after aiming two sabre cuts at his head, carried him off a prisoner from the midst of his own soldiers.

" The Russians astonished at having been at- " tacked only in front—styled Murat in derision " the general of the high roads." If this reproach was directed by the Russians against the King of Naples, it ought to have been taken up by Mr. de Segur in a different manner. Murat and his cavalry were not upon the road, but to the right of Marshal Ney's point of attack, in order to be in communication with the corps of Junot, which was crossing the Dnieper at Prouditchewo, and was to turn the left of the Russian position. Our soldiers styled Barclay *the general of roads*, and with better reason.

The officer of the palace seems to make it a reproach to the Emperor, that he was not present at the engagement of Valontina; and amongst other reasons which he gives for his absence, he does not fail to mention fatigue. It is a foremost idea with him, invariably to represent Napoleon oppressed with fatigue, and greatly fallen in a physical as well as in a moral point of view. It may be conceived that a kind of shame has prevented Mr. de Segur from attacking the Emperor with the weapons which his enemies have wielded; but it excites a feeling of indignation to see him cloaking an insult under the disguise of pity. There is no difference in the effect, neither we regret to add, is there any in the intention.

The two grand Russian armies had retired, as we have already observed, the one by the road to Moscow, the other by that to St. Petersburgh. In directing the corps of Marshal Ney and the cavalry of the King of Naples on the road to Moscow, which, according to his instructions, was to be intersected towards Latichino by the Duke of Abrantes, the Emperor thought that these once united, having only to contend against a rear guard, could easily throw it back; and that his presence was more important at Smolensko, as a central point, for receiving the reports from the different corps.

After waiting at the distance of a league from the town, in an intermediate position, between the roads of Smolensko and of Moscow, Napoleon did

not return to his head-quarters until five of the afternoon, when he thought the engagement was over. Previous, however, to quitting that position, he sent to the King of Naples, his orderly officer Gourgaud, under whose command he placed several others (Mr. Rohan Chabot among the rest.)* He directed him to follow the attack which was making upon the road to Moscow, and to cause the movements of Marshal Ney, of the King of Naples, and of the Duke of Abrantes, to coincide simultaneously with each other. This officer was to send his reports of the engagement to the Emperor. It was only after having taken this precaution that Napoleon re-entered Smolensko.

According to the direction laid down by the Emperor, the Russians could not have defended the position of Valontina. He must have supposed that the Duke of Abrantes, after passing the Dnieper, would have continued his march towards the high road, and thus out-flanking the left of the Russian position, have compelled them to make a precipitate retreat. He knew that Morand's division, belonging to the corps of Davoust, by taking the left of the high road, would also out-flank the right of the Russian position. Could he foresee that these arrangements would not be carried into effect? In spite of the entrea-

* Mr. Rohan Chabot was aid-de-camp to General Count de Narbonne.

ties of the King of Naples, in spite of the orders and instructions from the Emperor, which the orderly officer communicated to him, Junot constantly refused to take the road in the rear of the Russians. It appears that this general, who had given so many proofs of the most brilliant valour, was beginning to feel the symptoms of the complaint of which he died soon afterwards. The orderly officer, seeing that the general would not execute the order of which he was the bearer, said to him: "Duke, what am I to report to the "Emperor?" The Duke of Abrantes was surrounded by his staff, and appeared very dejected. He replied with peevishness: "You will report, "sir, that I have taken up a position, because "night has overtaken me." In vain the orderly officer observed that there yet remained four hours of day-light, that Marshal Ney suffered much from the attack he was obliged to make in front; all his remonstrances were to no purpose; the Duke of Abrantes would not make any movement. When the engagement was over, the orderly officer returned to Smolensko, and presented himself to the Emperor at midnight, to give him an account of it. Napoleon sensibly affected at the useless effusion of blood at Valontina, and at the death of General Gudin, asked why Junot had not carried his orders into execution. The officer communicated what had taken place. The Emperor then sent for Berthier, and said to him: "It appears that Junot has enough

" of it; he has refused to turn the position of the " Russians. He is the cause of our having had a " very sanguinary engagement, of our having lost " General Gudin——I will not allow him to " command the Westphalians any longer; he " must be replaced by Rapp, who speaks German, " and who will be a proper leader for them." The Prince of Neufchatel wrote the orders relating to this change, but in the course of a few hours Marshal Duroc and other great officers, old companions in arms of Junot, succeeded in pacifying Napoleon, and that general retained his command.

" The Emperor gave orders to Davoust to sup- " port Ney and Murat."

In the preceding chapter Mr. de Segur has already sent him on to that destination, and made it a ground of reproach, that the marshal, *the most prudent,* should be placed under the orders *of the rashest.* These two chapters, which dwell upon the same movement, are so deficient in arrangement, that they appear to treat of events occurring at an interval of two months from each other. But all is confusion in Mr. de Segur's accounts, as well as in his recollections.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE picture given by the author, of the distribution of the rewards decreed by Napoleon, possesses some interest; but it is deficient in details. Mr. de Segur, who, in general, is lavish of them, has omitted amongst others the following: The Emperor, on visiting the position of Valontina, said to General Gerard: "This is a field of battle "to my liking; four Russians to one Frenchman; "Gerard, this is quite right." He then praised the courage of the troops, repeatedly recommended order and discipline to them, and on coming up to the seventh light infantry, desired all the captains to form a circle around him, and said to them: "Point out to me the best officer in the "regiment.—Sire, they are all good officers.— "Come, point out the best.—Sire, they are all "good officers —Why, this is no answer to my "question; speak as Themistocles did: I am the "first; the second is my neighbour." They then named Captain Moncey, who was wounded, and absent at this moment. "What, said the Emperor, "Moncey who was my page, the son of the Mar- "shal? Now name me another.—Sire, he is the "best officer.—Well! I give him the decoration."

Mr. de Segur allows the mind of his reader no

rest; after this review he immediately presents us with a sight of the hospitals, where he makes a display of his taste for afflicting scenes. He does not stop at Smolensko; he falls back upon Witepsk and even upon Wilna, where he goes to borrow his darkest colors. He appears to find fault with the Emperor for the sufferings and the state of want of the soldiers, of which he presents the most exaggerated description.

In justice we must say, and without fear of contradiction, that of all ancient or modern generals, Napoleon is the one who shewed the most tender, the most unceasing care to the wounded, that the intoxication of victory never made him forget them, and that his first thought, after every battle, has been for them. If his soldiers have sometimes stood in need of provisions, of beds, medicines, or other articles necessary for the dressings of their wounds, the author might direct his reproaches to the intendant general of the army. The Emperor had given every requisite order, and supplied the military administration with means, in men and horses, as abundant as those for the artillery. The latter branch of the service, notwithstanding the engagements that had taken place, was never in want of ammunition. When the administration set in motion a *materiel* so considerable as to consist of several thousand carriages, it could have no difficulty in procuring the transport of some hospital waggons; this would have spared the intendant of the army the

necessity of requesting at Smolensko* that general Lariboisiere, who commanded the artillery of the army, would cause him to be provided with the tow which is used for lining the caissons, in order that he might supply it to the purpose of dressing the wounded.

CHAPTER IX.

The author says, "that Napoleon had employed "two of his officers to sound the sentiments of the "Russian people, in order to encourage them to "rise, but that the attempt had only served to "put them on their guard against him." And immediately afterwards he adds, that "this ex-

---

* The *materiel* of the artillery of the army before Smolensko (the guards, the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th corps, and the reserve of cavalry) was as follows:

57	———	12	pounders.
267	———	6	do.
32	———	4	do.
2	———	3	do.
10	———	obuses of $6\frac{1}{3}$	inches.
122	———	do. $5\frac{1}{3}$	do.
490	field-pieces,		

and ——— 2477 caissons loaded with ammunition; forming a total of 2967 carriages, exclusive of pontoon carriages, forges, spare gun carriages, &c.

" pedient was repugnant to Napoleon, and that " subsequently several heads of families offered " themselves to head insurrections, but were re- " jected." Thus in the same page we are presented with two important contradictions. We must not wonder at it; the author has made us familiar with them. He says further on, " that the " sight of us excited their horror... that the Em- " peror then perceived the magnitude of his en- " terprise; that so long as he only encountered " kings, their defeats were but sport; that the " kings being conquered, he had now to do with " nations; that it was another Spain he had found " at the opposite extremity of Europe." In Spain the population had risen against us, being driven to fanaticism by the monks, amongst whom each family reckoned one of its members. That population was the leading party in the war, and carried it on in person, if the expression may be allowed. On our entrance into Russia, on the contrary, the only fighting men were the regular troops. The state carried on the war, the state had ordered the nation to fall back at our approach, or rather had enjoined the soldiers to set fire to every dwelling in their retreat, a sure means of compelling the inhabitants to remove. This is what took place, and what ought to have been known to Mr. de Segur. But where has he seen Russian *guerillas?* In what encounters have our troops had to face the peasantry? Let Mr. de Segur inform us, and we may then discover with

him that Spain which he has found out at the other extremity of Europe; but nothing of all this was the case. Here, as in every page of his work, there is exaggeration, confusion, and supposition. It was only after the battle of the Moskwa, and during our retreat, that a few peasants, excited by the allurement of plunder, murdered some of our wounded who had remained in their power.

"He (Napoleon) was daunted, he hesitated, he "paused....a fever of hesitation attacked him; "his looks were directed towards Kief, St. Peters- "burgh, and Moscow."

"At Kief he should envelop Tchitchakof and "his army. By marching in concert with Saint- "Cyr upon St. Petersburgh, he should surround "Wittgenstein. On the other hand, he should, in "Moscow, be striking at the very heart of Russia.

"Of these three plans the latter appeared to "him the only one practicable.....and yet, "adds the author, the history of Charles XII was "present before him."

Ought it not to be inferred from those expressions that Charles XII was his guide in the plan of marching upon Moscow; whilst, on the contrary, the Swedish monarch committed the fault of not marching upon that capital. To know this, it was not necessary to be a military man; nothing more was requisite than a perusal of the history of Charles XII, we will not even say that of the chamberlain Alderfeld, but simply Voltaire's history. It is universally acknowledged

that the march of Charles XII, up to his arrival at Smolensko, was in strict conformity with the rules of strategy, since his line of operations and his communications were secured, and since Poland and Riga were in his power. The fault committed by the king, was his having left the Moscow road in order to take the direction of the Ukraine; this was the cause of all his disasters, by making him lose his line of operations, and by preventing the arrival of Lewenhaupt with a supply of men and provisions to his assistance.

The position of Napoleon at Smolensko, which he converted into a large depot and a *point d'appui*, allowed him to proceed with perfect security to Moscow, which was not at a greater distance than ten days' march. Besides, we really did not enter an enemy's country until leaving Smolensko. The magazines of Minsk and of Wilna were at eight days' march in our rear; those of Kowno, Grodno, and Bialistock were on the third line. On the fourth line were those of Elbin, Marienwerder, Thorn, Warsaw, etc.; further back in the rear those of Dantzig, Bromberg, Posen; lastly, on the sixth line, upon the Oder, were the magazines established in the fortified towns in which we had garrisons.

CHAPTER X.

The author gives the particulars of a victory obtained at Polotsk. It was of so much importance as to place the Emperor perfectly at rest, and secure that the enemy would not, for a long time, attempt to stir in that direction. This victory procured for General Saint-Cyr the staff of marshal of the empire. "Notwithstanding this success, "the determination to proceed beyond Smolensko "was too perilous for Napoleon to decide on it "alone; it was necessary to draw him into it." How can it be supposed that the Emperor, once in possession of Smolensko, should have stopped there, when the armies of Bagration and of Barclay were retiring upon Moscow, and when there was no well-founded motive for abstaining to follow and fight them in that direction? For the Emperor was certain that the enemy would give battle in order to protect his capital. In the eyes of all reflecting people, a victory and the capture of Moscow held out a prospect of peace. The author himself, in the expressions which he ascribes to the Emperor, in his conversations with his generals in the preceding chapters, *respecting the disorganized state of the army*, the great number of stragglers, etc., makes him say, *that there is*

no time to be lost, that peace must be extorted, that it awaits them at Moscow. Were we to admit the truth of these perpetual hesitations on the part of the Emperor, we should have to acknowledge that this great man had lost his mental faculties. But Mr. de Segur's insinuations are invariably contradicted by the facts.

At Wilna, at Witepsk, Napoleon is represented to us as a being devoid of energy, of will, even of reason, not knowing what to do, what may become of him, giving no orders, and appearing to depend upon chance for every thing. And yet we find him forseeing every thing, directing military and political measures at the same time. We see him entirely upsetting the Russian plan of campaign on the very first march, separating their army into two bodies, compelling them to abandon their line of operation, their magazines, their entrenched camp, their communications, and to resign to us the whole of Lithuania almost without a struggle. At Witepsk, when, according to Mr. de Segur, the Emperor is buried in a deep torpor, the Russian Generals come in a body to attack him; this is what he desired. They imagine that he is going to bear with the French army upon their right; they manœuvre accordingly; whilst, with the rapidity of lightning, he crosses the Dnieper and appears upon their left flank. These important movements are so judiciously combined, they are executed with so much precision, that Barclay and Bagration, notwith-

standing all their light troops, notwithstanding their numerous agents and partisans in the country, are only apprized of the danger that threatens them, by the attack made upon their rear, against Smolensko, by that great captain whom they had hoped to surprise by their right in scattered cantonments, and whom Mr. de Segur exhibits to our view as fallen into an almost continual state of torpor and indecision.

We have just demonstrated how false is Mr. de Segur's assertion; may *we* be allowed to add our personal testimony on this point? We received our orders direct from the Emperor; we saw him at all times, whether when he issued those orders to us, or when we rendered an account to him of their execution, and we have never seen him such as he is described by the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace.*

---

* Extract from a confidential letter of the Duke de Frioul, grand marshal of the palace, which is in our possession.

Bivouac, before Witepsk, 28 July, at night.

"The army, after constant fighting for the last three days, "and driving back the enemy, has arrived before Witepsk. All "the corps will be united to-night, and there will be a battle to-"morrow, unless the enemy should retire, as we are given to "apprehend, from the position which he has taken up in front "of us, with the view of covering Witepsk. Yesterday and to-"day, in the various encounters that have taken place, and in "which only a few of our troops were engaged, the Russians "have always been vigorously repulsed. They have lost some

Is there not an injustice in saying, at the beginning of this chapter, that his lieutenants seemed to have done more than himself? Is it then indispensable, that the commander-in-chief of an army of nearly four hundred thousand men should be present at every engagement? He cannot be everywhere at one and the same time, and this is a misfortune. He issues his orders and his instructions, communicates a general idea of his plans; and it then becomes the duty of each of his generals to conform to them, as far as circumstances and localities will permit.

Assuredly, had Napoleon been with the fifth, seventh, and eighth corps, Bagration would not have crossed the Dnieper; he, and his army, would have been lost to Russia. Had Napoleon been with Schwartzenberg, the corps of Tormasow would have experienced a similar fate; had Napoleon been with Ney, the Russian army, on its quitting Smolensko, would have paid dearly for the fault which its generals had committed of marching in a circuitous direction, in the midst of almost impracticable cross roads, in order to

---

" prisoners and several pieces of cannon. *The Emperor is in* " *the enjoyment of excellent health.* We have lost General " Roussel of the army of Italy; he was accidentally killed by a " patrole. The colonel of artillery Lideot has been mortally " wounded in reconnoitring. Ferreri has had a leg shot off. We " are impatient here to learn that the Duke of Tarentum has " passed the Dwina, and sent forward the battering train."

regain the high road to Moscow and the Dnieper at Soloniewo. *

Marshal Davoust who, in the 6th chapter, had been placed against his knowledge under the orders of the King of Naples, appears, in this chapter, to emerge from his ignorance; he obeys with an ill grace. Fortunately, says Mr. de Segur, "Barclay having fallen back without resistance "nearly as far as Dorogobouje, Murat had no "need of Davoust." We do not exactly see what other *resistance*, except that founded upon honor, could have prevented Barclay from retreating; this was certainly not what was meant by Mr. de Segur. The enemy soon makes a show of resistance; the King of Naples prepares to attack him; he wishes to give the left to Davoust, who insists upon retaining the right.

"If there exists a spirit of discord in our ad-"vanced guard, it reigns also in the Russian "camp." The admissions of Mr. de Segur are worthy of remark. "Confidence in their com-"mander was wanting, he says; each step seem-"ed a blunder, each resolution the most injudi-"cious. The loss of Smolensko had soured all."

---

* A General (Moreau) whom some persons have long set in opposition to the Emperor, being consulted by our coalesced enemies, as to the best plan of attack that could be adopted against him, replied, "Fight Napoleon wherever he is not." It would appear that our officer of the palace is not of this opinion.

These few expressions of the author appear to us a complete refutation of the praises which he has bestowed upon the ability of the chiefs, and the order prevailing in the Russian armies. Mr. de Segur falls from one contradiction into another, because he never knows what he says any more than what he intends to say.

Upon receiving the intelligence that the Russians appeared desirous of offering battle, Napoleon had quitted Smolensko. The author might reproach him "with having neglected the hostile armies of "Essen at Riga, of Wittgenstein, before Polosk, of "Hartel, before Bobruisk, of Tchitchagof in Vol- "hynia, forming a total of one hundred and "twenty thousand men, by which he suffered "himself, with indifference, to be surrounded." But according to his custom of being at variance with himself, he tells us, a few lines lower down: "one hundred and fifty seven thousand men would "have been sufficient to destroy the Russian "army, and to seize upon Moscow;" and he hastens on to a calculation that represents us as superior to the same hostile corps of which mention has already been made. "He would thus, said "he, have supported himself upon two hundred "and eighty thousand men, so as, with one hun- "dred and fifty five thousand, to invade a coun- "try ninety three leagues in extent, for such is "the distance from Smolensko to Moscow." All this mighty enumeration of forces, acting upon various points, has no other object in view than

to afford matter of blame that "those two hun-
"dred and eighty thousand men were command-
"ed by six different leaders.... the most elevated
"of whom....he who occupied the centre....
"was a minister of peace and not of war." What could Mr. de Segur have wished? Could a single army, under a single chief, have occupied so extended a space as that from the Baltic to the confines of Turkey? The minister of peace held no military command. His functions, as well as the title given to him by Mr. de Segur, were purely of a pacific nature. The Emperor was the real chief of all those armies. He was in direct communication with them, and stood in need of no intermediate agent.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

On leaving Dorogobouje, the army marches towards Moscow, with the Emperor, Murat, Davoust, and Ney in the centre, Poniatowski on the right, and the army of Italy on the left. The centre column, which followed the road taken by the Russians, could obtain but little subsistence upon it. "In order to live better, says our officer "of the palace, it ought to have set out later every "day, halted earlier, and then given greater ex- "tent to its flanks during the night." The object was not solely to obtain better subsistence, but also to march in military order. Mr. de Segur could not resist here his inclination to murmur, though he acknowledges that what he points out is *scarcely possible.*

"It was a curious sight to observe the volun- "tary and continual efforts of so many men to "follow a single individual to such great dis- "tances." The author knows full well, that in every army in the world, the multitude are led by one man. What is his object in making this reflection? Mr. de Segur, it is true, sees in the French army, an army of volunteers commanded

by the Emperor, who was not, however, accustomed to consider as volunteers the soldiers under his orders.

This chapter embraces details on the mode of living of the soldiery, whose *existence* appears a *prodigy* to the author; and on the precautions taken by the military administration. It exhibits exaggerations that are familiar to the author, such as the animosities between the soldiers, " which " would have infallibly led to most sanguinary " intestine conflicts had not all been subsequently " overtaken by the same misfortune, and involved " in the horrors of a common disaster."

The word *happily* is the only one wanting in this phrase.

CHAPTER II.

We have again Mr. de Segur refuting himself. In the preceding chapter he has shewn us Napoleon without foresight; and at the opening of the present one, he informs us that, in the vicinity of Dorogobouje, this prince sends orders to Marshal Victor to advance to Smolensko.

The author blames Napoleon for " dating from " the heart of old Russia a number of decrees." Was he not then aware that the Emperor, when he quitted France, had left no regency behind, and

that his government was so well organized, that, from the extremity of Russia, he governed France as if he had been at the Tuileries?

What does he mean by alluding to a bridge which *his guard was ordered to protect, which they burn from thoughtlessness, and which is afterwards repaired?* In relating a fact of that nature, does not the author wish it to be believed, that such was the state of disorder in the French army, that the most disciplined corps joined in it from mere *thoughtlessness?*

Respecting an affair of the advanced guard, in which the King of Naples, carried away by his impetuosity, was for a moment in great danger, the author says: "at the moment of the most im-"minent danger, a battery twice refused to fire; "its commanding officer pleaded his instructions, "which forbade him, upon pain of being broke, "to fight without orders from Davoust." A marshal could have had no right to break an officer; all he could do was to ask of the Emperor his dismissal, on giving an account of the facts; and assuredly Napoleon would not have broke an officer for obeying the King of Naples, and firing upon the Russians, when he had his battery in front of them. This fact, besides, is as correct as the refusal of the artillery of the guards to fire when at Smolensko, as related in chapter IV of the 6th book.

Was this pretended insubordination of a picked body of men brought forward by Mr. de Segur,

merely with the view of shewing that there reigned great disorder in the army? It is more probable that he introduced this incident merely as evidence of a misunderstanding between Davoust and Murat. He takes advantage of it, on the one hand, to make a pompous eulogium on the Russians, which coming from Marshal Davoust is at least out of place, and on the other to censure the manner in which Murat led on his troops. What he says on the subject is incorrect; for the cavalry, thus led on, could not have resisted the fatigue of a few day's march. It is a pity that the author has not presented us with Murat's reply; but he adds, "that there was something in the misunderstand-"ing between these chiefs which did not displease "the Emperor." The Emperor saw, no doubt with pleasure, any spirit of emulation which was productive of advantage to the service; but if any misunderstanding had existed, it would have sensibly affected him.

CHAPTER III.

THE author falls into a fresh contradiction. He has just asserted that there was something not displeasing to the Emperor, in the misunderstanding of his chiefs; he now says that *quarrels between his chiefs, gave him uneasiness.*

The quarrel between Murat and Davoust, which engrossed nearly the whole of the second chapter, begins again with the present one, and forms the concluding part of it. These rivalries and jealousies, related with so much self-satisfaction, are ridiculously exaggerated. They may have engaged the attention of the idlers in the ante-room, but were of such little importance, or influence over the progress of affairs, that the mention of them, at such lengths, may lead into error, and convey of our army a very false notion. It is besides a parody upon the disputes of Ajax and Achilles; even Patrocles performs a part in them. In the Emperor's army, all gave obedience. One might fancy that Mr. de Segur's heroes, like those of Homer, were princes who brought into the train of the king of kings, armies composed of their own subjects, over whom they held sovereign sway, and who ceased to fight as soon as it was the hero's wish to shut himself up in his tent.

The fact is, that General Compans, whose division appears to have been the occasion of the dispute between the King of Naples and Marshal Davoust, never had, directly nor indirectly, any discussions with the Prince. Murat, in his pursuit of the enemy, led his cavalry on as every good general ought to do, and not as our officer of the palace represents him to have done. Infantry was indispensable to him on many occasions. Marshal Davoust had some difference with him on the subject, in the neighbourhood of Viazma.

The King sent General Belliard to submit to the Emperor, that he stood in need of a division of infantry, and to communicate to him the difficulties which Marshal Davoust threw in the way. Napoleon, after listening to Belliard, sent for General Compans, and said to him: Well General! what can be the meaning of this quarrel? It delays our march. Compans replied, that he knew not what misunderstanding could exist between the King of Naples and Marshal Davoust, but he thought the advanced guard would proceed more rapidly, if some infantry were attached to the king's cavalry, which was often detained on its march by the smallest defile, or in order to repair a bridge; whereas, with the aid of some infantry, such obstacles would not occur. I am of your opinion, said Napoleon; very well: return to your division. A few moments afterwards, the Emperor sent the Prince of Neufchatel to Marshal Davoust, to acquaint him that Compans' division should march henceforward in the advanced guard under the orders of the King of Naples. A salutary effect was soon derived from this arrangement.

CHAPTER IV.

The author ascribes to the Russians a bitter censure of Barclay de Tolly, in order to have an opportunity of replying to it by a brilliant apology of the conduct and character of the hostile commander. He admits that Barclay had *erred in suffering himself to be surprised at Wilna.. ; but it was remarked that, subsequently, at Witepsk and at Smolensko, he had forestalled Napoleon, etc.* We will request of Mr. de Segur to explain to us the manœuvres of that Russian General whom he so highly praises, when he quitted the vicinity of Smolensko to attack us in our cantonments at Witepsk, and committed the mistake of supposing that we were upon his right, whilst we were marching upon his left flank. We will ask him to explain all the marches and countermarches of the Russian armies, from Smolensko to Roudnia and Madwa at this period. We will ask him to explain why, if Barclay had fixed upon the plan of retiring before us, he fought at Smolensko, instead of only retaining a rear-guard in that city, having already sent the corps of Bagration in the direction of Dorogobouje. Lastly, we will inquire of him what was Barclay's motive for exposing

the whole of his army to be attacked and overthrown by ours, during his retreat by cross-roads, at the time when the high road to Moscow, which presented a much shorter distance to that city, was left to the protection of a rear-guard of cossacks. This resolution was one of so much imprudence, that, if the Duke of Abrantes had carried into execution the movement assigned to him, the troops which Barclay directed to return towards Smolensko by the road of Moscow, with the view of affording assistance to that rear-guard, and of impeding our march, would have been entirely taken prisoners, and the remainder of his army would have had every difficulty in regaining the road to Moscow.

In the same chapter Mr. de Segur states, on the subject of a flag of truce: "Our advanced posts "did not keep a proper watch; *every where the* "*same negligence was perceptible—every one was* "*asleep.*" We have only one observation to offer upon this point, which is, that the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace never went to the out-posts; he cannot, therefore, have any certainty of the correctness of his assertion. This episode is moreover, not to the purpose; if we kept so bad a look out in presence of a general of such experience as Barclay de Tolly, why did he not carry off the Emperor and his staff?

CHAPTER V.

SINCE Kutusoff has assumed the command, every thing announces an approaching battle. The Emperor is no longer the same in Mr. de Segur's opinion. He is no longer a man harrassed, unnerved, worn down by the weight of his undertaking, or driven on by fatality to his own ruin; he is a superior genius, preparing his dispositions "with that tranquillity of mind peculiar to extra-"ordinary men—he surveyed the whole country "with that eye of a conqueror which sees every "thing at once, and without confusion, which "penetrates through obstacles, sets aside acces-"sories, discovers the object of his attraction, and "fixes it with an eagle's eye, etc."

Despairing at last of being able to give an adequate picture of the greatness of his hero, he exclaims: "How much the historian is at a loss for words to define the *coup d'œil* of a man of genius."

As, however, such rare praises stand in need of some corrective, he presents humanity to our view, as was done by the slave, who every day reminded the kings of Persia that they were men; and he says: "That, at the sight of the Gjatz, "which pours its waters into the Volga, he was

"heard to boast of being the master of those "waves destined to visit Asia—as if they were "proceeding to announce his approach, and to "open the way for him to that quarter of the "globe." Those hyperboles are the language of a rhetorician; and Napoleon did not lay claim to this character.

"Compans skilfully avails himself of the undu- "lations of the ground; its elevations served as "platforms to his guns for battering the redoubt, "and screened his infantry, whilst drawing up "into columns of attack. The sixty-first marched "foremost; the redoubt was taken by a single "effort, and with the bayonet; but Bagration sent "reinforcements, by which it was retaken. Three "times did the sixty-first recover it from the "Russians, and three times was it driven out "again. But, at length, it maintained itself in it, "covered with blood and half destroyed."

There are nearly as many false assertions as words in the above statement. But the author is perhaps excusable; he could not have been an eye-witness to what he relates. He had no other guide than the accounts published respecting the Russian war, accounts chiefly drawn up by persons who were not present at the military events which they describe, and who took no part in them.

This redoubt mounted with twelve pieces of cannon, had been raised upon an elevation situated between the village of Schwardino, and

the wood which covers the old road from Smolensko to Moscow. On the side of the village, the slope of the elevation was less uneven than on the other side; but between this slope and the wood, a rather extensive plain intervened. In advance of the redoubt, and at the distance of about one hundred and twenty yards a small eminence presented itself. General Compans who, in the preceding chapters, is found marching with the advanced guard, was specially directed by the Emperor to attack the redoubt. Napoleon attached great importance to carrying that very night (5th September), this position which covered the left centre of the Russian line. For this reason, he ordered the attack, without waiting the arrival of the other divisions of the first corps. In the rear, and upon the flanks of the redoubt, strong Russian columns were seen, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to the number of upwards of fifteen thousand men.

General Compans quickly drove the enemy from the villages of Fomkino and Doronino, and compelled him to retire into his position on the flanks of the elevation. He established five or six companies of light troops upon the little eminence already mentioned. Being scattered about the eminence, and availing themselves of such shelter as it could afford, they were directed to keep up a continual fire upon the men who worked the artillery of the redoubt, where very little infantry was stationed. A battalion was placed in

the rear of the eminence in order to support these marksmen.

The artillery of Compans' division took up a position to batter the redoubt and the Russian troops which were placed on its flanks. Part of the King of Naples' cavalry came up between Compans' right and the wood; but it was kept in check by the artillery and cavalry of the enemy. General Compans, at the head of the fifty-seventh and sixty-first regiments, proceeded to the right of the elevation upon which the redoubt was established. He ordered General Dupelain to march upon the left with the twenty-fifth regiment, in the direction of Schwardino. He stationed the hundred and eleventh still more to the left, in order to turn the right flank of the Russians. In this movement General Compans was attacked by whole masses of cavalry, but he took a skilful advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and of the protection afforded by a fence, which allowed him to prosecute his movements in spite of those masses of cavalry, and even to drive them back with a severe loss. A most murderous fire soon commenced in this quarter, between the two regiments of Compans, and the Russian infantry that supported the left flank of the redoubt. The distance between them did not exceed twenty yards; but the troops upon the two opposite slopings of the ground, were covered breast high. This sanguinary firing lasted three-quarters of an hour; its rapidity and the noise, prevented the

men from bearing the general's command to march forward with fixed bayonets; a manœuvre which would have occasioned much less destruction to our ranks.

The Russian Generals, on their side, who suffered more than we did from this close firing, made fruitless attempts to induce their troops to march up to ours; night was approaching; nothing yet appeared to be decided. Compans determined at all hazards to extricate himself from this dreadful situation, took with him a battalion of the fifty-seventh, and ordering the fence to be opened on his right, he made it advance in close column by divisions, concealing four pieces of artillery loaded with grape shot which followed in its rear. He led this battalion on to the extreme left of the Russians who flanked the redoubt, and, at the distance of a hundred yards, opened a battery of grape shot which made a tremendous havoc amongst the enemy Compans taking advantage of the disorder into which their ranks had fallen, charged with his battalion with fixed bayonets. The enemy gave way upon this point, and the disorder having communicated itself from the left to the right, they abandoned the position which they had so long defended, and retired upon their second line, leaving the redoubt in our possession. This battalion of the fifty-seventh which decided the contest, lost its chief, and had two hundred men killed and wounded in the space which it had marched over to come up to the enemy.

Whilst this was going on upon our right, the hundred and eleventh regiment upon our left followed the general movement; but the fire, which gained the village of Schwardino, having enabled the Russian general to discover through its glare that he was pursued in this direction by one regiment only, he ordered his cavalry to charge it. The regiment stood the shock with great firmness; but it lost, in this charge, its two regimental field pieces.

The Emperor had calculated that Prince Poniatowski's march upon the right would have mainly assisted the attack of the redoubt. But in spite of all the endeavors of this prince, his march was retarded by the obstacles he met with in the woods; only one of his batteries could take any share in the action.

The redoubt was not carried by storm; the Russians abandoned it when the movement made by the battalion of the fifty-seventh compelled them to give up their position. We found there all the pieces of cannon which had defended it. Artillery men, horses, all had been destroyed by the firing of our light troops. It is untrue that the redoubt, once in our power, was ever re-taken by the enemy; not a single Frenchman could therefore have been found killed in that redoubt.

"Next day, when the Emperor reviewed that "regiment (the sixty-first), he enquired where was "its third battalion—In the redoubt was the re-"ply of the Colonel."

From the account we have just given of the events that occurred upon this point, it will easily be seen how ridiculous is the answer attributed to the colonel of the sixty-first; to tell the truth, however, Mr. de Segur is not the author of it. He borrowed that anecdote from the work of Labaume, who received it no one knows where. The fact is that no French battalion forced an entrance into the redoubt. It was, as we have explained it, the brilliant attack of the battalion of the fifty-seventh that decided the retreat of the Russian corps appointed to defend the elevation upon which the redoubt was established; by that movement, we were left masters of the redoubt. The author says it was chiefly the boldness of a Spanish regiment that foiled the enemy. This fact also is inaccurately stated. When the hundred and eleventh regiment moved forward towards the enemy's right, and was charged by the Russian cavalry, the regiment Joseph Napoleon, forming part of Friant's division, came up to its assistance; but the fire of the hundred and eleventh had alone sufficed to make the Russians fall back. The whole of this chapter savors of the author's ignorance respecting what took place in this action of the 5th September.

CHAPTER VI.

The first rays of the sun of the 6th September, displayed to our view the Russian army in the same position in which it had been discovered on the preceding day; and, we will agree in this with Mr. de Segur, it occasioned a general feeling of exultation.

"At last there was an end to this vague, inef-
"fectual and moveable warfare, in which, however
"deeply we plunged into it, our efforts were
"paralysed. We were on the eve of reaching
"the goal; and every thing was about to be
"decided."

CHAPTER VII.

Whilst the Emperor is engaged in examining the position of the Russians, the Prince of Eckmühl comes to announce to him that he has closely surveyed their left, and submits to him a plan for turning it with his five divisions, and with the corps of Poniatowski. Napoleon refuses; Marshal Davoust insists, but to no purpose. This plan is probably of the invention of Mr. de Segur, and

laid down from the reports of certain individuals, as to what might have been done at the battle of the Moskwa. He sends Davoust back to his post, *murmuring against such an excess of prudence.* Amongst the variety of reasons that might be given in justification of the Emperor's refusal, why does the author mention *his age, which had rendered him less enterprising.* Was Napoleon an old man at forty three years of age? The fact is that even to this day, knowing as we do all the forces which the Russians brought to that field of battle, no one can affirm what might have happened, if the movement proposed by Davoust had been carried into execution. With a view to its success, it ought to have been carried into effect during the night. Now, the inconveniences attendant upon such marches in a wooded and unknown country, almost without a guide, are well known. When it was question of much easier manœuvres, the consequences of which were of less importance, we see what occurred to the corps of Junot, both before and after the battle of Smolensko. It is, moreover, very probable, that the enemy, owing to his immense number of light troops, would have been soon apprised of the movement; this would have occasioned counter measures on his part, or made him fall back, and the battle we so eagerly desired would have been again put off.

After having described the army to us as disorganized, dying with hunger and fatigue, weakened and dispirited, why does Mr. de Segur tell

us " that it was sound, supple, vigorous, like " those manly bodies, who, having just lost the " plumpness of youth, display forms more masculine and strongly marked: Still he finds it " silent like nature just before a violent storm, " or crowds at the moment of an imminent " danger. The temerity of the situation into which " Napoleon had urged his army," appears to the author quite evident; " there was no rest for it " but in death or victory." But what does he reckon upon? Upon the curiosity of the soldiers, who " will wish to see Moscow.... perhaps to " plunder it."

Always *plunder!* In youth there is a difficulty in repressing the exaltation of any feeling; and the influence which glory, a spirit of companionship, and gratitude, exercise over our judgment is not of rare occurrence. But our officer of the palace is superior to those weaknesses. Neither the glory of the army, the sentiment which is felt for companions in arms, nor gratitude for his benefactor, can prevent him from discovering that the army and the soldiers are plunderers, and that the chief who commands them favors the spirit of plunder.

The proclamation to the army *will some day be deemed admirable*, says Mr. de Segur; but why should it not be so considered now? What is grand and sublime possesses at all times that character.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE author represents Kutusoff to us as endeavoring, in the name of religion, to stir up the fanaticism and enthusiasm of his semi-barbarian soldiers. Insults are heaped upon Napoleon. Both proclamations may well be compared together. Mr. de Segur tell us, that the inhabitants of an uncivilized nation, who are governed "by the impulse of their bodily sensations, are "on that very account, the more formidable as "soldiers... Confined by slavery within a narrow "sphere of action, they are reduced to a small "number of sensations, which are the only sources "of wants, of wishes, and of ideas."

Our *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace has formed to himself a strange notion of a soldier! What! the soldier is the more formidable, in proportion to the greater rudeness of the people to which he belongs? This maxim is rather contradicted by the history of the Greeks and of the Romans, who, at the periods of their most splendid triumphs, were the most civilized nations in the world; and it will not be borne out by the example of the French military, who, although they belonged to the most polished nations of modern times, were *not therefore the less formidable.* However unpalatable to Mr. de Segur the assertion may be,

the glory of the French soldiers belongs as much to their innate bravery, as to that crowd of sensations which arises out of a perfectioned state of civilization, and is productive of a thirst after warlike celebrity.

Shortly afterwards, he supposes the Russians to be rather idolators than christians, and "that they "had converted the christian religion into one "entirely physical and material, to bring it to the "level of their brute and limited capacity."

These may be very fine reflections, but the reader does not look for a dissertation upon metaphysics, or upon ideas, from the pen of an historian who presents a relation of the imposing battle of Moscow; the simple recital of facts would, for him, have possessed greater charms.

To the correct account which the author affords of the reception of the King of Rome's portrait, he might have added the following expressions of the Emperor, which indicate his deep emotion, and the feelings which agitated him in the midst of the deafening acclamations of his soldiers: "Take it away; it makes its appearance too soon upon a field of battle."

Colonel Fabvier, aid-de-camp of Marshal Marmont, came to announce to the Emperor the loss of the battle of Arapiles (Salamanca). Mr. de Segur tells us, that "the Emperor gave a kind "reception to the aid-de-camp of the vanquished "general, feeling disposed to shew indulgence for "a defeat, on the eve of a battle, the result of

" which was doubtful." There is a total absence of accuracy in the statement of this fact, and of the reflections which follow it. The Emperor expressed the greatest displeasure, when he learnt that Marshal Marmont had exposed the French army, in order to gratify a purely personal ambition, by giving battle without waiting, in conformity to his instructions, until the arrival of the corps of Soult, which was to enable him to secure the victory. Colonel Fabvier, a man possessed of the most elevated and refined feelings, considered his honor as impeached by the Emperor's reproaches, and the army witnessed him the next day fighting on foot, as a volunteer, in the hottest of the action, as if to shew that the soldiers of the army in Spain, yielded not in bravery to those of the army in Russia.

The details given to us by the author, respecting the night passed by Napoleon, are a heap of unconnected ideas, ill-gathered expressions, broken conversations, constantly interrupted soliloquies. Is it possible to recognize in this picture, the general who held the chief command in fifty pitched battles? One would suppose that Napoleon had never fought any. This paragraph can only have been written upon notes supplied by some *valet-de-chambre*, to an historian too little acquainted with the Emperor, to estimate them at their real value.

Napoleon, whose mind became more at rest when he found " his army sound, supple, vigor-

" ous, etc., is frightened at its destitute state. " How," as he is made by Mr. de Segur to say, " weak and famished as they are, could they sup- " port a long and terrible shock?" Be it recollect- ed, that his observations relate to the same army, and to expressions purporting to have been utter- ed on one and the same day. There is a similar contradiction in his picture of the Emperor, whom he represents as being by day *calm*, gifted *with the eye of an eagle—extraordinary*—and at night, as being the victim of the terrors and anxieties of a feeble child, who finds himself suddenly placed in an unexpected situation.

CHAPTER IX.

At five in the morning of the 7th September, Napoleon took up his position near the redoubt which was carried two days before. From this central position, he dispatched several officers to watch the execution of the orders he had issued during the night. The author says that " the " Emperor's attention was then directed towards " his right, when, all at once, near seven o'clock, " the battle began on his left." This is altogether incorrect. The firing commenced from the battery upon our right, could it have been the intention

of our officer of the palace, when stating it to have commenced by the left, to open his account of the battle with the partial attack of a regiment (the hundred and sixth), which owed its safety entirely to the ninety-second. It might thence be inferred that, from the very beginning, there was not even a general officer upon this point, to give orders, and to have them obeyed. We will observe by the way that this ninety-second is the same regiment which, on the occasion of the battle of Ostrowno, had fallen under Mr. de Segur's censure.

" It was Napoleon himself who had just ordered " his left wing to make a violent attack. He " multiplied his orders, under the most violent " state of excitation, and engaged a battle in " front, the plan of which he had conceived in an " oblique order."

Conformably to the general arrangement for the battle, Prince Eugene was, by a feint attack upon Borodino, to draw the enemy's attention to their centre and right wing, with the view, first, to facilitate the movement which Prince Poniatowski was to make in the direction of the old road from Smolensko to Moscow. Secondly, to prevent the enemy from withdrawing troops from his right, in order to reinforce his extreme left, upon which Marshal Davoust was to make his attack.

" Rapp rushing to replace Compans, again led " his soldiers on, with fixed bayonets, and at a " running pace against the enemy's redoubt."

The Emperor pleased at the manner in which General Compans had carried, on the 5th, the redoubt of Schwardino,* had committed to his charge the attack of the redan of the extreme left of the Russian position. This general had under his orders his own division and that of General Desaix. As soon as the cannonading commenced, he formed his division in two parallel masses. The right one was destined to keep the enemy out of the wood, and in this manner to cover the movement of the left brigade which marched straight up to the redan. Desaix's division remained as a reserve on the second line. At the moment when General Teste (with the twenty-fifth and fifty-seventh regiment) was penetrating into the redoubt (it was then half-past seven in the morning), Compans received a wound in the shoulder. This general, who was replaced by

* On the 6th, the eve of the battle, the Emperor sent for Compans, to inform this officer that he destined him to attack the enemy's redoubt which stood on our extreme right. Marshal Ney was present. Compans proposed to make his division pass through the wood, in order to avoid the discharges of grape-shot. It was urged by Ney that this might break through the uniformity of the movement; but Compans having represented that the wood which he had reconnoitred was a copse that offered no obstacle to the march, the Emperor approved of his plan. General Compans added, that his only apprehension was that the enemy might advance into the wood upon his right, and take a position between Poniatowski and himself. Napoleon said to him: *You are right; in order to obviate this danger, I place Desaix's division at your disposal.*

General Dupelain in the command of his division, consigned the order of attack to General Desaix, who was likewise severely wounded a short time afterwards. This was the officer whom General Rapp came to succeed. Marshal Davoust, who was on the right of the great battery, was wounded nearly at this time.* It was a great misfortune that these several commanders should have been wounded almost at the same moment. The wound of General Compans, who was well acquainted with the Emperor's intentions, was an event particularly fatal to us; the first corps showed some indecision in its movements.

According to our historian, General Rapp, who was wounded at the head of Compans' division, comes to inform the Emperor *that the guards were wanted to complete the business.* Mr. de Segur probably imagines that General Rapp's wound had affected his head. Would he not, in fact, have exhibited some proof of folly, had he proposed to the Emperor, in the commencement of

* General Sorbier, sent by Napoleon to the Prince of Eckmühl, was joining him at the moment when a cannon ball struck his horse. The muzzle of one of his pistols which was forced in the holster, gave the Marshal so severe a contusion, that he was thrown from his saddle. General Sorbier at first thought he was dead, and came to communicate the accident to the Emperor, who made no reply. But an officer soon after arrived, who informed Napoleon that the Prince of Eckmülh was at the head of his troops. 'The Emperor feelingly exclaimed: God be praised!'

the battle, to bring up the reserve? But the author will have heard the reasonings of some generals on the subject of the battle, subsequently to the event; he will have heard, that if the guards, both infantry and cavalry, had come up, the victory would have been attended with much more brilliant results. In his system of criticising Napoleon, he has laid hold of this idea, which he continually puts forward through the whole course of his narrative, without, however, taking into consideration the moment at which such an operation might be made available. The author would have suggested the commencement of the action as the seasonable moment for an attack of the guards, which ought not to take place in any case, except with the view of securing the victory, or of rendering it more complete. He must have but little knowledge of the military science, who does not know that it is laid down as a principle, that the reserve should only be engaged in the last extremity, and that the skill of a general consists in using all his endeavors to compel the enemy to be the first to bring up his reserve. Had Mr. de Segur observed attentively the different battles fought by the Emperor, he would have found that, to an application of this maxim, he was generally indebted for his victories.

"Nay, then, with his three divisions, reduced
" to ten thousand men, rushes into the plain."

Marshal Ney's corps was placed in the centre, with its second line formed by the corps of the

Duc of Abrantes. Its right supported the left of Marshal Davoust. He neither rushed into the plain, nor hastened to Davoust's assistance. He executed the Emperor's orders to attack, conjointly with Marshal Davoust, the three redoubts that covered the enemy's left. The wounds of Generals Compans and Desaix, and of Marshal Davoust, having caused some hesitation in the manœuvres of the first corps, the attack made by that corps did not produce all the effect that had been expected from it. The movement of Ney's three divisions, having been executed with the utmost precision, was completely successful. Encouraged by that attack, the two divisions of Davoust repeated theirs, and the three redoubts remained in our power; it was then nine o'clock in the morning.

According to Mr. de Segur, the Russians, towards mid-day marched to retake the redoubts. "The French," he says, "who were still in the "disorder consequent upon victory, were asto-"nished and fell back." This account appears to have been copied from the Russian Gazettes. It is untrue that, during any part of the battle, the French abandoned the three redoubts of which they had taken possession at its commencement. The corps of Ney and Davoust proved adequate to maintain the redoubts against the reiterated attempts of the Russians to dispossess them. Their general perceiving, at the very first attacks, that he had placed his right in a disadvantageous position,

hastened to withdraw Baggowouth to his left, which had been already so much weakened by the taking of the redoubts.

The movement which Mr. de Segur supposes to have been made by the Westphalians, the mistake which he attributes to them of firing upon our troops, the disorder he alleges to have followed this, are untrue all equally untrue. The Westphalians, as we have already noticed, were in reserve behind Marshal Ney. The Emperor observing the failure of Davoust's attack, sent them to the right of that marshal, and thus united his corps with that of Poniatowski, which was in the direction of Utitsa. It was consequently at the commencement, and not the middle of the action, as stated by the author, that this corps was placed upon Marshal Davoust's right, in order to support his attack, and not with a view of affording assistance to the Polish troops. It would appear from the details given to us by Mr. de Segur on the subject, that he did not go, as an amateur, to see the engagement upon this point. Who can have informed him that our soldiers, pursued by the enemy's cavalry, "ran round the parapet (of the redoubt) in "a state of the greatest panic, and that they only "wanted an outlet to run away." Further on he tells us: "at the same time Ney had again form-"ed his division." Where did he find that they were ever broken? All these assertions are deficient in truth, as well as the picture he gives us of

Murat, " who alone in the midst of the enemies, " was seen fighting with one hand, and with the " other waving his plume." The author not having been present at this battle, has suffered himself to be carried away by his recollections *of the Iliad*, so far as to imitate a passage of it, without reflecting that the times and the weapons are entirely altered.

CHAPTER X.

" THIS vigorous action (the taking of the village " of Semenowskoï) opened the road of victory to us. " It was necessary to rush into it; but Murat, " Ney, and Davoust were exhausted. They " halted, and whilst rallying their troops, they " sent to ask for reinforcements. Napoleon was " then seized with a hesitation which he had never " before displayed."

It is rather strange that Murat, Ney, and Davoust should, after obtaining a victory, be made by Mr. de Segur to ask for reinforcements, at a moment when he tells us that Bagration has withdrawn his left to Psarewo, or three-quarters of a league in the rear; which would have left us masters of the whole field of battle originally oc-

cupied by the left of the Russian army. *The hitherto unknown hesitation* of Napoleon, shews, at least, on the part of the historian, a want of memory. Until now, in fact, has he not constantly presented him to us as tormented with *a fever of hesitation?*

Now, however, Bagration returns from Psarewo to the attack of Semenowskoï; Friant's division is in advance of the village. Our officer of the palace tells us that *his soldiers began to give way*, that Murat seized one of their leaders by the collar, whilst in the act of retreating, and cries out to him: *What are you about?* that the Colonel answered: *You see well enough that it is no longer possible to stand here. Why! I remain, exclaims the King!* "These words stopped the officer; he "looked the King steadily in the face, and coolly "rejoined: You are right. Soldiers, face the "enemy; let us go and be killed." Without enquiring who can have related to Mr. de Segur this conversation, we will observe, that Friant's division was not thrown into disorder for a single moment; until that occasion it had remained in reserve, owing to which circumstance the Emperor had selected it to take Semenowskoï, and to keep possession of it. In this division, which contributed so much to the victory, as in the whole French army, there was not a single colonel who, at the head of his regiment, stood in need of being led on by the collar against the enemy, or who would have given this silly word of command! *Soldiers,*

face the enemy; let us go and be killed! If every thing were true, which Mr. de Segur relates upon this subject, that single expression: *face the enemy, let us go and be killed,* would have convinced the King of Naples, that he who spoke in such a manner was incapable of suiting the action to the word.

"Meanwhile Murat had sent Borelli to the Em-
"peror to ask for assistance—Borelli insisted,
"and the Emperor promises his young guard;
"but he had scarcely advanced a few paces, when
"Napoleon called out to him to halt." At the moment when our right wing obtained the advantage, the enemy sent the whole of Platow's and General Ouwaroff's cavalry across the Kolocza, and ordered them to make a vigorous attack upon our left. The light cavalry of General Ornano was thrown back, and our infantry in this quarter was under the necessity of forming itself, by regiments, into squares. Prince Eugene ran some danger. It was also at this moment that the Emperor was informed of the arrangements made by the enemy to resume the offensive upon our right. It was therefore natural for him not to send the reserve to the right, without knowing what was taking place upon the left. As to the pressing request of Borelli, an individual whose rank is not mentioned by the author, does he suppose that any one will give credit to such tales?

We will not refute the ridiculous assertion respecting *the guard which, under pretence of*

dressing the line, made its advances slowly, by Count de Lobau's orders. Could so considerable a body carry a movement by stealth, as it were, under the very eyes of the Emperor?

"The artillery of the reserve advanced at this "moment.—Lauriston had obtained the Em- "peror's consent to that manœuvre." If we are to believe Mr. de Segur, not only Napoleon had given no order, but his generals would have been compelled to extort them from him. The artillery of the guard, commanded by General Sorbier, was ranged in battery ever since the commencement of the action. The Emperor observing that all the reserves of the enemy, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were in motion to recover the position of Semenowskoï, ordered the corps of Ney, the cavalry of the King of Naples, and the reserve artillery to advance to the support of Friant's division. Roguet's division of the young guard, was likewise sent to form a second line in the rear of Friant's division; Mr. de Segur says not a word of this. The Emperor himself ordered the movement; it did not occur to any one to advise him, or to offer to carry it into effect; Napoleon commanded; all obeyed him.

The author says, *that, during the whole of this day, the Emperor was seen sitting down, or walking about leisurely—at a distance from the battle;* and he forgets that he alludes, two pages before, to spent balls that fell close to him. He says *that he gave signs of melancholy resignation—that he*

shewed a dead calm "a sluggish mildness; that "some fancied they traced in it that dejection, of "which violent sensations are generally the fore-"runners." The author should tell us why were those violent sensations experienced by the Emperor previously to the battle, which could have reduced him to such a state. *Others imagined that he had already become indifferent to every thing, even to the emotion of battles. Many remarked that the calm constancy and sang-froid which is displayed by great men on these great occasions, turn in the course of time to phlegm and to heaviness, when age has worn out their springs.*

Must we always repeat that Napoleon was then in the prime of life, and in the enjoyment of a vigorous constitution? Can the *maréchal-des-logis* be in earnest, when he makes such assertions, which would lead one to suppose that the Emperor was bereft of all moral and physical strength, and had subsided into a total absence of sensibility and moral feeling? Have not the generals, the officers who approached Napoleon, the chiefs and soldiers of his guard, seen him such as he really was? Independently of those eye-witnesses, do not the facts sufficiently attest for him? It is well known that, so early as two o'clock in the morning of the 6th, the Emperor had visited all the corps of his army, spoken to all the generals, reconnoitred and studied the enemy's position, in its most minute details, as well as the exact nature of the ground upon which the battle was to be

fought. The 6th was employed in this manner; it was only in the night that he pointed out the mode in which the Russian army was to be attacked. After dispatching all his orders to the several corps, he slept for less than two hours, in the night from the 6th to the 7th, which was almost wholly taken up in receiving reports, and in issuing directions. On the 7th, he was mounted before five in the morning, and in advance of the redoubt of Schwardino, a central position from whence he might observe all the events of the battle. He had in his rear the reserve (his old guard.) It was in full uniform according to his orders, and ranged in columns by battalions, at the distance of sixty paces; this led the enemy to estimate it at double its real numbers. The young guard was in advance. He thus kept his select corps at hand, to avail himself of them according to circumstance, if, notwithstanding all his arrangements, victory should remain doubtful.

In this position the Emperor was in front of the projecting point of the enemy's line, which formed a kind of triangle opposite our own; from thence he could fly to the support of our left wing, or of our right, and be prepared for an attack upon the enemy's centre.

In an army of upwards of one hundred thousand men, it is impossible for a commander-in-chief to follow every movement from right to left with strict precision. Such an army is therefore divided into corps, which are also subdivided into

divisions and brigades; each division is organized in such a manner as to carry on isolated manœuvres, and to suffice to itself; the commander-in-chief is the soul of that army. Each commander of corps is to carry into effect the prescribed arrangements, in the way which is most adapted to his position and to local circumstances. It is not indispensable to the unity of action, that the commander-in-chief should see and execute every thing, or that the generals under his orders should be his mere instruments. If this were the case, an army ought never to exceed six thousand men; and even then, as it is optional with the various commanders to effect such movements as the events may call for, the general-in-chief would be exposed to the consequences of the errors they might commit. It would be strange indeed to expect, that the chief of an army of one hundred thousand men should constantly have his whole line in view, and be independent of the generals under his orders.

In a battle, he is, on the contrary, dependent upon all. For the original order may be modified and even altered, according to circumstances, by every officer, from the general down to the chief of battalion or the captain of artillery, who does not stand in need of directions to arrange his pieces, to spread them over a greater extent of ground, or to advance a few steps in order to take up a position. We may even assert that every one commands in a battle, even to the very cor-

poral, who remains detached with some riflemen upon a bridge or in some narrow pass. It would be the height of absurdity to understand war in another manner, and to suppose that so many thousand men are mere machines, set in motion by the chief in its most trifling details. The general-in-chief, as we have already stated, points out the spirit of the battle, he hovers about in all directions, and keeps his reserves at hand in order to apply a remedy to unforeseen events; there is a defect of unity and of action, when he pretends to undertake too much.

Mr. de Segur, who represents the Emperor as fallen into a state of torpor in the position which he had taken, ought to recollect, if, however, he was there, that it was from this central position that Napoleon sent orders to Prince Poniatowski to commence the attack; that Marshal Davoust, having been slightly wounded, came here to inform him of the hesitation with which his own attack was made, when the Emperor, dissatisfied, sent him back to resume the command of his corps; that when the vigorous co-operation of Marshal Ney secured to us the three redoubts of the Russian left wing, and when Napoleon saw that the enemy withdrew many troops from his right to direct them towards Semenowskoï, it was from this position that he dispatched orders to general Friant to seize upon the village, and informed him that he would send the whole of the reserve artillery to his support.

Whilst the Emperor was issuing these orders upon his right, the cossacks and the cavalry had made an irruption upon our left, beyond Borodino; he therefore sent in that direction the legion of the Vistula, under Claparede, which he kept in reserve with his guard. Subsequently, when he heard that the enemy was bearing vigorously upon our right, and that the attack of the Poles had received a check, he sent orders to Junot's corps to proceed to the right of Davoust, in order to establish a communication between him and the Polish corps. With the view of replacing the Westphalian troops of Junot, which occupied a position in the rear of Marshal Ney, he sent Roguet's division of the guard in that direction. Lastly, when he learned that the enemy's attack upon our right had been defeated, and that our artillery made a dreadful havoc amongst those masses, it was from the same central position that he dispatched orders to the King of Naples to make a grand charge with his cavalry, wheeling round his left wing. Whilst these movements were taking place, he sent directions to Prince Eugene to renew his attack, and to carry the main redoubt. The execution of these several orders produced the results which the Emperor had anticipated from them; the victory was decided in our favor.

This narrative sufficiently explains the motives that determined Napoleon to remain in the position which he had selected, and not to change it,

without very powerful reasons. Accordingly, no sooner was the first line of the enemy broken in by the capture of the centre redoubt, than Napoleon was seen surveying in person our whole line of battle, and directing the new arrangements to be adopted. What would have been the consequence if the Emperor had repaired to the right, towards the Polish corps, whilst an attack was making upon our left, or if he had proceeded to Borodino, when our extreme right was outflanked by the enemy?

This brief statement will enable the reader to decide why the Emperor remained in his position, during the execution of the orders he had issued. We repeat it, he had a reserve at hand to meet any unforeseen event. It ought not to have charged, since the victory was not doubtful for a moment. All military men are agreed upon this principle, that, in a battle, the main reserve ought not to be engaged, unless in a case of absolute necessity, or in other words, unless to avoid a defeat. It was from an ignorance of this principle that General Melas, on the point of conquering at Marengo, lost his army and the whole of Italy. Deeming that the victory was certain, he ordered his reserve to charge with the view of rendering it more decisive. Desaix's division arrived; the hostile army was unable to rally; it was entirely destroyed!

We might adduce more signal instances in proof of the truth of this observation, if it stood in need

of demonstration. Napoleon had powerful motives besides, for adhering to this supreme law of war. With an enemy before him, who had his own capital at his back, and every facility for receiving reinforcements, being himself at a distance of eight hundred leagues from home, what might not have happened, had the battle been renewed on the following day, as Kutusoff had intended it? The French troops, notwithstanding their victory, and perhaps on account of it, might have been driven back. A fresh corps of twenty thousand picked men might have been sufficient to gain the day.

What would be proved, however, by *those excitations which were not wanting to him?* Nothing else than that the Emperer had sufficient strength of mind to excuse them, to set them down at their real value, and to have a proper sense of what his duty, as commander-in-chief, imposed upon him.

Mr. de Segur supposes that the movement which occasioned the advance of our right wing, when it wheeled upon the centre, was effected as if by chance, and without the Emperor's knowledge. We are not aware who can have given him this information. The movement was enjoined by the general plan of the battle, and took place in consequence of Napoleon's direction to the King of Naples.

"In this manner, about mid-day, the whole of "the French right wing, Ney, Davoust, and "Murat....presented themselves on the half-

" opened flank of the remainder of the hostile " army, of which they could see the whole in- " terior, the reserves which were abandoned, and " even the retreat."

The left wing of the Russians, after it had failed in all its attempts in the direction of the village of Semenowskoï, was forced, by the vigorous charge of the cavalry of the King of Naples, to retreat upon its second position. Its left was in advance of Psarewo ; its right joined the corps of Doctorof in the rear of Gorki, and in front it was supported by the main redoubt. This position was still sufficiently strong. Our historian asserts that this was the moment of the battle when Belliard came to request of the Emperor that his guard might bear upon that point. But this General cannot have said, " that there was still a " ravine and a thin copse separating us from the " road to Mojaisk, which presented a confused " crowd of flying and wounded soldiers, and of " carriages in full retreat." For, as we have just stated, the Russian line, which covered this road, was still formidable. " The Emperor hesitates, doubts ; orders Belliard to go and look again." The zeal of this General would appear to have obscured his sight on the first occasion ; for he soon returns to announce that the enemy is preparing to defend himself. Nevertheless, he persists in his request to be allowed the assistance of the guard, *otherwise it will require a second battle to terminate the first.*

The part which Mr. de Segur has assigned to General Belliard does not at all suit him. It might be that of a giddy man, but by no means of a prudent General. This is clearly proved by the expressions attributed to Marshal Bessieres and to the Emperor. The Marshal reminds Napoleon, "that the reinforcements are at a great "distance; that Europe is between him and "France, that it was necessary to preserve, at "least, that handful of soldiers, who still remain "to answer for its safety." And Napoleon adds: "that nothing is yet sufficiently unravelled; that "before he could order his reserves to charge, "he wishes to see clearer upon his chess-board." It is worthy of observation, that Mr. de Segur himself admits this to have been the moment when "Prince Eugene's efforts were found unavailing against the main redoubt. Napoleon's reply, therefore, is a victorious refutation of that species of reproach which the author levels at him, for refusing to allow his guard to proceed to the attack.

If Belliard, on his return back to the King of Naples and to Ney, had reported to them the Emperor's words, they would have had no difficulty in understanding him. But the author supposes, on the contrary, that Belliard informed them of his having found Napoleon "seated in the same "place, with a suffering and dejected air, his fea-"tures sunk, his look sullen, giving his orders in "a languid manner, in the midst of those dread-"ful warlike sounds, to which he appears an en-

" tire stranger." What connexion was there between those rash suppositions, and the clear reasons given by the Emperor to General Belliard? All this, however, is intended to introduce a brutal tirade, which he ascribes to Marshal Ney, in the following words: " What keeps the Emperor in " the rear of the army? Since he will no longer " make war in person, since he is no longer a " general.... let him return to the Tuileries, and " leave us to act the part of generals in his stead." Marshal Ney's hastiness of character did not so far beguile his judgment as to make him forget that of which he was so intimately persuaded; namely, that the fate of himself, of the army, of the expedition, and of France, depended upon the Emperor. We have, moroever, had many opportunities of seeing Marshal Ney during the battle, and the zeal and devotedness which he displayed in executing the orders and instructions of the Emperor, have satisfied us that it never occurred to his mind to pass a censure upon them.

It is not enough, however, that Napoleon's generals should condemn his military operations; his intendant and secretary of state must likewise attempt to correct them. He is warned by both that *the moment for ordering the guard to charge had now come.* If Mr. de Segur wanted to establish the correctness of his idea, that the physical and intellectual faculties of the Emperor were impaired, he could not have invented a clearer proof of it. Napoleon is, therefore, reduced to the con-

dition of being warned by his intendant and his secretary of state, that the moment is arrived for advancing his reserve!!....All this, however, is untrue, and it could not be otherwise. Messieurs Daru and Dumas would never have dared to suggest to so great a captain any military movement. The strangest circumstance in this statement is, that Mr. de Segur, notwithstanding his title of a general officer, should seem to share in the opinion, *that the guard ought to have been directed to charge;* and should, at the same time, ascribe to the Emperor this unanswerable reason for not allowing it to charge: *If there should be another battle to-morrow, where is my army?*

Considering our distance from France, the imperial guard was like a fortified town, under shelter of which the army might at all times have rallied. Mr. de Segur, who wrote after the events had occurred, should have reflected, that if the guard had been brought into action at the battle of the Moskwa, the French army, of which it constantly formed the nucleus, and supported the courage during the retreat, would have had every difficulty to recross the Niemen.

CHAPTER XI.

In this chapter the author returns to the commencement of the battle, and to the first operations

of Prince Eugene. He represents his attack as partial and incoherent in its character. "Besides, "he says, it ought not to have been made so pre- "cipitately.... the battle having been arranged to "begin by the right wing, and to wheel on the "left." Since our officer of the palace will surfeit us by reiterating this assertion, in order to undervalue the merit of the Emperor, we will repeat here what we have already stated: 1st, that the engagement began from the batteries of the right under General Sorbier, who was directed to support Marshal Davoust's attack against the enemy's left; 2dly, that the Emperor dispatched to Prince Eugene the order to attack Borodino, with the view of drawing the enemy's attention to that quarter; 3dly, that Napoleon perceiving that the enemy withdrew the whole of Baggowouth's corps from his right to his left wing, and apprehending that Ney and Davoust might not be in sufficient strength to resist, ordered Prince Eugene to make a brisk attack upon the centre redoubt of the enemy, so as to prevent his bringing all his forces to bear upon our right.

Mr. de Segur, however, in the various chapters of his work, which relate to this battle, describes partial movements, without presenting to us its general features. Since he is so fond of minute details, he ought to have given the name of the brave general, who, on the first attack of the redoubt, penetrated into it and was made prisoner, after being covered with wounds. It is true that general Bonnami is a Frenchman.

Further on he informs us, that the viceroy, who was not able to carry the redoubt on this first attack, sent to communicate to the Emperor the critical position in which he was placed, and to ask for some assistance, that of the guard no doubt. So that Marshal Ney solicits the assistance of the guard on the right, and Prince Eugene on the left; the Emperor refuses to send it to either point, and yet Mr. de Segur appears to hold him blameable for it. These facts alone are sufficient to prove how much Napoleon was justified in keeping back his guard to the last extremity. It is false, however, that he refused assistance to Prince Eugene, when he stood in need of it, since he sent to him the legion of the Vistula, which formed a part of his reserve.

"The day was far advanced; our ammunition "was exhausted; the battle terminated. It was "then only that the Emperor mounted his horse, "though not without difficulty, and rode slowly "along the heights of Semenowskoi." This is altogether incorrect. The Emperor proceeded to that village as soon as it fell into our power. He sent for general Friant who had taken possession of it. Upon hearing that, notwithstanding a wound he had received, he was still at the head of his division, Napoleon said, with a smile, in the presence of his soldiers: *In that case I have no uneasiness; let us leave him to himself.* When, however, he discovered shortly afterwards, the considerable forces with which the enemy was preparing to attack Semenowskoi, he posted the

forty-eighth, the thirty-third, and a Spanish regiment, upon the elevation in the rear of the village; he directed that the thirty-third should form into a square on the site of Semenowskoi, with the fifteenth regiment upon its left. From that position also, he ordered Marshal Ney to bring together the divisions Compans and Desaix, and to outflank the enemy's left. After giving these instructions, the Emperor hastened to the centre of the army, and sent orders to Prince Eugene to make a vigorous attack upon the main redoubt.

As to the *ammunition* being *exhausted*, this is an equally unfounded assertion; ammunition was at no time wanting. The French artillery fired upwards of ninety-one thousand shot in that battle. But in proportion as this enormous quantity of ammunition was consumed, it was replaced by the activity of General Neigre, who directed the park of artillery, and by the well concerted measures of General Lariboisiere. Two more battles might have been fought without resorting to the dépôts which were stationed at Smolensko.

The Emperor confided to the young guard the duty of retaining possession of the field of battle. The enemy might receive reinforcements during the night; Napoleon made every necessary arrangement for supporting this corps in case of need. The battle having ceased in every direction, he proceeded to the rear of the redoubt of Schwardino, where his tents had been pitched,

for the purpose of dispatching his orders to the several commanders of the army. It was in this place no doubt that Mr. de Segur again got sight of him.

CHAPTER XII.

THE scene opens in the Emperor's tent. Instead of representing him engaged in issuing orders, Mr. de Segur supposes him to be a "prey to "bodily dejection and to great mental anguish. "In his army, in his very tent, the victory is "gloomy, isolated, and uncheered by flattery! "The persons whom he has summoned,* Dumas "and Daru, listen to him, and say nothing. "But their attitude, their downcast eyes, their "silence spoke more eloquently than words."

Pending the battle, it behoved Messieurs Dumas and Daru to remain silent; they are made by the author to speak. After the battle, the Emperor summons them to his tent in order to ascertain what measures they have taken for the proper attendance upon the wounded, for the service of the moveable hospitals, for providing

---

* Assuredly those gentlemen do not accept the designation of flatterers, with which Mr. de Segur has honored them.

the transport and other objects requisite for the army. This was speaking to them of their duties; and they remain silent! In the preceding chapter, Mr. Daru is made by Mr. de Segur to add his advice to that of others, for a charge of the guard. All military men, even at the present day, are agreed as to the uselessness and the danger of such a resolution; but as the author ascribes the advice to an administrator, we must not be surprised that the latter should give evidence of his defective knowledge of military tactics. Our *maréchal-des-logis* now introduces a new adviser, who cannot plead the same excuse; this is Murat. He comes to ask for some cavalry of the guard. "The enemy's army, "said he, is passing the Moskwa in great haste "and in disorder; he wishes to surprise and destroy "it." This is tantamount to accusing the king of Naples of ignorance of the localities, and of the enemy's position. Had Mr. de Ségur taken the trouble to glance at a map, even a plain post-road map, he would have found that the Russian army, which was retreating upon Mojaisk, ought not to cross the Moskwa on its march in that direction. Had he read the reports of the enemy's generals, he would have found that, accordingly, it had not crossed the river; that, on the contrary, it had passed the night upon that portion of the field of battle which had remained in its possession, its right resting upon the elevation of Gorki, and flanked beyond that elevation

by a division of light infantry and by cossacks, and its left upon the woods in the rear of Semenowskoi,

The author discovers at last, "that, at such a "distance, the Emperor had judged it indispens- "able to preserve a select and devoted body of "men." These are powerful motives; but Mr. de Segur is, no doubt, one of those who, as he says, were not satisfied with them. For he raises, as if by way of support to himself, a concert of murmurings and lamentations at the manner in which the battle has been conducted. Murat says, "that he had not recognized the genius of Napo- "leon." Eugene, "that he would not account "for the indecision shewn by his adopted father; "Ney was singularly obstinate in recommending "a retreat." We have often wondered by what means our officer of the palace could have learned what the Emperor, the Princes, and the marshals said to each other. His position with the army was of a nature to make it unlikely that he was their confident. We entertain the same degree of incredulity with regard to the expressions he attributes to the king of Naples and to prince Eugene. With respect to those which are ascribed to Ney, we know what reliance to place upon them. We are far from believing that the marshal ever uttered them; but the source from which they are drawn is not unknown to us: the *Gazette of St. Petersburgh* supplied them; the editor of it was much less acquainted with the

marshal than Mr. de Segur. It was an object with the editor to establish that the battle was attended with doubtful results for us; and he proved it by supposing that the retreat was recommended by one of the most daring of our generals. Was this the authority upon which Mr. de Segur had relied?

"The Emperor could only estimate the extent "of his victory by the number of the dead; the "ground was strewed, to such a degree, with "Frenchmen, extended prostrate on the redoubts, "that they rather appeared to belong to them "than to those who remained standing. There "seemed to be upon the field of battle, more con-"querors killed than conquerors surviving."

It is worthy of remark that our officer of the palace, who shews a deplorable anxiety to exaggerate our losses, and who might almost be fancied searching every corner of the field of battle in order to rake up the most trifling details, who watches upon the countenances of our officers and our soldiers, the secret of their inward sensations, in order to give them his own interpretation, and to clothe them in the gloomy colours of his imagination, does not say a word of the losses and the consternation of the Russians! If he had contented himself with quoting their own reports, he would have made it known that they admitted a loss of nearly *fifty thousand men, killed or wounded*; that more *than twenty thousand of their*

wounded were on the road to Moscow.* The number of Frenchmen found killed in the redoubts, was very trifling, in comparison with that of the Russians; and this may easily be conceived; if we reflect that what Mr. de Segur constantly call redoubts, were arrows or redans. The Russians, placed behind the epaulment, maintained their position until our soldiers rushed in on all sides, and destroyed them with the bayonet. But those works, which were all open at the gorge, being once in our power, offered us no shelter from the enemy's firing. No troops therefore remained within them; they were all placed on the sides, or in the rear of the demi-bastions.

We dwell upon this circumstance merely to show that the author describes what he has not seen. Had he gone over the field of battle, he would not have said that *there appeared to be more conquerors killed than conquerors surviving.* Our loss was not one-third of that of the Russians. Mr. de Segur, who has in store a collection of hideous pictures, does not fail to exhibit one in this place; it is the spectacle presented by the field of battle. Among other tales got up to frighten children, he mentions a Russian soldier, who lived many days in the carcase of a horse,

* See Boutourlin, vol. i. page 349. In page 116 of the second volume, he says, that Kutusoff was engaged at Tarantino in reorganizing the corps which had escaped the *slaughter of Borodino.*

which a shell had opened, and of which he gnawed the inside. He ought to gave given us the size of the soldier and the dimensions of the horse.

" From seven to eight hundred prisoners, and " about twenty pieces of cannon were all the tro- " phies of this incomplete victory."

If he had known that the flower, and, in point of number, nearly half the Russian army had been destroyed; that Bagration and his best generals had fallen, that the capture of Moscow was the consequence of this victory, he could not have asserted that the *victory was incomplete*, however familiarized he may be to inaccurate statements.

CHAPTER XIII.

MURAT now becomes the sport of the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace. He appears to have caught the Emperor's complaint, of rejecting all the good advices given to him. He orders a charge; one of his aids-de-camp points out to him that a deep ravine lies between our cavalry and the enemy. But Murat, *more fiery than ever, insisted that they should march; that if there existed any obstacle, they would discover it; he then made use of taunting*

expressions to urge them on. We must allow that the French must have been a strange army, if the Emperor and his generals were such as Mr. de Segur is pleased to represent them. What he says of our officers, that taunting expressions were used, to urge them on to their duty, is so extraordinary, that one might be inclined to believe that our officer of the palace did not consider himself a French officer.

The author, who is undeviating in his system, describes the Emperor to us as *moving forward at a still slower pace than on the preceding day, and so completely absent* that he knows not where he is going. He is fortunately warned that he is advancing into the very midst of the enemies; he then stops.

What we have hitherto seen is not enough. *The Russian autumn had triumphed over him.* In order to explain this thought, Mr. de Segur again fancies a hurricane, which only existed in his own brain, but which, according to him, struck Napoleon with sudden cold, and occasioned in him *a burning fever that dried up his blood and oppressed his spirits.* If all those who have approached the Emperor, on the day of the battle, were dead, and there remained no record of the events of that day, our historian might talk to us of that *oppression, that burning fever,* with his customary confidence in the credulity of his readers. But when a great number of persons, his secretaries, his medical men, his officers are yet living, when they well

know that Napoleon's habitual state of body had not changed, that he worked with his accustomed ardor and fatigued many horses; when they can attest that it was only in the night from the 7th to the 8th, that he was seized with a hoarseness caused by the activity he displayed on the eve and on the day of battle, how can Mr. de Segur presume to affirm as facts, what so many eye-witnesses are enabled to deny?

"Our troops entered the town, some merely "passing through it in pursuit of the enemy, "others for the sake of plunder, and to obtain "quarters." The author should have told us in what ranks he marched; was it in the first ranks! Although he has hitherto presented to our admiration the great order preserved by the Russians in their retreat, he is obliged here to confess, that they had left an immense quantity of wounded in the town, a circumstance which did not prevent their setting it on fire. No doubt he has a ready excuse for them: "Their humanity, he says, gave "way to the desire of firing upon the first French-"men they saw entering it."

The account which he gives of the noble feat performed by the *voltigeurs* of the thirty-third, inspires with a desire to know the name of the brave officer who commanded them. But the author does not mention it; we will repair this silence, by stating that his name was Callier; that he had under his orders the company of grenadiers and the third of fusileers, Captain Sabatier,

forming together, at most, a hundred men. Both companies belonged to the first battalion of the thirty-third, attached to Friant's division.

Notwithstanding Mr. de Segur's unintentional admission of the number of their wounded, (a circumstance which does not prevent the Russians from burning the town which contained those unhappy wretches,) he goes back to his old system, by asserting that, in the two succeeding days, "There was found neither a human being nor any "thing that would afford an indication of the "Russian army." He appears to have forgotten that all the villages, whether upon the road, or the vicinity of it, were filled with wounded, and presented the sanguinary traces of that army.

The Emperor, as his proclamation had promised it, intended to afford rest to his army at Moscow, to repair the losses he had suffered, whether in the action or on the road, and to restore his several corps to their full complement. But as he is taking measures for bringing down reinforcements of men and of artillery, Mr. de Segur takes advantage of this circumstance to say, that *his hopes were diminished*, and to talk *of his distress.*

Marshal Davoust, according to the author, urges the Emperor to withdraw from Murat the command of the advanced guard, and to bestow it upon him; and Mr. de Segur appears to blame Napoleon for leaving that command to the King of Naples, with whose *bold and inexhaustible ardor* he was well acquainted. What more *than a*

bold and inexhaustible ardor can be wished for in a general of advanced guard in pursuit of an enemy's army?

" But Napoleon is informed that we are only at " a distance of two days from Moscow. That " great name, and the great hopes which he at- " tached to it, revived all his strength; on the " 12th of September he was sufficiently recovered " to set out in a carriage, and to rejoin his ad- " vanced guard."

The author insinuates that the Emperor was in an infirm state of health, which compelled him to stop at Mojaisk. The hoarseness of voice he experienced on the 8th, is but a trifling accident after such great fatigues. It is a most natural occurrence after four nights passed in a bivouac; on the 4th near Gridnewa; the 5th and 6th on the heights of Borodino, and on the 7th, upon the field of battle. This hoarseness, however, has been the author's foundation for all the stories he relates respecting the Emperor's ill health, for which he prepares us since the very opening of the campaign, and upon which he proposes to dilate until the expedition shall have been brought to a close. He has himself asserted that, on the 8th, Napoleon went over the field of battle, bestowing his care upon the French and Russian wounded; a circumstance tending to prove that his indisposition was not a serious one. Consequently it was not the cause of his sojourning at Mojaisk; he was detained there by interests of

the highest importance. At the issue of so sanguinary a battle, a general in chief has more than one object to provide for, more than one order to give. To call for an account of his losses, of the resources in ammunition still left to him, a point of so much consequence after so great a consumption; to collect supplies, to take measures for securing the service of every branch in the military administration, to procure intelligence of the enemy, to ascertain his movements and arrangements, especially when the reports of the advanced guard and the interrogatories of the prisoners give reason to suppose that he intends to fight another battle;* such were the cares which engaged every moment of Napoleon's attention; and assuredly the vigilance of so active and so provident a mind was not found wanting.†

---

* This was the case, since the enemy appeared inclined to offer us battle in front of Moscow, of which the French army was only at five days' journey. Then it was that the Emperor wrote to the Duke of Belluno to direct the marching battalions and squadrons, and the stragglers, towards Smolensko, in order that, from thence, they might proceed on to Moscow.

† Amongst the numerous orders which the Emperor dispatched from Mojaisk, the following letter, written with his own hand, immediately upon his arrival at that head-quarter, proves that the illness which Mr. de Segur supposes to have preyed upon him, had no influence over his mental faculties.

For the Major-General.

"Cause the town to be reconnoitred, and trace a redoubt which will turn the defile.—Cause two bridges to be thrown over the Moskwa.—Write to Prince Eugene that he may proceed to

As soon as the Emperor received the report of General Lariboisière, which stated that the greater part of the ammunition consumed at the battle of the Moskwa, had been replaced by the supply he had ordered down from the intermediate parks of artillery, he left Mojaisk to draw nearer to his advanced guard, and to be in a position to act, should the enemy attempt to fight a battle. It might be supposed from Mr. de Segur's statement, that Napoleon stood in need of being transported in a carriage. Never was this conquering hero more strangely misrepresented. What can be the object of a supposition which falls to the ground before the irrefragable testimony of facts and of individuals? Is the author candid in his error; or is he, unconsciously, the echo of hatred and of prejudice? The reader may judge for himself.

Ronza, and have bridges constructed at Serguiewo, collect quantities of cattle and supplies, and obtain intelligence.—Write to the Prince of Eckmühl to have Borisow occupied, and to gather provisions and information.—To the Duke of Elchingen, to come to-morrow with his corps to Mojaisk.—Leave the Duke of Abrantes to keep the field of battle.—Mojaisk, 8th September, 1812."

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

The author takes us back to Wilna in order to call to our mind that Napoleon was the aggressor, and that Alexander *was taken by surprise in that city, amidst his preparations for defence.* Will he allow us to remind him also, that all the preparations of Russia were made; that her army was assembled on her extreme frontier; and that the Emperor Alexander was already at his head quarters at Wilna, when Napoleon had not yet quitted Paris, as he still made attempts to negotiate a reconciliation, of which he ought to have abandoned every hope.

Mr. de Segur afterwards carries us to Drissa with Alexander. He tells us that "it was here "he first consented to receive an English agent, "so important did he deem it to appear, until the "last moment, faithful to his engagements with "France."

In the first place, *to be* and *to appear* are not synonymous terms; in the next, it seems to us natural enough to suppose that, ere the Russian cabinet could have decided upon receiving a Bri-

tish agent, its intercourse with the English cabinet must have been some time established. We willingly distinguish the Emperor Alexander from his cabinet. Who does not know, that upwards of a year previous to the breaking out of the war, the agents of England exercised an influence in Russia, which was not unconnected with subsequent events?* "So much is certain, adds Mr. "de Segur, that, at Paris, after the success of the "campaign, the Emperor Alexander affirmed to "Count Daru, upon his honor, that, notwithstanding the accusations of Napoleon, this was "his first infraction of the treaty of Tilsit." If we admit that Russian policy does not take into account any of its acts, except such as were subsequent to hostilities, we must believe that assertion. Is the author, however, in earnest, when he relates those details? Did not his duty, as an historian, impose upon him the obligation of replacing facts in their true light, and of adding to his narrative some reflections, of which he is on other occasions so unsparing.

---

* A praiseworthy author, Mr. de Montveran, in his *Histoire critique et raisonnée de la situation de l'Angleterre*, published in 1820, and written in a spirit unfavorable to Napoleon's system, expresses himself as follows: Russia was roused, either by the agents of England near the Russian nobility of the anti-gallican party....or by her negotiators near the person of the Emperor Alexander, whose exertions, since the spring of 1811, although carried on in secret, were as successful as they were unremitting.

Our officer of the palace glances rapidly at the opinions which the *enemies* of the Emperor Alexander entertain of this prince *as a military man;* but he dilates, with satisfaction, upon his *political measures.* "It is admitted," he says, "that they "were singularly adapted to places and to men." Mr. de Segur might have mentioned, amongst those measures, "the addresses which he allowed "Barclay to issue, and which were designed to "corrupt the French soldiers and their allies."

"It appears, in fact, that, in the political means "which he employed, there was a very striking "gradation of energy." This is his proof: "In "the recently acquired portion of Lithuania, every "thing had been spared in the retreat.... In an- "cient Lithuania.... the inhabitants were hurried "away with all they could carry with them.... "But in Russia Proper... every thing that could "not be removed had been destroyed."

The inhabitants of Russia Proper must have felt very grateful for a predilection which was evinced by such humane acts; but *qui aime bien, châtie bien.**

The author then takes us to Moscow. He tells us, that *the gift of one peasant in ten,* which the nobility of Moscow offered *simultaneously and without deliberation,* "was attributed to a state of "submission, and caused the principal nobles to "murmur, that, with respect to the merchants,

* Who loves well, chastises well.—*French proverb.*

" whose fanatical enthusiasm, when the insults
" heaped upon the Emperor Napoleon were read
" to them, is represented by him in hideous colors,
" it was necessary to have recourse to constraint,
" in order to obtain from them the assistance they
" had promised with so much patriotism."

These circumstances supply him with a reflection, it might almost be added a maxim, which it is a pity he should never have applied to the French army and to its chief, namely that " de-
" tails are of little consequence.... that every
" thing in the world suffers from too close an ob-
" servation; that, in short, nations ought to be
" judged in a mass, and according to results."

CHAPTER II.

We now enter upon the details of what was taking place at Moscow before the arrival of the French army. The governor, Count Rostopchin, promises, in a proclamation, to march to the defence of Moscow with one hundred thousand men and a hundred pieces of cannon; but as soon as he is informed of the approach of the French, he disappears after setting fire to the city, which he is commissioned to defend and to protect from injury. The author exhibits Count Rostopchin as one of the greatest men of modern times.

In the first place *he is the noble descendant of*

one of the greatest Asiatic conquerors. The scaffolding raised by our *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace gives way, when it is known that Count Rostopchin is the son of a steward of Count Orlöff, uncle to the historian of that name. His fortune began under the Emperor Paul, whose confidence he enjoyed before that prince came to succeed to the throne; he was successively entrusted by him with the seals of the war department, and placed in the ministry for foreign affairs. He was afterwards created a count, as well as his father, and honored with the great order of Russia. The family alliance existing between Mr. de Segur and him, explains the anxiety with which that writer endeavors to extol the nobility of his extraction.

The resolution of Count Rostopchin was no doubt dreadful, and unprecedented since the days of barbarism. *It was admirable,* says a Frenchman; it was atrocious rejoins all Europe, and, with her the Russians themselves. It will assuredly secure immortality to its author, but it will be the immortality of Erostratus. Passions still exalt that action at the present day; but the very object at which it aimed cannot ennoble it. It is a crime with which history will reproach his memory, "A subject determines the fate of the nation, "without the countenance of his sovereign; ap- "pointed, by his very station, to protect a nume- "rous assemblage of people, he sacrifices them: he "conceives his plan without an effort, executes "it without hesitation, and remains calm and

satisfied." This impassibility, this self-satisfaction, which our officer of the palace admires, is sickening to the soul.

Instead of resorting to dramatic forms, and to the deception of the romancer, in order to lead the judgment of contemporaries astray upon that horrible event, he should have said, that there was found a man who felt a thirst of acquiring celebrity at any price; who combined a savage energy with an inexorable ambition; who made himself the instrument of a cabinet well skilled in the art of seducing, of a cabinet accustomed to sacrifice friends or foes to its interests, without feeling any scruple as to the means to be employed; that such a man was bold enough to brave the disavowal of his sovereign, and was sufficiently daring to take upon himself the responsibility of such a horrible catastrophe.

Since Mr. de Segur boasts of the sacrifice which Count Rostpochin made of one of his palaces, it might well be asked whether all have been ruined in that calamity; whether pretended sacrifices made with a display of ostentation, were not repaired even before they had been accomplished; whether, in short, in that great conflagration, the gold of England had not *insured* some of the properties.

Who has revealed to our author that Napoleon would have availed himself of the *revolutionary army* in Russia? The Emperor himself replied to that imputation in his speech to the senate on the

20th of December, 1812. "The war which I "maintain with Russia is a political war. I "might have armed against her the greater part "of her population by proclaiming the freedom of "her slaves. This was requested of me by a great "number of villages; but when I came to know "the state of moral degradation of that numerous "class of the Russian nation, I refused to adopt a "measure which would consign so many fami- "lies to death and to the most horrible tortures."

CHAPTER III.

THE pretended historian of the grand army relates "that a vulture entangled itself in the chains "which supported the cross of the principal "church, and was held suspended by them." Does he partake of the credulity of the people of Moscow? At day-break this bird was found tied to the belfry. It does not require much sagacity to guess that this *presage* was prepared in the night by the governor, whose inventive genius has put many other juggles into practice.

This observation may be applied to a much more mischievous act. "Rostopchin caused "the most wretched amongst the French priso- "ners to be exhibited to the people, who grew

" bolder at this exhibition of weakness before " them." In order to increase their *wretchedness*, he had them ill-used, stripped, and deprived of food during thirty-six hours, and in this condition had them paraded through the city like wild beasts, holding them up to the derision and to the blows of the populace. He then had them sent to a bagnio, where the greater part perished of misery and hunger. We have seen many of these ill-fated men, who survived this disgraceful treatment, giving to the Emperor an account of it, on his entrance into Moscow. We were commissioned to provide them with clothes and provisions. How great is the difference between this conduct of the governor of Moscow towards unfortunate warriors, and that which was observed towards the numerous Russian prisoners who passed through Paris and other French cities in 1814! The commandants of towns supplied them with provisions, bestowed on them every care, and were even sparing of humiliations to them.

In the statement presented by Mr. de Segur of the Russian army in the position at Fili, which he estimates at ninety-one thousand men, the remains of a hundred and twenty-one thousand men, who were present at the battle of the Moskwa, he rates the loss of the Russians in that battle, at only thirty thousand men; whereas Colonel Boutourlin, aid-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia (who wrote under his master's dictate, and upon the notes and reports furnished by the Russian staff) estimates

the loss at fifty thousand men. Mr. de Segur, therefore, makes a gratuitous allowance of twenty thousand men to the Russian army. By way of compensation, however, he states the loss of the French army *at forty thousand men*, whilst it is acknowledged to have been considerably below that of the Russians, whose masses remained for so long a time exposed to the fire of four hundred pieces of cannon, placed upon elevated ground, and skillfully directed by the generals of artillery, Sorbier, Foucher, Pernetti, an Anthouard.

The author says, that upon hearing of Kutosoff's intention to abandon the city, Rostopchin *devotes himself*. The devotedness of Count Rostopchin may well be called in question; for when he caused Moscow to be set on fire, his own residence was spared.

Mr. de Segur keeps out of view the horrid seene which closed the day on which Moscow was evacuated. When Rostopchin caused the prison to be thrown open, a Russian, accused of being a traitor, was dragged from the crowd, and brought before him. "He was the son of a tradesman, "and had been apprehended in the act of excit- "ing the people to revolt."

The tradesman's son had not been *apprehended in the act of exciting the people to revolt*; he had done no more than translate a French bulletin. His father, who is represented in the character of an ancient Roman, did not *curse his son*; we know, on the contrary, *that he cursed* the man who de-

prived a father of him. The unfortunate youth was not *levelled to the ground by an ill-directed sabre cut;* he received the first blow from the governor himself, who then gave him up to the fury of the populace.* Rostopchin, who had declared, in his address to the people of Moscow, that "the "tribunals were closed, that there was no occa- "sion for them in order to try the guilty," loses no time in giving that dreadful example of arbitrary conduct, by causing a wretch to be massacred without trial, and of his own private authority. He goes beyond this; he is the first

---

* The above detail was given to us by an eye-witness.

The following is the account given of that event by the Abbé Surugues, an emigrant priest, and curate of the parish of St. Louis in Moscow, in a letter he addressed to Father Bouvet, a Jesuit, which was published in England and in Russia.

"The governor summoned before him Mr. Vereachaghin, the "son of a Russian tradesman, who was convicted of translating "a proclamation of Napoleon, which announced his proximate "approach to Moscow. The governor-general, ordered the un- "fortunate man to advance in the midst of the dragoons of the "Russian police: 'Wretch, unworthy of thy country,' he said, "'thou hast dared to betray it and to dishonor thy family; thy "crime is above the ordinary punishments of the knout and of "banishment to Siberia; I deliver thee up to all the vengeance "of the people thou hast betrayed. Strike at the traitor, and "let him expire under your blows.' The unfortunate man ex- "pires under the sabres and bayonets of the surrounding multi- "tude. His feet are bound with a long cord, and his body, co- "vered with blood, is dragged through the streets amidst the "outrages of the populace, &c."

to strike him, and gives him up to infuriated men, in order to instruct the people to take justice into their own hands, and to bathe themselves in blood. What are we to say of the other co-operators of Rostopchin! What a noble retinue was formed about him by that filthy and disgusting horde of galley-slaves and malefactors whom he styles *the sons of Russia!* Such instruments were well selected for so monstrous an undertaking!!

CHAPTER V.

WERE it not known that Mr. de Segur's work has only been written to create an effect, that the ideas with which it swarms have only sprung up after ten years had passed over the events, and that all that has since happened, has had a tendency to alter their course; the sententious reflections, the poetical images, the studied sensibility of feeling, which are spread over this chapter, would be sufficient to establish the truth of the assertion. The thoughts, the sentiments, which he attributes to the army, never entered into our minds. The officer of the palace speaks of *our debasement.* Why should we have felt debased; we have not been so after our disastrous retreat; could we be debased when we were conquerors, and had that

further conquest before us, which was the price of our labours and of our courage? The sentiments which inspired every soldier, at this time, were those of glory and the consciousness of the esteem, which even our enemies did not refuse us. *Debasement* falls to the share of cowardice and of treachery.

" Murat," says the author, " was for a moment " tempted to believe, that he might himself be- " come a new Mazeppa." What! the sovereign of one of the finest and richest countries in Europe, could have envied the part of an obscure chief of a few hordes of cossacks! This is indeed too much! Mr. de Segur may have hitherto ascribed words and actions to his personages quite in contradiction with their character and position. But the latter is rather a too far-fetched poetical licence.

The tendency to be satirical again leads our historian astray, when he says, " that one of the " Emperor's officers, determined to minister to his " gratification, drove before his horse five or six " vagabonds with whom he had fallen in, fancy- " ing that he was bringing a deputation to him."

These were merchants and other citizens of Moscow, who, seeing the town deserted and given up by its governor to disorder, and to the plundering of malefactors, came to implore the protection and generosity of the conqueror. What other motive than the desire of pleasing the Emperor could have decided Mr. de Segur to solicit

the favor of accompanying the expedition to Russia, and of being entrusted with functions entirely at variance with his rank in the army, and with the military profession? We, who have never served Napoleon except in a military capacity, are enabled to certify that all the soldiers of the French army felt an eagerness to please their chief, and to prove their devotedness to him. The same wish animated those who had not their daily table and daily quarters provided for them, who were constantly exposed to privations, to balls and shots, and who said to Napoleon, in the heat of the battle of the Moskwa: *Be not uneasy; thy soldiers have promised to conquer; and conquer they will.*

CHAPTER V.

Military men who read the pretended History of the Grand Army, cannot refrain from a smile "at "that secret shuddering of the French cavalry, as "they listened to the trampling of the horses, "when they entered Moscow." So it is *of that melancholy*, and of those vague dreams which the author attributes to our soldiers. He transfers to the French army his own sensations. There is only wanting to this picture that of the night-mare

with which the soldiers must have been affected, when they were resting at the bivouac. If the army, however, had been troubled with such visions, could it have conquered at the battle of the Woskwa?

"The barbarous and savage token of national "hatred" towards us, which the author supposes to have been left behind by Rostopchin, proceeded from galley-slaves, whose patriotism had been borrowed from casks of brandy which were distributed to them. It is, no doubt, because Count Rostopchin had adopted them, by the name of *sons of Russia*, that they are designated in this place, as representatives of the nation.

CHAPTER VI.

"NAPOLEON did not enter Moscow till after dark."

Though the assertion respecting this nocturnal entrance be of little importance, we animadvert upon it, because it is not founded on fact, and because the author seems to delight in exhibiting the Emperor as introducing himself every where by stealth, and under favor of darkness. This tends, no doubt, to heighten a picture; truth, however, should not be sacrificed to fiction. The King of Naples crossed the bridge of the Moskwa

at mid-day, at the head of the cavalry and of the advanced guard. About two o'clock Marshal Lefebvre entered Moscow with a division of the guard. It was at this moment that Napoleon established himself at an inn of the suburb of Dorogomilow; the fire had not yet broke out in the city. Only one house, at the Bazar, had been burned. The Emperor repaired to the Kremlin on the 15th, at six o'clock in the morning.

Upon an occurrence so simple in itself, the author exercises his imagination; he improves upon, magnifies, and disfigures it, deducing consequences out of it which only apply to his manner of viewing objects. An officer, exhausted with fatigue, is awakened from his sleep by the light of the fire; he first enquires whether the corps to which he belongs is free from danger; and when he has satisfied himself of the fact, he again composes himself to sleep, and leaves it to others to attend to what concerns them. Hereupon, Mr. de Segur makes the following reflection: "Such was the unconcern produced by the mul-
" tiplicity of events and of misfortunes, so blunted
" were the feelings, such was the selfishness arising
" from excessive suffering and fatigue, that each
" one was left with only just strength and feeling
" enough to attend to his personal service and
" preservation."

Assuredly, if Mr. de Segur, whose functions were limited to the service of the palace, had been sent for, he would have excused himself, without

incurring the blame of indifference or egotism. Why should not this be the case of the officer he alludes to?

"The Kremlin contained a magazine of gun-
"powder."

The Kremlin contained no such magazine. Every thing in the arsenal, indicated the precipitancy with which it had been evacuated by the Russians. Tow, projectiles, broken caissons, were strewed about the court. In the halls, we found forty thousand muskets, (of English, Austrian, and Russian manufacture,) about a hundred pieces of cannon, quantities of lances and sabres, and a considerable number of trophies taken from the Turks; but no gunpowder could be discovered: there was none within the precincts of the Kremlin. The extensive magazines which we seized upon, were situated in isolated buildings at the gate of the Germans, on the outside of the city. They contained four hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder, and upwards of a million of pounds of saltpetre. Rostopchin had forgotten to destroy them!

"The guards asleep and carelessly posted, had "suffered a whole park of artillery to draw up "under the windows of Napoleon." The author constantly seeks to represent the French army as an ill-organized horde. Because the imperial guard, which was quartered in the Kremlin was accompanied by its artillery, Mr, de Segur tells us that this artillery had remained there through *the*

negligence of the guards who had fallen asleep. To attack in this manner a picked body of men, so famed for its good order and its habits of service, indicates nothing less than a passion for tarnishing a reputation well earned.

Various quarters of the city, which were at a distance from the Kremlin, were set on fire. Towards four o'clock in the morning, one of the Emperor's officers caused him to be awakened, in order to communicate the intelligence to him; this prince had thrown himself upon his bed, only a few moments before, after dictating orders to various corps of the army, and attending to business with his secretaries. It is inconceivable how Mr. de Segur, who should have been better acquainted with the interior service of the palace, always represents Napoleon to us as fearing to be disturbed from his rest. He ought to know that the lowest officers did not hesitate to wake him, when they had a report to submit. The aid-de-camp upon duty, who would have taken upon himself to abstain from apprising him of any officer's arrival, would have been severely reprimanded. The author should recollect what took place at Gloubokoe, when the aid-de camp upon duty delayed announcing to Napoleon the arrival of an officer from the King of Naples.

It was on the 16th, that the fire approached so near to the Kremlin, as to endanger its safety. At mid-day the fire communicated to the stables of the palace, and to a tower adjoining the arse-

nal. A few sparks even fell into the court of the arsenal, upon some tow that had been used for the Russian caissons; the caissons of our artillery were there. The danger was imminent; the Emperor, being informed of it, repaired to the spot. The ground, upon which our caissons were laid, was covered with burning tow. The Emperor entered the arsenal, at the moment when General Lariboisiere was giving orders to have them removed. The gunners and soldiers of the guard, uneasy at finding Napoleon exposing himself to so great a danger, increased it by their own anxiety. They seized between their arms the burning tow, in order to carry it out of the court yards. General Lariboisiere then requested the Emperor to keep away, and shewed him the gunners who were bewildered by his presence. The prince then returned to the palace. After his departure, this fire, which might have been attended with fatal consequences, was soon extinguished.

This occurrence took place in the morning, and was not the reason of Napoleon's quitting the Kremlin; the danger appeared, on the contrary, to keep him there. Already Prince Eugene, Marshals Lefebvre and Bessieres had requested him to leave that residence; they were unable to succeed. An officer* having informed him that the flames surrounded the Kremlin on all sides, he

* The orderly officer Gourgaud.

desired him to accompany the Prince of Neufchatel to an elevated terrace of the palace, in order to verify the fact. The impetuosity and violence of the wind, and the rarefaction of the air, brought on by the ardor of the flames, occasioned a dreadful hurricane; the Prince of Neufchatel and the officer were on the point of being blown away. Although they confirmed to the Emperor that every thing round the Kremlin was on fire, this prince, inured to all kinds of danger, was hesitating to withdraw himself from this peril, when the Prince of Neufchatel made the following observation to him: "Sire, if the "enemy should attack the corps of the army "which are stationed outside of Moscow, your "Majesty has no means of communicating with "them."

Determined upon quitting the Kremlin, Napoleon sent Mr. de Mortemart, one of his orderly officers, to discover through the burning city, a passage that might lead as far as the fourth corps to which he was desirous to repair. He soon returns to say, "That the flames had not allowed "him to make his way through." Shortly afterwards, another officer announces that the passage was getting free from obstruction. The Emperor then called for his horses and quitted the Kremlin, leaving for its protection only a battalion of his guard.

CHAPTER VII.

"We were encircled by an ocean of flames, which "blocked up all the gates of the citadel, and frus- "trated the first attempts that were made to depart. "After some search, we discovered a postern gate, "leading through rocks, to the Moskwa. It was "by this narrow passage that Napoleon, his offi- "cers, and his guard, succeeded in escaping from "the Kremlin.—A single narrow winding street, "presented itself completely on fire, and appeared "rather as the entrance than as the outlet of this "hell; the Emperor rushed on foot, and without "hesitation, into this dangerous passage.—We "stepped on a ground of fire, beneath a fiery sky, "and between two walls of fire, etc. etc. etc."

An ocean of flames did not block up all the gates of the citadel, and could not have done so. There was a wide esplanade beyond the ditch; and no necessity, therefore, to explore an issue. The Emperor withdrew himself, by one of the great gates of the Kremlin, accompanied by his officers, as was the case on his entrance, and not by a road practiced through rocks. He alighted at the quay of the Moskwa, where he mounted his horse. He was preceded by one of the agents of the police of Moscow, who acted as his guide.

We followed for some time the banks of the river, and took up our quarters, the wooden buildings of which were entirely consumed by the flames.

Although we accompanied Napoleon during the entire of this march, we did not witness the *splendid horrors* described by Mr. de Segur. In traversing Moscow, we stepped upon ashes, it is true; but not under *fiery vaults*. Perhaps we had not taken the most direct road; but it is untrue that the Emperor ran any danger in the course the march. It is equally untrue that our guide *stopped in a state of uncertainty and agitation*, or that the Emperor was indebted for his life to some marauders of the first corps. There is as little correctness in the report of that affecting meeting of Marshal Davoust, *who desired to be carried back to the raging fire, in order to rescue Napoleon or perish with him*. Mr. de Segur, besides, enables his reader to appreciate the truth of his narrative, by the marvellous circumstance, which he relates of a convoy of gunpowder defiling through the fire. The conflagration had lasted thirty-six hours: where is there an officer so deprived of reason as to expose a convoy of gunpowder to an infallible explosion, by making it traverse the city, when it could be directed to proceed by the outskirts?

In his numerous descriptions of marches and of battles, the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace has not found a single opportunity to allude to the excellent order of march of those immense columns of artillery, which, in spite of every dif-

ficulty, were always in readiness to mow down the Russian battalions, and which were led on by chiefs who could so well combine with courage in battles that foresight so essential for ensuring a victory with all its attendant results. He might at least have abstained from making an untrue assertion, to the prejudice of that picked body of men.

"The effort he had made to reach Moscow had "exhausted all his means of warfare."

It is easy to perceive that the author is not well versed in military matters. If by means of warfare he alludes to the *personnel* of the army, we will reply to him, that the French army, which had been joined by Pino's division, by the Bavarian cavalry of General Pressing, and by several detachments, was nearly as strong in numbers as before the battle of the Moskwa. With respect to the *materiel* (the artillery), the intermediate parks which General Lariboisiere had stationed in echelons between Mojaisk and Smolensko, had already replaced, in a great measure, the ammunition which had been consumed.*

---

* In a letter from the Major-general, written by the Emperor's order to Marshal Bessieres, and dated from Moscow the 27th of September, 1812, which relates to the military events that had occurred before the arrival at Moscow, we read the following passage: "By retiring in the direction of Moscow, Ku- "tusoff did what he ought to have done; he intrenched himself "in several fine positions, and endeavored to make us believe

The Emperor had remained at Petrowsky from the 16th at night, until the 18th in the morning, when he returned to the Kremlin. Mr. de Segur would have it be believed that it was during this interval of forty hours that he determined upon the course he should adopt, without even waiting for the reports concerning Kutusoff's march, and for an answer to the letter "confided to the care "of a superior officer of the enemy, who had just "been found in the great hospital." After having informed us that, during his short stay at the castle of Petrowsky, Napoleon remained *undecided, bewildered with astonishment*, the author adds: "He declares his intention to march upon St. Pe- "tersburgh. This conquest is already marked out "on his maps, hitherto so prophetic. Orders are "even issued to the different corps to hold them- "selves in readiness." Let us not, however, entertain any alarm; *his decision is only a feint*. All this is merely intended to sound *his most confidential ministers; Berthier and Bessieres soon convinced* him, etc.

"that, before we could enter Moscow, a second battle would "have to be fought. This measure was so judicious, that if "the statement furnished by Lariboisiere, who commands the "artillery, had shewn twenty thousand gunshots less than it ac- "tually exhibited, the Emperor would have stopped, although "the field of battle was one of the finest we ever saw, because "it is impossible to carry redoubts without artillery and abund- "ance of ammunition."

We have often seen Napoleon reasoning with his officers and his ministers, and endeavoring to carry his own conviction to their minds; we had not yet seen him attempting to impose upon their credulity, and forming the part of a juggler in their presence. Mr. de Segur introduces this as a variation.

The writer supposes that the Emperor was apprised of *Kutusoff's march upon Kalouga*, during his stay at Petrowsky; he only learned it on his return to the Kremlin. Historical truth is not what Mr. de Segur is in search of; it is indifferent to him, provided he can display his false reasonings.

"He had so fully calculated on concluding "a peace at Moscow, that he had provided no "winter quarters in Lithuania." What is become then of those stores *as immense as the enterprise.* What is become of the magazines and fortifications of Wilna, Minsk, Witepsk, Smolensko, etc.? The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace ought to explain to us what he means when he states that *no winter quarters were provided in Lithuania.*

Napoleon "determines, therefore, to return to "the Kremlin, which a battalion of his guard had unfortunately preserved." Why does the author say *unfortunately preserved*, since, a few lines above this, he admits that eight days must elapse before Napoleon could receive Alexander's reply, and *rally*, and re-organize *his army*, etc.? But Mr. de Segur was, perhaps, better quartered at

Petrowsky than in the Kremlin; is this his reason for wishing that the latter place had been burned down? As he assigns no grounds for his regret, we cannot imagine any other.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE return of the Emperor to the Kremlin supplies Mr. de Segur with a crowd of hideous descriptions of our bivouacs, and of what is going forward in the interior of the city.

We do not know why he has concealed from his readers those facts to which our very enemies have given publicity. "Napoleon's first care, when he "re-entered the Kremlin, was directed to the "relief of the unfortunate people of every class. "He ordered magistrates to be appointed, who "were to make known all such persons as were "without shelter or means of support. He caused "houses of refuge to be thrown open for the re-"ception of those whose houses had been burned, "and promised to have them provided with ra-"tions. He repaired to the foundling hospital, "which had escaped the conflagration, sent for "the director of it, General Toutolmin, called for "an account of the establishment, prevailed upon

" him to make his report to the Empress-mother,
" and dispatched it by an estafet; this report re-
" mained unanswered.

" Napoleon then gave his attention to the hos-
" pitals, many of which had been preserved from
" the fire. But what was his surprise when told
" that those establishments were in absolute want
" of articles of immediate necessity, without me-
" dical men, without remedies, without attend-
" ance; that a great number of dead had been
" found in them; that out of upwards of ten thous-
" and wounded who had recently arrived from
" the army, one-half had perished for want of as-
" sistance; that the remainder were struggling
" between privation and death! An order was im-
" mediately issued to all the surgeons of the
" French army, to establish an administration for
" the relief of all kinds of complaints, to distri-
" bute the sick in suitable places, and to make
" accurate reports of the condition of these miser-
" able beings."

" On the other hand, Marshal Mortier, Governor
" General of the city, and general of division
" Count Milhaut, the military commandant, re-
" ceived orders to organize a municipality, and
" an administration of police, for the purpose of
" restoring order to the city, and of procuring for
" it the means of subsistence, etc. etc."

These details of which we acknowledge the correctness, with the exception of the number of Russian wounded, which instead of being ten

thousand, exceeded twenty-five thousand,* are extracted from the letter of Abbé Surrugues, already adverted to.

The same Abbé Surrugues, curate of St. Louis, in Moscow, says, in another part of his letter: "Napoleon ordered that fifty thousand rubles "should be placed at the disposal of the magi- "strates entrusted with the care of those who were "in a state of indigence. According to the par- "tition made, each individual was allowed ninety "rubles; but the difficulty of transporting so "heavy a coin having been attended with a trouble "and delay incompatible with the precipitate "departure of the French, that distribution "proved almost ineffectual, etc. etc."

Is it with the view of adopting a celebrated maxim, which one of Beaumarchais' characters is made to utter, that Mr. de Segur begins by accusing the flower of our army, and even our officers, with *hurrying on to the work of plunder*, and then endeavors to excuse them, by saying, "that "they were not impelled by covetousness; that "one hand washed the other, and that they had "paid for every thing by the danger they had in- "curred."

Is not this defence worse than the accusation? Why does he vilify his countrymen in so gratuit-

* It is true that upwards one-half of those twenty-five thousand Russian wounded perished in the flames, in consequence of the measure adopted by Rostopchin.

ous a manner? May not this severity towards them, have been suggested to the author by the remembrance of the act of a certain personage, who, being an amateur of India shawls and cloths, introduced himself into the cellar of a merchant in the bazar, by an aperture made in the roof? From that cellar he handed to the soldiers the articles which he drew out of it. The latter, deeming that the articles were as much their property as his own, disappeared altogether with them, leaving in the cave the individual in question, who had been led to it by his own cupidity. And yet this amateur-plunderer, had not for excuse the consideration *that the one hand washed the other, and that he had paid for every thing by the danger he had incurred.* For he was not called upon to incur any; the only risk, to our knowledge, which he ran during this campaign, was that of remaining altogether in the cellar.

There is, however, a very great difference between *plundering*, and *seizing upon provisions.* It can well be understood that Mr. de Segur, who had, twice a day, his cover laid on the table of service, at the Emperor's residence, should never have had occasion to go in search of provisions. But that he should deem it amiss that some needy officers of regiments, who do not possess that advantage, seeing a house or a store in flames, should seize upon a few bottles of wine and some provisions, that he should consider this in the light of plunder, is an abuse of words, and an unfeelingness which no expressions can well qualify.

The author ought to have said without disguise or oratorical evasions, that the species of warfare adopted in the present day, being carried on with immense armies, whose prompt and rapid movements will sometimes bring together two hundred thousand men on the same day, it has become quite impossible to subsist the troops by means of regular distributions; that foreign armies have experienced it in Germany and in France, where they carried on a system of *marauding* and *plunder* at the same time; that the essential object is to prevent any injury being inflicted upon the inhabitants; that, in this respect, no troops in Europe have displayed more humanity than the French; that the complaints of rape or murder were almost unknown in countries occupied by our soldiers, and that foreign troops, on the contrary, and especially the Russians, have been reproached with committing those excesses in nearly every village through which they passed, even in Germany, amongst their own allies. And yet this is the Russian army, which Mr. de Segur describes to us as *having reached the summit of true glory;* whilst he constantly draws the reader's attention to the *plunder* committed by our unfortunate soldiers, who carried off the bacon and flour which they stood in need of.*

---

* In the letter of Abbé Surrugues, curate of the parish of St. Louis in Moscow, which has been already mentioned, are the following passages, concerning the plunder of that city. The

"People, however, have expressed too much "wonder," he says, "at the virtues as well as the

---

testimony of this emigrant priest is the less to be suspected, as he is an enemy of Napoleon.

"Meanwhile the mob broke open the doors, and forced its way "to the cellars of the shops which were threatened with the "fire. Sugar, coffee, tea, soon became objects of plunder; "then hides, skins, stuffs, and every article of luxury. The "soldier who, at first, had only been a quiet spectator of the "scene, soon took an active part in it; the stores of flour were "plundered; all the cellars overflowed with wine and brandy, "&c. No sooner, in fact, was it established beyond a doubt "that the setting fire to the city was a hostile measure resorted "to by the Russian government, than plunder became an act of "unavoidable reprisals on the part of the enemy.

"It has been remarked that the populace of Moscow played "the most conspicuous part in the plunder; they pointed out to "the French soldiers the most concealed cellars, in order to "have a share of the booty; they introduced the cossacks "into private houses on the departure of the French; and "the peasantry of the vicinity of Moscow, who came to take a "part in the plunder, carried away and concealed whatever "they could lay hold of.

.....

"It is worthy of observation, that the plunder, which origin- "ated in necessity, was kept up and encouraged by unfaithful "housekeepers, the greater number of whom betrayed their "masters, and pointed out the *Klodowoie* and the hidden "cellars in order to divide the plunder; and after the depar- "ture of the French, the populace of Moscow and its vicinity "left permanent traces of its insatiable avidity.

.....

"The French, thanks to the safeguard which had been "allowed us upon their arrival, respected our establishment. "It had remained undisturbed until the entrance of the cossacks

" vices of the French army; they were the virtues " and the vices of the moment.... the former were " less praiseworthy, the latter less reprehensible, " having been enjoined, as it were, by the force " of example and by circumstances."

As neither virtues nor vices can be conventional, as they exist at all times, this reflection seems to cast a fresh imputation against the renown of the French army.

" who preceded them, and who remained unchecked by any " authority. I consider myself fortunate, in having lost only " a few articles of plate, some bottles of wine, provisions of " sugar, &c.

" Thanks be to God, the church of St. Louis escaped the " plunder, but it could not escape a visit from the cossacks on " their return.

.....

" The unfortunate people, who had suffered from the plunder, " proceeded to the residence of the Emperor Napoleon at " Petrowski in order to solicit his protection; he appeared to " compassionate their distress, and promised that he would take " means to afford a remedy to it. Upwards of four hundred " amongst them were received with no less zeal than generosity " in the dwelling of Zapatof at the Red-gate, and found there " not only a safe asylum, but likewise every attention and " means of sustenance.

" Many repaired to the hotel of Count Razomowski, which " was occupied by the King of Naples, who received them ' with every mark of humanity; he ordered them some assist- ' ance, which, however, proved very inadequate to the wants ' of so many people."

CHAPTER IX.

When Kutusof abandoned Moscow, he took the road to Kolomna. On the 15th September, the Russian army halted at Janki, four or five leagues from Moscow; on the 16th it crossed the Moskwa at Borowskoe. Kutusof now determined to take up, on the flank of the line of operations of the French army, an offensive position against the communications of that army, which would, at the same time, enable him to cover Kalouga and the southern provinces of Russia. As the position of Tarontino, behind the Nara, procured him the advantage of intersecting the centre road from Moscow to Kalouga, and of proceeding to the other two high roads which pass by Zerpouchow and Malojaroslawetz, he selected that position as a halting place for the Russian army.

The King of Naples had at first imagined, that the enemy was retreating upon the Occa; but as soon as he discovered the real movement of the Russian army, he followed it in the new direction which it had taken.

Some military men have felt surprised that Kutusof, if he had not the intention of offering battle a second time, before abandoning Moscow to its fate, should have retired upon that capital,

for the purpose of taking from thence the road to Kalouga, a movement he might have made in a direct line and with so much facility from Mojaisk. It appears that the loss of the battle of the Moskwa completel deranged, by its consequences, the plans of the Russian general, and that, outflanked on his right by the Polish troops, he had no hopes of effecting a flank movement, except by interposing the Moskwa, beyond Moscow, between his army and the enemy.

Mr. de Segur gives no details of the military movements; he prefers confining himself to descriptions, which he has probably borrowed from the Russians, or taken from his own imagination, as he has done in the greater part of his work. He supposes that the Russian soldiers heard the *murmuring of the flames*, at a distance of seven or eight leagues. He says, that one might "see the "fire of their sombre and threatening looks re- "sponding to the flames which they considered "as our work. It already betrayed that feroci- "ous revenge which was rankling in their hearts, "which spread throughout the empire, and to "which so many fell victims." Two pages farther on we read, on the subject of the same Russians, these phrases, which seem to convey a contradiction: "They have since claimed nothing, even in "the enemy's capital which they preserved. Their "renown has therefore remained great and un- "sullied."

"Their sacrifice was complete, without reserve,

"without tardy regrets." And yet we have just seen that it was the work of one man. How did he carry it into effect? By concealing from the inhabitants his mischievous plan; by resorting to the most violent threats to compel them to abandon their city; by throwing the prisons open, and letting the malefactors loose; by placing torches in their hands; by removing from the city every means of stopping the conflagration. It was so far from being an act of patriotism on the part of the Russians, that the inhabitants who remained at Moscow joined their endeavors to ours, for the purpose of arresting the progress of the flames.* *A complete sacrifice* is that which was

---

* "At this time the fire was consuming the lower part of the "Patrowska, and all the shops situated at the bottom of the "bridge of the Marshals. The flames, blown by the wind, "threatened to extend beyond the bridge, devour all the shops "on the other side, and re-ascend towards the Loubianka; "already the inhabitants of that quarter, with their bundles "upon their backs, seemed prepared for this last sacrifice. "All was consternation in the church of St. Louis; the unfor- "tunate people who had taken shelter within its boundaries, "with their bundles in their hands and resigned to their fate, "had called upon me to give them absolution. I requested they "would delay a little longer, and that I should inform them "when the moment arrived. Instantly I proceeded to the scene "of danger; I reached it covered with sparks and burning frag- "ments. Nothing short of an interposition from Heaven could "save us; it inspired a company of grenadiers stationed on "this spot, with the courage to provide themselves with buckets, "and water the roofs of the houses the most exposed; and they

presented by the town of Saguntum, whose inhabitants, after throwing their wives, their children, and their treasures into the flames, rushed in after them; such an action justly claims our admiration. But a set of vagabonds who set fire to a city in which they possess nothing, and do so at the call of an individual who is so much execrated by his countrymen, that for many years he dares not make his appearance amongst them. Such a set can only inspire one with horror.

They have since claimed nothing, &c. Have they not had their share of the thousand millions imposed upon France?

Their fame has remained great and unsullied; they have known true glory. Does true glory consist in massacring the prisoners, in exposing them naked upon the snow, to a death attended with the most agonizing sufferings? Does it consist in plundering, in ravishing our women, burning our villages, as they have done in the whole of Champany? Let the author inquire of the inhabitants of the eastern provinces, what they think *of that great and unsullied renown, and of the true*

"did so with such a degree of activity, that they prevented the "fire from making any further inroads. This measure saved "the whole quarter, the only one in the city that remained un- "injured; it comprises all the upper part of the bridge of the "Marshals, the Rojestkuka, the two Lubianka, the post office, "the bank, the Tchistiprout, and the extremity of the Patrowska "situated between the two ramparts, and also the Maraceca."— *(Extract from Abbé Surrugue's letter.)*

glory of the Russians; he will see what answer they will give him.

Mr. de Segur praises the act of Count Rostopchin, who sets fire to his country house, and declares that he does so, "in order that it might "not be polluted by the presence of the French."

What is good taste in a Frenchman to repeat expressions so grossly insulting? the subsequent conduct of Mr Rostopchin has not corresponded with his words; for shortly afterwards he was found to come in the midst of those Frenchmen, and marrying his daughter to one of them.*

We will ask of the author, who constitutes himself the apologist of Mr. Rostopchin, to inform us whether this Russian Count did not feel himself compelled to burn his country-house, under the apprehension that he might incur the reproach of having personally lost nothing in that great disaster, of which he made himself the instrument?

Our officer of the palace is astonished that, after the lapse of eleven days, Napoleon should still be in Moscow, and *losing the time which he ought to have gained.* It was natural to hope that the Russian army, having been almost annihilated at the battle of the Moskwa, the Emperor Alexander would make peace at Moscow. This capital having been destroyed by fire, Alexander might

* The Nephew of Count Philip de Segur.

fear that Napoleon, after paralyzing Kutusoff's army by one of those decisive manœuvres which were so familiar to him, might make a rapid movement upon St. Petersburgh. All the intelligence received from that city communicated the apprehensions entertained of such a movement. Already the public archives were embarked, and the French were expected to arrive. We may be allowed to think, that if Alexander had been left to himself, he would not have incurred those dangers, but would have signed a peace. He was prevented by the high Russian nobility, and by the English envoys, who mixed up with seduction the remembrance of a sanguinary catastrophe. With this object in view those heralds of perpetual war had made the governor of Moscow their instrument for burning that capital, being desirous by its destruction to inflame the national hatred, to deprive us of that pledge when the moment for negotiating should arrive, and oppose a powerful obstacle to peace. The flattering opinion which Napoleon had entertained at Tilsit and at Erfurt of the personal character and sentiments of the Russian Emperor, justifies the hope he might have entertained that this sovereign would treat all odious insinuations with contempt, and rather listen to the true interests of his country, than to considerations which were purely of a personal nature.

Whilst Napoleon waited for this reply from Alexander, his whole attention was given to pro-

cure repose to his army, to repair the losses of every kind which it had suffered, to organize the hospitals, to administer relief to its wounded, and to collect the provisions of all kinds that were scattered about the city. His solicitude was not even confined to his troops. It was extended to the unfortunate inhabitants of Moscow, who had remained in that city. He used every means to improve their distressing condition. The Russian wounded, who were in the hospitals and in the houses which had escaped the fire, were treated as our own. His care extended to the service of religion; he ordered that the churches which had been spared should be opened; sent for the popes and curates who were dispersed, and gave a fresh example of his respect for the sentiments of the people towards their sovereign, by inviting them to pray for Alexander.*

---

* "Historical truth requires us to observe in this place, that "the constituted authorities, so far from opposing the free ex- "ercise of the national form of worship, gave orders to have a "search made for their popes, who were compelled to resume "their functions. Some were discovered, but under different "pretexts they refused to perform their office. Many no doubt "had a fair motive, since their church had been burned; others "were offered every requisite assistance to enable them to re- "sume the exercise of their ministry; but whether it proceeded "from fear, or from any other motive, it was found impossible "to persuade above three or four of them in the course of three "weeks.

"Only one pope of my neighbourhood consulted me as to

In this place the author again ascribes speeches to many personages, with the view, no doubt of establishing their reputation for frankness, courage, and especially foresight. Napoleon was desirous of sending a negotiator to Alexander; but the Duke of Vicenza, *more susceptible of obstinacy than of being a flatterer*, refused. Can those who are acquainted with the Duke of Vicenza, give credit to such an assertion? They know that he was sufficiently impressed with a due sense of his duties and of his own dignity not to refuse the missions which the Emperor was pleased to confide to him, and that if he wished to refuse any, it would not assuredly have been a mission, the object of which was to prevent the further effusion of blood. To be enabled to form a proper estimate of all those rude conversations,

---

"whether he might resume his functions; he was a stranger to "Moscow, and chaplain of the regiment of knights-guards; he "was surprised by the French on the departure of the Russian "army; I earnestly urged him to it. He obtained from the "commandant of the city the requisite safeguard to perform his "office with becoming decency; and the people came in crowds "to the only church opened for his form of worship. This pope "had been made to apprehend, that he would be compelled to "pray for Napoleon, and not for Alexander. He was assured "in my presence, that he had not to alter a single word in his "liturgy, and might continue to pray for his lawful sovereign. "He performed his office as usual, and sang the *Te Deum*; it "was on the anniversary of the coronation of Alexander."

(Extract from Abbé Surrugue's Letters.)

those indications of pride without an object, that absence of all becoming conduct, we appeal to those who have seen Napoleon descending from the throne, and placed in the power of his enemies. Where is the individual who, even at St. Helena, would have dared to act in that manner towards him?

The Emperor's last words to Lauriston were: "I wish for peace; I want peace; I must abso-" lutely have peace; only save my honor."

The Emperor desired peace, since he had entered into the war against his own inclination. He may have expressed to General Lauriston a desire to that effect; but never used the words *save my honor*, since the French honor was in no way compromised; the proof of this is, that notwithstanding our disasters, it has remained untainted.

CHAPTER X.

In informing his readers of the arrival of General Lauriston at Alexander's head-quarters, Mr. de Segur exhibits that negotiator as delighted to *break off a negotiation which he disapproved.* If this had been the case, General Lauriston would have soon discovered that the Russians only

wanted to gain time, and had no intention whatever to make peace. His correspondence, however, contributed as much as that of the King of Naples, to keep up the hopes of the Emperor. If we are to believe the author, Napoleon and the King of Naples alone entertained an illusion, which General Lauriston ought to have removed.

"Murat, tired of battles, regretting his throne, "since his hopes of a better one had vanished, "suffered himself to be charmed, seduced, and "deceived."

What does the author mean by that hope of a better throne which Murat had entertained? Does he allude to Poland? But Murat never dreamed of exchanging the rich kingdom of Naples against the deserts of Sarmatia, and no such question had ever been agitated. If the kingdom of Poland had been re-established, Prince Poniatowski, and not Murat, would have reigned at Warsaw.

The same Murat who no longer hopes for a *better throne* than that of Naples, is represented a little further on, as flattered with the idea of being *King of the Cossacks.*

A battery of artillery, belonging to an Italian division, was attacked upon the road by partisans who threw this convoy into confusion, and blew up some caissons; they could succeed, however, in carrying away the cannon. On this occasion, the author asperses the character of the officer, by imputing *cowardice* to him. The truth is, that

from the inquiries which the Emperor caused to be instituted, this officer proved to have been rather unfortunate than guilty; the matter ended there.

Who can credit the enthusiasm which Mr. de Segur attributes to Russian recruits? "Not one "failed to obey the national appeal; all Russia "rose in a mass; mothers, it was said, wept for "joy on learning that their sons had been selected "for militia-men; they hastened to acquaint them "with the glorious intelligence, and even returned "in their company to see them marked with the "sign of the crusaders, and hear them cry, 'Tis "the will of God!"

Such is the condition of the serf, that the state of a Russian soldier, however wretched, appears happiness to him. And yet since the disasters suffered by Alexander's armies, the terror and discouragement which the French armies had created were so great that the recruits would no longer march. In order to compel them to rejoin the camp at Tarontino, they were tied in couples, and led on by Cossacks, who struck them with the staff of their lances. Had Mr. de Segur consulted the French officers, prisoners of war, who had been carried to the rear of the Russian army, he would have learnt the above facts.

The author, whose imagination is always in the clouds, and who has already given to us, as an omen, the history of a vulture caught in the chains of a steeple, presents to us, as an inauspicious fore-

boding, "Those crowds of ill-omened birds who "seem as if they meant to defend the cross of the "Great Ivan." Ivan's tower was the highest in the city; it was therefore quite natural that it should afford an asylum to a great number of ravens, especially after the conflagration which had destroyed nearly every steeple.

The author will have it that this omen made a strong impression upon the mind of the Emperor, which he pretends to have been accessible to every kind of presentiment; "In vain he tries to discover "his star in a brilliant sun, and to make others "recognize it,* this offered no diversion to his "mind. To the sullen silence of inanimate Mos-"cow, was superadded the still more sullen si-"lence of Alexander. It was not the faint sound "of the footsteps of our soldiers wandering in that "vast sepulchre, that could rouse our Emperor "from his reverie.

"His nights in particular become irksome to "him. He passes part of them with Count Daru." Count Daru will be but little flattered by that approximation, however involuntarily made.

We will not follow the author in those conversations; it is easy to perceive that they have been made up after the events.

---

* A star in the Sun—this is extraordinary indeed!

CHAPTER XI.

UNDEVIATING in his system, Mr. de Segur represents the Emperor to us as pleased in creating to himself an illusion on the state of his affairs, "catching at every thing to keep up his hopes, "when all at once the first snows fell, and dis- "pelled all illusions." The Emperor's *illusions* did *not fall with the snow.* Having considered that he had not left undone any thing that his duty required of him, in order to obtain a peace, that the hopes which the reports of Murat and Lauriston had created did not turn to reality, and that there remained to him only one month of fine weather for acting, he determined to draw nearer to his reinforcements. The author makes it a reproach to Napoleon that he would not leave a *part of his artillery in Moscow.* The army round that city mustered, at the time of departure, six hundred pieces of mounted cannon, with a complete supply of every thing. The artillery horses had been reinforced by the horses of the pontoon carriages, which had been left at the Kremlin. It never could, therefore, have entered the Emperor's mind to abandon to the Russians a part of his artillery;

this would have been a loss so much the more serious to him, as he expected that a fresh battle would be fought. But Mr. de Segur is on the look out for every opportunity of exhibiting Napoleon rather as a man deprived of his faculties, than as a skillful general.

"In this desert country, he says the Emperor "gave orders for the purchase of twenty thousand "horses."

A multitude of persons belonging to the army had a much greater number of horses than the regulations allowed to them. The Emperor's order was directed to the purchase of this excess, with the view of turning it over to the artillery and to the military transport.

Napoleon is exhibited to us such as he was at Wilna, Witepsk, and at Smolensko, surrounded *by disapproving looks*: "To Count Daru he "frankly reveals his intentions." He informs him of his plan of crushing Kutusoff, and marching upon Smolensko. But Count Daru "who had "hitherto been of this opinion, now tells him that "it is too late; that the Russian army is restored to "its former strength .... that the moment his "troops should turn their faces towards France, "they would perish in detail, etc. What then is "to be done exclaimed the Emperor?"

The situation of Napoleon, reduced to take advice from a civil administrator on the military movements to be adopted, is nothing more than singular; the exclamation *what then is to be*

done? proceeding from a man whose greatness and power we have all witnessed, must excite our compassion. Fortunately the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace comes to his assistance, by means of an advice which Count Daru is made to administer to him. This lion-like advice was as follows: "To remain here, to make of Moscow a vast in- "trenched camp, and winter in it. He would "answer for it that neither bread nor salt should "be wanting." The Emperor might have placed reliance upon this, if from the very opening of the campaign, the exertions of the administration had succeeded in supplying the army.

"Foraging on a large scale would supply the "rest." The author who so opportunely suggests these words to Count Daru, forgets the expressions he used in the preceding page. "Napoleon de- "sires that forage for two months shall be pro- "vided, on a tract where the most distant and "dangerous excursions were not sufficient for "the passing day. Those poor horses, therefore, would have run great risk of dying of hunger; but we must not feel any uneasiness respecting our cavalry. "Such of the horses as it will not "be possible to feed, may, according to Mr. "Daru, be salted down. In this manner we may "wait the return of spring, when our reinforce- "ments and all Lithuania in arms will come to "our relief, etc.

In attributing this language to so enlightened a man, the author ought to have told us what

were the advantages which this counsellor discovered in the Emperor's remaining at Moscow, rather than returning to Smolensko and Witepsk, where he might enter into winter quarters, and prepare himself for a new campaign. Our author no doubt forgets that Kutusoff's army, which was daily increasing, would have become in spring much more powerful in numbers than it was at present, whilst our own army, blockaded in Moscow, and reduced to its own limited resources, would have witnessed the daily loss of the horses belonging to its carriages and to its cavalry. If to these military considerations we add others of a political nature which are obvious to all, will it not be evident that there is not one word of truth in that pretended conversation.

Whilst Mr. de Segur describes the Emperor "struggling amidst the dreadful scorn of men "and elements which was gathering round him, "passing his days in discussing the merits of some "new verses, or the regulations for the *Comédie* "*Française* at Paris, prolonging his meals with "the view of stifling thought, passing whole hours "in a reclined posture as if in a state of torpor, "with a novel in his hand, &c." at the same time that he exhibits him in so unfavorable a light, and displays so many proofs of the disregard in which he holds him, he presents to us "Kutusoff as gaining all that time which we were "losing.... neglecting no advantage.... at once "bold and crafty, slowly preparing an impetuous

" warfare, &c..... Rostopchin, receiving daily " reports from Moscow, just as before its cap- " ture, &c."

This description exhibits to our view a new feature of the author's impartiality, and the same spirit which presided at the scenes in the interior of Napoleon's palace in Paris, at Wilna, and at Witepsk.

An armistice had been agreed upon with the Russians ever since General Lauriston's journey. Mr. de Segur has described at great length the good understanding that subsisted between the advanced posts of the two armies, and which he attributes to the excessive confidence of the King of Naples. Now, however, as if to screen the Russians from the reproach of bad faith, which they incurred by their unexpected attack upon Winkowo, he pretends that *Murat declared to Miloradowitch that the armistice was at an end;* this assertion is wholly unfounded.

The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace likewise supposes that Murat caused the Emperor to be informed " that a woody country on his left might " favor attempts against his flank and rear, that " his first line backed by a ravine, might be forc- " ed into it; that in short the position he occu- " pies is full of danger, and renders a retrograde " movement necessary. But Napoleon will not " consent to it;" and the motive which the author assigns for the refusal is that this Prince " dreaded

above all the appearance of receding; he preferred risking every thing."

We are under the necessity of saying in this place that Mr. de Segur is mistaken, when he wishes to persuade that Napoleon whilst at Moscow, and at a distance of twenty leagues from Murat, gave him minute directions respecting the position of his troops. The Emperor had quite a different notion of war; he issued a general order, as we have repeatedly observed, and left the details of its execution to the person to whom that order was directed.

This Prince had recommended to the King of Naples to watch the Russian camp, and to select the most convenient position for the purpose, without crossing the Nara; but he had not prescribed the particular arrangements,* which could

---

* The following letter comes in support of what we assert; it shows that the King of Naples was at liberty to quit Winkowo, and to retire upon Woronowo, if he apprehended an attack.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram, to His Majesty the King of Naples.

Moscow, the 13th October, 1812, 2 o'clock in the morning.

"From your reports to the Emperor, and the information transmitted to him respecting the enemy, His Majesty considers that Woronowo is an excellent and a compact position, that it may be defended by infantry which would easily cover the cavalry. Should you agree with him in this opinion, you are authorized to take up that position.

"The Emperor has this night sent off his horses, and after to-morrow you will be joined by the army, for the purpose of

only be determined by local circumstances. If Murat had upon his left a woody country, he was to clear the ground for himself in that direction; if a ravine was in the rear of his position, he was to take up a better one. Is our historian unacquainted with those first elements of military science, or does he wish to make it a reproach to the Emperor that Murat was taken by surprise in his position at Winkowo? The latter conjecture

---

attacking and driving away the enemy. The army will require three days to come up with you; you will, therefore, have to maintain your ground for four or five days; and should you fear an attack from the enemy, or that the nature of things may render it impossible for you to avoid a continuation of the losses which you have suffered during the last eight days, you have the resource left to you of taking up the position of Woronowo. All the vehicles which you sent are loaded with provisions; those that have arrived this night will likewise proceed to-morrow, &c. &c."

In another letter, from the Prince of Neufchatel to the King of Naples, dated Moscow the 14th October, 1812, at 10 o'clock at night, there is found the following passage:—"Cause the pass which is to lead you to Mojaisk to be properly reconnoitred, in order that, if you should be compelled to retreat before the enemy, you may be well acquainted with that road. The Emperor apprehends that your baggage, your park of artillery, and the greater part of your infantry, might file off unknown to the enemy.

"Is it true that in repassing the defile of Woronowo, your cavalry might be covered by your infantry, and in a less fatiguing position than its present one in the plain, which compels it to be always on the qui-vive? In any case it is of importance that your troops be provided with many days' provisions. There are at Moscow one thousand quintals of flour, and an abundance of brandy at your disposal, &c."

appears the more likely as in the following page, he tells us that " young Berenger hastens to us " with the intelligence that Murat's first line had " been surprised and overthrown, his left turned " by favor of the woods, his flank attacked, etc." ; in short, all his anticipations are realized.

Our officer of the palace should have told us that the Russian general, availing himself of our confidence in his word, re-commenced hostilities on a sudden, in the hopes of destroying our advanced guard ; but that this plan was defeated by the valor of the King of Naples and of the troops under his orders. The enemy's loss was greater than our own. If we lost Generals Fischer and Dery, whose names are not mentioned by Mr. de Segur, the Russians lost Generals Baggowouth and Muller. Beningsen, who appears to have been the promoter of this breach, afforded, by his conduct, a fresh proof that he was better versed in the revolutions of a palace, than in military operations.

What a strange opinion foreigners would entertain of the officers who approached the Emperor, upon reading, " that no one dared to inform him " that the guns were firing in the direction of " Winkowo ; some kept back from incredulity or " doubt, others from love of ease, hesitating to " provoke a terrible signal, or apprehensive of " being sent to ascertain the correctness of the " assertion, or of exposing themselves to a fati- " guing excursion."

"At these tidings, Napoleon recovered the fire "of his early years."

The Emperor, who, according to Mr. de Segur is worn out at forty-three years of age, whilst Kutusoff at eighty possesses all the energy of youth, had not waited for this event to order the retreat, or to emerge from the apathy into which the author has thrown him.

In the appendix will be found many letters written by the Emperor during his stay at Moscow. An estimate may be formed of his activity and foresight by those documents, which are but a very small proportion of the multitude of orders he issued on military matters in that space of time. They will establish that Napoleon did not wait the attack of Winkowo to organize and reinforce his army, to secure his communications, to complete the number of horses required for his artillery, to increase his supply of ammunition (by means of the powder found at Moscow, close to the gate of the Germans, and the shot picked up from the field of battle) to send away his wounded, and all useless objects, and to prepare himself for undertaking active operations on any point he might think proper. We say nothing of the couriers who were daily dispatched to Paris, with his instructions upon every branch of internal administration, upon politics, finances, war, &c. &c.

In one page, "the division of Claparede sets "out for Mojaisk;" in the next, we are told that

" Claparede and Latour-Maubourg have cleared " the defile of Spaskaplia." We will ask the author how Claparede's division could be, on the same day, in two places distant upwards of twenty leagues from each other. But in a work which swarms with so many important errors, inaccuracies similar to the above should not arrest our attention.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

The Emperor himself presents, in this chapter, the motives of his stay at Moscow. "He was "obliged to allow time, to the soldiers to recruit "their strength, and to the wounded collected in "Moscow, Mojaisk, and Kolotskoi, to move off "towards Smolensko." But, as if the author found it impossible to make the Emperor utter in succession two rational expressions, he hastens to add, that Napoleon, *pointing to a still serene sky*, asked his officers, if "in that brilliant sun, they did not recognize his star?

That metaphor of a star in the sun is a great favorite with Mr. de Segur; it is often to be found in his work. In general he endeavors to persuade, that Napoleon placed a childish reliance upon his star, and was pleased in expressing it; this is quite absurd. A man like Napoleon might calculate upon his genius, his talents, his deep meditations; but he believed in his star just as much as Cæsar believed in the sacred chickens.

All antecedent chapters have exhibited this great captain to us as plunged into a state of heaviness

and torpor; and yet the author says: "Napoleon "who entered Moscow with ninety thousand "fighting men, and twenty thousand sick and "wounded, quitted it with upwards of one hun- "dred thousand combatants. He left there no "more than twelve hundred sick. His stay, there- "fore, notwithstanding daily losses, had enabled "him to afford rest to his infantry, to complete "his ammunition, to augment his forces by ten "thousand men, and to promote the recovery or "the retreat of a great proportion of his wounded, "etc."

In the midst of a long description of the equipages and the train of the army, on its departure from Moscow, the author displays *the gigantic cross of Ivan the Great.*

This cross, which stood on the top of the tower of Ivan Waliki, was thirty feet in height, and made of wood covered over with very thin sheets of gilt silver. In the attempt to carry it off, the sappers entrusted with the operation let it fall to the ground; it was dashed in a thousand pieces. The sheets of silver were set apart, and the wood thrown away. A small cross of pure gold, about ten inches in height, was found fixed in the centre of the great one. The former alone was preserved, and carried off with the treasure of the army. We then have the gigantic cross of Mr. de Segur dwindling to ten inches! Many of his assertions might be reduced in a similar proportion.

Following this cross we see *long-bearded Rus-*

sian peasants carrying or driving along our booty, of which they constituted a part: In saying that those peasants were a part of our booty, does the officer of the palace wish to insinuate that they were led on as slaves, and so justify the infamies committed by the Russians upon the unfortunate French who remained in the hospitals of Moscow, and were recommended to their humanity,* It is untrue that any peasant was reduced to captivity; some followed us to make money, others to

---

* General Guillaume de Vaudoncourt, in his *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la Guerre, entre la France et la Russie en* 1812, a work superior to all those which have hitherto been published respecting this campaign, as much by the acknowledged talents of the author, as by the correctness of the facts, relates (page 252) "That on the 23d Oct., the Russian General Ilowaiki "entered Moscow, that he there found, in the three remaining "hospitals, about fourteen hundred Russian sick or wounded, "and six hundred and fifty French sick or wounded, who were "in too weak a state to be removed with their comrades. "Nevertheless a part of the latter were thrown upon cars for "the purpose of being dragged to Twer, but they all perished "of cold and want, or were assassinated by the peasants in "whose charge they were placed, and who murdered them in "order to obtain possession of their clothes. The rest were "left in the hospitals with the French surgeons who had re-"mained to take care of them; but they were neither provided "with food nor medicines."

General Guillaume de Vaudoncourt having been taken prisoner during the retreat, was enabled to collect many documents and details of the highest interest, a circumstance which has occasioned a demand for his work by all those who desire to form a just idea of the events of that war.

collect what might be abandoned upon the road, others in short as hired servants.

The author has consumed four pages in describing the retreat from Moscow, and bestows only a few lines on the skilful movement by which the Emperor deceived the enemy, when he turned his position of Tarontino, and took the direction to Kalouga and Malo-Jaroslavètz.

CHAPTER II.

ARRIVED on the 23d at Borowsk, the Emperor learned at night that the Viceroy had caused Malo-Jaroslavetz to be occupied; "But," says Mr. de Segur, "he slumbered upon success, instead "of following it up." He seems thereby to blame Napoleon for not moving on at once to Malo-Jaroslavetz. But this prince having been informed that a Russian corps under Doctoroff was marching upon his left, and had reached Aristowo, would not have been justified in proceeding in the direction of Malo-Jaroslavetz, until he was satisfied that the forces marching upon Borowsk were not the whole of the Russian army. What motive, besides, had the Emperor for marching upon Malo-Jaroslavetz, which, according to Mr.

de Segur, Delzon's division had found *deserted?* That phrase: *the Emperor slumbered upon success, instead of following it up,* is therefore without meaning.

The criticism of the officer of the palace proceeds from his omissions to consult the maps; for, speaking of Malo-Jaroslavetz, he says: "That "was the only point at which Kutusoff could in- "tercept the new road to Kalouga." And yet at Borowsk we incurred the same danger.

The author had said that our misfortunes were occasioned by our stay at Witepsk, then by our march upon Moscow, lastly, by our stay in this capital. Now, on the occasion *of the whole day sacrificed to the passage of the Nara and its morass,* he adds: "Be this as it may, we may date "all our calamities from that delay."

An officer comes from Prince Eugene to announce to the Emperor that Malo-Jaroslavetz having been occupied only by two battalions, the enemy came at day-break to attack it, and had forced back the weak body of troops that defended it. He adds that the Viceroy is marching to the support of Delzon's division Mr. de Segur then says that the whole army of Kutusof was hastening up, that already his columns were placing themselves across the old road to Kalouga, which was free on the preceding day, and which we might then have occupied and marched over, but which Kutusof would hencefor ward have it in his power to defend at every step.

The assertion of our *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace is intended to justify the reproach he has antecedently thrown upon Napoleon, for his slowness in moving towards Malo-Jaroslavetz. We have already stated the reasons which prevented the Emperor from proceeding at once to that place, before the enemy should have reached it. We shall add, that from the instructions given to the Viceroy, he was to occupy Malo-Jaroslavetz with a strong force, and instead of two battations only, the whole of Delzon's division ought to have been stationed there. As soon as Napoleon learned the attack of the Russians upon that point, he sent one of his officers* to Prince Eugene, to order him to maintain himself in Malo-Jaroslavetz. He informed him that he was marching to his support, and enjoined him to secure that town by strong batteries on the right and left of it. The Emperor had consequently foreseen every thing, and done all that was necessary.

Mr. de Segur coolly relates the loss experienced by the fourth corps in the person of General Delzons. The intrepity of that general, and the affecting death of his brother, might have supplied the historian of the grand army with some expressions of regret and of esteem for such brave men. The Russian generals, and Koulnief amongst others, have obtained the tribute of his

* The orderly officer Gourgaud.

praises; it is painful to observe that he neglects to render the same justice to French general officers.

According to his custom, the author, whilst exaggerating our forces, diminishes those of the enemy. The three French and Italian divisions which conquered at Malo-Jaroslavetz, under Prince Eugene's orders, did not exceed sixteen thousand men. The Russian army, composed of sixteen divisions, had twenty thousand men in the field. Our loss was about three thousand men; that of the enemy was about eight thousand. This was one of the most glorious engagements fought by the French and Italian troops, considering the great disproportion of numbers. The author seems to reproach the Emperor with it, when he says, "that so sanguinary a conflict might have been avoided." Had he reflected, however, upon the subject, he would have understood, that owing to the position of the enemy, and the bad state of the roads, it was impossible that our march from Moscow to this point could be effected with greater rapidity. The army could not all advance in a body; it marched therefore in echelons.

"The several corps of the army had remained "out of reach of each other." A proof of the contrary is, that the corps of Marshal Davoust which marched in the rear of that of the viceroy, arrived at Malo-Jaroslavetz in the morning of the

24th., and that the Emperor himself arrived there about noon of the same day.*

If the author had made himself acquainted with the marches of the army at Marengo, at Wilna, at Echmühl, he would have discovered that the marches of Malo-Jaroslavetz had been directed by the same man and the same genius.

CHAPTER III.

Our officer of the palace commences this chapter by an error, which though of little consequence, deserves to be animadverted upon. He hints that during the battle the *Emperor was to the right of the high road, at the bottom of a ravine, close to the rivulet and village of Ghorodinia.* During the whole of the battle the Emperor stood upon the causeway leading to the bridge of Malo-Jaros-

* The Emperor quitted Borowsk at an early hour; he was breakfasting at two leagues from that town, on the road, with the King of Naples, the Prince of Neufchatel, and General Lauriston, when the firing was heard. He instantly mounted his horse, and by twelve o'clock had reached an elevation opposite Malo-Jaroslavetz, above the Louja, on the left of the road, and admirably situated for the purpose of observing the enemy's movements.

lavetz, from whence he saw the action, and could issue his orders. From that point he ordered Gerard's division to cross the Louja, on a second bridge* which he had caused to be constructed above the one already in existence, to proceed to the right of Malo-Jaroslavetz, and to extend his right to the woods of Terentiewa. He also sent Compans' division to the left of Malo-Jaroslavetz. He attempted in person to erect a battery on the left bank of the Louja, for the purpose of affording support to the right of General Gerard from one bank to the other.

He did not return until night to the house which Mr. de Segur finds "an old, weather beaten, "filthy, wooden hut, parted off into two rooms by cloth." What we find most accurate in the History of the Grand Army, are the details respecting the interior of the quarters occupied by the Emperor. We will not contradict the author on this point, but will simply observe that Napoleon did not return to the hut until after the engagement.

Marshal Bessieres whom Napoleon has commissioned to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, returns to tell him "that it is unassailable. "Heavens, exclaims the Emperor, clasping his "hands, are you sure you are right? Is it really "so? Can you answer for it?" Bessieres repeats

* This bridge was constructed by means of buttresses.

"his assertion: he affirms that three hundred "grenadiers there would be sufficient to keep in "check a whole army."

That theatrical grief, those clasped hands appealing to heaven, form a striking contrast with the real character of Napoleon. The author departs, more particularly in this place, from the rule prescribed to historians as well as to poets, of making their personages act and speak according to their received character. The author will have read in some account that the position of Malo-Jaroslavetz was difficult to force for the purpose of gaining the road to Kalouga; and without considering that already, on the eve of the engagement, we were masters of the bridge and of the town, in which the strength of the position consisted, he makes Marshal Bessieres say that the position taken by the Russians beyond the town is *unassailable*, and that *three hundred grenadiers would there be sufficient to keep in check a whole army*. This assertion evidently proves that the author has not even seen Malo-Jaroslavetz. Three hundred grenadiers can oppose no obstacles to an army, except in an almost inaccessible defile; the real defile consisted in the bridge and the town; and we were in possession of both. The position of the Russians was so assailable, that, on the very night after the action, Kutusoff retreated with his army nearly the distance of a league, to take up a position behind the small river of Korigea.

Who then can have seen Napoleon, after that pretended report of Bessieres, "crossing his arms "with a look of consternation, hanging down his "head, and remaining as if overwhelmed with the "deepest dejection?" Who can have heard him say "that his army was victorious, and himself "conquered; that his route is intercepted, his "manœuvre thwarted; that Kutusoff, an old man, "a scythian, had been before hand with him? "that his fortune had not failed him, but he had "been wanting to his fortune?" Those fine sayings, like so many others, are related only by Mr. de Segur; and yet it is not probable that he was a party to the conversation between Marshal Bessieres and the Emperor.

Napoleon having Malo-Jaroslavetz in his power, nothing prevented his marching upon Kalouga, by forcing his way through Kutusoff's army. On the other hand, if he wished to avoid a battle, what prevented his diverting Kutusoff before Malo-Jaroslavetz, and directing the rest of his army to Kalouga through Kremskoe and Medka? This movement was even commenced, since, according to Mr. de Segur himself, the corps of Poniatowski had been sent to Kremskoe. We may, therefore, assert it; that *stupor* and consternation into which he throws the Emperor, "that "feverish restlessness, that cruel night, dur- "ing which he lies down, rises again, calls inces- "santly, etc." scenes so faithfully re-produced from those of Witepsk, and of Moscow, have ori-

ginated in the mind of the author, who so delights in conceptions of this nature. He may have often heard that Napoleon rose in the night; he found this very remarkable, when nothing was more common to him. If he had had a better knowledge of what took place at the Emperor's quarters, he would have learned that, when the army was performing any operations, it was the constant practice of this prince to rise every night, from midnight to two o'clock in the morning, being the hour for the arrival of the reports, which the generals dispatched to him at the close of the day. But Mr. de Segur, whose nights were undisturbed, may not have known what took place during his sleep.

Towards five in the morning, an orderly officer* arrived, whom he had directed to pass the night at the advanced posts, in order to render to him an account of what might be ascertained of the movements of the enemy. He informed the Emperor that the Russians seemed to occupy very nearly the same position as on the preceding day; but that, on the right, General Gerard and himself had heard the trampling of cavalry moving in that direction, and supposed to be proceeding to Medyn.

Napoleon then successively summoned to his presence the King of Naples, Marshal Bessieres, and Count de Lobau; and said to them: "It ap-

* Mr. Gourgaud.

"pears that the enemy remain firm, and that we "shall have a battle. In the situation in which "the army stands, is it advantageous to give or "to avoid it?" Bessieres and Murat had no doubt of our conquering Kutusoff's militias; for, they said, the Russian army was destroyed at the Moskwa. But a battle would disorganize the army; the cavalry, as well as the artillery horses, had suffered much from bad provender; the new losses we should incur in horses could not be repaired; our wounded would be for ever lost to us; our marching upon Kalouga was a hazardous enterprise in this state of things; what was best to be done, according to them, was to retire upon Smolensko. The Emperor, after a short discussion, came up to Count de Lobau, and said: "Well, Mouton, what is your opinion?" "Sire, "my opinion is, that we ought to retire upon the "Niemen, by the road which is shortest and best "known, through Mojaïsk, and as soon as pos- "sible." This he repeated at various times. Napoleon's resolution appeared shaken, but he said he would go and see the field of battle, before taking any decision; and he called for his horses.

Mr. de Segur's account of the cries of the cossacks, when they attacked the Emperor, is full of inaccuracies. As soon as this prince discovered the cossacks, who were charging the canteen carriers upon the road, he passed to the left and said: *Quick, my squadrons of service forward.* But the squadrons of service were not so soon mounted

as Napoleon. Three troops of his escort had alone followed him, one of chasseurs, one of lancers, and one of dragoons. These troops rapidly pushed forward, and their presence kept the cossacks in check. It is untrue, that they approached the Emperor so closely, that one of them struck General Rapp's horse in the chest with his lance. It is equally so, that this officer seized Napoleon's horse by the bridle. Some staff and orderly officers of the Prince of Neufchatel joined the three troops on service, whilst the Emperor retired towards the squadrons of the guard, which were descried at a distance.

It was in the skirmish which the chasseurs of the guard and the Polish troops had with the cossacks, and at the moment of the arrival of the horse grenadiers, that Mr. Lecoulteux, after having killed a Russian horseman and taken his lance, was wounded by a sabre cut across the body, which was inflicted by a horse grenadier of the guard, who mistook him for a cossack, because a green great coat concealed his dress. It is untrue, that the cossacks *carried their audacity even to insolence; neither were they seen retiring at a slow pace across the interval between our squadrons, and coolly reloading their arms;* three weak troops were sufficient to upset them. This is so true, that they hastened to ford the Louja, which our cavalry crossed immediately after, in pursuit of them. The orderly officers Athalin, Lauriston, Chabrillant, Montaigu, Tintigniers, and others,

were present with us at this encounter. They, as well as Mr. Lecoulteux, who was severely wounded, can vouch for the truth of our assertion. Mr. de Segur was probably at Gorodinia, and will have given this account, as he has done so many others, upon hearsay.

He concludes, by saying: "All this furnished "matter for reflection." What is likely to have the same effect, is the manner in which the above facts, and so many others, have been presented to view.

How can the author say that the Emperor.... "remained for half an hour struck with astonish- "ment, that the enemy had dared to attack him "on the very day after a victory, and that he "should have been obliged to fly?" What is there so astonishing in a sudden attack upon the head-quarters by some light cavalry? The victory of Wagram was, assuredly, a brilliant one; and at night the Emperor was compelled, by a rush of cavalry, to take shelter in the midst of his guard, which he caused to form into a square. Many examples might be quoted of such unexpected encounters.

Mr. de Segur presents us with a horrid picture of the field of battle of Malo-Jaroslavetz. Does he imagine that wars are carried on without the loss of men? From his description of a field of battle, we might fancy we heard a citizen of Paris who happened to be suddenly transported to one.

CHAPTER IV.

"CAN you ever forget, comrades, the fatal field "which put a stop to the conquest of the world, "where the victories of twenty years were blast- "ed, where the great edifice of our fortune began "to totter to its foundation?"

The present chapter opens in this elevated strain. An observation suddenly occurs to the mind; which is, that if the brave veterans of the grand army have lost every thing, there are persons whose fortunes have suffered but little injury, and who are on the road to new preferments.

According to Mr. de Segur, Napoleon is placed "between the two armies, his steps and his eyes "wandering from south to west, along the roads "to Kalouga and Medyn, both which are closed "against him. On that to Kalouga, are Ku- "tusoff and his army." But upon the road to Medyn we do not discover any impediment. Our *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace says, indeed, that Platoff is there with his cossacks; but, however indifferent may be the opinion he entertains of the French army, he cannot suppose that the cossacks would be any obstacle to it. It is true that, by his account, they have just been *traversing through the army*. Matters did not occur as it is

here represented. We have already observed in the preceding chapter, that they forded the Louga on our right flank, and plundered several canteen carriers upon the road; but finding themselves charged by some troops of the guard, they fled back in all haste by the way they came.

The author does not tell us that the Emperor remained the whole day upon the field of battle, before he decided upon adopting the advice of his generals, who recommended a retreat direct to Smolensko. The time which he passed upon the field of Malo-Jaroslavetz, the difficulty he had in leaving it, give reason to suppose his having foreseen that the Russian army, frightened at the issue of the engagement on the preceding day, was beating a retreat. The unanimous opinion, however was, that the Russians wanted to offer battle; and this was the strongest argument used by Murat, Davoust, and others, to persuade him to regain the road to Mojaisk.

Instead of mentioning that the Emperor went out to reconnoitre, Mr. de Segur brings him back to Gorodinia, where he supposes that a council was held which never had any existence. He attributes speeches, in his own way, to Murat, Marshal Davoust, Bessieres, Berthier, Eugene, etc., and makes them deliberate on the subject of the retreat; whereas Napoleon, before he left the field of Malo-Jaroslavetz, had already communicated his arrangements for the direction which each corps was to follow in its march. But these

conversations furnish to Mr. de Segur an opportunity for making Bessieres say that, *even in the guard, enthusiasm would be wanting;* as if it were not acknowledged, even by our enemies, that this celebrated corps was never found wanting to its reputation, under the most trying circumstances, and that the sentiments of honor, courage, and devotedness which inspired it, only ceased with its existence. Marshal Bessieres knew that corps too well, he was too proud of commanding it, ever to have said that *its enthusiasm would be wanting.*

As a sequel to all those conversations, and to the quarrels which they occasion, the author finds nothing more appropriate than to represent the Emperor as losing "the use of his senses." He takes care to add, that "*those who assisted him* "have asserted that the report of another warm "affair with the cossacks at Barowsk, a few "leagues in the rear of the army, was the last "shock which induced him finally to adopt this "fatal resolution."

Such testimony, from *valets-de-chambre,* must singularly flatter the cossacks; they must be very proud of the part which the author ascribes to them.

CHAPTER V.

"It was after the great effort had been made, "namely, that of Malo-Jaroslavetz, and when "nothing remained to be done but to march, that "he retired." Here then Mr. de Segur agrees with us in contradicting the opinion he put into the mouth of Marshal Bessieres, "That the posi- "tion of the Russians was unassailable, and that "three hundred grenadiers would have been "capable of arresting the progress of a whole "army. "Similar contradictions are to be found in every part of the work.

We have already observed in the foregoing chapter, that the Emperor's intention was again to give battle to the Russian army. For being secure of a victory, he might have proceeded to Smolensko by the way of Kalouga, Medyn, or Mojaïsk, without fear of being pursued.

Notwithstanding the assertions of Mr. de Segur, we must here repeat that it was only in compliance with the entreaties of his principal generals that he relinquished the idea of coming to an engage- ment. One of the motives which most powerfully influenced his decision, was his anxiety as to the fate of those who might be wounded in the affair,

and whom he would have been under the necessity of abandoning.

The Emperor himself had judged correctly: the Russian army was retiring. But when all the generals are of a contrary opinion to that of the general-in-chief, success is rendered uncertain. Napoleon frequently yielded to the opinions of others with a facility which he has afterwards regretted. He has been heard to say, with respect to circumstances of greater importance, but unnecessary to be related here, that he should have avoided great reverses, especially during the latter part of his career, if he had been guided entirely by his own judgment.

There is something beyond simplicity in the supposition that a "couple of skirmishes with the "cossacks had disgusted the Emperor." Such a remark is unworthy of serious refutation.

"From that moment he saw nothing but Paris, "just as when leaving Paris he had nothing in "view but Moscow." The desire of again seeing Paris had no influence upon his determination. By beating the Russians and occupying Moscow, he had attained the first object of the war; having however failed to obtain the second, which was peace, prudence and his duty dictated to him to join the rest of his army and his magazines, in order to take up winter quarters, and place himself in a situation to renew the campaign in the following spring. If our troops had not been overtaken by a winter, whose severity and pre-

mature commencement baffled all anticipation, they would have arrived unhurt at their quarters.

On quitting Moscow the Emperor had no intention of stationing himself behind the Beresina, because the several corps of Macdonald, Saint-Cyr, and Oudinot, on the left, and those of Schwarzenberg, Reynier, and Dombrowsky on the right, were to keep back Wittgenstein, Essen, Titchakoff, and Tormasoff, who were opposed to them. It was only on his arrival at Smolensko that he determined to proceed to the Beresina, having learned that the numerous reinforcements which had joined Wittgenstein had obliged Saint-Cyr to abandon the Dwina, and that the tardiness of Schwarzenberg had given Titchakoff an opportunity of gaining several marches upon him in the direction of Minsk. If his orders had been executed, notwithstanding even the want of promptitude on the part of Schwarzenberg, our magazines at Minsk, Wilna, and Borizow would have remained in safety, under cover of the divisions of Dombrowsky and Loison, of the reinforcements at Wilna, and of the second corps. Being thus secure of a passage across the Beresina at Borisow, the army might have taken up a position behind that river.

How could a Frenchman write that "the French "army marched with downcast looks, as if "ashamed and humiliated," when a single corps of that army, consisting of only sixteen thousand men, had been sufficient to beat the Russian

army; which, as Mr. de Segur expresses it, retreated as if routed. To have made such a statement is to have been wanting both in exactness and in dignity.

As to the criticisms he offers upon the Emperor's plan of the campaign, it is to be regretted that he did not communicate to him at the time, that which he now lays before his readers. Napoleon *in his distress* would doubtlessly have been happy to find a saviour in the *maréchal-des-logis* of his palace.

CHAPTER VI.

MARSHAL MORTIER, left at the Kremlin with eight thousand men, was regarded as sacrificed: the "other officers, his old companions in glory, "quitted him with tears in their eyes, etc."

The Emperor quited the Kremlin on the morning of the 19th of October, leaving orders for Marshal Mortier to evacuate it on the 23d. And as that prince took the road to Kalouga, and directed his march against the army of Kutusoff, Marshal Mortier did not consider himself sacrificed by remaining in the citadel. Its fortifications had been augmented by works which had

occupied twenty days, and were sufficient to enable it to maintain a protracted defence by a division of the young guard; and Mortier had nothing to fear beyond the attacks of the cossacks of Wintzingerode and the Russian peasantry. Where did Mr. de Segur learn that these cossacks preceded ten thousand Russians? And what does he mean by the four days of Marshal Mortier's resistance at the Kremlin, where no attack was made? A circumstance which is sufficient to prove that the garrison of this citadel had not even been reconnoitered by the enemy, is that when Wintzingerode and his aid-de-camp presented themselves there and were taken, they were accompanied by merely a few horsemen. Besides, General Wintzingerode had no Russian infantry with him. How could the cossacks with their lances think of attacking the Kremlin, the high and thick walls of which would alone have sufficed to keep them off even supposing no garrison to have been stationed there?

The terms of reproach in which Napoleon addressed M. de Winzingerode, when that officer was brought as a prisoner before him, are exactly related. But, with respect to the distinction drawn by the Emperor between a Russian fighting for his country and a foreigner disposing of his services for hire, Mr. de Segur remarks, "that "there was calculation even in his anger."

As to the defence which he has just put into the mouth of M. de Wintzingerode "that Alex-

" ander was his benefactor and that of his family; " that all he possessed, he had derived from him, " etc.;" the reply was noble and just; such sentiments do honor to those who entertain them. It is to be regretted that the author should not himself have felt the propriety of them.

The Emperor, who is always represented to us as a man whose faculties were declining, and who had lost all energy, exhibits nevertheless on this occasion a spirit which, it would seem, should have been sufficient to silence the *disapprovers* at his head-quarters. These gentlemen, however, discover in the just reproaches applied to M. de Wintzingerode, " a spirit of violence which displeases " them, and eagerly flock round the captive gene " ral to re-assure and console him." What probability of truth is there in this statement? I appeal to the author. That the Emperor's expressions of just resentment should have displeased him, we are bound to believe, since he states the fact. But that he and his friends should have manifested their displeasure by an affected incivility towards their chief, is what we may be permitted to doubt. It may be very well to say so at the present day; but the local color* of the affair is not visible.

---

* This is a technical expression which requires to be explained. " Local color" is a term used by painters to denote the *real* color of an object when exposed to the light, as distinguished from that which it may assume when in shade, &c. The author pro-

CHAPTER VII.

The author, who has set his palette with none, but the darkest colors, to paint the history of this memorable expedition, is already presenting us by anticipation with an account of the calamities occasioned by the intensity of the cold. Let him repress his impatience; he will have no want of striking pictures; let him not be in haste to inform us that the winter overtook the army three days after it had quitted Moscow. Until the 6th November, that is to say, during sixteen or seventeen days, the weather continued fine, and the cold much less severe than it had been during some months of the campaigns of Prussia and Poland, or even in Spain (in the mountains of Castile), during the winter campaign in which the Emperor was personally engaged in 1808.

Mr. de Segur gives as a positive fact, the report brought by a Russian prisoner on the 28th October, that the whole of the enemy's army was

---

bably means to intimate that the truth is not to be discovered in this instance, through the disguise with which Mr. de Segur has invested it. TRANSLATOR.

marching, by way of Medyn, upon Wiazma; and he adds, that "the Emperor yielding to the im-"pulse of the moment, disregarded the informa-"tion."

Notwithstanding the geographical knowledge which the author ascribes to this soldier, it was impossible he should bring such a piece of intelligence to the Emperor: for on that day Kutusoff himself had no idea of advancing upon Wiazma, as we shall proceed to shew by his marches.

After the battle of Malo-Jaroslavetz, Kutusoff retreated upon the road to Kalouga, and halted on the 26th at Gonzarewo. The movement made by Poniatowski in the direction of Kremskoe, having led the Russian general to fear that Napoleon would proceed by way of Medyn to Kalouga, he marched with his army to Polotnianoizavod, upon the road from Kalouga to Medyn. Miloradowich, although he had been informed that the French had quitted Malo-Jaroslavetz, fearing lest he should find them already at Medyn, made at Adamskoe a movement towards the rear, and stationed himself between that town and the position occupied by Kutusoff. Kutusoff was, therefore, at Polotnianoizavod on the 28th; he even remained there whilst Napoleon was at Oupenskoe, in the direction of Mojaisk; that is to say, at a distance of twenty leagues off. He had made that movement under the impression that Napoleon was marching upon Kalouga by way of Medyn. The Russian soldier, therefore, even had he been the

intimate confidant of Kutusoff, and even supposing him to have traversed a distance of twenty leagues in the twinkling of an eye, could not have informed Napoleon on the 28th, that the Russian army was marching upon Wiazma. Moreover, Kutusoff having learned on the 29th that the French army had retired towards Mojaisk, determined to follow it in its retreat, which he believed to be in the direction of Witepsk, by way of Wolokolamsk, Zoultzow, Beloi, and Souraj; and on the 29th, therefore, he advanced in two columns, and passed the night at Adamskoe, in the rear of Medyn. On the following day, the 30th, he reached Kremskoe; and it was not till then that he became acquainted with the real direction of the retreat of the French army.

We have entered into this detail of marches in order to prove substantially to Mr. de Segur how much he is mistaken, since, at the time when he introduces his Russian soldier, Kutusoff was under the impression that the French army was proceeding through Medyn to Kalouga; in consequence of which impression he manœuvred to avoid being cut off from the latter town.

The statement afterwards made by the author, that Davoust sent this soldier to circulate the report he had brought, in order to revenge himself upon the Emperor for not following his advice, is unworthy of the character of that marshal. What can be the meaning of this eternal anxiety to de-

tract from the merit of both the Emperor and his generals?

The metaphor of "the weather, which had not "been admitted to his councils, and which seemed to be revenging itself for the slight, etc." is a play upon words, worthy of the *Précieuses ridicules.**

It is not to be believed that there was no bridge over the Kolocza at the period when the army was returning. For all the escorts of artillery, etc. proceeding to Moscow went that way; there was at the abbey of Kolostkoi an establishment of artillery, and the eight corps was stationed at Mojaisk. This supposed deficiency, nevertheless affords the author an opportunity of censuring the Prince of Neufchatel, whose long experience and intimate acquaintance with the details of a large army cannot however be questioned. Mr. de Segur gives us to understand that "there was no "general system, no common link, nothing to "bind all the different corps together." Even admitting, however, that the bridge in question had not been repaired, the blame should fall upon the eighth corps: but that corps deserves no such blame; the bridge existed. The great park of ar-

* The heroines of a well-known comedy, by Molière, eminently distinguished for their ignorance, affectation, and pedantry.

TRANSLATOR.

tillery of the army, in order not to incumber the passage of the defile, was directed to pass to the right of Borodino, by means of a bridge constructed for that purpose.

" After having passed the Kolocza," says Mr. de Segur, " we were marching absorbed in " thought, when several of us, raising our eyes, " uttered a sudden exclamation....The cry of " *this is the field of the great battle!* formed a " long and melancholy murmur." This proves evidently that the author did not examine the field of battle. He supposes it to have taken place on the left bank of the Kolocza, whereas the great redoubt, the three other redoubts taken by Ney and Davoust, the village of Semenowskoi, taken by Friant, in short, all that he has himself mentioned is to be found on the right bank.

If the reasoning of the officer of the palace relative to the battle of the Moskwa, and the conversations he has reported, had not sufficiently demonstrated that he never witnessed what he relates, we might find a further proof of that fact in the romantic description he gives of the field of battle on our return. But we are far from envying the gratification he derives from supposing upon his road " thirty thousand carcases half devour- " ed," which were not there. If the traveller he speaks of should ever take him for a guide, he will run a great risk of being misled.

CHAPTER VIII.

The author is unable to repress his desire to repeat to us a story, which he has not even the merit of having invented; it belongs exclusively to Mr. Labaume. It is that of a French soldier, whose legs had been shattered during the battle, and who lived for fifty days in the carcass of a horse. In giving an account of the engagement, our writer had already related a similar occurrence, with only this difference, that the first soldier was a Russian, and the second a Frenchman. Will the author's imagination never be tired of exhibiting such disgusting pictures!

All the wounded had been collected on the evening of the day of battle, and on the days immediately following. The eighth corps was left at its position of Mojaïsk for that purpose. It may be confidently asserted, that every thing left upon the field was carried away, not excepting even the balls. The general of artillery collected upwards of twenty thousand of them, to be again used as ammunition.

M. de Segur's description of the hospital at Kolotskoi seems to convey a censure upon the purveyors of the army. Innumerable orders were issued from Moscow; and it was especially to the

care to be bestowed upon the wounded, that the indefatigable attention of the Emperor was directed. The artillery constantly provided for the utmost of its consumption, and far from being in want of ammunition, the army was obliged, during its retreat, to sacrifice a part of what it had. And could it be more difficult for the purveying department to provide medicines and dressings for the wounded, than for the artillery to secure the necessary supply of ammunition? On quitting Moscow, the Emperor expressly ordered, that all carriages without distinction, his own included, should be appropriated to the conveyance of the wounded. It was in conformity with the same principle, that in Egypt, on the return from the expedition to Syria, after having appropriated all the horses to the removal of the wounded, he was to be seen on foot himself, in the midst of the sands of the desert, having surrendered his own horse to a wounded man.

The author mentions that "an atrocious act "was committed by the canteen-carriers, who "threw the wounded, who had been placed in "their carts, into ditches. One only survived." This statement is greatly exaggerated. It is true that a few despicable fellows of this description from motives of cupidity stained themselves with this crime: but it was no sooner committed than repressed, and severe threats prevented its repetition.

To relieve the reader's mind from the painful

emotions excited by the mention of such an act of barbarity, the officer of the palace might have adduced numerous examples of that active humanity which generally characterises Frenchmen, and which was abundantly exercised during this melancholy affair. The greater part of the wounded, who, agreeably to the orders of the Emperor, had been placed in his own carriages and those of the army, were saved. Among them was M. de Beauveau, a lieutenant of carabiniers, who was accommodated in one of the imperial carriages, and owed his life to that circumstance.

The facts relative to the bodies of some Russian prisoners found lying on the road, are related with similar inexactitude. The following is what occurred: the Emperor, at the head of his staff, was proceeding along the right side of the high road of Smolensko. Having observed the bodies of two or three Russian soldiers lying not far from the road, he called the orderly officer,* who was just before him, and directed him to go and see what they were. That officer returned and informed him that they were Russians. The Emperor appeared much astonished, and said: *What? Russians in our front!* The orderly officer replied: "Sire, I am informed, that the Spaniards and "Portuguese in charge of the prisoners, have shot "several of them who refused to march. Napo-

* M. Gourgaud.

leon's countenance became severe: "What?" said he eagerly, "do they massacre the prisoners? "Berthier, what does this mean?" Berthier replied, that he was ignorant of the circumstance, but would immediately enquire into it. An enquiry was accordingly made; when the Spaniards pretended that the column of prisoners having found some brandy in a cart that had been abandoned on the road, had drunk too freely of it, and that several of them becoming intoxicated, had attempted to disarm the escort, who had therefore been compelled to fire upon them. Proper measures were taken to prevent the recurrence of such irregularities.

"Napoleon preserved a melancholy silence; "but on the following day the murders had ceas- "ed." What can we understand from this, but that the Emperor either instigated or connived at these murders? Such a gratuitous outrage upon the elevated character of Napoleon, can excite no feeling but indignation. Policy alone would have dictated to him not to tolerate such cruelties; since the Russians were in a situation to make reprisals, and to much greater advantage.

The author pretends, "that it was found suffi- "cient to suffer those unfortunate men to die of "hunger;" and adds, a few lines farther on: "but what was to be done?" What actually was done. The Russian prisoners, as well as our own troops, subsisted, for the most part, upon the flesh of horses. "Cruelty was practised from ne-

" cessity." Cruelty was not practised; and there was no necessity for it. Three or four thousand disarmed Russians, whether at liberty or prisoners, could not render the circumstances under which we were placed either worse or better. The prisoners dropped off successively in the rear, and joined their countrymen.

" During a halt in a frozen field, strewed with " the vestiges of both armies, Napoleon endea- " voured to relieve himself from the insupportable " responsibility of having occasioned such exten- " sive calamities; consigning the author of the " war, which he had really dreaded, to the detes- " tation of the whole world.... The Duke of Vi- " cenza, with perhaps somewhat too much of im- " patience, became irritated: he gave signs of " displeasure and incredulity, and abruptly broke " off the irksome conversation."

It is a painful task to have to animadvert perpetually on this unaccountable mania for exhibiting in a false light, sentiments which could not but be natural to Napoleon in the situation in which he was placed, and which in fact did him honor. A man must be unhappily organised who can suppose perversity carried to the extreme of putting forth a deliberate misrepresentation under the semblance of sensibility. No: the responsibility for calamities which had not yet occurred at the period of which the author speaks, rests not upon Napoleon. " This war, which he had in fact " dreaded," (why not say he had sought to avoid

it?) cannot be imputed to him: The Duke of Vicenza, who is always chosen as a principal performer in these preposterous scenes, which have existed only in the imagination of the author, would certainly disavow the part in them which Mr. de Segur has represented him as performing.

CHAPTER IX.

THE Emperor stops at Wiazma to wait for Marshal Davoust, who executes his movement too tardily. Mr. de Segur makes the Marshal, on being reproached on this account *by the corps under Prince Eugene* reply, that "his horror of confu- "sion induced him to methodise his flight."

Marshal Davoust cannot have made use of this expression: the French army never fled before the Russians. From Moscow it might have advanced to St. Petersburgh, a movement which it is to be presumed the author would not have denominated a flight. The Emperor preferred however, proceeding to Smolensko, to pass the winter in Lithuania. This march, voluntarily performed by Napoleon, cannot be called a *flight*. It was not the Russians he sought to avoid, but the winter in the heart of Russia.

Mr. de Segur's taste for metaphor leads him to

say that "in the marsh of Czarewo-Zaimicze, the "sound of the enemy's drums mingled itself with "the voice of Davoust." This cannot have occurred, since Marshal Davoust was followed on that road by only a few cossacks, all the infantry there, (that under General Paschewitz,) arriving at Gjatz only during the night. That of the advanced guard of General Miloradowitch, marching upon our right flank, in like manner arrived only during the night at the heights of Czarewo-Zaimicze.

The author concludes this chapter with a flattering portrait of the Russian General Miloradowitch, and prepares us for his brilliant feats of arms. But in the very next chapter at the battle of Wiasma, the General himself refutes the pompous panegyrics bestowed upon him by the historian of the grand army.

CHAPTER X.

"On the 3d November, Prince Eugene was pro-
"ceeding towards Wiasma, whither his artillery
"and equipage had preceded him, when the dawn
"of day discovered to him his retreat in danger of
"being intercepted on the left by an army; be-
"hind him his rear-guard cut off, and on the right,

" the plain covered with stragglers and vehicles " fleeing before the enemy's lances."

It is untrue that the corps of the viceroy had its rear-guard cut off. His corps was followed immediately by that of the Prince of Eckmühl, of which the division under Gerard formed the rear-guard. The communication between these two corps was always open. The author supposes the artillery of the viceroy to have been at Wiasma: this is also incorrect; it was merely the equipage of the prince that was there. He was incapable of committing such a fault as to march without his artillery.

The narrative of the battle of Wiasma, so glorious for the troops of Marshal Davoust and of Prince Eugene, is strangely distorted: it is evident that the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace did not comprehend it. The following is a statement of the facts as they occurred.

When Prince Eugene, as he was proceeding towards Wiasma, followed by the corps under Davoust, perceived that the enemy, advancing on the left, intended to intercept his communication with the high road near that town, he apprized the marshal of the circumstance, and concerted with him the movement proper to be made. The Prince's corps formed itself into a column to the right of the high road, (looking towards Wiasma); one of its divisions remaining on the left of the road, and facing the enemy, who was advancing on that side. Davoust's corps continued to ad-

vance towards Wiazma. The division under Compans forming the head of the column, after having overthrown the Russian troops that obstructed its advance, passed the ravine of Pruditcha; and immediately turning to the left, placed itself in order of battle behind that ravine, covering the town. The Italian division, stationed to the left of the road, kept back the enemy during this movement. When Compans had formed a line behind the ravine, together with the other divisions of the first corps, the Italian division and the rest of the vice-roy's corps passed the ravine in their turn, and took up their station to the left of the first corps, covering Wiazma in like manner. Established in this position, our troops, whom the enemy had hoped to overthrow close to the town, repelled all his attacks, and killed great numbers of his men.

"Eugene and Davoust heard the sound of another battle to the right of their rear. They concluded it to be the remainder of the Russian army comingdown upon Wiazma, by the road of Jucknow; the entrance by which road was defended by Ney.... The noise of this engagement to the rear of their own, and threatening their retreat, gave them some uneasiness, etc."

This statement is a further proof that the author does not even remember the scene of action. Otherwise he would know that Eugene and Davoust, from the position which they occupied, could see perfectly every movement of the enemy

opposed to Marshal Ney, and that they had nothing to fear in that quarter. The viceroy's corps glided off during the night, through Wiazma, covered in its turn by that of Marshal Davoust. The division under Compans did not traverse Wiazma, but passed on the outside of the town, over the bridge which had been constructed there.

The French army was not, at this epoch, in such a state of disorder and demoralization as the French historian wishes to make us believe: the best proof of which is, that the two corps of Eugene and Davoust overthrew the twenty-five thousand Russians who endeavoured to obstruct their passage, and who were commanded by the General Miloradowitch, whom M. de Segur extolled so immoderately in the preceding chapter.

"Kutusoff remained inactive and indifferent, "although within hearing of the battle." The English commissioner "vainly endeavoured to "excite him into action, he even called him a "traitor; but nothing could move him." Among several reasons which the author assigns for the inaction of this *temporiser*, as he himself calls him, he has forgotten to mention the recollection of the battle of Malo-Jaroslavetz, in which three divisions of French troops repulsed his whole army.

He says: "the Russians had already penetrated "into the town (Wiazma), when Davoust was en- "deavouring in his turn to enter it." It might have been useful that he should explain how the Russians obtained entrance to the town, between

the viceroy's corps and that of Marshal Davoust, which joined in their march; and how they occasioned the skirmish he alludes to. But Mr. de Segur does not hold himself bound to substantiate what he asserts. Beneath his pen our losses have become greater while those of the Russians are not noticed

---

CHAPTER XI.

Our officer of the palace, who has long indulged himself in describing, by anticipation, the horrors of the winter, says here, that "on the 6th No-"vember, the heavens declared themselves." It is indeed from that fatal day, but only from that day, that we must date the commencement of that premature winter, which baffled all calculation, and overwhelmed the army with such accumulated evils. Three days more, and our troops would have arrived unhurt at Smolensko, where numerous magazines would have furnished them the supplies of which they stood in need, and have enabled them to renew their operations with increased vigor.

The author adds: "Trophies, glory, all those "advantages, to the acquirement of which every "thing had been sacrificed, became burthen-"some."

The French in their distress did not hesitate to

sacrifice vain trophies; but they never found their glory burthensome. It may have become irksome to certain epauletted courtiers, who would have preferred the dust of the gallery of Saint Cloud to that of the field; but it never sat heavily upon those who had truly deserved it.

CHAPTER XII.

The author has said, in one instance, that *Napoleon was obliged to fly*; in another, "that it "was a novel sight to behold Napoleon compelled "to yield and to fly;" and lastly, that Napoleon "felt ashamed of appearing to fly."

Most assuredly the Emperor was not insensible to the disasters of his army. Nevertheless, was it possible he should experience the feeling of shame, at a moment when his army, enfeebled as it was, though still strong by his presence, had just proved to the enemy, that it was yet able to command respect. Mr. de Segur confounds shame with the grief of a noble mind conflicting with adversity.

"He found there (at Dorogobouje) the hand-mills which had been ordered for the expedition."

During the time he was at Moscow, Napoleon, always provident, had directed the artillery to construct some of these mills. The workmen of

that corps had completed several; of which the guard made use. Those which M. de Ségur speaks of had been ordered by the intendant-general of the army. Their tardy arrival shews how well-timed were the measures of the department under the direction of that officer.

The intelligence of the skirmish with Mallet, brought to the Emperor by a courier, serves as a pretext for some sinister reflections by the author, who exaggerates and distorts every occurrence, only to draw from it the most unfavorable inferences.

The ill-grounded confidence with which Mallet had got up his conspiracy, the disproportion between the smallness of his means and the audacity of the attempt, could not but strike the Emperor. But what made the strongest impression upon his mind was not only the want of foresight, of presence of mind, and of resolution on the part of the heads of the police, but the too evident proof that the monarchical principle, as applied to his dynasty, had taken such feeble root, that some of his principal functionaries, upon the news of the Emperor's death, had forgotten that, upon the demise of the sovereign, there was another ready to succeed him. It was also the deplorable levity with which, without waiting for his commands, several officers had been executed; whom false appearances had misled, and who, at the bottom of their hearts, had not conceived they were committing any crime. From the first moment that

the intelligence reached him, the Emperor was heard to give utterance to these painful sentiments.

An aid-de-camp of Marshal Ney came to announce to Napoleon, that that officer had been obliged to abandon Dorogobouje, and that he had "been compelled to retire precipitately beyond "the Dnieper."

On the very day when the Emperor had stopped at Mikalewska (the 6th), Marshal Ney had directed the rear-guard to take up a position beyond the Osma, near Gorki. It was on the 7th that the Russian general Miloradowitch attacked the rear-guard in the neighbourhood of that river, and pursued it as far as Dorogobouje. There Marshal Ney kept his ground and repulsed all the attacks of the enemy; who, finding himself unable to displace him, brought the division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg to bear upon his right: this movement induced the marshal to abandon Dorogobouje and proceed towards the Ougea, where the enemy followed him only with a few cossacks. Miloradowitch, after the spirited resistance he had encountered at Dorogobouje, shaped his course to the left, towards the grand army of Kutusof. How then could Marshal Ney send word to the Emperor that he was retiring *beyond the Dnieper?* Dorogobouje is situated upon the left bank of that river; so that, in order to *retreat precipitately beyond the Dnieper*, Marshal Ney must have passed over to the right bank;

which he did not. Prince Eugene's corps alone went over to that side. The Dnieper intersects the road from Dorogobouje to Smolensko at Soloniewo; and the head-quarters of the Emperor were established on the same day (the 7th), in the neighbourhood of that place. Now, it is not true that, on that day, Marshal Ney's corps arrived at that point. As we have already mentioned, that officer retired towards the Ougea. Instead of making statements and supporting them by reflections calculated only to mislead the judgment of his readers, Mr. de Segur should have given us some details of this affair, and of the gallant resistance made by Ney in Dorogobouje to the superior force by which he was assailed.'

The aid-de-camp of Marshal Ney was sent, says Mr. de Segur, to inform the Emperor "of the "disorder into which the corps that preceded "him had fallen; to tell him, that, after a tremen- "dous night, in which snow, wind, and famine "had driven the greater part of his men from the "fires, the dawn of day had brought with it the "tempest, the enemy, etc. etc."

If the mission of this aid-de-camp had no other object than to apprize the Emperor of the disordered state of the army, and to make fruitless reflections upon the subject, it was, at the least, useless; and Mr. de Segur might have spared himself the trouble of presenting us on the occasion with two more pages of his remarks, and of informing us that "the eagle no longer protected,

"but destroyed." Napoleon was but too well aware of our misfortunes: if, however, the officer dispatched to him was commissioned to point out any method of alleviating them, the author ought not to have omitted stating it.

Why does he not mention that, at Dorogobouje, the general commanding the artillery, suggested to the Emperor to send to Smolensko for some fresh horses of the train, to meet us on the way? Napoleon immediately approved of the measure, the execution of which proved highly serviceable. Orders were also sent for provisions to be brought to meet us in like manner.

"Napoleon felt that there was now nothing to "be done but to sacrifice the army part by part, "beginning by the extremities to save the head." ——"As for Ney, he perceived that a victim was "necessary, and that the lot had fallen upon him: "he devoted himself, etc."

The Emperor never had an idea of sacrificing any part of the army: he sufficiently proved that his solicitude extended to every portion of it. Moreover, the cold was as destructive to *the head* as to *the extremities*. The Prince of Eckmühl had commanded the rear-guard as far as Wiazma. It was relieved by Marshal Ney who was far from considering himself as a *destined victim*, merely because he was intrusted with the duty of protecting the march. Such a reflection may be considered as an insult to the memory of the marshal. It was indispensable that some one should

take the command of the rear-guard; and certainly none could be better fitted for such a trust than Marshal Ney. These assertions completely fall to the ground; the more especially as from the time it quitted Dorogobouje, the rear-guard was only followed by cossacks, and not by the enemy's infantry.

"In the meantime the advance of the Russians "was favored by a wood, and by the carriages we "had abandoned: from thence they were enabled "to fire successfully upon Ney's men. Half of "the latter, whose frozen muskets disabled "their benumbed hands, became discouraged: "they loosed their hold: availing themselves of the "precedent afforded by their weakness on the pre-"ceding day—fleeing, because they had fled, etc."

These reflections are quite inappropriate, since, as we have already mentioned, there was no Russian infantry upon this road. If the author had only once visited the rear-guard, he would have known that the cossacks fled before a few armed men, and confined their attacks to the attendants and other unarmed individuals. Marshal Ney often amused himself by retarding the advance of this light cavalry by placing across the road a caisson with a long lighted train attached to it. The cossacks seeing smoke issue from it, would not venture to approach until the explosion had taken place, and it was some time before this could occur. When has the author known our troops to be seeking pretexts for a *flight*? They

might be extenuated by fatigue and cold; but pusillanimous, never. Their firmness in adversity has tended as much to shed a lustre over this retreat, as their valor has contributed to immortalize our glorious campaigns.

Such a thought as that "Marshal Ney exposed "his life just as when he was neither a husband "nor a father; neither rich, powerful, nor of dis- "tinguished reputation; in short, as if he had "yet every thing to gain, when in fact, he had "every thing to lose," never entered that officer's mind. On no occasion, whether in the fields of Fleurus, or those of the Moskwa, did such considerations make him hesitate to place himself in the midst of danger? With such privileged souls as his, *every thing is to be lost* when honor is endangered; and *every thing is to be gained* when new glory may be acquired.

Mr. de Segur says that "his officers, amongst "whom he himself observed Fezenzac, seconded "him very ably," whilst he was defending himself in a palisadoed house. If Mr. de Segur was anxious to mention Colonel Fezenzac, he might have chosen a better occasion for so doing than that of a despicable attack of cossacks, whom a few musket-shots were sufficient to repulse.

Be it admitted, however, that in this chapter the mind reposes for a moment, consoled for the injustice and disapprobation heaped upon the French army and its officers, by perceiving that one of its most illustrious generals has found grace

in the sight of the officer of the palace, who freely praises his heroism.

CHAPTER XIII.

The calamity which befel the army of Italy on crossing the Wop, a stream that *was but a rivulet* when the army first passed it, but which *had become a river* at the time of its return, is painted in glowing colors. It is described with all that superfluity of afflicting details, which characterises the style of our writer; but the narrative of it is accompanied by very little praise of the courage and constancy of our unfortunate troops, who, reduced to such an extremity, that the efforts of the enemy were as nothing in the catalogue of their difficulties, continued to resist with perseverance the incessantly recurring obstacles opposed to them by a murderous sky and a land covered with ice.

"The cossacks stripped the prisoners they made, "collected them into parties, and then, striking "them with the staves of their lances compelled "them to march naked over the snow."

These cruelties exercised upon our unfortunate prisoners, together with others mentioned by the author in a prior page, where he observes that

" they met with nothing but cossacks and an " armed population who surrounded, wounded, " and stripped them, and then with shouts of fero- " cious laughter left them to expire naked upon " the snow, etc.," completely falsify the eulogium he has elsewhere bestowed upon the magnanimity of the Russians. We are far from believing that it was by order of the generals or other authorities that these atrocities were committed; but why were they tolerated? And how can Mr. de Segur reconcile such barbarities with the assertion " that they alone were acquainted with true glory, " and that their renown continued great and un- " sullied?"

" The officers endeavored in vain to repulse " the soldiers, who suffered themselves to be struck " without complaining, etc."

Our officers set their men an example of voluntary privation, and did not *strike* them. Notwithstanding all that our historian has said, they would have blushed to shut themselves up in houses and refuse all access to them, whilst the troops were bivouacking upon the snow. If any selfish beings existed, regardless to such a degree as this of the sufferings of their comrades, they were certainly not to be found among the number of those holding a command in the army.

" There was a moment when this unfortunate " army had sunk into the situation of a shapeless " multitude, a vile tumultuous mass fit only to " overwhelm itself."

Never was Prince Eugene's army in the state of disorganization which the author describes: It fully proved at Krasnoi, that it was neither *a vile tumultuous mass,* nor *a shapeless multitude.* The division under Broussier, which formed the rear-guard, was still accompanied by its two batteries of artillery well organized.

" Prince Eugene succeeded however in saving " his rear-guard. It was while returning with it " to Smolensko, that the stragglers of his corps " had been thrown back upon the corps under " Ney."

When the advanced guard of the fourth corps reached Smolensko, Prince Eugene left in its position the division commanded by Broussier with the Bavarian cavalry, to keep back the cossacks. That division was not exposed to any danger by this measure: the cossacks took care not to attack it seriously. As for what our author says about *the stragglers of Prince Eugene's corps having been thrown back upon that of Ney,* the thing was impossible. The road from Doukhowtchina to Smolensko which Prince Eugene was following, entered Smolensko behind the position occupied by Marshal Ney on the road from Dorogobouje; so that Prince Eugene's stragglers could not be driven upon the troops of Marshal Ney, which covered them in that direction.

" The Colonel of the fourth regiment, young " Fezenzac, succeeded in re-animating his men " nearly disabled by the cold."

That officer had probably no occasion to use much eloquence to induce the brave fourth to march against the cossacks; for, as we are compelled to repeat, this road was followed by none but the enemy's light cavalry. The circumstance was by no means of sufficient solemnity to call forth the remarks as to the "superiority of the "sentiments of the mind over the sensations of "the body." This superiority is moreover common to all who think and act nobly, without distinction of rank. It was doubtlessly by mistake that the common-place principle of morality was introduced here.

CHAPTER XIV.

M. LE MARECHAL-DES-LOGIS, after drawing a distressing picture of the confusion prevailing among some unarmed soldiers, whom the governor of Smolensko refused to admit into that town before the entry of the various organized corps, says that, on the arrival of the guard, "they loaded it "with imprecations. Were they then always to "be sacrificed to that privileged class, that idle "ornament which no longer took the lead but at "reviews, at festivals, and above all, at distribu-"tions of any kind?"

If it were yet to be proved that our officer of

the palace has no correct notions relative to the armies by the side of which he has sometimes marched, what better evidence of the fact could be desired than the opinion which he ascribes to the stragglers following our different corps, concerning the imperial guard? According to him, this celebrated guard, which alone often constituted an army; whose mere presence at the greatest battles insured victory; whose exertions, when necessary, never left doubtful the event of a contest, in which it preferred dying to surrendering, was an *idle ornament!* a toy which Napoleon paraded about from one end of Europe to the other! Our historian ought to have let us know at what reviews, or *festivals* it took a part since quitting Moscow. This *class, privileged* only in respect of its courage and discipline, was the core, the very life of the army. What could be more natural than to take all the possible means of preserving it?

The description given by the author of the disordered state of our troops at Smolensko, is virtually nothing but a censure upon the furnishing department. "Napoleon calculated upon a fort-"night's supply of provisions and forage for an "army of a hundred thousand men; there was "not found however the half of it, even in flour, "rice, and spirits; meat was altogether want-"ing."

The Emperor was justified in calculating upon extensive resources at Smolensko, since on quit-

ting that town for Moscow (the 24th August), he had given all the necessary orders for providing them. He expressed the greatest discontent at the non-fulfilment of those orders. "The fur-"nisher only saved his life," according to Mr. de Segur, "by prostrating himself long upon his "knees. Perhaps, however, the reasons he as-"signed availed him more than his supplica-"tions."

Our writer is here alluding to one of the principals of the departments for supplying *meat*, who, according to his accounts, purported to have sent forward to meet us nearly a thousand head of cattle, whereas in fact, he had sent none. The reports made to the Emperor on this subject made him acquainted with the fact that this man had sold the cattle to some Jews, who had forwarded them to the Russians; in consequence of which Napoleon directed that he should be tried by a court-martial. Assuredly it was neither *his reasons nor his supplications*, that saved him. The author would not allege so many grounds for excusing this unworthy agent, if he had been acquainted with these facts.

During the three months which had elapsed since the Emperor quitted Smolensko, it would have been easy to collect there a supply of provisions; which might have been drawn not only from the immense magazines established in the rear, but from the resources presented by the country. Lithuania had not been ravaged: it was favo-

rably disposed towards us, and none of the enemy's corps had remained in it. On his departure from Moscow, Napoleon had, therefore, every reason to calculate upon finding considerable supplies at Smolensko. Messrs. Daru and Mathieu Dumas were of the same opinion.

"After all, he was irritable from a natural "necessity: he had not been deceived as to the "want now experienced."

The Emperor finding his army in want of provisions through the non-execution of his orders, of course, expressed his dissatisfaction with warmth. He was not *irritable from natural necessity*: he even forgot to punish.

"The genius of Napoleon, by attempting to "rise superior to time, climate, and distances, "had, as it were, lost itself in space."

How are we to reconcile this opinion with that expressed nearly at the beginning of the first volume: "Admitting even that the rapidity of the "expedition was an instance of temerity, it would "still have been probably crowned with success, "if the premature decline of his health had not "deprived the physical powers of that great man "of the vigor, which his mind retained." And with that at a subsequent page. "This enter-"prise was necessary to the completion of a great "design nearly accomplished: the object of it "was not unattainable, the means of success were "sufficient...."

He had committed all "to the chance of a first

" movement by Alexander." We have already refuted this accusation of levity and inconsistency with which the author pursues the memory of Napoleon. He marched upon Smolensko and Moscow, to beat the Russian army and force Alexander to conclude a peace.

" He was still the same man as in Egypt, at Marengo, Ulm, Essling." How often has he endeavored in the course of his work to prove, by distorted or unfounded statements, that Napoleon was but " the shadow of himself; that age (forty-" three years), weighed him down, etc. etc.?" In short, has he not said, " Where were now these " rapid and decisive movements which distin-" guished him at Marengo, Ulm, and Eck-" mülh?" It was Fernand Cortez; it was the " Macedonian burning his vessels, and above all " things desiring, in opposition to his soldiers, to " penetrate into unknown Asia."

This comparison is difficult to explain. Independently of the resolution which such a determination implies in a man already bereft of it, " who no longer possesses that character of spi-" rited and ever varying decision, rapid as the cir-" cumstances calling it forth." What similitude is there between the situation of Napoleon and that of the conqueror of Asia? If, after crossing the Niemen, he had broken his line of communication, and abandoned his rear, to shew his army that it must depend upon its own resources, the analogy might have some foundation. Then,

what are we to understand by the *Macedonian burning his vessels?* Alexander never burned his vessels. When, after conquering nearly the whole of Asia Minor, he quitted the coast, and set out from Milet to prosecute his expedition, his fleet becoming useless to him, he sent it back, and employed it in subduing the Pontus and the neighbouring countries. But why should we be surprised that Mr. de Segur is ignorant of the history of Alexander, when he shews himself to be so imperfectly acquainted with that of Napoleon's campaigns? Before venturing to speak of such splendid military combinations, the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace should have taken the pains to read and study the accounts of them.

The *history of the grand army* is nothing more than a rhetorical display by one whose vague and gloomy imagination delights in exhibiting pictures of which the coloring is almost always false. The facts are never approached with candor and simplicity; the reflections are unnaturally subtilized or contradictory. In short, the greatest deficiency in the *History of the Grand Army* is that of historical truth.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

"On the same day, at the same hour, all Russia "had recommenced acting upon the offensive. "The general plan of the Russians had suddenly "developed itself, etc."

This general plan of the Russians, suddenly developing itself on the same day and at the same hour, is a very pretty supposition at an epoch so long subsequent to the event as the present. But at the period alluded to, Kutusoff was solely occupied in defending himself and reorganizing his forces.

On the 18th October, "at the very moment "when the artillery of Kutusoff had just destroyed Napoleon's illusions of glory and of peace, "Wittgenstein, at a distance of a hundred leagues "behind his left, precipitated himself upon Polotsk; Titchakoff behind his right....the one "advancing from the north, the other from the "south, had both endeavored to unite their forces "towards Borisow. It was the most difficult "passage of our retreat, and these two armies of

"the enemy had nearly reached it, whilst twelve "days' march, the winter, famine, and the grand "Russian army still separated Napoleon from it."

Judging by the author's statement, we should conclude that the attack of Kutusoff at Winkowo, had convinced the Emperor that all hopes of peace was at an end; and yet the orders given by that prince* on the 5th, 6th, 10th, 13th, 14th, and 15th of October, shew that he had already given orders for evacuating Moscow and proceeding to Smolensko.

Mr. de Segur's assertion relative to Wittgen-

---

* 5th October. Napoleon writes to the *Major-Général* on the subject of removing the wounded who were at Mojaisk, at the abbey of Kolotskoi and at Gjat.

6th October. Napoleon writes to the *Major-Général* to direct that Junot may remove all the wounded to Wiasma, and that Baraguey d'Hilliers may forward those at Wiasma to Smolensko; desiring further that, in eight days from that time, not a wounded man should be remaining at Rouza, at the Abbey, at Mojaisk, or at Gjat.

6th October. Napoleon writes to the *Major-Général* directing that no troops whatever shall go beyond Gjat or Mojaisk.

10th October. Napoleon writes to the *Major-Général* desiring him to give orders that the detachments of infantry, cavalry and artillery may remain at Smolensko.

13th October. Letter from the *Major-Général* to the King of Naples, announcing to him that the army is about to march from Moscow to join him, and repulse Kutusoff.

15th October. The Emperor orders the first, third, and fourth corps of the guard, to hold themselves in readiness for marching.

stein aud Titchakoff is equally erroneous. Titchakoff was, on the 18th October, at Brezecz-Litowski, upon the Bug. On the same day Wittgenstein was attacking Polosk. The distance from Polosk to Borisow is five days' march, and from Brezecz to the same place (Borisow) it must be at least twelve days' march. So that these two generals, whom Mr. de Segur represents as close in the neighbourhood of each other, were seventeen days' march asunder. It is clear, that the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace wrote this passage without consulting a map. How could he suppose that Kutusoff, who was stationed on the road to Kalouga, separated the French army from Borisow? This is not all; on the same day, the 18th October, on which Titchakoff and Wittgenstein are supposed to be *in contact*, Titchakoff was being beaten by Regnier, while endeavoring to march to Warsaw; and it was not till the 20th October that he returned to his position at Brezecz. It was only on the 28th, after having left twenty-eight thousand men under the command of Sacken, whom he directed to watch the motions of Schwarzenberg, and mask his movement towards Minsk, that he set out for that town, where the head of his column arrived on the 16th November. Prince Schwarzenberg had just been reinforced by Duruttes division, which made the force under his command amount in all to about fifty thousand men. Titchakoff left Minsk on the 19th for Borisow, of which place he obtained

possession on the 21st; and on the 23d he ordered Lambert's division to cross the river, in order to obtain intelligence of Wittgenstein. This division encountered Oudinot's corps, by which it was repulsed and compelled to return towards the right bank of the Beresina. So that more than a month after the epoch, at which M. de Segur represents the two corps of Wittgenstein and Titchakoff as in *contact*, they were still disunited.

Marshal Saint-Cyr had occupied, since the 18th August, an intrenched camp before Polosk. "This camp shews with what facility the army "might have wintered on the frontiers of Lithu-"ania." The author highly praises the good construction of the barracks of our soldiery: "they "were handsome military villages, well entrench-"ed, and sheltered both from the winter and from "the enemy."

Immediately afterwards he informs us, that, for two months past, the French had been losing great numbers of men by going in search of provisions; "that they were continually betrayed by the pea-"santry, and even by their guides." He then adds: "These checks, joined with want and "disease, had diminished the force under Saint-"Cyr by one-half. The Bavarians were reduced "from twenty-two thousand men to four thou-"sand, etc."

What becomes then of the facility with which they might have *wintered*, if we had already sustained such losses? And as if the contradiction

were not sufficiently striking, he adds in the next page: "These works were so far from being com-"plete, that they served, not so much to cover "their defenders, as to shew them the position "where they were to maintain themselves."

What becomes then of the "*handsome military* "*villages, well intrenched?*" It would seem as if their fortifications had suddenly become reduced to simple picquets, for marking out the station the troops were to defend. The facility of wintering was therefore not so great as the author appears to have supposed.

CHAPTER II.

How are we to reconcile these passages: "Witt-"genstein repulsed, Steinheil beaten, ten thou-"sand Russians, and six generals placed *hors de* "*combat*...." with "the pride and joy prevailing "in the enemy's camp," whilst in our's "all was "melancholy and destitution."——Melancholy! from what cause? Was it on account of having beaten the Russians? or because of quitting a country where *want and disease prevailed*, to enter one that abounded in every kind of provisions and forage? Has the author then forgotten that, upon the arrival of the second corps at the Beresina,

the troops had provisions in abundance, and a reserve of cattle following them?

Mr. de Segur gives a singular description of the retreat of Marshal Saint-Cyr; he states that it "was effected by all the roads leading to Smo-"liany." The motive for this retrogade march was, according to him, *to be better supplied with provisions, and to march more freely and connectedly.* The motive of obtaining provisions was good enough, provided the enemy was not pursuing; but the plan of separating themselves in order to *march connectedly,* appears difficult to comprehend.

Marshal Saint-Cyr having retired towards the corps of Marshal Victor, which was thirty thousand strong, and marching to his right on its way from Smolensko; and not being much pressed by the Russians, whom he had just beaten, was enabled to pursue his march without molestation. And in point of fact he received no check but upon a column of his left.

The author describes the Emperor at Mikalewska, as receiving nothing but accounts of his disasters. "His countenance remains the same, "he changes none of his habits, nor any thing in "the form of his orders. Any one would have "supposed from reading them, that he still com-"manded several armies."

The different corps of the army were still in their original state of organization; composed of divisions, brigades, and regiments. The losses

sustained on the way had certainly much diminished their numbers; but that was by no means a reason for not issuing orders to them in the usual form, since their organization remained unchanged. Nay, more; on the occasion of passing the Beresina, the Emperor made no change in the denominations of the various corps of his army: and he was in every point of view right in so doing. For the enemy being informed by the orders of the day which he intercepted, by the prisoners he made, and from all the sources of information which he possessed, that the army retained the same number of corps, and the same organization as when it entered upon the campaign, never believed the extensive losses we had sustained, but always supposed us stronger than we really were. If, on the contrary, several corps had been condensed into one or two, our weakness would thereby have become known to the enemy, at the same time that it would have had the effect of putting every thing into confusion.

"As for Baraguey d'Hilliers, whom another "officer has just accused, he is summoned to at- "tend; and having been deprived of his distinc- "tions, set out for Berlin; where he will antici- "cipate the judgment to be passed upon it, by "dying of grief."

General Baraguey d'Hilliers had been entrusted with the command of a division forming at Smolensko; and had cantoned his troops upon the road from Smolensko to Elnia. The approach of

the Russian army in that direction ought to have induced him to consolidate his division, which he however omitted to do. On the 9th November, one of his brigades was attacked by three chiefs of Russian *partisans*, and although it consisted of sixteen hundred men, of which five hundred were cavalry, it surrendered and laid down its arms. The remainder of the division retreated in all haste towards Smolensko. Some French depôts, the most considerable of which was at Klemenstiewo, were also taken by the enemy. The greater part of the artillery horses, stationed within a considerable circuit of the environs, were likewise carried off by the cossacks. The Emperor expressed to General Baraguey d'Hilliers, the dissatisfaction he felt at his having so injudiciously scattered all his forces. He deprived him of his command, and sent him to Berlin. It is, however, not true, that he was *deprived of his distinctions;* he was to be tried? In the case of a general so thoroughly sensible of the principles of honor, and so good a Frenchman as General Baraguey d'Hilliers, the misfortune of having deserved to be put upon his trial, may certainly have had a fatal influence upon the already infirm state of his health.*

* In a letter from the Prince of Neufchatel to General Charpentier, governor of Smolensko, dated Wiazma, the 1st November 1812, in which he gives him an account of the movements of the army, directs him to apprise the governors of

Independently of the irreparable losses, both of men and horses, which we had sustained in consequence of the injudicious conduct of general Baraguey d'Hilliers, the Emperor was much distressed on learning that a French corps of eleven hundred infantry and five hundred cavalry, had laid down its arms before a body of *partisans*. Only a few days before, Marshal Ney, in order to shew his soldiers how little those troops of cossacks were to be feared, had ordered a captain of grenadiers to select fifty men, to go and set fire to a village situated at the distance of half a league from the road, then to retire in the direction of another village which he pointed out to him, and rejoin him after the exploit. "You will be," said he, "surrounded by five or six hundred cossacks, "or more; but be firm: not one of you has any "thing to fear from them." The officer immediately proceeds to comply minutely with this order; in doing which he presently finds himself surrounded and annoyed by a thousand or twelve hundred cossacks. The Russian commander in vain causes one half of his followers to dismount:

Mohiloff and Minsk thereof, prescribes new measures to be adopted by the supply department, and requires to be informed of the state of all the magazines, subsistence and ammunition at Smolensko, will be found the following sentence: "Make "General Baraguey d'Hilliers acquainted with the movement "of the army, etc. *I have already intimated that that General should be careful not to commit himself: repeat to him, from me, that opinion.*"—(See Appendix.)

He cannot succeed in securing any of this handful of brave men. Marshal Ney then dispatches half a battalion to the assistance of these fifty grenadiers; who together with their officer, rejoin the column untouched.

With respect to the reflections which Mr. de Segur, who is continually reverting to the past, in order to complain of the present, attributes to the troops on the subject of the thirty-four days of inactivity at Moscow, and the want of care in providing for their various wants; is it not obvious that they indicate a desire on his part of censuring the Emperor? During his stay at Moscow, his utmost care was bestowed upon his army. On quitting that city his solicitude was especially directed towards the accommodation of the wounded: all the carriages, including his own, were appropriated to their reception. The orders given to the different commanders of corps, required that they should carry provisions with them for twenty days, which appeared sufficient for the purpose of reaching Smolensko before the frost. Troops and depôts of provisions were to be stationed at Wiazma and Dorogobouje. The author, therefore, accuses Napoleon of improvidence unjustly. All our misfortunes arose from the severity of the cold, and from the circumstance of the Emperor's orders not being duly complied with. (See the Emperor's letters, in the *Appendix*.)

Mr. de Segur concludes these long reflections by saying that from Moscow "it would, at all events,

"have been necessary to return; and nothing had "been prepared, even for a pacific return." What! if peace had been concluded, we should have been unable to obtain provisions, and retire upon our line of demarcation! we should have been destitute of resources! Would not even the Russians themselves have had an interest in securing them to us?

The Emperor hoped to find at Smolensko fresh troops, horses, and considerable magazines. Although his expectations were not entirely realized, Smolensko offered us some valuable resources. Flour was distributed to the troops; in fact a general issue was made of whatever the magazines afforded. The Emperor had originally intended to preserve that town, and to take up positions near the Dwina and the Boristhenes. Having learned that Admiral Titchakoff was advancing towards Minsk, and that the reiterated orders he had sent to Victor, to drive back Wittgenstein beyond the Dwina had not been complied with, he determined upon retiring behind the Beresina. The author seems to reproach Napoleon with having remained five days at Smolensko; and yet those five days were employed in the very most advantageous manner possible for the army. The long march from Moscow, which it had just performed without stopping, had occasioned a great number of stragglers to remain on the way. It was hoped that a halt of a few days would afford the greater part of them an opportunity of coming

in. Besides which, all the corps did not reach Smolensko at the same time as the Emperor, and it was necessary to await the arrival of the whole before renewing the march.

It is easy to conceive that M. de Segur, who had no knowledge of the plans of the Emperor, should have imagined that he was wasting time at pleasure. It is easy to conceive also, that among *the wise* of whom he has frequently spoken, and in whose number he is doubtless included, there might be some who would have been disposed to retire in all haste to Wilna, and even beyond the Niemen or the Vistula, happen what might to the rest of the army. The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace is here, as elsewhere, the organ of the discontented, whose vaporings he has recorded.

"It was known that Ney had received orders "to arrive at Smolensko as late as possible; and "that Eugene had been directed to pass two days "at Doukhoutchina." Napoleon's letter to the *Major-Général*, which we subjoin, disproves the statement relative to Ney.* As for Eugene, he

---

* *Napoleon to the Major-Général,*

Semlewo, 3d November, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, directing, that as soon as he shall have assumed the command of the rear-guard, he will cause the army to move forward as quickly as possible; for we are thus consuming the remainder of the fine weather without marching. The Prince of Eckmühl is detaining the Viceroy and Prince Poniatowski for every charge of cossacks that he perceives. Hereupon, &c. &c.

crossed the Wop on the 9th, arrived on the 10th at Doukhoutchina; and remained there on the 11th, to get his troops into order and give them a little rest: it was not till the 13th that he reached Smolensko.

Among other reflections attributed by the author to the French soldiery, is the following: "Could the Emperor be ignorant of the satisfac- "tion experienced by the Russians, when, three "months before, he stumbled so unfortunately "over Smolensko, instead of continuing his "march to the right towards Elnia, where he "would have cut off the communication between "the enemy's army and his capital?..... At the "present day....will these Russians imitate his "blunder, by which they profited?"

Who would believe that a writer, bearing the title of general, had made such a reflection! What then! ought the Emperor to have omitted to take Smolensko, and leaving that place in the power of the enemy, in his rear, to march upon Moscow! Peace could not be expected till the Russian army should be beaten and the capital taken. The whole plan of the Emperor rested upon this basis. Smolensko is with reason regarded as the key to Moscow, since he who is master of Smolensko can advance to Moscow without danger, by commencing from that point his line of operations. If the author's idea be correct, why do the Russians, in all their accounts, speak of the consternation and gloom which the taking of that im-

portant place by the French occasioned in all Russia?* The circumstances attending our retreat were totally different. When the Emperor was marching to Moscow it was proper he should occupy Smolensko; when retiring upon the Beresina, he could not retain that place. Kutusoff would not have done well to lose his time in attacking it; it was his duty to endeavor to join the army of Titchakoff as speedily as possible, in order to cut off our retreat. He was in his own country; and had therefore nothing to apprehend for his rear.

"Did not the circumstance of Augereau and "his brigade being carried off upon that road, "sufficiently inform him in this respect?" General Augereau and his brigade were taken, not by Kutusoff, but by the Russian *partisans* Denisof, Dawidof and Seslavin, who united their forces for that purpose.

The author supposes that the Emperor remained at Smolensko, for the pleasure "of dating for five "days from that town, and thereby giving to a "forced and precipitate retreat, the appearance

---

* "The loss of Smolensko spread terror throughout the in-"terior of the empire. If Napoleon had had it in his power "to push forward a corps to Moscow before the Russian army "was in a condition to sustain a general battle, the consterna-"tion would have been at its height, and the nation, in despair, "would perhaps have regretted the sacrifices it had made to its "independence."—*(Boutourlin, vol. 1, page 304.)*

" of a slow and glorious one." Here again the feeling of those who were anxious to guard themselves from danger, and escape from privations as speedily as possible, and at any price, is conspicuous. We must repeat, that the Emperor remained at Smolensko no longer than was necessary to collect his scattered followers; to remove his sick and wounded; * to avail himself of the resources of the place, and to avoid being routed instead of retreating; as he might have been said to be, had he marched continually without stopping. One proof that these five days were not lost to the army, is that after quitting Smolensko, it again shewed, by the engagement at Krasnoi, that it had not degenerated; and that, from the time of the occurrence of those engagements, Kutusoff no longer ventured to attempt intercepting its retreat, or even to follow it too closely.

The author attributes these reflections upon our stay at Smolensko, to some of Napoleon's officers. He adds, that they were made " in private, for " their devotedness to him had yet two years " longer to continue." This avowal is tolerably ingenuous. What then! The devotedness of the Emperor's officers was to continue only so long as

* On the 7th November, there were in the hospitals at Smolensko, three thousand six hundred and seventy-eight sick, of whom two hundred and two were Russians; on the 8th, nine hundred were sent forward towards Orcha, and the rest of them were removed during the time we remained in the town.

he should have benefits, honors, and gold to lavish upon them!! Notwithstanding the praises bestowed upon Messrs. This and That, we doubt whether they will feel flattered by the opinion M. de Segur entertains of their attachment.

At the conclusion of an eulogium upon General Latour-Maubourg, the author remarks that: "He "constantly advanced in the same order and at "the same measured pace, through the midst of "unbounded confusion; and nevertheless, to the "honor of the age, he arrived as rapidly, as high, "and as soon as the rest."

It is not easy to perceive what the honor of the age has to do with the advancement of M. Latour-Maubourg. One of the Emperor's fixed principles was to reward merit wherever he found it. Strict justice requires it to be admitted that he has constantly acted upon that principle; and requires also that the whole honor of so doing should be ascribed to himself.

According to the statement of the officer of the palace, the French army, originally a hundred thousand strong, had been reduced in twenty-five days to thirty-six thousand; and this slender residue was encumbered with sixty thousand followers without arms: which statement would imply that the whole number of killed, wounded, and missing, since the departure from Moscow did not exceed four thousand.

These relics of the different corps of our army ...."Kutusoff was about to put successively to

"the sword." There is something revolting in this expression, as proceeding from a Frenchman. Assuredly, if our soldiers were put to the sword by Kutusoff, the Russians were put to the sword by our army; and so effectually, that they were no more heard of.

CHAPTER III.

On quitting Smolensko with his army, the Emperor was obliged to make it advance in successive *echelons*, in order to avoid the confusion and incumbrance of the artillery, the carriages, and the followers. On the 13th, he ordered the division commanded by Claparede to march, with the treasure and baggage; on the 14th, he set out himself, accompanied by his guard, leaving at Smolensko the corps of Davoust and Ney, which were mutually to support each other, and to evacuate the town on the 16th, after having blown up the fortifications.

Napoleon arrived at Koritnia, where he passed the night. On the following day, Miloradowitch, at the head of twenty thousand men, did not venture to attempt intercepting his advance, but contented himself with sending a few shots after him. The Emperor reached Krasnoi, where "The mere "appearance of Sebastiani and of the grenadiers

" who preceded him, was sufficient to repel the " enemy's infantry." It was on the 14th that the division under Claparede, on arriving at Krasnoi, drove back Ojarowski's flying corps, which was endeavoring to establish itself there. The imperial guard, accompanying the Emperor, had not suffered, the enemy not having ventured to attack it. " But," says our author, " the Russians, from " their eminences, saw all the interior of the " army, its deformities, its weaknesses, its most " discreditable parts; in short, all that is com- " monly concealed with the greatest care."

The guard marched in perfect order; and for *these deformities, these discreditable parts,* it seems that Miloradowitch was fearful of seeing them too closely, since he did not dare to oppose their advance. Mr. de Segur, who has favored us with so brilliant a portrait of this general, whom he compares to Murat, finds himself thus forced to falsify, by facts, the praises he has lavished upon him. " After the guard had passed, he took cou- " rage, condensed his forces, and coming down " from his heights, established himself strongly " with twenty thousand men across the high road. " By this movement he separated Eugene, Da- " voust, and Ney, from the Emperor, and cut off " these three commanders from the road to Eu- " rope." Mr. de Segur is so far carried away by his imagination, that he forgets that the scene occurred in Lithuania!

CHAPTER IV.

PRINCE EUGENE, who, with his corps, had passed the night of the 15th near Koritnia, was at the distance of three leagues from Krasnoi, when the stragglers, who were marching before him, were attacked by the cossacks of Miloradowitch. These men, for the most part unarmed, formed themselves into a body, repulsed the attack, and retired upon the corps of which they formed a part.

Eugene perceiving that Miloradowitch was desirous of arresting his progress, placed the Italian guard to the right of the road, the divisions under Phelippon and Broussier to the left, and the third division in the rear. In this position, although he had only a few pieces of cannon remaining, he vigorously repulsed all the attacks of Miloradowith. During the whole of the engagement the Prince had manœuvred so as to threaten the enemy's right; at night, perceiving that he had considerably reinforced himself on that side, he put his army in motion, and passed behind the enemy's left. By this movement he went round the corps opposed to him, and, in the course of the night, joined the young guard which was beyond Krasnoi.

Our historian describes these movements very diffusely; and encumbers his narrative with ill-timed reflections, which serve but to render it obscure. What is the meaning of "those battalions "of the enemy flanking both sides of the road," along which the numerous followers were proceeding to join Eugene, and which, "either from "a feeling of admiration or of pity, call to our "men, and beseech them to surrender?" We shall not accept this sentiment of supposed *admiration*, because it is ungracious to appropriate praise and adulation to oneself; and we cannot but decidedly reject the expression of *pity*. It is, however, a sentiment completely in harmony with the idea of the *furcæ caudinæ*, beneath which, according to the *maréchal-des-logis*, Kutusoff compelled us to pass. He should simply have said, without hyperbole or boasting, that the recollection of Malo-Jaroslavetz, and the appearance of our brave soldiery intimidated their enemies. The author himself has observed shortly afterwards with respect to the Russians, that "Vic-"tory was new to them, that even having it at "their command, they knew not how to profit by "it; but postponed till the morrow the comple-"tion of the affair."

CHAPTER V.

NAPOLEON having reached Krasnoi on the 15th, and being informed that the Russian army was in the environs, and that Ojarowski's corps, stationed in the town, threatened the left of the road, was determined to prove to the Russians, by a nocturnal attack, that the French army, notwithstanding the disasters which had befallen it, was still animated by the same courage. For this purpose he directed General Roguet, with his division of the young guard, to go that same night and attack the corps of Ojarowski. His instructions were to charge the Russians at the point of the bayonet without firing. This expedition produced the result which the Emperor expected: the Russians being taken by surprise, lost great numbers. The most important effect, however, of this gallant attack, was the circumspection with which it inspired Kutusoff; he immediately countermanded the movement he had directed to be made by Tormasof's corps, with a view to intercept our progress from Krasnoi to Liadi. Such splendid achievements, shedding a lustre over our misfortunes, which we owed to nothing but the

inclemency of the season, ought to have exalted the imagination of a French writer.

The reflections ascribed by the author to Kutusoff, relative to the slowness of the motions of our army, are degrading to it: he describes it as imprisoned beneath the lash of a cossack, who "chastises it the moment it seeks to quit the track marked out for it."

The observations he attributes to Wilson, namely, that the cossacks were heard to say "it was "a shame to suffer those skeletons thus to leave "their grave," is equally extravagant. Kutusoff declined attacking the French army because the real Russian army had been defeated on the Moskwa; and because with that which he had re-organized he had been beaten both at Malo-Jaroslavetz and at Wiazma, although his forces were five times as considerable as those of the French. He knew that, though there might be in the French army a few desponding soldiers marching isolatedly, the courage of the rest augmented as their numbers decreased; and that Napoleon was at their head. That an Englishman should not have felt this, or not have expressed it, is easily conceived; but a Frenchman!

On quitting Smolensko the Emperor had directed Ney to form the rear-guard. That marshal was not to quit the town till the 16th, after blowing up all the fortifications: the Prince of Eckmühl was ordered to support him. On the 16th, at a very early hour of the morning, Davoust hav-

ing left one division under Marshal Ney, commenced marching with the other four. During the day, after having apprised Ney of the engagement by Prince Eugene, he continued his march towards Krasnoi. Marshal Ney conceiving that there could be nothing between him and Napoleon but cossacks, did not think it necessary to march till the 17th. The position which Miloradowitch had taken up, on the road from Smolensko to Krasnoi, during the night between the 16th and 17th, consequently separated these two corps. It became, at the same time, known at Krasnoi, that the Russians, whose movement upon Dobré had been stopped by the attack made upon them by General Roguet, were preparing to retake that place. Napoleon's situation was critical. On the one hand he saw his retreat on the point of being cut off, and on the other, if he were to retire, two of his corps abandoned. He summoned Berthier, Mortier, Lefebvre, and Bessieres, and told them it was necessary to prepare for attacking the enemy on the following morning. Those marshals merely replied by pointing out the situations of their respective corps. "No matter," answered Napoleon; "we must, without hesitation march "to the assistance of Davoust and Ney;" and accordingly, at day-break he put himself at the head of his guard to proceed against the enemy. This intrepid movement of the Emperor, who, with a handful of men, marched against the whole of the Russian forces, had its due effect. Miloradowitch

quitted his position on the road, and receding towards the centre of the Russian army, left a free passage for the corps of Marshal Davoust, which therefore joined Napoleon.

This chapter, with the exception of a few passages which we have been obliged to notice, is in general written with a spirit of impartiality, of which one cannot but regret the absence in the other parts of the work. The army and its commander are here less disfigured than usually. Setting aside a few blemishes in the way of ill-judged comparisons and ill-timed reflections, the heroic attitude of Napoleon, and the grandeur and dignity of his decisions, are faithfully depicted. How could the author, after describing this splendid movement, suffer to remain in his work the odious imputation which occurs at a prior page of it, where we read that "Napoleon felt that there "was nothing now to be done but to sacrifice the "army part by part, beginning by the extremi-"ties, to save the head." How could he fail to perceive that he was himself triumphantly refuting the reproaches on the score of torpor, caducity, indecision, and insensibility, with which he has loaded him.

CHAPTER VI.

"THERE it was," (at the head-quarters at Liadi,) "that all the papers, which Napoleon had collected "for the purpose of writing the history of his life, "were consumed: for such was his intention when he entered upon this fatal war."

There is something ridiculous in supposing that the Emperor, on entering upon the war, *carried with him all his papers in order to write the history of his life*, as if he had expected to find himself in Russia in a state of undisturbed repose. That prince had no occasion to burn a single paper relative to his history, because he brought none with him. What does the author mean, besides, by these collected papers? Napoleon had no need of taking such a precaution, since the acts of his life are everywhere recorded. He had caused entries to be made in registers, of his correspondence as general-in-chief of the armies of Italy and of Egypt, and these registers never quitted his archives. His intention was to take advantage of the state of repose in which he expected to be left by the general pacification, in order to write a complete history of his campaigns and of his reign; and if he could have had the benefit of those valuable materials at St. Helena, he would

have been better able to raise an imperishable monument to the glory of the French arms.

The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace allows no opportunity to escape him of repeating that it was part of the plan of the Emperor to stop at the Borysthenes. How can he imagine that, when quitting Paris, he had conceived the project of stopping upon the confines of Lithuania? His object was to secure by conquest that peace which he could not otherwise obtain: but he could attain this object only by destroying the Russian armies. If his military combinations had all succeeded, that peace might have been obtained even in Lithuania; but then he would not have remained there for the pleasure of writing an account of his campaigns. Events having however had another issue, he could not, in the month of July, stop to take up cantonments. Already arrived upon the Dwina, he had four months remaining for action. He decided to march against Moscow, under the conviction that Russia would not surrender that city without a battle: and it was upon that battle that his hopes of peace were founded. But before he commenced the undertaking, he left the several corps of Macdonald, Saint-Cyr, and Oudinot, upon the Dwina; and upon the frontiers of Volhinia, those of Schwarzenberg, Reynier, and Dombrowski, to keep the Russian armies in check, at the same time that other considerable corps, those of Victor and Augereau, were organising in his rear; the one to

advance and form his reserve, and the other to insure his communication as far as the Rhine. Already master of Smolensko about the middle of August, he advanced to Moscow, which was only ten day's march distant from the former town. The battle he had wished for took place, and the Russian army was partly annihilated. The occupation of Moscow was the result: every thing promised peace. But this would have been too injurious to England, and the burning of Moscow was resolved on; a sacrifice which cost that power nothing, but was more prejudicial to Russia than the most disadvantageous peace could possibly have been. To insure the success of so monstrous an undertaking, England placed herself between Alexander and Napoleon, and beneath a Russian mask put in motion the springs of her crafty system of politics to entangle Alexander, and predispose him against every attempt at negotiation. Just as in Turkey she had, by disseminating corruption and falsehood, imposed upon the Divan, and placed the Sultan under the necessity of subscribing to the peace.

CHAPTER VII.

Mr. de Segur represents the Emperor, on his arrival at Orcha, as uncertain as to the route he should take: and he makes him hold a council on this point, in which General Jomini figures. It is proper to notice that this General did not occupy in the army a post that could entitle him to a place in the council. He was at this epoch merely commandant of the little town of Orcha. If Napoleon applied to him for information, it was merely in virtue of his office, and in order to ascertain the resources of the place. Our historian attributes to the Emperor a plan, in order to bring forward General Jomini as combating it. Napoleon never "expressed an intention of abandoning his line of operations upon Minsk, of "joining the Dukes of Belluno and Reggio, of "overthrowing Wittgenstein, and of regaining "Wilna by passing round the Beresina at its "source."

If he had conceived such a project, and had desired the opinion of General Jomini upon it, that officer should have added to the reasons he is made to urge against it, that if such a manœuvre were to be made, Titchakoff would reach Wilna from

Minsk long before the French army could arrive there. But the Emperor's orders dated Doubrowna the 18th and 19th November 1812, are quite sufficient to make the whole affair both of the project and the council fall to the ground.

By his letter of the 18th, to the *Major-Général*, he orders as follows: "Write to the governor of "Minsk to inform him that I shall be at Orcha to-"morrow: Apprise him that I have ordered the "second corps, with a division of *cuirassiers*, and a "hundred pieces of cannon, under the command of "the Duke of Reggio, to proceed in all haste, and "in a straight line to Borisow, to secure that im-"portant point, and thence to march upon Minsk. "In the mean time General Dombrowski will pro-"ceed to that place with his division, and observe "the movements of the corps now at Minsk. Re-"commend him to send native agents to the Duke "of Bassano and Prince Schwarzenberg, and to "write to you frequently."

By a letter of the following day, at three in the morning, the Prince of Neufchatel wrote to the Duke of Belluno: "The Emperor will arrive at "noon this day at Orcha: it will be necessary "*M. le maréchal*, that the position you may take "up should be nearer to Borisow, Wilna, and "Orcha, than the enemy's army. Endeavor to "mask the movement of the Duke of Reggio, and "to make it appear, on the contrary, that the "Emperor is advancing upon General Wittgen-"stein: a manœuvre which will appear sufficiently

" probable. His Majesty's intention is to march " upon Minsk, and when that place shall have " been occupied, to follow the direction of the " Beresina, etc."

In this pretended council, Mr. de Segur makes Jomini play a somewhat ridiculous part. " It was " on that occasion," he observes, " that he declar- " ed himself aware of the existence of a road to the " right of the town (Borisow), raised upon wooden " bridges over the Lithuanian marshes." According to him, this was the only road by which the army could proceed to Wilna, by way of Zembin and Molodezno. This discovery would not have required any very great topographical knowledge on the part of General Jomini, since the road is laid down in all the maps, and the Polish officers of the Emperor's staff were acquainted with it. The baggage-masters of the second corps returned by that road from Wilna.

Assisted by this brief *exposé*, it will be easy for the reader to appreciate the details with which M. de Segur continues his narrative: and he will readily believe that General Dode had no difficulty in dissuading the Emperor from a manœuvre, which, as we have just seen, he never had contemplated.

M. de Segur has fallen into another error, with respect to the order he supposes to have been given " to General Eblé, to proceed with eight " companies of sappers and pontoneers, to secure " a passage over the Beresina; and to Jomini to

"act as his guide." The Emperor was at Orcha on the 19th; and the bridge of Borisow was not taken by the enemy till the evening of the 21st. Moreover it was not from Orcha, as stated by the author, but from Bobr, and on the 24th, that the Emperor directed General Eblé to march.

The officer of the palace is again wrong in stating that, at Orcha, the disordered condition of the army became aggravated. On the contrary, the magazines in that town furnished the means of making some issues to the troops. The intense cold which had distressed us from the time of quitting Smolensko, having been succeeded by a thaw, the bivouacs became supportable. The artillery was still numerous, notwithstanding all the author has said. A park of artillery, which was established there, served to replace a great part of our ammunition; and five complete *batteries* were distributed to those corps of the army which stood most in need of them. The garrison of the town, as well as the Polish cavalry, which had been cantoned in its environs, joined the army. M. de Segur himself says, that "shelter "and the issue of supplies effected what menaces "had been insufficient to accomplish: the follow- "ers had rallied, etc. etc."

CHAPTERS VIII & IX.

THE obvious intention of the *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace, in writing these two chapters, in which he gives an account of the events which occurred to Marshal Ney, after his separation from the army, events eminently glorious for the memory of that illustrious officer, interdicts the critical reflections which several passages of that episode suggest. We shall merely notice this observation: "So completely did Marshal Ney "possess the true constitution of a great man,—a "strong mind in a robust body,—and that vigor- "ous health without which no man can be a hero!" A multitude of examples might be adduced to disprove this opinion. It is the effeminacy of the mind which incapicitates the body: a strongly constituted mind, to which dangers serve but to impart increased energy, supports a frail envelope. Ney was a being of this privileged description: even though he should have possessed a feeble body, he would still have been a hero.

It is to be regretted that M. de Segur has not furnished more details of the brilliant engagement sustained by Marshal Ney at the head of the third

corps and of the division under Ricard.* Why has he not mentioned that impetuous attack by the 15th light infantry, the 33d, and 48th, who destroyed the Russian line as many as three times, notwithstanding the tremendous fire of more than 50 pieces of ordnance? Why does he not speak of those two brave companies of sappers and miners, commanded by Colonel Bouvier, who perished in that affair? Why does he say nothing of Generals Dufour and Barbanegre, of Colonel Pelet of the 48th, and of many other officers, who, desirous of surpassing their own soldiers in bravery, fell with them to the cry of *vive l'Empereur, vive la France!* Why does he omit to notice, that it was Colonel Pelet, who, disfigured as he was with blood, induced Marshal Ney to cross the Dnieper to his right, instead of proceeding to Mohilow, on his left, as the Marshal had at first intended?

The author should have informed his readers, that the Emperor, on quitting Doubrowna, left instructions with Marshal Davoust, who commanded the rear-guard, to remain in that town as long as possible, under the impression that Ney might direct his course that way, along the right bank of the Dnieper. So, indeed, occurred

* After General Friant was wounded, General Ricard commanded his division, which had been detached from the first corps, and placed under the orders of Marshal Ney, at Smolensko.

the fact; for only a few moments after Davoust's departure, which took place somewhat too promptly, Marshal Ney presented himself before Doubrowna: but the bridge had been destroyed. M. de Segur, who is generally so lavish of detail, leaves much to be desired with respect to the satisfaction expressed by the Emperor, on being informed of the re-appearance of his brave companion in arms. That Prince was at Barania, dining with Marshal Lefebvre, when an orderly officer *, whom he had left at Orcha, to distribute the artillery among the different corps of the army, announced to him that some Polish officers had just arrived in the town, and had applied for assistance on the part of Marshal Ney, who was at a few leagues distance. The Emperor immediately rose, and seizing the officer by both arms, ejaculated, with the liveliest emotion: "Is that "really true? are you sure of it?" The officer having assured him that he was certain of the fact, that he had accompanied Prince Eugene, who, with his corps, was marching to meet the Marshal; having, in short, succeeded in convincing the Emperor of the truth of his report, his Majesty exclaimed: "I have two hundred mil-"lions in my cellars at the Tuileries, and I would "have given them all to ensure Ney's safety."

* M. Gourgaud.

BOOK XI.

CHAPTER I.

" In this manner the army had, for the third and " last time, re-crossed the Dnieper, a river half " Russian, half Lithuanian, but of Muscovite " origin."

We shall say nothing about the *Muscovite origin* of the Dnieper. The question of ascertaining the priority of existence either of Moscow or the Dnieper might be worthy of occupying the sittings of a burlesque academy; it would form a com panion to the famous question, as to which of the hen or the egg first came into existence.

The author says, that " the army marched on " the 22d from Orcha towards Borisow..... " through melted snow, and a deep and soft " mud. The weaker men were drowned in it."

It is a strange abuse of an hyperbole, to say that the mud was so deep that many persons might be drowned in it. No doubt it continued thaw-ing when we left Orcha: but the progress of the thaw was slow. No part of the road was broken in; its surface of ice and snow was alone covered with water and mud; the frost returned in the night from the 22d to the 23d.

The author again brings forward his reflections upon the conduct of Napoleon during this campaign; they do not, however, receive more weight or more credit, because they are ascribed to the chiefs of the army. Some are made to say, that "just as Charles XII had brought his army into "the Ukraine, so had Napoleon led his own to "perish at Moscow;" others, that "the hope of "terminating the war in one campaign had been "well-founded; that, when he pushed his line of "operations as far as Moscow, Napoleon had "given to so lengthened a column a sufficiently "broad and solid basis." But one of the principal objections with the latter is, that "the first suc-"cesses of Marshal Ney, on the field of battle of "the Moskwa, had not been followed up."

We have already demonstrated how unfounded was this reproach from M. de Segur to the Emperor, on the subject of the battle of the Moskwa. We again repeat, that the battle of the Moskwa had all the success which could have been expected; it was immediately followed by the capture of Moscow; and peace ought to have been the result of it. The flower of the Russian army perished in that battle; the Russians admit a loss of fifty thousand men. On what occasion besides, subsequently to that battle, did the Russian army display the same character of vigor; was it at Malo-Jaroslavetz, where it was defeated by three French and Italian divisions? Was it at Wiazma, where Miloradowitch was completely routed by

our rear-guard? Was it at Krasnoi, where Kutusoff, with a hundred thousand Russians, was driven back by Napoleon at the head of fifteen thousand men? Assuredly, if the latter Russian army had been the same that fought so valiantly in the fields of the Moskwa, we should not have achieved such results. How can our officer of the palace, who describes the French army as entirely disorganized, with the exception of the guard, which was its nucleus, presume to blame Napoleon for not ordering this select corps to charge on the occasion of that battle! The importance of the guard in a retreat, is the best reply that can be given to him. If our army, notwithstanding all the disasters with which it was overwhelmed, was enabled to retire from Russia with all its glory, we are consequently indebted for it to the foresight of the Emperor.

The best proof that the reflections ascribed by Mr. de Segur to our generals were written after the event, is that they are ill-timed. They were not such as could have then been made by the chiefs of the army, who were fully acquainted with the orders and recommendations given by the Emperor, and with the measures which he adopted previously to his arrival at Moscow, and during his stay in that city. They well knew how usefully his time was engaged there, and what were the objects which had exercised the faculties of his active and discerning genius. The impression created by those salutary arrangements was yet

quite recent; but no trace of it was left in the author's mind. He considers nothing but the result. An historian ought to view matters under a different aspect; he ought to go back to the times and places; bring every thing into account; interrogate the past, in order not to omit any circumstance that may throw a light upon his narrative. The detailed and very exaggerated statement he gives of our losses, would lead to suppose that he has presented a summary of circumstantial reports made by the various corps of the army, which could only have been known several months afterwards. How could the army be at that time acquainted with them, It is a fresh proof, in addition to so many others, of the credit due to all those fine speeches. The case is the same with respect to the marches and movements of Schwarzenberg's troops, which the army is made by M. de Segur to relate with such minute particulars, though they could not have been known until long subsequently to that period.

The reproaches which he makes to Napoleon "of having left to the Duke of Bassano the direc-"tion of military affairs," are devoid of any foundation. The Duke of Bassano was at Wilna with his *chancellerie* and the diplomatic body, which could not follow the army. He there transacted the business of his department, and exercised likewise the chief influence over the government of the country. The orders for the military movements did not pass through his hands; they were

always addressed, in a direct manner, by the Prince of Neufchatel to those generals who were not within that sphere of action to which the Emperor gave an immediate impulse. If the Duke of Bassano was sometimes apprized of them, it was, that he might be informed of the state of affairs, and when the occasion required it, take such measures as unforeseen circumstances might call for. But his intercourse with the heads of the corps stationed upon the Bug and the Dwina, was generally limited to his transmitting to them the information which he received from headquarters. The well-known activity of this minister leaves no doubt as to the regularity of those communications. But we are not aware whether, at the same time that he was urging Prince Schwarzenberg to accelerate his march and to move forward, he may not have endeavored to avoid creating in him a discouragement which would probably have had the effect of detaining upon the frontiers an ally who was already too little inclined to proceed any distance from it.

Is it the wish of the *Maréchal-des-logis* of the palace, who constitutes himself in this place the interpreter of the opinion of the army respecting the Austrian general, to exculpate him by making him say that he received contradictory orders, which it was not in his power to carry into effect, and that the Duke of Bassano communicated false intelligence to him? If these were the only reasons alleged by Prince Schwarzen-

berg in reply to the serious reproach of having, with the view to cover Warsaw, abandoned his line of operations upon Minsk, which held our magazines, and was in our line of retreat, posterity will pronounce upon the merits of such a justification.

CHAPTER II.

The instructions transmitted by Napoleon from Moscow to Marshal Victor on the 6th October, "supposed a brisk attack on the part of Wittgenstein or of Titchakoff. They recommended to "Victor to keep in the vicinity of Polosk and of "Minsk; to have near the person of Schwarzenberg a prudent, discreet, and intelligent officer; "to keep up a regular correspondence with "Minsk, and to send other agents in various directions."

Those instructions were intended to prevent the disaster consequent upon the capture of Minsk. The author blames the Emperor for not renewing them. "His deputy appeared," he says, "to have forgotten them." And in order to justify the latter, he adds: "In short, when the Emperor learned at Dombrowna the loss of Minsk,

"he did not consider Borisow to be in such press-
"ing danger, since, when he crossed the Orcha
"on the following day, he caused all his pontoon
"equipages to be burned."

The Emperor no sooner heard of the capture of Minsk, than he ordered the second corps, together with a division of cuirassiers and a hundred pieces of cannon, to march rapidly upon Borisow, whither Dombrowski's division was proceeding, and from thence upon Minsk, as is established by the letter which we have already quoted.

The Emperor directed that the two pontoon equipages at Orcha should be burned, in order that the horses belonging to them might be applied to the artillery which was in that town. Independently of the difficulty of conducting the pontoon equipages to Borisow, Napoleon could not suppose, at this time, that, in spite of the instructions he had previously given to the Dukes of Belluno and Reggio, the important point of Borisow would so soon fall into the hands of the enemy. He, therefore, preferred to carry away cannon rather than heavy boats, which appeared useless, and, being ill-secured, would have remained upon the road.

The author now introduces a general of engineers, who "questioned by Napoleon, declares "that he sees no other safety than in breaking "through Wittgenstein's army." As Mr de Segurs does not give the name of that officer, he probably ushers this new actor upon the boards,

in order to allege that this advice was given to the Emperor. He forgets that, in a former page, he made the general of engineers Dode reply to Napoleon, who had resolved upon going to defeat Wittgenstein, in the direction of Smoliany, that Wittgenstein's position was *inaccessible.* It is a pity that General Rogniat did not make the campaign of Russia: what important resource would not the learned author of the *Considérations sur l'Art de la Guerre* have afforded to Mr. de Segur, in all those conversations which he has prepared after the events!

"The Emperor points out, with his finger upon "the map, the course of the Beresina above Bo- "risow; it is at that place that he wishes to cross "the river; but the (unknown) general represents "to him that Titchakoff is on the right bank; and "the Emperor selects another point lower down "than the first: then a third still nearer to the "Dnieper. Finding then that he is approaching "the country of the cossacks, he stops and ex- "claims: Ah! Pultawa indeed! this is like "Charles XII."

In order to give credit to this narrative, we ought to suppose great absence of mind either in Napoleon, or in the general of engineers who communicated the anecdote to the author. Napoleon endeavored to find out a favorable point for crossing the river, above or below Borisow, and those of Beresina and Weselowo were the two which were pointed out to him, it being always his

intention to march upon Minsk or upon Wilna. According to the author, it would appear that, Beresino, which is at the distance of a long march from Borisow, was not the point chosen, but another much lower down. Now we can discover no other than Bobruisk, a fortified town occupied by the Russians; this circumstance, combined with the movement of Kutusoff's army upon the lower Beresina, would not have afforded a facility to our crossing in that direction. That hypothesis is already sufficiently inadmissible. But Mr. de Segur is not contented with it, he makes the Emperor proceed as far as Pultawa, or more than one hundred and twenty leagues from the point where he actually was; this is done no doubt to bring about his comparing himself to Charles XII., without considering that, in order to make the comparison, he has chosen two situations entirely different from each other.

With a view to justify such an exclamation on the part of Napoleon, he adds, that this idea made so strong an impression upon him, "that his "mind and even his health are affected by it, in a "still greater degree than at Malo-Jaroslavetz.' He names as his witness, "a valet-de-chambre "who was alone present at his distressing situation." No one perceived it, and the author gives as a reason, "that the strength of man generally "consists in concealing his weakness." So that our *Maréchal-des-logis* is never at a loss for facts or for reasonings to justify his suppositions. But

as he was determined to write a history, and stood in need of materials to compose it, he was compelled to bear all the disadvantage of such a position. He found it necessary to go every where in quest of notes. Each one furnished him with a scrap, which he hastened to place upon record, and to publish without attempting to ascertain its correctness.

The conversation which he supposes to have been held between Messieurs Duroc and Daru is improbable. They could not, at that time, have entertained the idea of the Emperor's being taken, and becoming a *state prisoner*. It could only have occurred to the author since 1815. How is it possible to believe, that, with an army at command of fifty thousand men, and a numerous artillery, the Emperor could have dreamed of surrendering himself?

The prince's actions, moreover, afford a sufficient refutation of this chapter. The latter is a work of the imagination; the others bore the stamp of reality. On the night of the 22d to the 23d November, he approves Oudinot's resolution to march upon the enemy, and driving them into the Beresina. If the Russians should succeed in destroying the bridge of Borisow, he was to seize upon a point to the right or to the left, and cause redoubts and two bridges to be constructed immediately. He directs, at the same moment, that the artillery horses attached to any kind of vehicles should be returned to the artillery and to the am-

munition caissons. When he hears, a few hours afterwards, and during the same night of the 23d November, that the enemy in their flight had broken down the bridge of Borisow, he orders the *Major-Général* to write to Oudinot the following letter:

"M. Le Duc Reggio, I have just received your "letter dated Naeza the 22d. The Duke of Bel- "luno will arrive at Kolopenitchi this day. On "the 24th he will move upon Baran. Endeavor "to take possession of the ford of Weselowo as soon "as possible, and to have bridges, redoubts, and "abatis prepared for its defence. We may from "thence return to the tête de pont of Borisow, "for the purpose of driving the enemy from it, "or else return towards Minsk, or lastly, as you "propose it, we might move upon Vileika by the "road which you constructed, and found very "serviceable."

We shall, however, close those observations, by quoting a passage from the work of Colonel Boutourlin, (page 362, vol. ii.) We therein find, that a Russian does more justice to the Emperor than is done to him by a Frenchman: "In this "situation, however, the most perilous in which "he (Napoleon) had ever been placed, this great "Captain was not inferior to himself. Unde- "pressed by the urgency of the danger, he dared "to measure it with an eye of genius, and still "found resources there, where a less skilful, or

"less resolute General would not have suspected "the existence of any."

CHAPTER III.

THE letter we have quoted at the end of the preceding chapter, gives no indication of an act of despair on the part of the Emperor. He quietly issues his orders for the passage of the Beresina; and yet the author says, that "since the 23d, "Napoleon prepared for it, as for a desperate "act." In support of this assertion, he adds: "He caused the eagles of all the corps to be "brought before him and burned."

This is an untrue assertion. If we suppose that the Emperor entertained such an idea, it could not be carried into effect; those eagles were of brass. How, besides, are we to suppose that, at the moment when this Prince is ordering that the scattered soldiers be picked up, and that muskets, carbines, and ammunition, be distributed to them, when, by the junction of the corps of Oudinot and Victor with those which had come from Moscow, he was still at the head of nearly fifty thousand men and of a formidable artillery, how are we to suppose that he should have adopted such a mea-

sure, which was only calculated to give the signal for a general disorganization, and would have been tantamount to exclaiming *sauve qui peut?* Napoleon, at the head of fifty thousand men, might move in every direction; and had even the passage of the Beresina been found impracticable, neither the Emperor nor the army would have been lost. The author appears to have forgotten the genius of our chief, the bravery of our soldiers, and the battles of Malo-Jaroslavetz, Wiazma, and Krasnoi. He, however, admits that, after passing Smorgoni, *the greater part of the colonels still marched with some officers round their eagle.* Marshal Ney, in a letter to the Prince of Neufchatel, dated the 2d December, announces that he has sent on the *eagles* after the guard.*

---

* *The Duke of Elchingen to the Prince of Neufchatel.*

Bialtze, 2d December, 1812.

Monseigneur, I this moment received the letter your Serene Highness has done me the honor of writing to me at one o'clock this morning, in order to acquaint me that the Marshal Duke of Belluno is ordered to form the rear-guard. I have collected in this place whatever infantry remains of the second and fifth corps, as well as the brigades of light cavalry under Generals Castex and Corbineau, and General Doumerc's division of cuirassiers.

I leave with the Duke of Belluno the cavalry, a battery of four-12 pounders and two howitzers. I march with the infantry in echelons in the rear, so as to be able to defend the bridges and defiles; for I cannot hope to form a reserve with the thousand men that remain to me.

I have sent after the guard the skeletons of the troops of

Mr. de Ségur contents himself with quoting, by the way, the sacred battalion, which he states to have consisted of about five hundred *commanders!* He seems to have no other object in view, when he notices this fact, than to shew the wretchedness of our cavalry. And yet the devoted conduct of those officers, who placed themselves in the ranks, who tended their horses, and went out as vedettes, etc. etc. was well worthy of being noticed.

The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace supposes that the road from Tolaczin to Borisow crosses through *the forest of Minsk*, whereas this forest is situated in the government of Minsk, and on the right bank of the Beresina. He likewise supposes that "the French army glided hastily "along through those woods, when the cannon "of Wittgenstein was heard upon our right. "Their threatening report," he says, "made us "accelerate our march." Such reflections should have been left to Russian gazetteers.

After presenting a frightful picture of the French army, which he causes to march before the second and ninth corps; "The second and ninth "corps," he says, "were staggered at the sight

---

the third corps, together with the eagles. I think that my presence in this place is not very necessary, and that I may, without inconvenience, leave General Maison in the command.

I cannot afford to your Highness any intelligence derived from the prisoners of war; because those prisoners were immediately sent to the imperial head-quarters. I am, &c.

" of so great a disaster. Disorder spread among " them." The best reply to this accusation is to be found in the conduct of those two corps, and in the engagements which they fought on both banks of the Beresina.

After so much verbosity and incoherent writing, our author says that " no one doubted of vic- " tory, . . . ; that the army felt itself overcome by " nature only; the sight of its Emperor cheered " it up again. . . . ; he was yet, then, to be found " in the midst of his army, like hope in the human " heart. . . . ; it appeared as if among so many " evils, the greatest was that of giving him dis- " pleasure, etc. etc." Such indeed were the real sentiments of the army, as is described by Mr. de Segur himself: truth must eventually prevail.

CHAPTER IV.

When it was ascertained, by the return of General Corbineau, that the ford of Studzianka was practicable, this point was fixed upon for the passage. Two others had been reconnoitred. The question, therefore, was to deceive and to dislodge the enemy. " As force could do nothing, " recourse was had to stratagem." These expres-

sions would lead one to believe that the author does not know how a river may be crossed against all opposition. Surely, with the powerful artillery we had still at command (that of the guard was yet entire), and protected as we were by the elevation of the bank which we occupied at Studzianka, a few moments would have sufficed us to beat down the Russian artillery on the opposite bank; the passage would have been equally effected, but with a loss which the Emperor was desirous of avoiding. If he made a shew upon several points, it was in order to compel Titchakoff to divide his forces, and to save from an attack by the whole combined Russian army, the first troops that would attempt to cross.

This passage would have commenced on the 24th, if the bridge scaffoldings which Marshal Oudinot was to have established, and the construction of which had been confided to the colonel of artillery Lafont, had been properly made. Unfortunately this important construction was carried on with so much negligence, that General Eblé found it necessary to have those scaffoldings burned, and fresh ones made on the 25th. If we are to believe Mr. de Segur, the Emperor had taken no precautionary means for the establishment of bridges. It was the Emperor, however, who, at Orcha, gave orders for carrying away from the two pontoon equipages that were in that town, all the tools, forges, utensils, irons, coal, etc. that might be found necessary for constructing bridges upon

scaffoldings. All that *materiel* was extremely well mounted. The pontoon equipages, as we have already observed, had furnished horses at Orcha for mounting several batteries. General Eblé had with him four companies of pontoniers, amounting to four hundred men, who had all preserved their muskets.

They were not sappers but pontoniers, who placed themselves in the water, notwithstanding the flakes of ice which floated down the Beresina. The sappers were only employed in the construction of the scaffoldings.

"On this occasion the winter showed itself "more Russian than the Russians themselves; the "latter were wanting to their season, which was "not wanting to them." We repeat what we have already stated, that the Russians could not have prevented our crossing, even if they had been as Russian as the winter itself. A river, which is a hundred and eight yards wide and only six feet deep, is not an insurmountable obstacle for an army that occupies the more elevated bank, and is enabled to line it with a numerous artillery.

CHAPTER V.

Our officer of the palace said in the third chapter that Napoleon, when making his arrangements for crossing the Beresina, "had been preparing "for it, as for a desperate act." He says in this place that "when he quitted Borisow, he imagin- "ed he was setting out for a desperate contest." We have already, in chapters III and IV, given a reply to this supposition. We shall not repeat what we stated upon that subject.

The author says that "Napoleon rejected, as a "disgraceful course, as a cowardly flight," the proposals to save his person, which he alleges to have been made to him by the King of Naples. First, it is very doubtful that the King of Naples ever made to the Emperor a similar proposal. Mr. de Segur however adds, "He was not at all dis- "pleased with Murat, probably because that "prince had afforded him an opportunity of dis- "playing his firmness, etc. etc." This is not the first time we have had occasion to notice that deplorable turn of mind, which leads the author to neglect truth, and what bears the appearance of it, in order to make a show of a knowledge of the

human heart, superior to that of any other individual, and to state what has been remarked by no one but himself. Larochefoucault, in his book of *Maxims*, has exhibited personal interest as the main spring of human actions. Mr. de Segur goes farther: he adds to it a brutal egotism, and a spirit of injustice wholly gratuitous. In his presumption of having alone fathomed the Emperor, of having surprised his secret however concealed in the inmost recess of the heart, he seems to have fancied him as a being mysterious, incomprehensible, out of the pale of humanity, such as the genius of Lord Byron has described Manfred to us. Napoleon displays a noble and generous sentiment; the author's reflection discolors him. It was natural for Napoleon to be beholden to Murat for the intention; but this would be too vulgar a feeling! According to Mr. de Segur, he is contented not to be displeased with him, because his vanity and egotism are consulted. The disposition to torture in this manner the mind and the sentiments of his hero, is well worthy of observation.

"The Emperor impatient to take possession of "the opposite bank, points it out to the bravest. "The French aid-de-camp Jacqueminot, and the "Lithuanian Count Predziecki were the first to "plunge into the river, etc."

The author's constant object is to shew that every thing in the French army was done without order, and that, at the moment of crossing the river, it thought itself quite lost; but such was

not the case. The Emperor had no occasion to *point out the bank to the bravest*, whom it would have been difficult to select without doing injury to the rest. Besides, bravery can only be displayed where danger is to be encountered; and the only one, in this circumstance, was that of passing a river which had some floating ice upon it. Napoleon issued his orders; and from the marshal down to the armed soldier, all hastened to obey them. A squadron (of Corbineau's brigade), each man of which had a foot soldier behind him, was the first to cross over, having been preceded by a few marksmen. This squadron was shortly after supported by part of the brigade, which formed in order of battle on the right bank, for the purpose of keeping off the cossacks, and of facilitating the works on the bridge. The Emperor likewise directed one of his officers* to swim across, in order to reconnoitre if the ground on the opposite bank would allow of artillery to pass without the necessity of employing fascines. In the meanwhile some infantry was ferried over to the other side upon rafts, for the purpose of removing the briars which covered it, and of driving the cossacks away.

Napoleon had ordered three bridges to be constructed, two by the artillery, and one by the engineer corps. But the river having been found

* Mr Gourgaud.

wider than was supposed, General Chasseloup, of the engineers, declared that he could not construct that third bridge, and he gave back the sappers to General Eblé, at the same time with the scaffolding which he had prepared for the occasion. The upper bridge was completed at one o'clock (the 26th); it was intended for the infantry. The Emperor caused Oudinot's corps to pass immediately. The cavalry brigade of Castex was the first to cross over; it was followed by Albert's infantry brigade, then by the rest of Legrand's division and by the whole of the second corps; those troops were full of ardor. Two pieces of cannon also passed over upon the bridge. Marshal Oudinot took up a position with his troops on the road to Borisow, which covered the road to Zembin.

The second bridge, at the distance of three hundred yards from the first, and destined to take the vehicles over, was completed at four o'clock. The artillery of the second corps, that of the guard, the grand park of artillery,* together with that of the other corps of the army filed off in regular succession. It often happened that the scaffolding of this bridge, by entering deeper into the mud of the river, caused interruptions in the passage, and called for repairs; but the brave

* The grand park, under the orders of General Neigre, consisted of three hundred carriages, fifty of which were gun-carriages.

pontoniers, cheered by the presence of the Emperor, and encouraged by General Elbé and by their officers (Messieurs Chapelle, Chapuis, Peyherinoff, Zabern, Delarue, etc. etc.*), overcame every obstacle. Immersed into the icy water to the very shoulders, they worked incessantly to repair and keep up the bridges: a devotedness truly heroical, and almost beyond the power of humanity! M. de Segur should have considered, that an army which reckoned such soldiers in its ranks, could not be conquered by the Russians.

He says that the Emperor, when he saw his troops in possession of the opposite bank, exclaimed: "Behold my star again!" From the moment that Napoleon was enabled to range his cannon in battery, he might consider himself as master of the opposite bank, since no Russian battery could have withstood our fire. Properly speaking, the passage across presented no danger except in case the corps of Titchakoff had appeared in strength, to prevent us from debouching from the bridge, or of his merely destroying the numerous bridges which are thrown over the marshes, on the road to Zembin. Now, the battles we had

* We regret being unable to name all the officers, non-commissioned officers and pontoniers, who have deserved to be held up to the gratitude of the army. Those intrepid soldiers sacrificed their lives almost to a man, without boasting and without hesitation, simply from a principle of honor, and from a sense of duty.

fought since the Moskwa, and the brilliant charge made by General Berkeim against Lambert's division, belonging to the corps of Titchakoff, afforded us the conviction that the Russians could not succeed in detaining us. The Emperor could not, therefore, have said: *Behold my star again!* Where, besides, did the author hear this prince speaking of *his star?* If Napoleon had had any confidence in it, he would have taken care not to proclaim it so openly on every occasion.

The reflection which follows, appears to us a contradiction. "For he was a believer in fatality, like all conquerors, those men, who having had the largest accounts with fortune, well know what they owe to her, and who, moreover, having no intermediate power between themselves and heaven, feel that they are more immediately under its protection." If conquerors do believe in fatality, they are superstitious. If they acknowledge that they owe every thing to chance or to fortune, they are materialists. If they have no intermediate power between themselves and heaven, they must attribute every thing to God. Now, they cannot be superstitious, materialists, and exceedingly religious, at one and the same time. Thus, in the whole course of the work contradictions alternately pass from facts to reasonings.

CHAPTER VI.

"NAPOLEON felt pleased at proclaiming aloud the "successes of Prince Schwarzenberg over Sacken, "with the addition, that Schwarzenberg had im- "mediately turned back upon Titchakoff and was "coming to our assistance."

The Emperor imagined, that as soon as Schwarzenberg should hear of Titchakoff's movement upon Minsk, he would hasten to follow him in that direction. We shall not explain the slowness shewed by that general at the time we speak of; subsequent events have sufficiently accounted for the causes which operated on the conduct of the Austrians on that important occasion, the consequences of which so fatally influenced the misfortunes of the army.

The *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace insinuates, that Titchakoff only quitted the Bug to come and oppose our passing the Beresina. It was only subsequently to the events, that it was supposed his movement was made with that object in view. The fact is, that Titchakoff marched towards Minsk and the Beresina, in order to attempt a junction with Wittgenstein. Consequently after he had taken Borisow, he hastened to send Lam-

bert's division across the Beresina, for the purpose of meeting Wittgenstein. But that division having been routed by Berkeim's brigade, belonging to the corps of Oudinot, this check on the one hand, and on the other, the information communicated by Wittgenstein, and Kutusoff's orders which the admiral received at that moment, made him resolve to descend the Beresina, and to draw nearer to the grand Russian army.

Throughout the whole of this chapter, the author seems to have at heart to convince his readers that the successful passage of the Beresina by the French army, is owing to the hesitation which Admiral Titchakoff shewed in his manœuvres. Without attempting to attack or defend the military operations of that general, we shall confine ourselves to stating, that if he had even taken up a position opposite the point which the Emperor had resolved to cross over, the passage would still have been effected; but the two armies would have had to regret the loss of a great many soldiers.

"Titchakoff might, on the following day, the "27th, have put to the rout, with his eighteen "thousand men, the seven thousand soldiers of "Oudinot and Dombrowski."

In order to reply to this assertion, we are obliged to repeat what we have already stated, that our artillery consisted of upwards of two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, well mounted. The right bank had an uninterrupted command

over the left bank of the Beresina, at that point where it is only a hundred and eight yards wide; our grape shot would have cleared all the approaches of that river, and the enemy's batteries would have been under the necessity of keeping out of the reach of our cannon, to avoid total destruction. The enemy, then, could no longer have interrupted the construction of our bridges; and under the fire of all our artillery, the army would have ranged itself in order of battle beyond the river, for the purpose of marching up from thence to the enemy, if he had ventured upon a manœuvre similar to that which was attempted by Vendôme, to prevent Eugene's debouching from his bridge at Cassano. In our situation it would have been nothing more than an ordinary battle, in which all the chances of success would have been in our favor, because our army might have deployed, and that independently of the quality of our troops, and the enthusiasm which they derived from existing circumstances, we should have found ourselves superior to the Russians in numbers. Titchakoff would have had to fight not only against the *seven thousand soldiers of Oudinot*, but also against the imperial guard, the corps of Eugene, Ney, and Davoust, forming together a mass of troops much more numerous than the admiral's forces.

Now that the events are removed from us, it is perhaps to be regretted that Titchakoff did not manœuvre in that manner. For, according to every

probability, his army would have been destroyed by ours; and however great might have been our losses, it would have been preferable for us to perish there as conquering soldiers, than a few days afterwards, from the intenseness of the cold.

The losses we suffered at the passage of the Beresina, are to be attributed to the negligence with which the Emperor's orders for making the necessary preparations to cross, were carried into effect; such as the construction of scaffoldings, etc. We have already seen that the corps of Marshal Oudinot, was in possession of the point at which a passage was to be effected, two days before the Emperor's arrival, but that the scaffolding had been prepared with such little care, that it was found necessary to begin it again. But for this circumstance, the passage would have taken place twenty-four hours sooner, and without any loss.

CHAPTER VII.

On the 26th November, Marshal Victor regained at Lochnitza, the road which the army had followed on its return from Moscow: General Partouneaux was directed to form the rear-guard with his division; Victor occupied Borisow with

his other two divisions. At four o'clock in the morning of the 27th, this Marshal commenced his march in order to reach Studzianka, where he took up a position at an early hour. He was replaced at Borisow by General Partouneaux. It were to be wished that Mr. de Segur had made us acquainted with the instructions left by Marshal Victor with this general, and informed us at what time he was to quit Borisow. He asserts that Partouneaux "was preparing to quit it, when an "order reached him from the Emperor himself, to "remain there all night." This fact is not correctly laid down; the Emperor did not send to Partouneaux the order to pass the night at Borisow. That General himself declares, that it was brought to him by an officer from the Prince of Neufchatel. But in such a case, the officer must have brought a written order; for those sent by the *major-général*, were always of the latter description, when any other officers than his aids-de-camp were the bearers of them. Besides, this was not the usual course; and nothing required its being altered. If Napoleon had intended that Partouneaux's division should remain at Borisow during the night from the 27th to the 28th, he would have directed the Prince of Neufchatel to issue to Marshal Victor his instructions to that effect; or had he wished to convey a direct order to General Partouneaux, he would have sent one of his aids-de-camp or orderly officers to him;

whereas, the mission was not confided to any of them.

" Napoleon no doubt imagined that he would " thus direct upon Borisow the whole attention " of the three Russian generals; and that, by Par- " touneaux's keeping them engaged upon that " point, he would be afforded sufficient time to " effect the passage of his whole army." Our historian does not supply the dates which we have quoted above. Had he so done, the reader would readily perceive how unfounded was the pretended motive for the stay of Partouneaux at Borisow. During the 26th, in the night that followed it, and on the 27th, nearly the whole French army had crossed the Beresina, with the exception of the corps of Marshal Victor. The occupation of Borisow, during the night from the 27th to the 28th, not only would, therefore, have been unnecessary, but have endangered the retreat of his division. For since this division was falling back on the 27th, as we have just stated it, every result that was expected from the presence of the French troops at Borisow, had been actually obtained.

"A multitude of stragglers, by falling back " upon Partouneaux, gave him the information " that he was separated from the rest of the army;" this circumstance determined him to quit the town and rejoin his corps. The enemy intercepts his way; Partouneaux attacks them, and is repulsed. He refuses to surrender; " he wishes to " make a last effort, and to force an opening to

"the bridges of Studzianka; but those men, lately "so brave, now degraded by misery, basely des- "troyed their arms."

General Partouneaux might reasonably have hoped to compel the corps which was opposed to him to open a passage; for that corps was placed between two fires. He would probably have succeeded in the attack, had he made it with the whole of his division. It seems that a false report led him to believe that the French army had crossed the bridges and had burned them; this circumstance put an end to all his hopes. It is untrue that *his soldiers basely destroyed their arms*, as is proved by a letter from the general, in which he bestows the highest encomiums upon them. That letter is in our possession.

"He fancied himself abandoned, betrayed." General Partouneaux believing that the bridges had been burned, might well consider himself as *abandoned* to his own resources, but he certainly never could believe that Marshal Victor intended to *betray* him to the enemies, and we have no fear of being contradicted by that general, when we affirm that he never thought himself *betrayed*. In the critical situation in which he was involved, perhaps he might have taken better means to extricate himself. We shall not venture to make any reflections upon this subject, persuaded as we are, that, in the course he adopted, he thought he was acting for the best.

"Of all that division, one single battalion es-

"caped. It is said, that its commander turning "round to his soldiers, enjoined them strictly to "follow his own movements, and that he would "kill the first man who should speak of surren- "dering! . . . He then quits the fatal road; glides "along the banks of the river, follows all its wind- "ings, and protected by the fight in which his "less fortunate companions were engaged, by the "darkness, by the very obstacles of the ground, "he files off in a dead silence, escapes from the "enemy, and brings to Victor a confirmation of "Partouneaux's defeat."

This narrative is incorrect. The battalion alluded to, belonged to the fifty-fifth regiment, and was commanded by Mr. Joyeux. He had been directed to destroy the bridges upon the Ska, and to form the extreme rear-guard from Borisow. Upon quitting that town, he followed the left road which the army had taken, and along which the covered waggons and the baggage were still proceeding on their way, and arrived at Studzianka unmolested, and bringing with him one cannon and its caisson. The Emperor anxious that Partouneaux's division should unite itself to the other two divisions of Marshal Victor, in order to cover Studzianka, sent one of his orderly officers* to meet him. This officer found the battalion of the fifty-fifth regiment upon the road. He in-

* Mr. Gourgaud.

quired if Partouneaux's division was at a great distance: "What! Partouneaux's division," replied the commandant of the battalion; "it takes "the lead of me; I form its rear-guard." The orderly officer having well satisfied himself that there were none but Russian troops behind, returned to the Emperor with the fatal intelligence. This prince appeared to be much astonished at the circumstance, which he was unable to account for. The loss of Partouneaux's division sorely affected him, as it was calculated to do, since, from the very commencement of the campaign, it was the only organized corps that had fallen into the enemy's power. But it is untrue that he used the word *defection*. That expression was not known in the French army. As a fresh proof that Napoleon did not consider the misfortune which befel Partouneaux's division as proceeding from *defection*, it may be stated that, in 1813, he appointed three children of that general to places in the public Lyceums.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE Emperor, says Mr. de Segur, refused to order the vehicles, which covered the left bank of the Beresina, to be burned. That prince had no urgent reasons for causing the baggage waggons re-

maining there to be burned: the only motive he could have had, would have been to avoid leaving any trophies to the enemy; but what miserable trophies a number of baggage waggons would make! This was moreover a very unimportant consideration, compared with the condition to which the loss would have reduced numbers of wounded, and of families who had followed the French army on its departure from Moscow, and who, even though they should fall into the hands of the enemy, might still not be totally destitute. Even in a military point of view, it was perhaps advantageous to leave the approaches to the bridge encumbered after the passage of the army and its artillery; since a new obstacle would thus be thrown in the way of the enemy. The author adds, that it was "from a leaning to the advice "which flattered him most," (a remark as untrue as it is puerile,) "and out of tenderness for the "situation of so many men, with whose misfor-"tunes he reproached himself." If this is an accusation directed against the authors of the war, it does not affect the Emperor; if against his conduct during the expedition, it is unjust and malevolent. Is it with these pedantic dissertations, and continual suppositions, that history should be written?

The estimate made by our writer of the Russian and French troops engaged on the 28th, is far removed from the truth. "Titchakoff with his "27,000 Russians of the army of the south, sal-

"lied forth from Stakowa upon Oudinot, Ney, "and Dombrowski. These numbered in their "ranks scarcely 8,000 men, supported by the old "and young guard, then consisting of 2,800 mus- "kets, and 900 sabres."

Oudinot's corps, and the division under Dombrowski, comprised 9,300 men; that of Marshal Ney, 5,400. The infantry of the old guard, which on leaving Smolensko, consisted of 5,777 men, still numbered 4,500; the young guard 2,200; the cavalry of the guard 2,000; the dismounted guard under the orders of Colonel (since General) Dautancourt, 1,800; Marshal Victor's corps, reduced to the two divisions commanded by Daendels and Girard comprised more than 1,100. Making, together, with Eugene's and Davoust's corps, and our numerous artillery, an army of 45,000 men completely equipped.

"Among the losses of that day, that of young "Noailles, an aid-de-camp to Berthier, was re- "marked: a ball killed him on the spot. He was one of those meritorious, but too ardent officers, who are prodigal of themselves, and who are thought to be sufficiently recompensed by being employed."

M. de Noailles was undoubtedly an estimable officer; but why should he *alone* be selected for praise, out of so many brave individuals who distinguished themselves upon this occasion? The author says not a word of General Legrand, who was wounded and behaved with the greatest in

trepidity; of General Maison, who equally distinguised himself; of General Candras who was killed; of Generals Merle, Grundler, and Berkeim; of General Zajonczek, that Nestor of the Polish army, whose leg was shot off; of the brave Colonel Dubois of the 7th curassiers, who contributed so much to the success of the affair. It is true that those officers bear names which glory alone has ennobled. Moreover, when facts are stated, they sould be stated correctly. It is not true, that M. de Noailles was killed by a ball. He had come with an order to the 23d regiment of chasseurs, and was speaking with Colonel Marbot, who commanded that regiment, when the Russian cavalry made a charge. The horse of Alfred de Noailles fell; and two cossacks were seen to drag away that officer by the collar, striking him at the same time. The 23d made an attempt to rescue him, which however was unsuccessful; and M. de Noailles, who has not since been heard of, was probably massacred by the barbarians.

In his account of this engagement, M. de Segur has forgotten to notice the orders sent by the Emperor to the division under Daendels, to recross the Beresina, in order to assist Marshal Victor, who, with only Girard's division, was maintaining a most unequal conflict against the efforts of Wittgenstein; and this at the moment when the Emperor and the troops which had crossed the Beresina, were violently attacked by

the army of Moldavia. It is true that, by recording such a fact, the author would himself have again refuted that passage of his work, in which he says, that "Napoleon felt that nothing was now "to be done but to sacrifice the army successively, part by part, beginning by the extremities, "to save the head."

"Night fell before Wittgenstein's 40,000 Russians could make any impression upon Belluno's "6,000 men. If, in the course of the whole campaign, the Russians had furnished the historian of the grand army with so glorious an incident as that supplied by the soldiers of Victor, he would undoubtedly have been less sparing of commendation.

CHAPTER IX.

In this chapter the officer of the palace heaps horrors upon horrors. It is true that, on the last day of the passage, the vicinity of the bridges was much encumbered; but his description of the scene is exaggerated beyond all measure. His taste for hideous descriptions carries him away: "The most fortunate gained the bridge, but had "to pass over heaps of half suffocated wounded, "women, and children, whom in their efforts they "could not avoid trampling on!" There were in the army a few *cantinières*, and a *very small num-*

ber of children. Several families having followed us, on our return from Moscow, the number of these became augmented. The idea of women and children struggling with death seems to have taken the fancy of more than one of the writers who have described this campaign: Such afflicting pictures are calculated to make a deep impression upon the mind. But M. de Segur has surpassed his predecessors, Labaume, Puibusque, Kerporter, etc. He re-produces the image at every moment; and in three pages mentions the women and children four times; as if their numbers had been immense, and instead of an army, it had been a wandering horde of Tartars, dragging their families about with them.

"The night from the 28th to the 29th came but "to augment all these horrors. Its darkness did "not rob the enemy's cannon of their victims. "Contrasted with the snow, which covered all else, "the course of the river, and that black mass of "men, horses, and carriages, together with the "clamors proceeding from it, enabled the Rus-"sian artillery-men to direct their fire. Towards "nine in the evening the desolation was still fur-"ther increased when Victor commenced his re-"treat."

This fanciful description seems to have been designed by M. de Segur as the finishing stroke to his picture. During the nights of our passage, the bridges remained entirely free. The mass of stragglers who endeavored to pass during the

day, retired at night to their bivouacs, which neither orders nor entreaties could induce them to quit. If the Russians had continued their fire during the night, these stragglers would have hastened to avail themselves of the free passage over the bridges to cross the river: but the fact was not so. On the 28th, the day of the glorious battle of the ninth corps, the firing ceased on both sides, at about five in the afternoon. At nine o'clock Marshal Victor commenced his retreat, and by one in the morning the whole corps, with its artillery, had passed in perfect order, leaving on the left bank only a small rear-guard. Nearly at the same time, the two divisions of light artillery, commanded by Colonels Chopin and Serrurier, passed also. During the whole of the night the enemy did not fire a single shot. The author intimates as much himself, by saying that "the multitude, benumbed "by the cold, or too anxious about their baggage, "refused to profit by this last night, by passing "over to the opposite bank." He says, that, "even the measure of setting fire to the waggons "was found insufficient to induce those unfortu-"nate beings to quit them." Assuredly, if the Russians, as before observed, had sent a few balls among these lethargic and improvident creatures, the greater part of them would have crossed the bridges.

If, as the Emperor had directed, the means of constructing the bridge had been ready on the 24th, the troops might have passed in the course

of that night and the following day; and on the morning of the 27th, the entire French army would have been on the right bank of the Beresina; So that neither the loss of Partouneaux's division, nor Wittgenstein's attack upon Studzianka would have taken place: in a word, we should not have had to deplore all the misfortunes which occurred.

This passage, which was effected, notwithstanding all the obtacles opposed to us, was not, by any means, so calamitous as several writers, who take a pleasure in aggravating our misfortunes, have represented it. Those who perished on the occasion were not of the number of the combatants; only three pieces of cannon remained on the other side of the river: in short, the number of prisoners which the enemy picked up (even taking the Russian statement) amounted to only 2,000 stragglers, sick, wounded, and travelling furnishers.* At half after eight, on the morning of the 29th, the bridge was fired; and this was not till an hour after some cossacks had approached it.

It will be satisfactory to our readers to be informed of the opinion expressed by the Russian historian, whom we have already quoted, relative to the Emperor's conduct at the time of crossing the Beresina. "Although surrounded on all "sides, Napoleon did not lose his presence of

* See the *Histoire de la Campagne de Russie*, by Colonel Boutourlin. Vol. 2, page 383.

" mind: but, by well-managed feints, deceived " the generals who were opposing him, gliding, " as it were, between the armies that were ready " to fall upon him, he accomplished his passage " at a well chosen point, where every local ad- " vantage was in his favor. The bad condition of " the bridges, which it was not in his power to " improve, was the only circumstance, that by " retarding the operation, rendered it perilous. " The great losses experienced by the French, " must not, therefore, be imputed to Napoleon; " but solely to the unfortunate circumstances " under which his army was placed, and which it " was impossible for him to avert."

And this is a Russian who speaks ! ! !

CHAPTER X.

After giving a description of the road leading to Zembin, across the marshes, over which there are bridges of several hundred fathoms in length, the *Maréchal-des-logis* appears to regret that the Russians had not destroyed those bridges, and expresses himself thus: " Inclosed within a narrow " space, between these marshes and the river, " without provisions, without shelter, in the midst

" of an intolerable hurricane, the grand army and " its Emperor would have been compelled to sur- " render without a struggle."

Even supposing that the bridges had been burned, that to repair them had been impossible, and that the marshes of Gaina, across which the road passes, had not been sufficiently frozen to sustain the weight of men and horses, *the grand army and its Emperor would still not have been compelled to surrender without a struggle.* The author says truly that we were enclosed between the marshes and the Beresina; but he does not mention that the third side of the triangle was occupied by the Russians. How could a man, holding the rank of general, conceive, that in such a situation *the grand army and its Emperor* would not have marched against the Russians, and passing over them, have taken the road from Borisow to Minsk ! ! After the exaggerating descriptions which Mr. de Segur has given of the weakness of the French army, the epithet *grand* applied on this occasion has that about it which might seem appropriate enough if found in a Russian newspaper, but is disgusting as coming from a Frenchman.

In describing in his usual manner the passage of the Beresina, our romantic author had forgotten one of his favorite themes, the indispensable hurricane: we, however, find it again here. This hurricane consisted, in fact, of a little wind and a few flakes of snow. As for the intensity of the

cold it may be estimated by considering that the Beresina was not frozen.

In speaking of "a nobleman, of times long "since passed, when gracefulness and brilliancy "were all-prevalent," Mr. de Segur allüdes to the Comte de Narbonne. "That general officer "at the age of sixty," he observes, "was to be "seen as soon as day-light appeared, seated upon "a trunk of a tree, covered with snow, engaged "with imperturbable gaity in the details of his "toilette; in the midst of the hurricane he caused "his hair to be elegantly and gracefully curled, "and carefully powdered, as if in defiance or con- "tempt of the accumulated calamities, and war- "ring elements surrounding him." Mr. de Narbonne, notwithstanding his age, went through the Russian campaign with all the ardor and activity of a young man. Is it in good taste on the part of Mr. de Segur, to endeavor to attach ridicule to that estimable officer, who always served France and the Emperor with fidelity, and died at Torgau, in charge of the defence and government of that place?

CHAPTER XI.

THE only important object of this chapter is the first intimation which Napoleon gave to Messrs. Daru and Duroc of his intention of setting out immediately for Paris. His reasons were powerful and unanswerable. Those which Mr. de Segur has represented him as assigning, are not the principal: there are others which must have particularly influenced his determination. A Russian historian has comprehended them better than the French general. "Napoleon," he observes,* "was not only chief of the army he was about "to quit; but since the destinies of the whole of "France depended upon him, it is obvious that "under the existing circumstances, his first duty "was not so much to be present at the last mo- "ments of the wreck of his army, as to watch "over the safety of the great empire which he go- "verned. And he could not better fulfil that "duty than by proceeding to Paris in order to "accelerate, by his presence, the organization of

* Boutourlin, Vol. ii. page 392.

" new armies, to supply the place of those he had " just lost."

He gave the chief command to the King of Naples, and entrusted the supply department to Count Daru; the Prince of Neufchatel remaining *Major-Général.* Mr. de Segur relates that there occurred between the Emperor and Berthier *a private and violent altercation,* in which that old companion in arms of Napoleon is made to act a part by no means creditable to him: our writer should have stated how he became acquainted with the circumstance. It is true that a private conversation took place between the Prince of Neufchatel and the Emperor, who afterwards related it himself. The subject in debate was the choice of a commander-in-chief for the army. Napoleon had determined to give the command to Eugene; but the Prince of Neufchatel insisted long in favor of the King of Naples. His solicitations were even distinguished by a degree of violence and pertinacity, foreign to his natural character: and he concluded by declaring, that if Prince Eugene had the command of the army, he would not remain under his orders. We must pardon in that veteran in French military glory, whom the Emperor had raised so high, and connected with royalty by marrying him to a princess of one of the most ancient reigning families of Germany, this ill-founded repugnance to being placed under the orders of an uncrowned commander. Mr. de Segur probably heard of this long discussion, which

took place in a room adjoining that occupied by the officers of the household. He may have heard vaguely that the Prince of Neufchatel had refused to remain in the army; and such a circumstance would be quite sufficient to induce him to give free scope to his romantic imagination, and report the private scene he has mentioned. It is the characteristic method of this author, and we may reasonably conclude, that a great part of his work has been composed in the same manner.

CHAPTER XII.

This chapter contains an account of some facts truly glorious for those of our troops which composed the rear-guard under the command of Marshal Ney and General Maison. Speaking of a conflict which took place a little beyond Malodeczno, the author relates that the enemy finding himself unable to overthrow the troops opposed to him, directed a part of his forces "towards "another entrance to that place;" but that "by "good fortune it happened that Victor, with "about 4,000 men, the remains of the ninth "corps, still occupied the village." It would be extraordinary indeed, if Generals Ney and Maison, who were making head against the enemy at a

short distance before Malodeczno, with only a few hundred men, had been ignorant that the place was occupied by Victor with 4,000. Victor was there with his corps by virtue of an order from the *Major-Général.**

This chapter concludes with a quarrel between Marshals Victor and Ney, respecting the com-

---

* *The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.*

Malodeczno, 4th December, 1812.

Four o'clock in the morning.

Mr. le duc, continue your movement of retreat to-day, come to the position of Malodeczno, and cause all the vehicles and stragglers to pass on before you. The second corps, which will protect this town until your arrival, is to take up a position in the rear. Head-quarters will be stationed at Benitza, near Markowa. We should have halted here, had it afforded us provisions; but the first magazines of any magnitude are at Smorgoni; bullocks, brandy, and biscuit, are collected there; let this be known to your stragglers, in order that they may rally in the direction of those magazines. Should you have any vehicles belonging to military equipages, send them on to Smorgoni for provisions. Nevertheless, we shall endeavour to forward you ten thousand rations of meat (in live cattle), and of biscuit; this will enable you to maintain yourself at whatever place you think proper, without apprehending that your troops should disband. If the want of transport should prevent your receiving those provisions in the course of to-morrow, you ought to continue your movement until you have approached your means of subsistence, which are at Smorgoni; there you will make a halt. Issue a proclamation for the purpose of rallying the stragglers, and send them on to Smorgoni; let a public notice be read by an officer of your staff.

(Signed) ALEXANDER.

mand of the rear-guard. Mr. de Segur exhibits Ney "breaking out into a violent passion, and "the coolness of Victor remaining unruffled." We do not well perceive the cause of the discussions, since the Duke of Belluno's letter* to the

---

* *The Duke of Belluno to the Major-Général the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.*

Bivouac, 5th December, 1812.

Four o'clock in the morning.

Monseigneur, the action sustained by the rear-guard on the 4th is the last effort it was capable of making against the enemies; the troops of which it was composed are now so reduced in numbers, and its remains are so wretched that I am compelled to save them from the harassing pursuit of the enemy, and to avoid every kind of engagement. The report which my first aid-de-camp must have made to your Serene Highness, respecting the state and condition of those troops, is strictly correct.

The advanced guard of the corps in pursuit of us reached Bienitza this day at the moment of our arrival there, notwithstanding that we marched during the night, and that the bridges of Malodeczno had been destroyed. It was eleven o'clock; had I attempted to defend myself at Bienitza, I would have had to offer battle, or to sustain a fresh one under every disadvantage, considering the disproportion between my forces and those of the enemy. I have, consequently, adopted the only proper course, that of continuing a retrograde movement, in order to pass the night at a village two leagues distant from Bienitza, and four leagues from Smorgoni. The enemy's vedettes and our own are in sight of each other; I shall probably be as closely pursued to day as I was yesterday, and I think it prudent that his Majesty should keep at some distance from us.

The stragglers are always close upon us, and in considerable numbers. The habit they have contracted of only marching by

Major-Général, shews that the rear-guard was commanded by that marshal.

CHAPTER XIII.

This chapter presents some fresh reflections to us concerning the sentiments of the army towards the Emperor. Our officer of the palace says: *It is true that a seditious movement was out of the question.* This is a superfluous remark. Who could have entertained the idea of sedition? This supposition was rendered impossible owing to the reciprocity of sentiments which existed between the army and its leader.

---

day affords an opportunity to the enemy of making many prisoners; but whether it proceeds from indifference, or that he mistakes their column for regular troops, he pursues them with great caution; I believe, however, that several were taken yesterday.

I propose to reach Smorgoni at nine o'clock this morning; and shall no doubt be under the necessity of passing the night at a still greater distance, unless I fall in with some troops to support us. Those of General de Wrede would be of essential use in this emergency. I suppose the Emperor will have ordered them to take our place, or to march in company with us.

I beg, Monseigneur, you will accept the assurance of my respect.

(*Signed*) THE MARSHAL DUKE OF BELLUNO.

The suppleness which Mr. de Segur attributes to the Emperor towards the marshals whom "he "won over into an approbation of his plan of de- "parture, by flattery, by caresses, and by confi- "dential effusions," is in opposition to Napoleon's character. The determination he took was desired by the whole army, and was made known to its great satisfaction. It felt that upon him depended the safety of all; that it was possible to lose armies, artillery, and whole provinces; but, that in losing him every thing else was lost. The avowal which he is supposed by our historian to make to his officers, is more ridiculous still; and in what terms is he said to make it? "Had I "been born to the throne, had I been a Bourbon, "it would have been easy for me not to have fal- "len into errors." These words could not admit of any explanation. Would the author wish thereby to suggest the idea that the Emperor undertook the expedition to Russia merely with a view to strengthen himself upon the throne of France? Does he wish to make Napoleon himself point out the dangers and ill-luck that await those who follow his fortunes, or attribute to him a foreboding of the great catastrophe which brought on his downfall? In such a case, we must confess that Mr. de Segur has the gift of prophecying events after their occurrence. Where, we ask, did he obtain those details? Is it likely that a thought of that nature should have entered the Emperor's mind at such a moment?

Is it possible he could have expressed it? Why was not his historian struck with the absurdity of the idea? The heart of Napoleon was torn at the sight of the calamities befalling his army; but no one was better acquainted with the causes which had produced them. It is difficult to understand how an officer of the palace could have fallen into so awkward a blunder, and have ascribed thoughts and expressions to that Prince, which are in such direct contradiction with his character and position.

No one, however, can mistake the object of that insinuation.

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER I.

THE opening of this book proves the incoherency of the author's ideas. "I had reached the period "of Napoleon's departure, and flattered myself "that my task was at last completed." When, however, he took up his pen, the events had gone by, and the facts which were to afford matter for his work were well known. Why was not his plan laid down before hand?

"I had announced myself as the historian of "that great epoch, when we were hurled from "the highest summit of glory to the deepest abyss "of misfortune." *The historian of that great epoch* has not fulfilled the task he imposed upon himself. He is the self-constituted bard of our calamities and disasters, but not of the exploits which marked that memorable expedition. When the author says we were hurled from *the highest summit of glory*, he does not convey his meaning. We feel inclined to hope he meant to say *the highest summit of prosperity*. If that expedition was attended with a disastrous result, it proved fruitful in traits

of heroism and devotedness, which have given to the French army an imperishable splendor. The soul sickens at all we have hitherto read; and yet Mr. de Segur announces that *nothing remained for him to retrace but the most frightful miseries.* He again addresses his comrades, and asks them, "Why should we not spare to you the pain of read-"ing them, and to myself, the sad effort of task-"ing a memory which has nothing left but ashes "to rake up, but disasters to reckon, and which "can no longer write but upon tombs?"

Our task in this place becomes more painful; we now feel more than ever all the bitterness which must attend the performance of our duty. Why did not the historian give way to that happy thought of ceasing the sad efforts of a memory which must indeed have been tired at finding nothing but *ashes to rake up?* We shall follow him, however, to the last, in spite of our repugnance, and what ought to discourage, will serve to assist us on the way.

From the situation in which the army found itself placed, owing to the departure of the Emperor, it could not but feel the immense vacuum which was left after him. Possibly, however, the misfortunes which occurred after that event might not have happened, had there been less anxiety to reach Wilna, and had the marches been shortened. The disorganization of the several corps of the army was owing to those marches, performed as they were, at a time when the cold had consi-

derably increased, for it had reached twenty-eight degrees in intensity.

"Most of the colonels of the army, who had "hitherto raised our admiration as we beheld "them marching with four or five officers or sol- "diers, and preserving their order of battle, took "no longer any council but of themselves; each "one considered that he was entrusted with his "own safety.... The cry of *sauve qui peut* became "almost universally prevalent."

The dreadful situation of the army cannot be an excuse to the author for casting an imputation upon the colonels, who, during the campaign, had so many moral, as well as physical sufferings to undergo, and these of a much more painful nature than what fell to the share of a general who had nothing more than a civil duty to perform in the Emperor's household. It would have been but justice to say, that Marshal Ney, who had in the rear-guard some troops entirely composed of colonels and superior officers, having seen many of them carried off by a grape shot, considered that their services would be purchased at much too dear a rate, by the injury which their loss would inflict upon the future prospects of the army. He deemed it preferable, and with good reason, that the army should reckon a few hundred men less at that moment, and that its future recomposition should be secured, by saving from the effects of their devoted zeal those colonels, superior officers, and others, who being left without sol-

diers, still persisted in remaining in the rear, for the purpose of fighting the enemy. He, therefore, commanded all the officers who were without soldiers under them, to withdraw and repair to the Niemen. He even sent away some serjeant-majors, and quarter-masters; and would only retain in the troops that were left, such a number of officers and non-commissioned officers as were in proportion to the numbers of the soldiers. Mr. de Segur had bestowed praise upon one colonel only; he throws blame upon the whole body. We are willing to believe him ignorant of Marshal Ney's order; but where a doubt existed, he should have passed the subject by unnoticed. We have so many occasions to point out errors and omissions in his work, which arose out of his ignorance of facts, that we ought not to be surprised at the last he affords us. But where there is a want of correct information, there is also temerity in undertaking to write a history.

Anarchy and disorder are described with similar exaggeration. There is no doubt that striking traits of egotism were displayed, such as were to be expected in the midst of those heavy calamities; but numberless acts of generosity and devotedness might also be recorded. Friends and comrades have divided with each other their linen and their wretched food; soldiers have carried their officers, servants their masters; General Legrand was borne by his grenadiers; General Zayonczek was saved by his soldiers; young

Sainte-Croix,* who suffered amputation at Mojaisk, was also saved by some friends upon his return; Colonel Marin (belonging to the artillery of the guard,) was carried by his cannoneers, etc. etc. Why present none but hideous sights to our view? Did the author dread to miss the aim he appears to have had in view, if he allowed us to see the better side of the picture?

CHAPTER II.

The progress of the French army towards Wilna, affords a subject for new scenes, in which our *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace does not slacken his endeavors to improve upon the horrors of the preceding chapters. And yet the condition of the army was sufficiently deplorable to have induced the author to resign the sad satisfaction of heightening the picture of it. "Soldiers were seen "madly rushing to the furnaces, gnashing their "teeth with a demon-like laugh, and throwing "themselves into the fires, where they perished in "the most horrible convulsions. Their famished "companions looked undismayed upon them;

* Brother of the general of that name.

" there were even some who drew out their bodies " disfigured and broiled by the flames, etc." The pen recoils from tracing what remains of this passage. The most remarkable effect produced by that extremity of misfortune was, that although nothing was done to avoid death, none sought a voluntary one. *Cannibalism* was wanting to complete the picture. Did Mr. de Segur ever witness one of these pretended acts? From whom does he derive his information? But he knows that the generality of readers are pleased with whatever is extravagant, extraordinary, and horrible at the same time; and he takes advantage of it. To this secret, may perhaps be ascribed the success of his work.

Could we expect, after such narratives, that he would present us with a cold dissertation upon the vanity of prognostics, or would quote " predic- " tions which announced an invasion of the Tar- " tars as far as the banks of the Seine?" and repeat the story of the pretended " storm that " marked our entrance upon the Russian ter- " ritory?" How can he venture to impose in this manner upon the feelings and the credulity of his readers!

CHAPTER III.

THE disorder that occurred at Wilna cannot be imputed to the Emperor. Upon his departure from the army (at Smorgoni on the 5th December) he had every reason to hope that the re-inforcements in men which it was receiving, as well as the abundance of supplies at Smorgoni, Ochmiana, and Wilna, would enable the several corps to re-organize themselves. Under this impression, he wrote to the *Major-Général* the following orders, dated from Bienitza the 5th December:

"My cousin, enclosed I transmit instructions to you for the re-organization of the army; the King of Naples will make every modification in them which circumstances may require. Nevertheless, I think it necessary to organize at once the Lithuanians at Kowno, the fifth corps at Warsaw, the Bavarians at Grodno, the eighth corps at Olita, the small depots at Merecz and Olita, and to send the dismounted cavalry to Warsaw and Kœnigsberg, as well as the soldiers of the train and of the military equipages, who have not any horses. All the cavalry remounts must be sent off after to-morrow from Wilna to Kœnigsberg, and the diplomatic agents to Warsaw; all wounded generals and officers must also

be sent on to Warsaw and Kœnigsberg, and they must be given to understand the necessity that Wilna should be left disencumbered, and that quarters should be provided in that city for the active part of the army. It is said that the treasure of the army is of considerable amount; give orders that a part of it be transmitted to Warsaw and Kœnigsberg, where it is wanted. All this will disencumber Wilna. Every order, in short, that has that tendency ought to be issued to morrow, for many reasons render this course necessary.

"Instruction.—Rally the army at Wilna, keep possession of that city, and take up winter quarters, the Austrians upon the Niemen, covering Breze, Grodno and Warsaw, the army at Wilna and at Kowno. In case the hostile army should march, and that it should not be possible to resist on the other side of the Niemen, the right is to cover Warsaw, and if possible Grodno; the remainder of the army is to keep in a line behind the Niemen, retaining Kowno as a tête-de-pont: have large supplies of flour collected at Kœnigsberg, Dantzig, Warsaw, and Thorn; order every thing to be evacuated between Wilna and Kowno, so that the army may have its movements unfettered; whatever is of most value is to be sent on to Dantzig."

There was at Wilna a supply of four millions of rations of bread, three millions six hundred thousand rations of meat, nine millions of rations of

wine and brandy, considerable magazines of vegetables and forage, of clothing, harness, and equipments, thirty four thousand muskets, and an arsenal well provided with ammunition of every kind. It will therefore be seen how unfounded is the reproach of want of foresight, which our *maréchal-des-logis* of the palace so often casts upon the Emperor. According to him, " no " chief dared to order the distribution of provi- " sions to those who presented themselves." That accusation attaches to the heads of the military administration. They were, perhaps, in hopes that by making distributions only in the regular forms, they would compel stragglers to rally ; but this proved an unfortunate course.

The author presents a revolting picture of the hospitals at Wilna. It is, nevertheless, a fact, that owing to the care of Doctors Desgenettes and Marie de Saint-Ursin, the numerous hospitals of that city had been placed in as good a condition as possible ; but at the moment of the disorder created by the obstructions at Wilna, the administration could no longer act. Mr. de Segur has exhibited to us an extraordinary state of things, as the consequence of a neglect that never existed. His prejudices could not give way, when so fair a field was open to them.

" At last the exertions of several commanders, " such as Eugene and Davoust, the compassion " of the Lithuanians, and the avarice of the Jews, " opened some places of refuge."

Officers had been stationed at the gates of Wilna, to point out to the soldiers of the various corps, the convents and other buildings in which they were to be quartered, and where they might have rallied and received the distribution of supplies. But the soldiers preferred scattering themselves over the town, and going into private houses.

In pursuance of the orders which the Emperor had sent from Zelitska to General de Wrede, this general had moved from Vileïka to Slobkchowska. On the 8th of December, the King of Naples directed him to repair to Ruckowi with his Bavarian troops, amounting to two thousand and some hundred men, in order to relieve the Duke of Belluno, who had hitherto formed the rear-guard, and to place himself under the orders of Marshal Ney, to whom this command was again confided. The Bavarian general, after being attacked in the latter position, by the corps of cossacks who preceeded the Russian advanced guard, and who were provided with a few light field-pieces, was thrown back upon Wilna; this occasioned a great disorder among the stragglers, canteen carriers, etc. The alarm was sounded; but the cossacks would not have dared, on that day, to enter a town which still contained some organized infantry. General de Wrede, accompanied by sixty light horsemen, proceeded to Ney's quarters. After ranging his troops in order of battle before his door, he went to the Marshal's apartment,

with his sword yet in hand: "Mr. le Maréchal," he said to him, "the enemy is close after me. I "come with my sixty horsemen to offer to lead you "in safety to the road to Kowno." Ney was leaning against the chimney. He coolly took de Wrede by the hand to a window giving upon the street, and shewing him the excess of the disorder, and the unarmed men who were hurried along in their flight, he said: "Mr. le General, do you "think that a marshal of the empire can mix with "such a rabble?" The Bavarian General stood amazed for a moment; he then objected to Ney that if he remained any longer in Wilna, he ran the risk of falling into the enemy's hands; the Marshal replied; "No, no, General, fear no-"thing for me; I have here fifty French grena-"diers about me; and all the cossacks in the "world shall not dislodge me before eight o'clock "to-morrow morning.

"Wilna might have been defended for twenty-"four hours longer, and many men might have "been saved."

It might, with ease, have held out several days. The cold had exercised nearly as great a havoc in the Russian as in the French army. The Russians advanced very slowly. The garrison of Wilna and the imperial guard might have defended the town against any attempt from the cossacks. Although the orders given by the Emperor, to place it in a condition to resist any serious attack, had not been fully carried into effect, some

pallisades had been raised. Had Wilna held out for twenty-four hours longer, it would have been easy, by means of distributions of all kinds to stragglers, to rally a considerable number of them; and if the place was to be evacuated at a later period, this might have been effected in good order. It is bitterly to be regretted, that when an important crisis occurs, the Emperor cannot be at once at the head of his troops and in Paris. After the passage of the Beresina, the army having then reached its magazines and reinforcements, Napoleon thought the moment was a favorable one for returning to France. If the instructions which he left on his departure had been followed, the disasters which befel us when he was gone, would not have occurred. They were, in a great measure, occasioned by the eagerness to reach Wilna in all haste. It was not sufficiently considered that those continual marches and the dreadful rigor of the cold, could only have the effect of completing the disorganization of the army.

"In this city as well as at Moscow, Napoleon "had given no regular order for the retreat."

At Wilna as well as at Moscow, Napoleon had prescribed all the measures which circumstances called for. From the moment that the communications between Wilna and the army had been restored, he had been indefatigable in issuing orders for the collection of provisions, and for sending on to that city all the baggage at Smol-

goni and at Ochuriana, which was useless to the army on its march.* The letter from the Emperor to the *Major-Général*, dated Bienitza, 5th December, 1812, which we have already quoted, prescribed various measures to be adopted as well for the re-organization of the army, as for the removing to Wilna every thing that was unnecessary to the action of the army. It terminates in these words: "In short, every order that has the "tendency to disembarrass Wilna, ought to be "issued to-morrow; for many reasons render "this course necessary."

It is inconceivable that in spite of such irrefragable proofs, Mr. de Segur persists to the end in his system of throwing obloquy. For he must have satisfied himself by the letters we are quoting, that had the Emperor's orders been carried into effect, (as they ought to have been, since no

* See the Appendix.

1st—Letter from the Prince of Neufchatel to Prince Eugene, dated Staiki the 2d December.

2dly—Letter from the same to the same, dated Selitza, 2d December.

3dly—Letter from the same to General de Wrede, 3d December.

4thly—Letter from the same to General Dalbignac, Malodetchzno, 3d December.

5thly—Letter from the same to the Duke of Belluno, Malodetchzno, 4th December.

6thly—Letter from the same to Count de Ureptowicze, dated at Malodetchzno.

obstacle stood in the way) that enormous obstruction of vehicles, covered waggons, and baggage, would not have taken place.

Speaking of the defile of Ponari, the author says: "Here it was that money, honor, every remains of discipline and of strength, were completely lost.... One of the covered waggons of treasure, which burst open of itself, became the signal; every one rushed upon them."

The real fact is as follows:—on the eve of the day in question, a director of the letter-post office presented himself to Marshal Ney at Wilna, and informed him that, for want of horses, he had been compelled to abandon his covered waggon which contained a considerable sum of money belonging to the government. The marshal inquired if, at least, before he abandoned the waggon, he distributed the money among the wretched soldiers who covered the road. On that officer's replying in the negative, Ney expressed his regret that those funds should have been left for the enemy's use. As the marshal was leaving Wilna with the rear-guard on the following day, and had arrived at the bottom of the hill of Ponari, he saw a long file of vehicles and covered treasury waggons, whose march was interrupted. Deeming it impossible to save them, because the enemy was close at our heels, he ordered the waggons to be opened, and their contents to be distributed to all who wished to carry them away; his order was obeyed. This dispersion of the treasure was no doubt to be re-

gretted; but circumstances called for it. Would Mr. de Segur have preferred that the Russians had become possessed of it; and was it to be made the ground of an accusation against the honor of the army.

"On the most exposed part of the hill, an offi-
"cer of the Emperor, Colonel Count de Turenne,
"kept the cossacks in check, and in defiance
"of their cries of rage and of their fire, he distri-
"buted, before their eyes, the private treasure of
"Napoleon to the guards within his reach. These
"brave men, fighting with one hand, and collect-
"ing the spoils of their leader with the other,
"succeeded in saving them. Long afterwards,
"when they were out of all danger, each man
"faithfully restored the depôt which had been con-
"fided to him; not a single piece of money was
"lost."

It may well be conceived that our *Maréchal-des-logis* of the palace felt anxious to praise one of his colleagues,* the chamberlain Count de Turenne, master of the wardrobe to Napoleon; but how happens it that the fertility of his imagination has not supplied him with something more flattering for Mr. de Turenne, than a representation of him giving away the various articles belonging to

* The four civil officers of the Emperor's household who were with the army, and under the orders of the Grand-marshal were, Messieurs de Segur, *Maréchal-des-logis* of the palace, Canouville, *ditto*, Turenne, chamberlain, master of the wardrobe; Beausset, prefect of the palace.

the Emperor's toilette,* whilst the rear-guard, under the orders of Marshal Ney, was sparing him the trouble of keeping the cossacks in check?

This anecdote, however, at the same time that it is entertaining to the reader, affords him, in the midst of such accumulated disasters, one consolation, which is, that after passing the defile of Ponari, no further accident befel those brave soldiers of the guard.

CHAPTER IV.

The mode of retreat adopted by Ney was not such as the author represents it. He supposes that the marshal made his troops march by night, and fight during the day. If that illustrious warrior had adopted so pernicious a mode of marching, it is quite clear that none of the troops could have resisted its effects, especially when it is recollected that there were but few regular distributions of provisions, and that it was only during the time of bivouacking that an attempt was made to procure them.

* These were no doubt what the author calls the *spoils of their leader*. The Emperor had no private treasure; that which was distributed at the hill of Ponari was the treasure of the army.

The gloomy reflections which our officer of the palace attributes to the army, after the passage of the Niemen, when they cast a parting glance upon that river, form a recapitulation of our misfortunes, presented in a small frame, in order to give the greater effect. He adds, that "Two kings, one "prince, eight marshals, followed by a few offi- "cers, generals walking on foot, and scattered "about without attendance; lastly, a few hun- "dred men of the old guard, with arms yet in "their hands, formed the *remains* of the army; "they alone represented it."

That brief analysis is distinguished by his habitual spirit of exaggeration, and warmth of expression. The following is the true estimate of the French army, as it was drawn up at that period:

Troops that recrossed the Niemen at Kowno, about the 15th Debember	36,000 men
Tenth corps	30,000
Polish corps, under the orders of Prince Poniatowski*	20,000
Seventh corps, Saxons and Frenchmen, under General Reynier	15,000
Austrian corps	26,000
	127,000 men

* Prince Poniatowski arrived at Warsaw on the 25th December, and brought back with his corps thirty pieces of cannon. (*Manuscrit de* 1813, *par le Baron Fain*, Vol. i. page 30.)

Each regiment had a tolerably correct knowledge of the number of men who were killed, wounded, or in hospital; they had none respecting those who died of cold; but there existed some information regarding such as were supposed to be prisoners of war. Why, since 1814, has no mention been made of the number of men who returned, and who were said to have been so generously restored by Alexander. Not only some are known to return at this very day, but many have remained in various governments of Russia. Mr. de Segur abstains from accompanying the picture of our misfortunes with these motives for our consolation.

With respect to the guard, at the period of its re-uniting (the 15th December,) at Werballen, where it remained on the 16th, it was still very effective, especially in men. In the cavalry, the regiment of polish light horse reckoned alone a complement of four hundred and twelve men, and upwards of two hundred horses, all very good and serviceable, besides sick and wounded soldiers. A great proportion of the men of this regiment having lost their horses, had proceeded, during the retreat, across the forests of Lithuania, and in the direction of Warsaw, where they arrived under the protection afforded them, as much by the inhabitants of the country, as by their knowledge of its language.

This chapter closes with a well-merited eulogium upon Marshal Ney, who displayed in that

memorable campaign, all those traits of heroism which are inspired by strength of mind, and by devoted zeal; and who never abandoned the contest until he was left without the means of continuing it.

CHAPTER V.

When the army reached Gumbinnen, three days journey from the Niemen, the Russians relaxed their march. Their distress fell little short of our own, and when they found us placed beyond the reach of hunger and cold, they became more prudent; this circumstance enabled the king of Naples to afford repose to the troops.

Mr. de Segur, on the subject of a council held at Gumbinnen by that monarch, puts into his mouth some expressions which, he says, were *the first symptoms of his defection.* He represents him as "provoked that the Emperor left him the "responsibility of the retreat, and vexed with "himself for having always rejected the proposals "of the English." To these inconsiderate expressions, Davoust replies with no less warmth than sound argument. The author adds: "Murat "remained disconcerted. He felt himself guilty. "In this manner was stifled the first spark of a

"treachery which at a later period was to effect
"the ruin of France. History mentions the fact
"with regret, since repentance and misfortune
"have kept pace with the crime."

It must unhappily be admitted, that the King of Naples was not equal to the circumstances, or to the mission confided to him, on the occasion of the Emperor's departure: few men possess the gift of being great, alike in prosperity and in trouble. Ever since the commencement of his military career, Napoleon had suffered no real check; no opportunity had therefore been offered to him, as would have been the case had his fortune been more diversified, of discovering amongst his generals some of those gifted beings who expand in adversity, as in their proper element. This prince was, therefore reduced to study the character of his officers, merely under the alternate varieties of his success; Murat's conduct had always been irreproachable; it required the workings of extraordinary events, to exhibit him in other colours.

Every thing considered, his defection is not more unaccountable than the many that succeeded each other in 1814, from March until the middle of April; and with all his penetration, the Emperor could not foresee so much blindness.

Napoleon had done every thing which it is incumbent upon a sovereign to do, in order to rivet the affection of those who are in his service. He had bound them to his fortune by the two most

powerful ties, interest and self-love. No prince, no government, could ever hold out advantages to them that would be equivalent to those which they derived from the Emperor's bounty.

Napoleon, however, was too deeply read in history, not to be well aware of the fate that awaits unfortunate princes. He knew that in modern nations there exists a mass of individuals strong in influence, and solely attentive to their riches, their convenience, and their pleasures; that they are unequal to a lasting display of constancy to misfortune, and of sacrifices too irksome for them; that their attachment to a government is always in proportion to the advantages it affords them. It was therefore no matter of surprise to him, after his reverses, that such a mass should have kept away; and transferred its homage to the new power by which his own was superseded.

But what he could not have expected was, that men who boasted of the generosity of their opinions, who laid much stress upon their spirit of independence, and who pretended to have alone upheld the national sentiment, should make his person, his actions, and his government, the object of their calumnious attacks.

Let the mighty shade of Napoleon be consoled! whilst ungrateful beings assail his memory, in the midst of the very palaces he has bestowed, justice is rendered to him by the people, who during his reign supported nearly the entire burthen of taxes and of the conscription; that people venerates his

memory, and in the retirement of their humble dwellings, they extol the glory of his name.

CHAPTERS VI, VII, VIII, AND IX.

THE chapters VI., VII., VIII., and IX., embrace the narrative of Marshal Macdonald's campaign, and of General Yorck's treachery. The author takes us back to the month of August. He passes high encomiums upon the Prussian troops, who fought in earnest. Not so their chief who, according to the author, *had higher views.* On this subject he draws a grammatical distinction between *defection* and *treachery.* The reader will decide by what name should be qualified, the conduct of an allied general, who being in command of the rear-guard of the army, avails himself of his position, in order to conclude an armistice with the enemy, without any participation in it by the commander-in-chief, who secretly draws away the remainder of the Prussian troops, "who "escapes from Tilsit in silence, and by favor of "the night;" and who thus, in the very presence of the enemy, deserts the French corps of which he formed the main strength. The opinion entertained of General Yorck's conduct by the French historian, will not be sanctioned by those who

place honor before every other consideration. The peculiar features of that conduct, which appear to him to lessen the odium attaching to it, might be pleaded in excuse for whoever thought that obligations entered into are no longer binding, from the moment that they are found burthensome, and may be shaken off at pleasure, provided appearances are not violated. We have too high an opinion of the noble sentiments which are hereditary in Mr. de Segur's family, to believe that, upon due reflection, he would have hesitated to stigmatize an action which morality disavows. We are the more justified in this belief, as he himself says, (chapter XI.,) "the blood of six hundred Frenchmen, Bavarians, and Poles, who "remained on the fields of battle of Labiau and "Tente accuses the Prussians for not having pro- "vided, by an additional article, for the safe re- "treat of the leader they were deserting."

CHAPTER X.

"THUS suddenly fell our left wing....Our right "wing detached itself from us insensibly, and "with the formalities required by its political po- "sition. On the 10th December, Schwarzenberg

" was at Slonim, successively sending advanced " guards in the direction of Minsk, Nowogrodeck, " and Bielitza. He was still persuaded that the " Russians were beaten, and fleeing before Napo- " leon, when he was informed, at one and the same " moment, of the Emperor's departure, and of the " destruction of the grand army, but in so vague " a manner, that he was for some time without " adopting any decided course."

Prince Schwarzenberg did not learn the Emperor's departure in a *vague* manner; it was communicated to him in as official a way as possible, by his secretary, Baron Sturmer, who was then upon a mission at Wilna, and was sent to him with the news. Mr. de Segur must have entertained a strong conviction of the good faith of the Austrian general, when he believed that being on the 10th December at Slonim, with an advanced guard in the direction of Minsk, this general could be ignorant that twenty-five days before that time, namely, on the 16th of November, Minsk had fallen into the possession of the Russians, and our retreat was obstructed in that quarter. He adds, that, " in his embarrassment, he addressed him- " self to the French ambassador at Warsaw, who " authorized him not to sacrifice another man." Thus without inquiring into the propriety or the motives of the application made by Prince Schwarzenberg to the French minister, the author seems to have at heart to exonerate him from every imputation.

He says, however, soon afterwards, that "as "the interests of the Russians agreed with those "of the Austrians, there was very soon a mutual "understanding." This is so true, that about the 21st December, as is related by Mr. de Segur himself, "An order from Alexander suspended all "hostilities in the direction of Schwarzenberg's "retreat; an armistice was concluded, to which "Murat gave his approbation. The two generals "were to manœuvre in presence of each other, "the Russian upon the offensive, the Austrian upon "the defensive, but without coming to blows."

These evolutions were nothing more than a parade, a contest of mutual politeness and attention, which was confined to the Russians and Austrians only. "For the corps of General Reg-"nier, which formed a part of Schwarzenberg's "army, was not included in the arrangement."

War was still kept up against that corps, now *reduced* by this defection *to ten thousand men*, as it had been against Macdonald, after the departure of the Prussians. But, continues our officer of the palace quite unmoved, "Schwarzenberg "persevered in his loyalty—he covered the front "of the French line, and preserved it.... If after-"wards, Regnier was overtaken and surprised at "Kalitch, it was in consequence of his halting too "long to protect the flight of some Polish depôts." These quotations afford a fresh proof of the sense of justice which influences the author. How often have we been under the painful necessity of

regretting, during the course of our observations upon his work, that of all that fund of partiality which he exhibits, no portion should have been bestowed upon the French army.

After these faithful statements of the conduct of the Prussians and Austrians, he presents us with an account of the horrors committed by the inhabitants of Kœnigsberg upon our unfortunate wounded soldiers, and a frightful description of the convent of Saint Basil at Wilna, where the Russians allowed our prisoners to die of hunger and privation, in the midst of an abundance which was afforded by the supplies of provisions we had left behind. But in the narrative which is presented by the French writer, those horrors serve to display the humanity, however tardy, of the Russian Emperor and his brother, who arrive thirteen days afterwards to apply a remedy for them.

CHAPTER XI.

The author says, that "the rallying of the "army upon the Vistula had proved delusive in "its effects: that on the 22d January, the old "guard numbered at most.. 500 fighting men.*

The young guard,	....
The first corps,	1,800
The second corps,	1,000
The third corps,	1,600
The fourth corps,	1,700
	6,600 men.

"Even the greater part of those soldiers, the "remains of 600,000 men, could with difficulty "handle their arms."

We have already presented a statement of the strength of the army on its departure from Kowno. Mr. de Segur had estimated it at 445,000 men upon its taking the field; in another place he ap-

* A detailed statement, now before us, of the five infantry regiments of the old guard, brings the number of men doing duty on the 20th December 1812, to 1471 men. On the 15th January, the young guard was directed to proceed from Posen to the Rhine, for the purpose of being re-organized, and the old guard returned to Paris.

proaches nearer to the truth when he carried it to 400,000; he now supposes it to be 600,000 men. In *the remains* to which he alludes he omits to include the 5th corps, consisting of 20,000 men and thirty pieces of cannon, which had arrived at Warsaw ever since the 25th December; he likewise omits the sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth corps, and the Austrian corps of Prince Schwarzenberg. He says in the following page: "The "troops of Macdonald and Heudelet's division "were kept united. All these remains were has- "tily brought together at Dantzig; 35,000 sol- "diers of seventeen different nations were shut up "in that city."

The author in this manner contradicts himself. Why then does he exhibit to us 6,600 men as the *remains* of 600,000, unless to lead us into error, and to swell our losses which are already so immense? Was it then out of these 6,600 men that Dantzig was garrisoned with 35,000? Did they also supply the 6,000 men to Thorn, the 8,000 to Modlin, the 4,000 to Zamosc, etc. etc.?

"Alexander stopped the progress of his troops at Kalitch, etc." Mr. de Segur, who exaggerates so much the losses of the French army, ought to have told us what the Russians had suffered.

Kutusoff's army, which at the battle of Krasnoi was 100,000 strong, was reduced to 35,000 men on the evacuation of Wilna by the French. The Russians had scarcely taken possession of that city, when they filled its hospitals with 18,000

sick, the greater part disabled by the severity of the cold.

The author of a notice respecting the campaign of 1813, published at Weimar in the German language in the year 1814, estimates at 20,000 men the number of Russian troops that might, up to that time, have reached Prussia, and at 30,000 the numbers that were collecting at Kaliteh, where the Emperor of Russia held his head-quarters. After giving an explanation of the ground occupied by the different Russian corps, he adds: "It is quite clear from this statement, that, had "it not been for the adhesion of Prussia, Russia "could not, for a moment, have followed up her "successes, but would have been compelled to "confine her operations to the limits of the "Vistula."

Sir Robert Wilson says, in his *Picture of the Russian power*, that the army of Alexander exhibited, at this period, several companies without a private soldier, and a great number of battalions which did not number fifty men.

CHAPTER XII.

The conclusion which is drawn by our *Maréchal-des-logis* is, that "the star of the north eclipsed "the star of Napoleon—that the human race in-"clines its course towards the south; that it turns

" its back to the north.... that this grand course " of mankind cannot be inverted with impunity: " that the Russian armies have been seen upon " the Elbe, and shortly afterwards in Italy; that " they came to reconnoitre the country, and will " come at a later period to establish themselves in " it....and that the invasion of the south by the " north, which was renewed by Catherine II will " yet be continued."

We have here an assertion formally laid down, and supported by specious arguments, although expressed in occasionally whimsical terms.

The author, then addressing those whom he styles his *comrades*, says to them: " Whatever may have " been the motive of our expedition, it was of im- " portance to Europe, inasmuch as its object was " to wrest Poland from the grasp of Russia, and " as its result would have been to ward off the " danger of a new invasion from the men of the " north, to weaken the impetuosity of that tor- " rent, and to raise a fresh obstacle to its progress."

Here we have again Mr. de Segur caught in the fact; he is himself found to demonstrate the necessity of the expedition. It would be asking too much of him that he should assign the real motive of the war.

He adds in conclusion: " What a man, and " what circumstances combined together to ensure " the success of so mighty an undertaking." Here again breaks out the admission, that the enterprise

was well timed, and that the Emperor was the man to ensure the success of it.

Thus it is that the author, who, throughout his work, took a delight in exhibiting the expedition to Russia as an unjust aggression, originating in Napoleon's personal ambition, disavows in these few words the assertions he had made, and justifies the necessity, the object, the occasion, of that memorable undertaking. But of what consequence is this tardy retractation? Of what avail are empty praises which appear to escape him merely for the purpose of acquitting his conscience of the injustice of the reproaches by which he has attempted to blacken the character of that great man! Was it worth while to exhibit Napoleon to us fallen from his wonted character, a prey to a debasing weakness, deprived of all moral and physical energy, to have sickened the reader's heart by paintings full of horror, which are scattered over a thousand pages, and all this in order to return to the point from which he should have started—to the truth?

He concludes in these words: "Comrades, my "task is now at an end. It now remains for you to "bear testimony to the correctness of the pic- "ture. Its colors, will no doubt, appear pale to "your eyes and to your hearts, which are yet full "of those mighty recollections."

The veterans of the grand army will not admit that to be a true picture which has so strangely

disfigured their illustrious chief, their sentiments, their constancy, and their victories.

How can the author believe that his colors will appear pale, when "his memory," as he says it himself, "has nothing left but ashes to rake up, "but disasters to record, and can no longer write "but upon tombs?

With him we may say, our task, as far as it depended upon us, is completed; it was a painful one. We have not undertaken to point out in detail the errors and mis-statements which swarm through the work; this would have led us beyond the limits we had prescribed to ourselves. We have not noticed all those passages which clearly shew that Mr. de Segur had no other object than to flatter the passions of the moment in which his work was written, passions that are daily giving way. We would have been detained at every page; would it not, besides, be calumniating the government to suppose that a work which lowers the pride of our arms, and is so little flattering to foreigners, should prove a title to military favors?

We have seldom held up to notice the whimsical style of Mr. de Segur, who will fortunately find no one to tread in his steps; our object was of too elevated a nature to allow of our being detained by mere trifles. It matters little to us that he should have pretentions to academical laurels; we had at heart, not to avenge the memory of

a great man who stands in need of no defence, whose fame is far above the reach of any attack, but to render homage to the truth, to call in facts, records, and men, as witnesses against a writer, who, yielding to the wanderings of a disturbed imagination, and speculating upon the cravings which the present generation has contracted for strong emotions, has, in a work of two volumes, which is either a romance, a poem, or a melodrame, trampled upon genius, courage, and misfortune, upon all that commands the respect of elevated minds. May the soldiers of Napoleon, may the friends of French glory, appreciate the feelings which guided our pen, and be not wholly indifferent to our efforts!

END OF THE

CRITICAL EXAMINATION.

APPENDIX.

ORDERS OF THE EMPEROR, &c.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Thorn, 4th June, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that, when you gave him the order to provide himself with twenty days provisions, you meant it to be done in a regular way, and without foraging the country; that the conduct of the Wurtemberg troops has spread sorrow and desolation in Poland; that it is high time it should be checked; that he is to mention in the order of the day, the displeasure of his Majesty against the Wurtembergers, and to take the speediest measures to prevent any devastation of the country; otherwise, we shall find ourselves in the same position as in Portugal.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Wilna, 2d. July, 1812.

My cousin, send back that aid-de-camp of the viceroy, and let the viceroy know, that, being without intelligence, though aware before hand of the general movement, it was ridiculous in him to remain stationary at Piloni; that since he knew of the cossacks being in the direction of Stoklitzi, he might have sent his light cavalry forward to scour the country, obtain intelligence and approach Wilna; that the news given to him by General R....., of there being thirty or forty thousand Russians upon his left, is devoid of common sense; that General R..... pretends having mentioned that they were upon his right; that in this case, they are the hussars who were seen in the direction of Stoklitzi; that all these delays very much thwart the Emperor; that the finest opportunities are, in consequence, allowed to pass without being made available; and that all the fatigues of the fourth corps are rendered useless accordingly.

Write to General R....., that I am surprised he is still at Ismory; that he must have lost his senses not to have continued his march towards Wilna; that if his artillery had occasioned him some delay, he might have left with it a guard of a hundred to a hundred and fifty men; that he gave the viceroy information of there being thirty or forty thousand Russians upon the left; that this absurd news has influenced the viceroy's operations.—Enquire of him why he ventured to give such intelligence, and order him to answer you without delay?

Write to the viceroy that I instructed him on the 28th, to move to the right, to push on strong parties of cavalry towards Olita, in order to learn what is going on there, to approach Wilna with the fourth corps, and to keep upon his right, that is to say, between the Niemen and Wilna, the sixth corps, which will send detachments in the direction of Merecz and Olkeniki, so that he may form his junction with the King of Westphalia.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Wilna, 5th July, 1812.

My cousin, write to the King of Westphalia, that I only received this day his dispatch of the 3d July, whilst his letters of the 4th came to me yesterday. You will inform him, that I am exceedingly dissatisfied at his not having sent all the light troops under the orders of Prince Poniatowski, in pursuit of Bagration, for the purpose of harassing his corps and retarding its march; that, when he arrived on the 30th at Grodno, he ought instantly to have attacked the enemy, and closely pursued them. You will tell him that it is impossible to manœuvre worse than he has done; that General Reynier and even the eighth corps were of no use in those operations; that Prince Poniatowski ought to have been made to march in pursuit of the enemy with all his disposable troops; that, in consequence of having departed from every rule and from his instructions, he enables Bagration to effect his retreat without precipitation; that if Bagration left Wolkowisk on the 30th, he may arrive at Minsk on the 7th, and what matters it that the King should be there in person on the 10th, since Bagration will have had four days start of him? Tell him that if Prince Poniatowski had had but one division, he ought to have sent him; but that every thing leads to suppose he might have sent forward the whole corps. He could not run any risk, since Bagration has no time to fight or to manœuvre, and only seeks to gain ground, well aware that he is intercepted by the manœuvres which I am now directing; that the Prince of Eckmühl is at this moment with his corps in advance of Volojin, but will not be strong enough to detain Bagration, since the latter is interrupted by no obstacle. Desire the King, therefore, to give orders immediately to Prince Poniatowski to set off with his cavalry and all his disposable troops in pursuit of Bagration.—You will tell him that all the fruits of my manœuvres and the finest opportunity ever offered in a war, have disappeared in consequence of that strange forgetfulness of the first notions of warfare.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Wilna, 7th July, 1812.

My cousin, communicate to the King of Westphalia, by a letter in cyphers, the Prince of Eckmühl's position of yesterday the 6th. You will frame the letter from the keys hereunto annexed.

Renew the order to him to hasten his march; tell him that the intelligence he affords respecting Bagration, is so imperfect, that it perplexes us; that if he knows the road he has taken, he ought to inform us of it.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Wilna, 7th July, 1812.

My cousin, the guard is under orders to march; its movements commences on the 9th, and is to continue on the 10th, and 11th. It is necessary that the pontoon train, the engineers, the artillery, and all that are on the move, should take six days provisions, at the rate of half a ration's allowance, and a sufficient supply of meat, for three quarters of a pound or one pound for each man. It is therefore indispensable, that, on the 10th, there be ninety thousand rations of bread for distribution to the guard, which the men are to carry on their backs, and which will secure their means of subsistence for six days, and three hundred quintals of rice, in order to distribute a pound of rice to each man; the guard will, in this manner, be supplied with provisions for ten days; that, on the 11th and 12th, two convoys of bread, of thirty thousand rations each, should leave Wilna and follow the movement of the guard; this will be a further supply of bread to them for four days; lastly, that, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, convoys of bread should depart, loaded upon the vehicles belonging to head-quarters, upon auxiliary vehicles, upon those which replace the vehicles of the ninth, tenth, and second battalions, upon those of the eleventh battalion, and such others as may yet arrive; so that on the 10th, and 11th, four thousand quintals of flour will have proceeded to follow the guard; this will be equivalent to three hundred and sixty-thousand rations of bread, or ten day's provisions for the guard and for head-quarters; these, added to the ten days' provisions which the guard will have carried away with them, form a supply of bread for twenty days. If the army should not march, other convoys will arrive; and if it should march, it will find resources in the towns; but I cannot be at ease unless the guard and the head-quarters be provided with twenty days' provisions, since the guard is the last to march, and ought to give the example of good discipline. In this account are not included biscuit, brandy, &c., which are deposited in the forty caissons belonging to head-quarters, and are a resource available in a case of emergency. As it appears that some biscuit has arrived, let it be ascertained that it is in proper condition, and give directions that the caissons of head-quarters be filled with it, as this is a more advantageous course, in case of unforeseen accidents.

Napoleon to the Major Général.

Wilna, 9th July, 1812.

My cousin, consider as of non-effect the last letter I wrote to you for the Duke of Tarentum, and substitute the following in its place.

"The Duke of Reggio has received orders to move upon "Solok, the Duke of Elchingen upon Kozatschizna; the King of "Naples is at Widzy. The enemy appears to concentrate him- "self at Dunaburg. The Prince of Eckmühl has arrived at "Minsk. The hetman Platoff with his cossacks, and the corps "of Bagration who wanted to proceed in the direction of that "town, have been cut off from it; they are now marching upon "Bobruisk. The King of Westphalia is in pursuit of them, and "had reached Mir yesterday. The viceroy is marching towards "the upper Dwina; the guards and head-quarters are to leave "this place in a few days. It is the intention of the Emperor "to march upon Moscow and St. Petersburgh, and by so doing, "compel the army, which is at Dunaburg, to re-ascend, and "set the whole of Courland and of Livonia free.

"The garrison of Riga, under the command of General Essen, "whose army-corps has been disunited, consists of thirty-three "battalions, of from two to three hundred men each, all recruits "made in the present year, and undeserving of any attention. It "is probable that, as soon as the fortress will be threatened, a "division will proceed from Dunaburg to its relief; for, accord- "ing to the information we possess, the garrison, as at present "composed, is inadequate to its defence. The Emperor cannot "give you any positive order, but merely general instructions, "because the distance at which you are stationed is already too "great, and will now become greater still. Move upon Jacobstadt "and Fredrickstadt, and there threaten to cross the Dwina; this "movement will have the advantage of compelling the Russian "army at Dunaburg to send a detachment to the right bank in "order to cover the two points at which a passage might be "effected," &c. &c.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Wilna, 11th July, 1812.

My cousin, reply to the King of Westphalia that you received with astonishment his letter of the 9th July, at two o'clock in the afternoon; that the order of the 30th is a positive one; that it is couched in these terms: *You are to move upon Minsk; General Reynier will move upon Nieswj, without however neglecting to cover Warsaw.* This means that General Reynier's first object ought to be to cover Warsaw, the second to move in the direction of Nieswj, provided the enemy should withdraw all his troops from Volhynia, and there should be nothing more to apprehend for the grand-dutchy. But, as every thing tends to prove that the enemy has left two divisions in Volhynia, it is, therefore, proper that General Reynier should not lose sight of his chief object, that of covering Warsaw. You will accordingly stop his movement at Slonim; the Prince of Schwarzenberg will pass before him in order to move first upon Nieswj and next upon the Dwina.

Let General Reynier send forward parties to Pinsk, and place himself in echelons, so as to fall upon the flanks of whatever troops might attempt to debouch upon Warsaw. In that position he will make a retrograde movement upon Warsaw, should that country be threatened; but so long as the enemy may know him to be prepared to debouch from Pinsk, and to have his corps ready to fall upon their flanks, and that they will have, moreover, to apprehend our entrance into Volhynia, it will be out of their power to march upon the territory of Warsaw; and should they do so, it would not be with impunity. General Reynier must also send back to Praga the regiment which was intended for the garrison of that place, and was improperly withdrawn from it. General Reynier's position in the rear is, therefore, a useful one.

His Majesty does not wonder you should not understand that instructions given at the distance of a hundred leagues should be of opposite tendencies, which future events are to clear up; what the Emperor complains of is that instead of studying those instructions, you make no account of them. It is not at all necessary to be stationed upon the Bug, in order to cover Warsaw; if this were the case, as the first object of General Regnier is to cover the dutchy, he should have left troops upon the Bug, when he learned that the enemy had retained two divisions in Volhynia. But as you were not apprised of what Bagration had left in Volhynia, as you were ignorant of the number of divisions he had with him, as you did not even pursue him, and as he was enabled to make his retreat as quietly as if he had no one in his rear, all this being in direct contradiction to the practice in war, it is not extraordinary that every thing else should bear the same stamp. General Reynier is, therefore, at liberty, according to the forces the enemy may have left in Volhynia, either to return to Brezesc, or to remain at Slonim, and to send detachments towards Pinsk. But the chief object is, that, until the enemy will have withdrawn their troops out of Volhynia, he should have a corps of observation prepared to cover Warsaw, and to fall upon any troops which might, from Volhynia, threaten the dutchy or the rear of the army.

Order General Reynier to write immediately to the Major-General, and to afford all the intelligence which he possesses. It is His Majesty's desire that General Reynier, and not Prince Schwarzenberg, should remain in observation, and march upon the grand-dutchy in case of need; many reasons have influenced this decision. The King will make known to Prince Schwarzenberg that I wish him to move upon Nieswj, if Warsaw should not be in any imminent danger.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Glubokoé, 20th July, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Prince of Eckmühl that I cannot be

pleased with his conduct towards the King of Westphalia; that I had given him the command only in the event of the junction taking place, and of both armies being on the field of battle, when a commander-in-chief became necessary; that instead of this, he made known those instructions before the junction had taken place, and when their only communication was by a few out-posts; that, after he had so done, and learned that the King of Westphalia had retired, he ought to have retained the command, and issued orders to Prince Poniatowski: that I no longer know at this time how my right is going on; that I gave him a proof of the high confidence I had in him, and do not think he has made an appropriate use of it; that, since he had taken the command, he ought to have kept it; but that he would have done better not to have taken it, since he had not formed a junction with the King; that now I am at a distance, I am ignorant of what passes on my right; that my affairs suffer accordingly, whereas if he had written to Prince Poniatowski that the King having resigned the command, he would direct the Prince's movements, my arrangements would not have been affected.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Glubokoé, 22d July, 1812.

My cousin, reply to General Reynier, that I authorize his not sending that regiment to Praga, and approve of the position in which he has stationed it. Let him know that the Duke of Belluno with the 9th corps, thirty thousand strong, and nearly all Frenchmen, will be at Marienberg; and that, should circumstances be urgent, and the dutchy of Warsaw be seriously threatened, whilst he, General Reynier, would be defending the intrenched camp of Praga and Modlin, he was to write to the Duke of Belluno, and acquaint him with the emergency; this would enable the Duke to come to his assistance. You will add that the war has taken such a turn as to enable us already to threaten St. Petersburgh and Moscow, and that, therefore, it is not probable the enemy should dream of offensive operations with any imposing forces; though it has been imagined that ten or twelve thousand men, belonging to troops of third battalions, which are good for nothing in line, might be sent with one or two regiments of cavalry to threaten the dutchy. The enemy will never be so mad as to detach upon Warsaw fifteen or twenty thousand men of good troops, whilst St. Petersburg and Moscow are so closely threatened. It is possible, besides, that in a short time I may carry the war into Volhynia; he would form part of that corps.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Witepsk, 2d August, 1812.

My cousin, send an officer to inform Prince Schwarzenberg that I place the seventh corps under his orders, that he is to rally

that corps, march against Tormasof and Kamenskoi, offer them battle, and follow them every where until he shall have succeeded in overcoming them. Acquaint General Reynier that I have given to Prince Schwarzenberg the chief command over the two corps united.

Napoleon to the Major-General.

Witepsk, 3d August, 1812.

My cousin, it is proper you should dispatch, before six o'clock this morning, an intelligent and trust worthy Polish officer to Prince Schwarzenberg with the duplicate of the letter you wrote to him by your aid-de-camp Flahaut; acquaint him that, in conformity with the intention manifested by the Emperor of Austria, I had intended to summon his corps to act under my immediate orders; that I had deemed the corps of General Reynier sufficient to keep the troops of Volhynia in check, as I had proposed sending a considerable body of Polish troops into Volhynia by the way of Mozyr so soon as the corps of Prince Schwarzenberg would have fallen into the line. But that since an imposing force of the enemy has been before hand with us, and General Reynier has allowed himself to be taken unawares, it is my wish that the Prince should march to repel the enemy, and prevent his laying waste that portion of the territory; that as General Reynier is chiefly in want of cavalry, the Prince's cavalry may take the start of him; that I wish him to leave at Nieswj about a thousand cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and one brigade, in all four thousand men, so as to form a body of reserve, commanded by a general of brigade, which may act according to circumstances; that it is optional with him to raise this reserve to seven or eight thousand men, if he found it in his power to do so without any inconvenience, that Tormasof has one division at Mozyr, and probably two divisions under his orders; that the latter can only consist of third battalions, like the divisions in Courland, which have been so easily defeated by the Prussians; that two hundred italian cavalry of the viceroy's corps have likewise met four of those battalions and overthrown them at the first charge; that, in the general organization of the Russian army, we were aware that Tormasof was to have the twenty-seventh, a new division, in which consisted his real strength; but that I believe this twenty-seventh division was unable to join him, and he will probably, in that case, have retained the ninth or fifteenth division; that it is necessary he should take every means of correctly ascertaining what are the enemy's divisions in Volhynia; that we believe Bagration has crossed the Borysthenes with six divisions; that, in such a case, there would remain in Volhynia one division at most, independently of Tormasof's third battalions; that I therefore wish him to make a rapid march, attack and overthrow Kamenskoi and Tormasof, and carry the war into Volhynia; that, on the other hand, the events that will occur, and the precise intelligence he may ob-

tain of the number of the enemy's regular divisions in Volhynia, will enable me to make him acquainted with my ulterior intentions.

P. S. Let the general of brigade which he may leave at Nieswj, be instructed to correspond with head-quarters and with the general commanding at Minsk, for the purpose of communicating intelligence.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Witepsk, 12th Aug. 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Castiglione that you do not understand him, when he says that he has not a single cavalry soldier, since he has at command a fine Saxon regiment of seven hundred men, whenever he may stand in need of it, though it is at present doing duty as a guard to the King of Saxony; that he has a regiment of dragoons at Hanover, which is now of eight hundred men, and will soon be double that number; that, as for expeditions of sixty thousand men, this is quite absurd; that the English and the Russians have something else to think of besides making descents; that Sweden, if she makes any attempt, will attack Norway; that, in any case, the latter power cannot venture more than fifteen thousand men; that it is proper, however, he should proceed to inspect the coast, pass the troops in review, and personally reconnoitre the ground.

The Major-Général to Napoleon.

Smolensko, 21st August, 1812.

Sire,

I have the honor to inform your Majesty that although six hundred men are employed at this moment in burying the dead, this operation is far from being terminated; with the view of expediting it, it is almost indispensable that the Russian prisoners be set to work. I request your Majesty will allow the employment of two hundred of them, who may be formed into companies with officers and non-commissioned officers, and so closely watched as to prevent any of the prisoners from escaping.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Smolensko, 24th August, 1812.

My cousin, enclosed you will find an order for the intendant to furnish Prince Schwarzenberg with a second advance of 500,000 francs. Communicate to the Prince the satisfaction I have felt at the victory he obtained; let him know that, to-morrow, I march upon the enemy, who appears to be taking up a position twenty leagues from this place on the road to Moscow; that I wish him to manœuvre in such a manner as to prevent the enemy's troops in Volhynia from marching upon me; that I recommend him to

keep them employed. Write to General Reynier to the same effect. Acquaint Prince Schwarzenberg that I have requested of the Emperor of Austria to sanction all the promotions, and to grant rewards in his corps; that I likewise propose to grant rewards upon the report he makes to me; that I await his proposals. Write to acquaint the Duke of Tarentum with what has taken place, and that I am about to march. Write also to General Saint-Cyr; let him know that I await his proposals in order to grant rewards to his corps; that it appears from the Russian bulletins that Wittgenstein has only two divisions, formed out of reserve battalions which are merely composed of recruits.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Dorogobouje, 26th August, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno to repair to Wilna, for the purpose of seeing the Duke of Bassano, and of learning the state of affairs; that, after to-morrow, I shall be at Wiazma, which is at the distance of five day's march from Moscow; that it is probable a battle will be fought, the result of which will lead us to Moscow; that, in this state of things, it is possible the communications may be intercepted; that some one must, therefore, take the command in such a case, and act according to circumstances; that I have ordered the 129th regiment, the Illyrian regiment, the Westphalian regiment which was stationed at Kœnigsberg, and the two Saxon regiments, to take the direction of Minsk; that I have besides stationed between Minsk and Mohilow Dombrowski's division, consisting of twelve battalions and of a brigade of light cavalry; that it is of importance his corps should approach Wilna, and he should act according to circumstances, in order that he may have it in his power to protect Smolensko, Witepsk, Mohilow, and Minsk; that Dombrowski's division must be in sufficient strength to protect the communication of Minsk, by Orcha, as far as Smolensko, since all it has to do is to keep in check the Russian division of General Hœrtel stationed at Mozyr, and consisting of from five to six thousand men, recruits for the greater part, against which, besides, Prince Schwarzenberg may act; that the fresh reinforcements I send to Minsk may also face every obstacle; and in any case, the movement of the Duke of Belluno upon Minsk and Orcha, and from thence upon Smolensko, appears to me calculated to protect our entire rear; that I have four thousand men in garrison at Witepsk, and as many at Smolensko; that the Duke of Belluno, by thus taking up a position between the Dnieper and the Dwina, will have an unmolested communication with me, be enabled to receive my orders without delay, and have it in his power to protect the communications of Minsk and of Witepsk, as well as those from Smolensko to Moscow; that I suppose General Gouvion Saint-Cyr has a sufficient force in the second and sixth corps to keep Wittgenstein in check

and have nothing to apprehend; that the Duke of Tarentum may move upon Riga in order to invest the place; lastly, that I order the four marching half brigades, being a total of nine thousand men, which formed part of Lagrange's division, to take the direction of Kowno; that it would only be, therefore, in the event of General Gouvion Saint-Cyr being defeated by Wittgenstein, and compelled to recross the Dwina, that the Duke of Belluno ought, in the first instance, to march to his relief; that, with this exception only, he must continue his march towards Smolensko.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.

Slawkowo, 27th August,
Nine o'clock at night.

You have received orders to proceed from Kowno to Wilna; you are to march upon four columns; provide yourself at Kowno with ten pounds of rice for each man, which the soldier will carry in a bag; and you will take care that he does not consume more than one ounce a day; you will also provide yourself with biscuit for six days, independently of whatever may follow you in vehicles. At Wilna you will take provisions as far as Minsk, at Minsk as far as Borisow, and at Borisow as far as Orcha. From Orcha to Smolensko your corps must march by divisions, so as to perform the distance in three days; the cavalry may proceed in advance. Take advantage of your being personally on the spot, in order to collect as much provisions as possible upon the road to Wilna, at Minsk and at Orcha. As the Emperor is marching to Moscow, your corps cannot arrive too soon at Smolensko, in order to keep up our communications and be as a corps of reserve to us.

His Majesty appoints you to the command of all the troops that are in Lithuania, in the governments of Mohilow, Witepsk, and Smolensko, in order that you may call upon them all, according as circumstances may require, and with a view to the common object; that object is to keep up the grand communication between Wilna, and head quarters through Minsk and Smolensko. The following are the troops which you will have at command in Lithuania: Dombrowski's division of seven or eight thousand men, which is employed in manœuvring between Mohilow, Minsk, and Bobruisk; four Illyrian battalions, two battalions of the 129th with its field pieces, two battalions of the 33d light infantry with its field pieces; two battalions of the 33d light infantry are proceeding to Smolensko; a battalion of that regiment remained at Minsk. Renew to General Loison the order to send them off; this will place at your disposal, with Dombrowski's division, about twenty four battalions. Four marching half brigades, which formed Lagrange's division, are at Kœnigsberg; I have ordered them to repair to Kowno, where these new levies are to remain in reserve.

The Polish cavalry and infantry regiments of Lithuania, according as they will be formed, will mount garrison at Wilna and

at other points; there are many isolated battalions at Wilna and at Minsk; several detachments are on the roads of Glubokoé and Kamen; as soon as they will be re-armed and put in order, they must be sent to Smolensko, with the exception of what belongs to the tenth corps commanded by Macdonald, and to the second and sixth corps.

The third battalions of the 4th, 7th, and 9th Polish regiments are not to enter into line the moment of their arrival at Wilna; you are to order them to proceed to Minsk, and mount garrison there; they are not to join Gerard's division until they have been at the school of the battalion. The three third battalions of the legion of the Vistula are to arrive at Smolensko, which will have a garrison of five to six thousand men; Witepsk is to have the same number.

You are to watch the fortress of Bobruisk until arrangements can be made for taking possession of it. You are to secure the communication from Wilna to Smolensko, which the enemy is endeavoring to intercept with his troops which may succeed in escaping from Schwarzenberg; this is the principal object to be attended to. You are to protect the communications between Smolensko and head-quarters, if they should be interrupted, come to the assistance of the army, if it should be found necessary, and lastly you are to form its reserve. There is no apprehension of its being threatened in the direction of the Dwina. The siege of Riga will necessarily draw the attention of the enemy to the lower Dwina. The forces under Saint-Cyr appear to be more than sufficient to keep the enemy in check. This object, however, in case of unforeseen events, ought to fix your attention. You are also to protect the territories of Witepsk, Smolensko, and Mohilow. We have five depots of cavalry, namely, Kowno, Merecz, Minsk, Glubokoé, and Lepel. You will look to the formation of marching squadrons. Give a general movement towards Smolensko to whatever is in the rear of the army. You will march to Minsk and Smolensko as soon as possible.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Wiazma, 30th August, 1812.

My cousin, write to General Dombrowski, that, considering the bad condition of the fortress of Bobruisk, it might be advisable for him to invest it with his infantry, and that he should scour with his cavalry, the outlets of Pinsk and Mozyr; he may obtain resources from the country, and the governor of Minsk may furnish him with troops for that operation. He may set fire to the town by means of howitzers, and expedite its destruction, as it is entirely of wooden construction.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Wiazma, 30th August, 1812.

My cousin, give directions to the King of Naples, to perform

to-morrow an ordinary march, in such manner, however, as to find himself at the distance of eight or nine leagues from Wiazma, and be enabled to reach Gjat on the following day. It is proper that, in case of events, the viceroy should have it in his power to turn the right of the enemy, and Prince Poniatowski his left, and that the three advanced guards be so near each other as to be able to charge together, a manœuvre which will naturally save the effusion of blood, and prevent the enemy from offering any resistance.

Give orders to the viceroy to follow the enemy upon the left, so as to be able to turn the enemy's right, to come up with the King of Naples, who is at the village of Koslowo, and who, to-morrow the 31st, is to make a short march which will lead him to within eight or nine leagues of Wiazma. Inform the viceroy, that it is necessary, that with the whole of his cavalry, and a strong advanced guard of infantry and artillery, he should turn the enemy's right, and have his share of the firing, if any should take place; that this is the only way to lessen the effusion of blood, and to accelerate the retreat of the enemy. Give a similar order to Prince Poniatowski with respect to the right; he is to turn the enemy's left. The Prince of Eckmühl is to follow, so as to be a league in the rear of the King of Naples; and the Duke of Elchingen two leagues in the rear of the Prince of Eckmühl. The Duke of Treviso will march at ten in the morning towards Fedorowskoé, in the rear of the Duke of Elchingen. The Duke of Abrantes will repair to Wiazma, cross the bridges to the right of the town, and take up a position one league in advance of it.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Gjat, 2d. September, 1812.

My cousin, the general staff is of no assistance to me, any more than the provost Martial of the *gendarmerie*, the baggage master, or the officers of the staff; no one serves as he ought to do.

You have received my order of the day for the baggage; take care that the first baggage I order to be burned may not be that of the general staff; if you have no baggage master, you ought to appoint one; let all the baggage proceed under his immediate direction. It is impossible to see a worse order than that which at present exists.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Gjat, 2d. September, 1812.

My cousin, order the King of Naples, the Prince of Eckmühl, the Viceroy, Prince Poniatowski, and the Duke of Elchingen to repose themselves this day, to rally the troops, to have a call made at three in the afternoon, and to communicate to me the precise number of men who are to be present at the battle; to have an inspection made of the arms, cartridges, artillery, and moveable hos-

pitals; to inform the soldiers that the moment of a general battle is drawing near, and that every preparation must be made for it.

It is necessary that before ten o'clock at night, I should be furnished with statements of the number of infantry and cavalry, the number of pieces of artillery, their *calibre*, the number of shots to be fired, the number of cartridges for each soldier, the number in the caissons, the number of covered waggons belonging either to regiments, to divisions, or to corps of artillery, the number of surgeons, the number of articles that may be prepared for dressing the wounds; these statements will also shew the number of detached men who would not be present at the battle, if it should take place to-morrow, but who might be made to join if it only occurred in two or three days, by pointing out the place where they are to be found, and the means to be adopted to that effect.

These statements are to be made with the greatest care, since their result is to guide me in my determination; they are first to comprise all the men present at the call, and next, all those who are to be present at the battle.

You will also direct, that I be made acquainted with the number of horses unshod, and the time necessary to shoe the cavalry horses, and have them placed in a proper condition for battle.

The King of Naples may, if he thinks proper, alter his position by moving his light cavalry and his small advanced guard forward the distance of a few wersts; Prince Poniatowski and the Viceroy will make a similar alteration in theirs.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Mojaisk, 11th September, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that the 8th Westphalian regiment, the Saxon regiment of Low, that of Rechten, the third marching regiment of Infantry which was formed at Kœnigsberg, the third battalions of the 4th, 7th, and 9th, the Polish regiments, the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th marching regiments of cavalry must all be sent on to Smolensko; that the enemy attacked at the very heart, loses no more time at the extremities; that he uses every exertion to prevent our entering Moscow, and shows a determination to omit no effort to drive us out of that city as soon as possible. The movement must therefore be from Smolensko to Moscow, as the numerous troops coming up, and those that are in the grand dutchy of Lithuania are sufficient to protect our rear. It is likewise necessary that the Duke of Belluno be prepared with his corps properly united, to march from Smolensko towards Moscow, for the purpose of reinforcing the army in proportion as the enemy may reinforce his own. Witepsk does not stand in need of any thing; however small may be the number of troops there, the enemy will leave that city unmolested; I shall, even withdraw all the troops from it, so soon as my hospital will have been removed. The Duke of Belluno must, therefore, forward every

thing, battalions, squadrons, artillery and stragglers to Smolensko, in order to march from thence towards Moskow.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Suburb of Moscow, 15th September, 1812.

My cousin, order the Duke of Dantzig to repair with the young guard to the Kremlin, where the police of that quarter will be exclusively confined to his care.

General Durosnel will perform the functions of governor of the city.

The King of Naples will cause the road from Kolomna to Troitzka to be occupied by Prince Poniatowski and by his cavalry.

The viceroy will move his head quarters to the gate of St. Petersburgh, and have the road occupied from, and including Troitzka, to the road where he has taken position.

The Prince of Eckmülh will intercept all the roads from that occupied by the viceroy, to the road occupied by Prince Poniatowski.

The viceroy and the King of Naples will send strong reconnoitring parties upon the road of St. Petersburgh and upon the road taken by the enemy, for the purpose of collecting intelligence and of picking up all stragglers.

Napoleon to General Lariboisiere.

Moscow, 18th September, 1812.

General Lariboisiere, I desire that the two companies of the marines of the guard may be provided with six 12 pounders and two howitzers. You will take this cannon from the arsenal of Moscow. The caissons are also to be had in that arsenal. The horses and soldiers of the train will be taken among those belonging to the caissons which you intended to send away. By this means the reserve of the guard will have an augmentation of sixteen pieces of cannon. It is likewise necessary to add to the reserve of the Prince of Eckmühl, eight pieces of cannon, six of which are to be 12 pounders, the rest howitzers; should it be found necessary, you might have them worked by two Prussian companies that follow the old guard. Sixteen pieces of cannon are not sufficient for the Prince of Eckmühl, who has a corps of five divisions under his orders.—Draw up a report that will let me know when the reserve of the guard will be as strong in number as when it left Paris, and when all that has been dismounted at Wilna, will have proceeded on its march.—There are in the arsenal of Moscow two hundred small caissons; I desire that they may be applied to some use; they may be rendered available with greater rapidity in bad roads; those caissons may be provided with *cognats*. Make me a general report respecting my artillery, and respecting the means of repairing all losses. It is my intention not to lose a single piece, but to keep it up to

its full complementary organization, which is by no means too strong. In short, see if it would be possible to establish mills at Moscow, for the purpose of making powder.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to H. M. the King of Naples.

Moscow, 22nd September, 1812.

Four o'clock in the afternoon.

Your aid-de-camp has just handed to the Emperor your letter dated at five o'clock this morning. Enclosed, you will find a second report from the Duke of Istria. The Emperor is in anxious expectation of some positive intelligence. A party of cossacks has made its appearance on the Smolensko road, at the distance of six or seven leagues from this place. They were about thirty in number, and surprised a convoy of fifteen caissons which were burned. His Majesty has just dictated to me the enclosed letter for General Sebastiani. The Emperor has determined that sentence of death shall be pronounced upon every officer who should, without authority, hold any intercourse with the enemy's advanced posts. His Majesty will not allow of any other correspondence with enemies than by means of cannon and musket balls. I repeat to you that his Majesty is extremely anxious to learn what opinion he is to form of the enemy's movements.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Istria.

Moscow 22nd September, 1812.

Four o'clock in the afternoon.

I send you a report from General Sebastiani which had been forwarded by the king, and from which it appears that the enemy is continuing his movement upon Kolomna. The King of Naples was expected to arrive with his advanced guard; he will have closely pursued the enemy; we, therefore, expect to receive in the night some intelligence of a positive nature. The Emperor desires you will likewise send him information of whatever you may have learned, and especially some news of Prince Poniatowski, and the reports he will make to you of what he may have heard respecting the Russians. You will have learned what took place on the road of Mojaïsk; but it was nothing more than a surprise of some fifteen caissons, in a village, by about forty cossacks who blew them up. The Emperor has sent Major Letort with two hundred and fifty dragoons upon the road of Mojaïsk, where we passed the night. Major Letort has orders to detain all the cavalry he may meet on the way; this will raise his number to fifteen hundred or two thousand men; with this force he is to protect the road. The whole army is prepared to move, and the Emperor has resolved to drive the enemy behind the Oka. The intelligence from the king and

from yourself, which is expected in the night will fix his determination, as to whether the army shall take the road to Tula or that leading to Kolomna. Should we proceed on the road to Tula, the cavalry under your orders, that of the guard, the polish troops of Poniatowski, Frederick's division of infantry will, from the nature of your position, form the advanced guard. But above all things send intelligence to us as soon as possible.

The prince of Neuchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Istria.

Moscow, 23d September, 1812,

Four o'clock in the morning.

I have submitted to the Emperor your letter written at eleven o'clock last night. In consequence of it, his Majesty waits for fresh intelligence previously to putting the army in motion. Prince Poniatowski was to arrive at Podolsk at an early hour yesterday; if you are without news from him, it is owing to the inroads of the cossacks. The movements you have ordered your cavalry to make, must infallibly procure us intelligence of the Polish troops under prince Poniatowski. His Majesty is likewise in expectation of the reports the king of Naples will have sent to him last night, which cannot arrive from the advanced guard before five or six in the morning. His Majesty approves of all that you intended to do. Order the country about Desna to be scoured. The five or six hundred cossacks who infested the road to Mojaïsk have done us a great deal of mischief; they blew up fifteen caissons, and took prisoners two marching squadrons of cavalry, amounting to about two hundred horses: those squadrons belonged to a marching column under the orders of General Lanusse, who had imprudently moved them to his right; they next attempted to attack a larger convoy of artillery; but the firing drove them away. Major Letort, as I have already informed you, proceeded yesterday to Prince Gallitzin's residence upon the Mojaisk road, with two hundred cavalry. In consequence of the information contained in your last letter, and that which has been communicated by the king, his Majesty has just dispatched General Saint-Sulpice, with all his dragoons to afford assistance to Major Letort in case of need; a measure which will probably be surperfluous, although it is not attended with any inconvenience; for the marches you have ordered to be made in the direction of Podolsk and of Desna, must have the effect of withdrawing the cossacks from the road to Mojaisk.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to H.M. the king of Naples.

Moscow, 23d September, 1812,

Four o'clock in the morning.

Sire, the Emperor received your letter of the 22nd September, at eight o'clock at night. He is in anxious expectation of hearing

from you, and from the Duke of Istria. Private intelligence leads us to believe that the enemy is no longer at Podolsk. Should this be the case, Prince Poniatowski must have arrived there last night, and your Majesty will know how to act. The Duke of Istria, on his part, must reach Podolsk this day. We likewise learn from private information that the enemy would appear to have evacuated Desna, and to be moving upon Serpuchow and Kalouga. Your Majesty should have only one object in view, that of resuming the pursuit of the enemy with your advanced guard, &c. &c.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 23d. September, 1812.

My cousin, write instantly to General Baraguay-d'Hilliers and to the Duke of Abrantes at Smolensko, to acquaint them that the cavalry and artillery composing each convoy, are to march together, to bivouac in a square battalion round the convoy, and not separate under any pretext whatever; that the commandant of the convoy is to bivouac in the centre of it; that every commandant failing to obey these directions, would be punished for his neglect, and as being the guilty cause of the loss of the convoy.

Renew the orders, that no convoy should leave Smolensko unless it be commanded by a superior officer, and escorted by cavalry and infantry, to the number of fifteen hundred men, (exclusively of the soldiers belonging to the train, whether of the artillery, the engineers, or the military equipages); that I observe with regret, that convoys have been sent on, whose escorts were not of sufficient strength to protect them. In conformity with what I have just enjoined, you will issue an order of the day, respecting the plan upon which convoys are in future to bivouac; send it to the commandant of the fifth and sixth convoys. Independently of this order of the day, let me see the terms of the ordinances respecting convoys and their escorts; I think they are very precise as to the manner in which convoys are to be guarded; in that case, those instructions ought to be re-printed, and posted up at the offices of all commandants of towns, from Kowno to this place.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 24th September, 1812.

My cousin, acknowledge the receipt of General Saint-Sulpice's letter; let him know that I attach great importance to his keeping the road from Mojaïsk to Moskow free and uninterrupted; and that I depend upon him for this object; that he is to take up his cantonments on the spot where he is at present, and put himself in communication with the Duke of Abrantes who is now at Mojaïsk; that I recommend to him, when estafets shall pass, to send patroles for their protection; that Colonel Letort is about

to replace himself under his orders, and that he is at liberty to retain him in echelons wherever he may think proper; that the occupation of Desna will probably keep off the enemy.

Recommend to him, especially, to station patroles for the protection of couriers. He should endeavor to ascertain whenever there are any more detached cossacks, in order to pursue them. I suppose he will have sent two or three hundred men to the spot from whence the detachment belonging to General Lanusse was carried off a few days ago; if he has not, let him do so now. Colonel Letort is to start this day or to-morrow morning; his corps will always be a patrol upon the road.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Istria.

Moscow, 26th September, 1812.

His Majesty expected to receive news from the King of Naples, previously to despatching your aid-de-camp; we have only received this instant the intelligence, that the king arrived at five o'clock yesterday at Podolsk, where he formed a junction with Prince Poniatowski. You will have heard this news; and it will have decided the enemy to evacuate Desna, which we suppose to be at this moment in your possession. Place under the orders of the king, the corps of Prince Poniatowski, and the third corps of cavalry; with respect to yourself, the Emperor desires you will take up a position, as a corps of observation, with Colbert's brigade, the light cavalry of the first corps, and the division of infantry commanded by General Frederich, for the purpose of marching to the assistance of the King of Naples, in case of need, and of intercepting the roads which the enemy might take, in order to bear down upon our line of observation, without the knowledge of the King of Naples. Another corps of observation, consisting of the dragoons of the guard, and a thousand infantry, is at the castle of Prince Gallitzin, where the Emperor slept.—General Guyot, with the chasseurs of the guard, two brigades of light bavarian cavalry, Broussier's division of infantry, and six pieces cannon, is stationed half-way between Moscow and the castle of Prince Gallitzin, in order to move in whatever direction circumstances may call him. The cannonading you heard yesterday morning upon your right, took place on the occasion of a reconnoitring made by the dragoons of the guard; it was ill-directed by Major Martod, who has been either killed or taken prisoner. Our loss, in this unlucky engagement, has been a few dragoons killed or taken, the major, a captain, an adjutant-major, and about twenty dragoons wounded; we have also lost some infantry. This ill-directed reconnoitring was surprised by three thousand of the enemy provided with cannon. Place yourself in communication with the corps of observation, which is on the road from Mojaïsk to the castle of Prince Gallitzin, if you should see no inconvenience in doing so; (I had particularly recommended to General Saint-Sulpice not to expose the dragoons of the guard.)

The Emperor is giving directions to the King of Naples to pursue the enemy, in order to drive him back some distance from Moscow, and to make him determine upon taking up his cantonments beyond the Oka. Keep up a constant correspondence with the king, and give us information of every thing that may come to your knowledge. The corps of observation under your orders is of the highest importance, so long as we shall not have driven away the enemy.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Istria.

Moscow, 27th September, 1812.

Seven o'clock in the morning.

The Emperor has been displeased at your receiving at your head-quarters the two flags of truce that were bearers of letters. In future, you are not to admit any one by the advanced post; the letters which the prisoners may forward, are to be received by the vedettes, and the bearers of them instantly dismissed. Every parley with the enemy must turn to our disadvantage, and be opened with some design, in that quarter which provokes it.—The Emperor thinks that the enemy's movement has had but one object in view, that of covering Kalouga, and reaching at once the road to Kiow, through which he hopes to receive his reinforcements. The idea of marching upon Mojaïsk, appears to his majesty, to be nothing more than vain boasting; the Emperor says, that a victorious army would not deem itself to be in a moral situation adequate to the attempt of such an operation; how can it be believed, that such a movement should really be contemplated by a vanquished army, which has abandoned its finest city?

As to the enemy's movement of retreat upon Kalouga, after the battle, it would evidently have been an invitation to the French army to march upon Moscow. But Kutusoff did what he ought to have done, when he retired by the way of Moscow; he has made indications of taking up several fine positions, and endeavored to make us believe that, before we could enter Moscow, we would have to fight a second battle. This measure was so judicious, that if the statement of Lariboisiere, the commander of the artillery, had fallen short of what it did by twenty thousand cannon shots, the Emperor would not have proceeded further, although the field of battle presented one of the finest sights ever beheld, since it is impossible to carry redoubts without artillery, and an abundance of ammunition.

The Emperor finds it a ridiculous assertion in the flags of truce, to say that they only lost a thousand officers in a battle where the Russians have had forty general officers killed or wounded, and forty or fifty thousand men of their best troops put hors de combat. His Majesty observes, that the greater number of their officers belong to Moscow, that all the particulars which have been obtained express, that they evinced a wish to defend that capital; that their army, by not doing so, gave an indication of its weakness.

As the advanced guard of our army has suffered itself to be imposed upon, by its having concluded a kind of armistice with the advanced posts of the cossacks, it appears natural to his Majesty, that the enemy should have pushed on his cavalry towards our left, for the purpose of annoying us; the road of Mojaïsk might even have been intercepted for a few days. The enemy's ambition has not carried them so far; they stationed cavalry upon every part of the road, in order to be well guarded, and acquainted in time with our movements.

Should the enemy maintain their position upon the Pakhra, it is the Emperor's intention to march up and offer them battle; but it is to be supposed they will not wait for him, and have no other object in view than to ascertain if our whole army is in front of them. The Emperor desires, in the first place, that you retain the two flags of truce until the King of Naples shall have crossed the Pakhra; you will then send them on during the night to the advanced posts of the King of Naples, through which they are to return to their own army; in the second place, that you receive no more flags of truce, but simply the dispatches of which they may be the bearers; the same form to be observed in regard to the letters you may have to forward. The Emperor's wish of saving his troops from fatigue induces him to refrain from marching with his army in order to dislodge the enemy; give every one to understand that His Majesty has reached their rear with his army.

Should you speak with flags of truce, it will be proper to tell them it was the Emperor's anxious wish that their army had marched upon Mojaïsk, as it would then have been placed between two armies.

Caution Generals Lahoussaye, Chastel and Girardin no longer to bring from the out posts any officers or soldiers as flags of truce, upon any account whatever; their letters only are to be taken in, and they are to be informed that the replies will be forwarded.

I have already informed you that General St. Sulpice, was, with the dragoons of the guard, at the castle of Prince Gallitzin; that General Guyot, with the chasseurs of the guard, six pieces of artillery, two brigades of bavarian cavalry; and Broussier's division of the fourth corps, had taken up a position on the road to Mojaïsk, half way between Moscow and the castle of Prince Galitzin. I am giving orders to the viceroy to send General Ornano with an additional force of five hundred cavalry and six pieces of cannon, as a re-inforcement to the brigade of bavarian cavalry which is at this moment with General Guyot, and to take the command of it.

Should any unforseen circumstances occur, you are authorised to write to General Ornano and to General Broussier to advance upon the old road from Moscow to Kalouga, in a line with you, whether at Fedozino, or Szarapowo, with the cavalry, infantry and artillery under their orders. As for General Guyot, his

artillery, and the chasseurs of the guard, they must remain in position on the Moscow road, half way to the castle of Prince Gallitzin, without making any alteration in that position.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 27th September, 1812.

My cousin, General Baraguay-d'Hilliers is at liberty to dispose of the polish regiment in any way he thinks proper; so many detachments are coming up from the rear, that he must have it in his power to give the peasantry a severe lesson.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the King of Naples.

Moscow, 28th September, 1812.

Two o'clock in the afternoon.

The Emperor has just received your letter, dated yesterday, the 27th, at nine o'clock at night. His Majesty has given orders, that the army should be prepared to march during the night, as it is already two o'clock, and too late, therefore, to move this day; the Emperor, besides, will receive intelligence from you, and from the Duke of Istria before night; and those dispatches will enable him to decide, whether it be necessary to set the army in motion. The Duke of Istria writes likewise, under date of yesterday, at nine o'clock at night, from his head quarters, four wersts in the rear of Gorki; so that your Majesty cannot be turned by the direction of Desna. Your Majesty must be sensible that your dispatches are expected with impatience. The Duke of Istria, says, that the enemy is likewise in front of him. General Lahoussaye is at Batukinka, in the rear of Gorki.

The Prince of Neufchatel to General Lariboisiere.

Moscow, 1st October, 1812.

The Emperor has just made the following dispositions, for the armament and fortifications of the Kremlin.

Armament.

The twelve first pieces of cannon to be placed at the Kremlin, are to be mounted there in the course of this day and to-morrow, in the under-mentioned positions:

1 piece at the Tower, No. 2.
2 —— at the Tower, No. 4.
1 —— at the Tower, No. 8.

The above will arm the side next to the river, which is 700 yards long.

1 piece at the Tower, No. 1.
2 —— at the Tower, No. 16.
1 —— at the Tower, No. 14.

These will arm the opposite side, the length of which is 840 yards.

The other side of the trapezium is nearly 1,000 yards long. It must receive

2 pieces at the Tower, No. 12.
1 —— at the Tower, No. 11.
1 —— at the Tower, No. 9.

These twelve howitzers, being 12, and 3 pounders, may direct their fire upon the whole circuit of its precincts, and flank it entirely.

Eighteen more pieces are destined to complete the armament of the Kremlin; you will point out the places where they ought to be mounted.

Fortification.

The most important works to be entered upon at the Kremlin, are:

1st, To demolish the building which rests against the Towers, No. 1 and No. 2.

2dly, To open four out of the five gates, and surround them with an intrenchment, so that the four gates may be rendered available for the purpose of debouching and making sorties, and protected at the same time against being forced by cannon balls, by means of pallisadoes and mounds of earth raised before them.

3dly, To open several walls in the interior, to enable one to go more rapidly round it.

4thly, To restore the lunettes H, K and L, to their original state, by connecting them with the wall, and palisading them properly, so as to admit of plenty of artillery.

5thly, To complete the *fermeture*, and establish a species of covered ways, and small hurdles close to the inclosure, between Tower 11 and Tower 8 in those places of the fortress which appear most deficient in strength.

6thly, To demolish all the buildings round the Kremlin, those in particular that are between Tower No. 14 and Tower No. 8, and especially a mosque with many steeples.

You are to concert measures with the general of engineers for carrying into effect the dispositions ordered by the Emperor.

Napoleon to General Lariboisiere.

Moscow, 3d October, 1812.

Count Lariboisiere, I have been this day to visit the foundry; I found there but little zeal or activity; every intelligence obtained leads to suppose that the enemy had in this park a hundred thousand balls; and it is supposed that he threw them into the water, which being but a pond, can easily be drained. Men must, therefore, be set to work with all activity to dig a small ditch which is necessary for that purpose, and to remove the sunken iron. During the fortnight that we are here, only ten

thousand cartouches for cannon balls have been made. I desire that, dating from to-morrow, you will put that foundry on such a footing as to cast every day six thousand cannon balls which will be stored up in the Kremlin, according as they are made. Independently of a supply and a half, which must be attached to the corps of the army, there must be a reserve of half a supply in readiness for marching. I was surprised at not finding a single officer belonging to the park of artillery. I saw two hundred small Russian caissons; I wish to know if you intend making any use of them; in the event of their not being made available for the artillery, they might serve for the military transports. Prince Poniatowski complains of having a hundred caissons too many, his supply being greater than is necessary. I desire to be informed how many pieces of cannon he has with him, and what is the extent of his supply. It would appear to be his wish to get rid of a hundred loaded caissons. I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the King of Naples.

Moscow, 4th October, 1812,
half-past four in the morning.

His Majesty would have wished that the horses taken from the vehicles in the train of the cavalry had been made use of for drawing the caissons which have been abandoned, as there is a greater need of artillery than of the vehicles that accompany the troops. The Emperor has granted rewards to the fifth corps; he has observed with pleasure the good conduct shewn by the Polish troops. His Majesty has received your letter of the 2d of October, at nine o'clock at night; he is pleased to find that you have occupied Woronowo. As you announce it to be your intention to write on the 3d, in the morning, the Emperor waits for your letter to answer you. His Majesty having determined to send one of his aids-de-camp to the Russian commander-in-chief, he desires you will order the chief of your staff to write to the general commanding the enemy's advanced guard a letter worded in the following terms:

"It being the intention of the Emperor to send one of his "principal aids-de-camp to the commander-in-chief Kutusoff, it "is requested that it may be made known, on what day, and at "what hour and place that General may be pleased to receive "him." This letter will be directed to the commandant of the advanced guard, and he is to give an acknowledgment of having received it. The Emperor, sire, of course leaves the selection of the moment for adopting this step, entirely at your own option, so that it may be made at a reasonable moment, and not have the appearance of being dictated by circumstances. The aid-de-camp whom His Majesty intends to send will probably arrive at your head-quarters to-night.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 5th October, 1812.

My cousin, the intendant General's statement appears to me to be an erroneous one. I have a difficulty in believing that forty-five days are required for withdrawing the wounded that are at Mojaïsk, at the convent, and at Gjatz; for it occurs to me that during those forty five days of inaction, part of them will be cured, part will die, and there will be left only the residue to be withdrawn, and experience proves that three months after a battle no more than one-sixth of the wounded remain in this condition. So that reckoning six thousand men, there would only remain one thousand to be transported at the end of three months. It is my intention to retain possession of my line of operations, and to attend to the removal of the wounded, etc.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My cousin, acquaint the Duke of Belluno that I have not yet given him any orders for the movement he is to perform, as it is to depend upon the movement of the enemy; that the Russian army of Moldavia, forming three divisions, or twenty thousand men, infantry, cavalry and artillery included, crossed the Dnieper on the first days of September; that it may be proceeding to Moscow for the purpose of re-inforcing the army commanded by General Kutusoff, or towards Volhynia to re-inforce Tormasoff's army; that the army of General Kutusoff defeated at the battle of the Moskwa, is now marching towards Kalouga, which might lead to suppose that it is in expectation of receiving re-inforcements from Moldavia by the road of Kiow; that, in this hypothesis, the Duke of Belluno would receive orders to join the grand army, either by the road of Jelnia and Kalouga, or by any other road; that, if on the contrary, the twenty thousand men from Moldavia had marched to the relief of Tormasoff, that re-inforcement would increase Tormasoff's army to forty thousand men; but that our right, commanded by Prince Schwarzenberg, would still be of equal strength, since, with the Austrians, Poles, and Saxons, that Prince has about forty thousand men under his orders; that I have besides requested of the Emperor of Austria to permit that the corps commanded by the Austrian General Reuss at Lemberg should effect a movement, and that Prince Schwarzenberg should receive a re-inforcement of ten thousand men; that, on the other hand, the Emperor Alexander is doing all in his power to re-inforce the garrison of Riga and the corps of Wittgenstein, in order to drive away Marshal Saint-Cyr from Polotsk and the Duke of Tarentum from Riga and Dunaburg; that letters just received from Prince Schwarzenberg, dated the 24th, would tend to prove that the army of Moldavia, instead of marching upon Moscow, has proceeded to join Tormasoff's army,

and re-inforced it; that it is, therefore, necessary to know what will take place; that, in this state of things, I order the Duke of Belluno to canton his army between Smolensko and Orsza, and to keep up an exact correspondence, by every estafet, with the Duke of Bassano, in order that this minister may write to him, and give him all the news he may collect from the different quarters; to send to General Schwarzenberg and General Reynier, a prudent, discreet, and intelligent officer; who is to learn from General Schwarzenberg what is going on, and from General Reynier the true state of things; to enter into a regular correspondence with the Governor of Minsk; and, lastly, to send agents in various directions to ascertain what occurrences take place; state to him that Gerard's division will be stationed towards Orsza, where it will be at the distance of four or five marches from Minsk, three marches from Witepsk, and four or five from Polotsk; that the other division, between Orsza and Smolensko, will be enabled rapidly to support him; and, lastly, that the third division will be near Smolensko; that, by this means, his corps will be allowed some repose, and may easily subsist itself; that it ought to be stationed at the top of the road, in order to leave uninterrupted the grand communication for the troops that are arriving; that, in this position, he will be at liberty to move either towards Minsk or towards Wilna, should the centre of our communication and depots be threatened, or should Marshal Saint-Cyr be closely pressed at Polosk, or that he is to execute the order he might receive to move on to Moscow by the road of Jelnia and Kalouga, in case the capture of Moscow and the new aspect of affairs should have determined the enemy to reinforce himself with a portion of the troops from Moldavia; that, in this manner, the Duke of Belluno will form the general reserve, in order to proceed to the relief of Prince Schwarzenberg and cover Minsk, or to the relief of Marshal Saint-Cyr and cover Wilna, or lastly to advance upon Moscow for the purpose of re-inforcing the grand army; that he has under his orders General Dombrowski who commands a division of eight thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry of Polish troops, which will bring his corps to four divisions; that the reserve brigade at Wilna, consisting of four Westphalian regiments, and two battalions of Hesse Darmstadt, which are expected to arrive from Swedish Pomerania towards the end of this month, and eight pieces of cannon, will likewise be under his orders; lastly, that two new divisions are to be united in the course of November, the one at Warsaw, which is the thirty second division, to be increased by three battalions from Wurtzburgh, and to continue to be commanded by General Durutte; the other at Kœnigsberg, being the thirty-fourth division which was stationed in Pomerania under the orders of General Morand, and which being also increased by a few battalions, will be commanded by General Loison. That whether, therefore, it be necessary to march to the relief of Prince Schwarzenberg, or of Marshal Saint Cyr, the Duke of Belluno can always bring together a mass of forty thousand men; that,

as the correspondence by estafet is free from delay, I shall always have it in my power to issue my instructions; and that it is only in the event of Minsk or Wilna being threatened, that the Duke of Belluno would put himself in motion, of his own accord, for the purpose of covering those two grand depots of the army; that the Duke of Belluno, having the command in chief over the whole of Lithuania and over the Governors of Smolensko and of Witepsk, must, nevertheless, accelerate the march of the administration, and especially take effectual measures for enforcing due obedience to the requisitions for corn and forage; that there are ovens at Mohilow, Orsza, Rasasna, and Dubrowna; that he must cause a great quantity of biscuit to be baked, and secure thirty day's provisions for his corps, without drawing any thing from the military transports, or from the convoys that might be proceeding to the army. The Duke of Belluno will also take care to keep up a correspondence with Witepsk; he is at liberty to send troops to support that point, and to maintain himself in it. He may proceed in person to Mohilow, Witepsk, and Smolensko, for the purpose of examining the country, and of expediting the march of the administration. If, by any accident, the communication with Moscow should happen to be intercepted, he would take care to send some cavalry and infantry forward for the purpose of re-opening it.

His head-quarters should be at Smolensko.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My cousin, the Duke of Treviso solicits provisions for the persons employed in the police; he solicits them for the foundlings, for the Russians who are in the hospitals, for the sick inhabitants, &c. &c.; all these are very fair requests; but no one is bound to do what is impossible. The Russian municipality must form a Russian company which will go by detachments into the villages, and take provisions by paying for them. The intendant general will grant the money necessary for this purpose, out of the funds I placed at his disposal. The municipality will be provided in this place with stores which are to be destined for the city, and provisioned in the manner already stated. This company may take the name of company of police, and should it succeed, three or four more may be formed on a similar plan, which will go over the neighbourhood, and forward on to this city, after paying for them, all that is necessary for the inhabitants, and especially for the hospitals; this is the only means of meeting every want; speak to Mr. Lesseps on the subject, and let not a single moment be lost.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My cousin, as I have taken care that the Duke of Abrantes and

General Baraguay-d'Hilliers be provided with the requisite number of troops for keeping possession of the country, it is my intention that the object I had in view should be carried into effect. You will commission the Duke of Abrantes, under his personal responsibility, to remove the wounded to Wiazma, and General Baraguay-d'Hilliers to forward them on to Smolensko. For this purpose the Duke of Abrantes and General Baraguay-d'Hilliers are to have the country scoured within a circumference of ten leagues, and to collect a sufficient number of vehicles for effecting those removals; it would be proper also to employ in this service, as far as Mojaïsk, the military transports that might arrive here, and that might not be loaded with clothing or with articles for the hospitals, but merely with flour. The flour will be applied to the use of the hospitals and to the soldier's daily allowance, and the vehicles will perform a journey to assist in the removals from Mojaïsk, Ruza, and the Abbey, as far as Wiazma. The orders, therefore, for retaining the vehicles belonging to the military equipages are only to be given to the Duke of Abrantes, and to the adjutant commandant Simonin, who is in charge of the Abbey; these officers will employ the vehicles as far as Wiazma; and the vehicles will then return empty from Wiazma to Moscow. Acquaint the intendant with these arrangements which modify the orders he has issued. In short, happen what may, it is my intention that there be not, in a week's time, a single wounded at Ruza, at the Abbey, at Mojaïsk, or at Gjatz; inform the Generals that this is an object of the highest importance.

Napoleon to the Major-Géneral.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that it is my intention that, henceforth, the regiments formed of scattered men, whether from Kœnigsberg or from Witepsk, be not employed in escorting the convoys of artillery. Those convoys ought to be escorted by battalions, or by parts of battalions properly organized.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My cousin, make General Baraugay-d'Hilliers acquainted with all the arrangements which concern the 9th corps, and with the position he is to maintain. Let him know that I quite agree in the propriety of his request, to have a large body of troops at Wiazma, another at Gjatz, and a third at Dorogobouje; that I give orders, in consequence, for detaining the troops which are hereafter named; that you will instruct the commandant of Gjatz not to let them pass Gjatz, and the Duke of Abrantes, not to let them pass Mojaïsk, if the troops had not yet gone beyond those points.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 10th October, 1812.

My cousin, the road from Smolensko to Mojaïsk being exhausted, it is proper you should write to General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, in order that he may instruct the commandants of Dorogobuje, Gjatz, Wiazma, &c. to have two parallel roads reconnoitred at the distance of two or three leagues from the right, where resources may be found, so that the detachments coming by those roads, might touch at the points of Dorogobouje, Wiazma, and Mojaïsk, but keep out of the main road for the purpose of seeking one where villages might be found, and which would afford some shelter.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 10th October, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that it is my desire, that upon the reception of the present order, the detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, of military equipages, the convoys of artillery, clothing, &c., be detained at Smolensko, so that nothing more should arrive by the road of Wiazma and Mojaisk, which is quite destroyed. The generals and the officers who are coming to the army to do duty, are likewise to stop at Smolensko, with the exception of those who are on special commissions.

There will be formed at Smolensko, a division of at least twelve thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, to which are to be added, five or six hundred caissons, military equipages, convoys of clothing, and convoys of artillery, which are to have at least, twelve pieces of cannon for the defence of that division, to be commanded by a general of division, three generals of infantry brigades, and three generals or colonels of cavalry. This division, sixteen or eighteen thousand strong, will take ten days provisions at Smolensko, and hold itself in readiness to march, not by the old road to Wiazma, which is broken up, but by a new one which I shall point out.

By this means, nothing more will arrive by the old road, neither convoys of artillery, of military equipages, or clothing, nor any detachments of infantry or cavalry; nothing but the estafets, the dispatches of the army, some officers of the staff proceeding upon service, and a few pressing objects, such as the five hundred hand-mills that are on their way from Paris, the first convoy of which must have reached Smolensko. This road will likewise be open for moving the hospitals, and for the detachments which proceed from the army to Smolensko; but nothing from Smolensko to Moscow shall pass that way. Order may thus be restored upon that road, and I shall be free from the apprehension that the detachments of infantry or of cavalry which are coming to the army might suffer on the march. Every month a convoy is to be despatched by the new road, for with the exception of the spot which the enemy occupies, six thousand men may pass in every direction.

Note down upon paper the strength of the first column, according to the information you have received from Smolensko, and let me know when you think it will be ready to move. I find already, that there are 1st., the three marching half brigades, forming six thousand men; 2dly, the fourth, fifth, and sixth marching regiments of infantry, which were formed at Kœnigsberg, amounting to about six thousand men; 3dly, two battalions formed out of men who were discharged from the hospitals at Witepsk, and Smolensko, whose numbers may be estimated at two thousand.

Independently of the above, I shall see whether it be proper to add to them the two battalions of the hundred and twenty-ninth, and of the Illyrian regiment. The corps with the detachments of every service which are to unite at Smolensko, must amount together, to upwards of fifteen thousand infantry; as to the cavalry, the artillery, and the military equipages, the details of them are not present to my mind. There will be a sufficient number of generals of division, and of generals of brigade to command that division.

General Baraguay-d'Hilliers does not appear to me to be in his proper sphere of action at Wiazma; send to that place, the General of brigade Chariere, who was formerly colonel of the fifty-seventh, and who being active and full of zeal, would be adapted to that station; he will have at Gjatz a colonel or adjutant commandant under his orders

You may direct General Baraguay-d'Hilliers to repair to Smolensko, and take the command of the division which is forming in that city.

Napoleon to General Lariboisière.

Moscow, 11th October, 1812.

General Lariboisière, I desire that the thirteen companies of artillery which are stationed at Erfurt, Magdeburg, Spandau, Glogau, Custrim, Stettin, Stralsund, Thorn, Dantzig, Pillaw, and Kowno, may join the army as soon as they have been replaced by twenty one companies which I am ordering from the interior of France; by this means, you will have at command, those twenty companies that are about to march, and the thirteen companies that are in the fortresses, which you are to station in the following manner: three companies with the guard; one company with the third corps; four companies with the thirty-second, and thirty fourth divisions of infantry; two companies with the twenty-eight division, two with the reserved battery attached to the ninth corps; two companies to be sent to Wilna; one to Minsk; three to Smolensko; in all, eighteen companies. You will have a sufficient number remaining for the general park of artillery, and for meeting any unforeseen emergency.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the King of Naples,

Moscow, 13th November, 1812.

Two o'clock in the morning.

From your reports to the Emperor, and the information

transmitted to him respecting the enemy, his Majesty considers that Woronowo is an excellent, and compact position, that it may be defended by infantry which would easily cover the cavalry. Should you agree with him in this opinion, you are authorized to take up that position.

The Emperor has this night sent off his horses, and after to-morrow you will be joined by the army, for the purpose of attacking and driving away the enemy. The army will require three days to come up with you; you will therefore have to maintain your ground for four or five days; and should you fear an attack from the enemy, or that the nature of things may render it impossible for you to avoid a continuation of the losses which you have suffered during the last eight days, you have the resource left to you, of taking up the position of Woronowo. All the vehicles which you sent, are loaded with provisions; those that have arrived this night, will likewise proceed to-morrow. The Emperor is very anxious that matters could be so arranged as to prevent the recurrence of similar losses to your corps. Might you not render the chiefs of the corps responsible for it?

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to H. M. the King of Naples.

Moscow, 14th October, 1812.

Ten o'clock at night.

The Emperor has just received the letter you have written to him at 12 o'clock this day; the movement upon Borowsk appears to the Emperor to be one of great difficulty, if the enemy should be aware of it, because you would expose your right flank to him during an entire day. Prince Poniatowski has sent this day a hundred sick men in the direction of Moscow; they will be sent on to Mojaïsk.

As the Emperor is removing his wounded to Smolensko at the same time that his Majesty is arming the Kremlin, so as to be free from every obstacle in Moscow, you will forward to Mojaïsk the sick and wounded, and every object that may embarass you, by forming them into a convoy. Cause the pass which is to lead you to Mojaïsk to be properly reconnoitred, in order that, if you should be compelled to retreat before the enemy, you may be well acquainted with that road. The Emperor apprehends that your baggage, your park of artillery, and the greater part of your infantry might file off unknown to the enemy.

Is it true that in repassing the defile of Woronowo, your cavalry might be covered by your infantry, and in a less fatiguing position than its present one in this plain, which compels it to be always on the qui-vive? In any case it is important that your troops be provided with many days' provisions; there are at Moscow one thousand quintals of flour, and an abundance of brandy at your disposal; give directions that all the vehicles you can command should come and take up the provisions. The Duke of Elchingen

and part of the Viceroy's corps are not yet arrived; the Emperor, besides, before he makes any movement, wishes to be satisfied that there remains no obstruction whatever in Moscow.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 16th October, 1812.

My cousin, renew to the Duke of Belluno the order for the artillery to send horses as far as Wiazma, for the purpose of removing the caissons and carriages of artillery which are found to have been abandoned along the road, and of taking them back to Smolensko.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 18th October, 1812.

My cousin, inform the Duke of Treviso, that I march to-morrow morning with the army in pursuit of the enemy; that it is my wish the Duke of Treviso should take up his residence in the Kremlin, and should quarter in it the following troops:

1st, Laborde's division; 2dly, General Charriere's brigade, composed of four battalions of dismounted cavalry, making nearly four thousand men; 3ly, two companies of sappers; 4thly, one company of artillery; 5thly, the artillery of Laborde's division; lastly, a brigade of five hundred cavalry. With this force the Duke of Treviso will be able to retain possession of the city; but this can only be effected by suitable precautions. The intendant will leave one of his deputies in it, several commissaries of war, and heads of offices. The general of engineers will leave a superior officer in command of the corps; the general of artillery, a superior officer, and several subaltern officers of artillery. The Duke of Treviso will cause the works for the armament of the Kremlin to be carried on with the greatest activity, and mount a battery with the cannon that remains here; he will have a small battery constructed of earth on the *terre-plein*, and mount four field pieces upon it, so as to batter the stone bridge with good effect; he will establish a strong out-post in the convent of the Prince of Eckmühl, the position of which is important, because it commands a bridge over the Moskwa. All the sick that are here will be collected together at the foundling hospital; their number must be from three to four hundred; there should consequently be a sufficient force to guard them. The brandy magazine near the stone bridge must also be guarded by a strong detachment. The Duke of Treviso will remove to the Kremlin all the stores that are at too great a distance. The generals, the superior military officers, the superior officers of administration who are here, will take up their quarters in the Kremlin. The commandant of the town, and the intendant may continue to lodge in the governor's residence, and in the quarters occupied by the Duke of Treviso near the Kremlin. The Duke of Treviso will see if it is neces-

sary to have the convent of Marshal Ney guarded. It would be useful to guard by an out-post the prison which the Viceroy has fortified on the road to St. Petersburgh. As for the rest, he will reduce the details of the service in such manner as he may think proper, and will preserve in preference what may be nearest to the Kremlin.

To-morrow, when the army shall have left the city, he will require the municipality to issue a proclamation for the purpose of informing the inhabitants that the reports of an evacuation are false; that the army is marching upon Kalouga, Tula and Briansk, in order to take possession of those important points, and of the manufactories of arms that are to be found there; also for the purpose of inducing the inhabitants to keep up the police, and prevent any attempt at completing the ruin of the city. He will cause the works of the Kremlin to commence to-morrow, and attend to their being carried on with the greatest activity; he will have the city guarded by strong patroles, especially on the side of the gates of Mojaïsk and Kalouga, in order to pick up all convoys of marching regiments which might be on the road from Mojaïsk to this place. Roguet's division will remain here to-morrow; it will proceed in the night, with the treasure and the intendant's head-quarters under its escort. The Duke of Treviso will keep up a severe police in the city; he will cause every Russian soldier to be shot who may be found in the streets; he will accordingly forbid all those who are in the hospitals from leaving them. No small out-posts are to be established in any direction, in order to avoid the ill-will of the peasantry and a surprise from the cossacks. Lastly, the Duke of Treviso is to collect as great a quantity of provisions as possible; he will direct an abundance of biscuits to be baked; he will make sure of provisions, for one month at least, in flour, potatoes, sauercrout, brandy, wine, &c. He is to preserve those provisions for cases of emergency, by causing all the mills to be set at work, so as to supply, if possible, his daily wants. Take care to furnish the Duke of Treviso with a cypher, in order that the correspondence with him may be secure and unrestrained.

Napoleon to General Lariboisière.

18th October, 1812.

General Lariboisière, I move my head-quarters this night to the gate of Kalouga, where the whole army is going to bivouac. I shall march in the course of to-morrow to follow up the enemy.

The Duke of Treviso remains in the city with ten thousand men, and, in any case, he is to defend the Kremlin. It is, therefore, necessary that to-morrow morning every caisson and vehicle be collected at the Kremlin. I may possibly return to Moscow. Nothing, therefore, that is valuable ought to be destroyed, such as powder, cartridges for the infantry, cannon balls, lead for making shots; but the sulphur and saltpetre may be burned; I have a

sufficient quantity of powder. The stables, or magazines that are round the city may be burned. The Russian caissons and other materials which cannot be removed to the Kremlin are to be burned to-morrow at eight o'clock in the morning, together with the sulphur and the saltpetre.

The Duke of Treviso is in command at Moscow. A superior officer of artillery must be left there with store-keepers, and likewise a company of artillery for the service of the *picus*, which serves as a rampart, and four officers of artillery attached to the Kremlin for that important duty.

It is necessary to have in the train of the army as great a number of caissons as possible. The 400 horses of the pontoon carriages must, therefore, draw the caissons in our possession, and follow the army. The grand head-quarters leave to-morrow morning under the escort of a division of infantry.

Write to the Duke of Treviso to make him acquainted with the colonel of artillery, the officers of artillery, and the company of artillery whom you leave in the city, together with every particular relating to the artillery of the Kremlin. The company of artillery will employ to-morrow and the following day in augmenting the defence of the Kremlin, loading the howitzers, shells, and granadoes, and providing the means that may secure the defence of that fortress.

The officers of artillery who have the charge of blowing up the Kremlin when the proper time shall arrive, are to remain in the Kremlin.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Krasno Pachra, 21st October, 1812.

My cousin, acquaint the Duke of Treviso, that as soon as his operation at Moscow is completed, that is to say on the 23d at three o'clock in the morning, he is to commence his march, and will arrive at Kubinskoe on the 24th; that, instead of repairing to Mojaïsk from this point, he will have to take the road to Wereia where he will arrive on the 25th. He will thus be in an intermediate position between Mojaïsk, where the Duke of Abrantes is stationed, and Borowsk at which place the army is to arrive; it will be proper for him to dispatch officers towards Fominskoe, in order to give us intelligence of his march. He will take with him the adjutant commandant Bourmont, the Bavarian and Spanish troops that are at the residence of Gallitzin, the Westphalians of the first and second station; he will bring together all the Westphalians, and send these in the direction of Mojaïsk. Should they not be in sufficient numbers, he would order cavalry to protect their march. The Duke of Treviso will give every requisite instruction to the Duke of Abrantes concerning the evacuation of Moscow. It is necessary he should write to us to-morrow the 22d, although no longer by the road leading to Desna, but by that of Szarapowo and Fomin-

skoe. On the 23d he will write to us by the road of Mojaïsk. The officer he may send will leave the road to Kubinskoe, and proceed to Fominskoe, as the head-quarters will probably be at Borowsk or at Fominskoe on the 23d. Whether the Duke of Treviso should perform this movement to-morrow the 22d, at three in the morning, or on the 23d, at the same hour, as I since directed him to do, he is to adopt the same arrangements. By this means the Duke of Treviso may be considered as the rear guard of the army.

I cannot too often recommend to him to employ the vehicles of the young guard, and of the dismounted cavalry, as well as all those that may be found, for the purpose of transporting the men who still remain in hospital; the Romans bestowed civic crowns upon those who saved the lives of their fellow citizens. The Duke of Treviso will deserve as many as he may save soldiers; tell him that he must have them transported upon his horses and those of all his officers; that the Emperor did the same at St. Jean d'Acre; that he ought to carry this measure the more readily into effect, as that convoy will no sooner rejoin the army, than they will be provided with horses and vehicles which the consumption of provisions will have rendered useless; that the Emperor hopes he may have to express his satisfaction to the Duke of Treviso for saving five hundred of his men; that he must, as it is but just, commence by the officers, then the subaltern officers, and give to Frenchmen the preference; let him call together all the generals and officers under his orders, to impress them with the importance of this measure, and with the claim they will have upon the Emperor by saving the lives of five hundred men.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Fominskoe, 23d October, 1812.

My cousin, write to Prince Poniatowski, that all the marching regiments of infantry and cavalry, the batteries of artillery, and other articles which the Duke of Abrantes is to send to Werein are to be under his orders, and when directed to move, he is to leave nothing behind, but bring all with him, until he rejoins the army. Let him know likewise that he is not to send his sick and wounded towards Mojaïsk, as this would obstruct the road which is too much so already; that it is better he should bring them with him.

Write a letter to General Teste, who commands at Wiazma, which you will forward by the officer you are dispatching to Prince Poniatowski, who will send it to the Duke of Abrantes for the purpose of its being transmitted. In this letter you will inform General Teste of the Emperor's desire that General Evers, with a column of three or four thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, should proceed from Wiazma to Iukhnow, eighteen leagues from Wiazma, taking with him the marching regiments which might be on their way to the army, and from thence push

his out-posts as far as the intersection of the roads at Znamenskoe. The general will take with him the estafets that might have arrived from Smolensko: at each out-post, namely, Sosowa, Trofimowa, and Andriewka, he will station detachments of a hundred infantry, and a piquet of cavalry, under the orders of a town commandant, who will fortify themselves in the houses, in order to be protected from the cossacks and the peasantry. Order General Teste to write to Smolensko for the purpose of communicating that the army is marching upon Kalouga, and then to take up his line of operations towards Ielnia. Give him directions to detain all estafets that might pass on their way from Wiazma to Iukhnow, where it is probable that a junction will be speedily effected, that is to say from the 25th to the 27th of this month.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Borowsk, the 24th October, 1812.

Write a letter, in cyphers, to the Duke of Belluno, as he will not receive it before the 26th, and will by that time have seen General Nansouty. Let him know that, being always without estafets, I am not acquainted with the latest position of affairs in his quarter, or whether the events may have compelled him to make any movement; but, that should he not have made any, and Gerard's division be still available, as well as the brigade of light cavalry, I wish him to commence his march immediately with his troops, to repair to Ielnia, and to push on from thence by the road to Kalouga, in order to meet the army, and effect his junction with us. If he could start on the 26th, he might, on the 30th, be at the distance of five marches from Kalouga; that I am establishing my line of operations, at first through Wiazma, Iukhnow, and Znamenskoe, until we can have formed a junction with him; that I should then establish him along the road from Smolensko to Ielnia; that in going, in this manner, over a space of forty leagues, he must take care to organize that part of the road by placing at each out-post a commandant, a detachment of a hundred men, and a relay for an estafet; that this must not, however, influence in any manner the decision he would have to take, if any thing extraordinary should occur.

Write, without disguise, to the Duke of Belluno, that the army is united at Borowsk; that Moscow has been evacuated after the Kremlin had been blown up, and that the army is marching upon Kalouga; that the province of Kalouga is one of the most abundant in Russia, and that, in fact, we have here a great abundance of every thing.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to General Charpentier.

Wiazma, 1st November, 1812.

The Emperor orders you to send an officer of your staff to Marshal Saint-Cyr, and to the Duke of Belluno, to acquaint them

that the army which is, this day, 1st of November, at Wiazma, will be at Dorogobouje on the third; that we are impatient of receiving news from them; that his Majesty supposes the Duke of Belluno will have already assumed the offensive and driven the enemy from Polotzk. You will also send an officer to inform the Governor of Mohilow, of the movement of the army; you will add, that this movement of the army is a voluntary one; that it is a manœuvring movement intended to bring us a hundred leagues nearer to the armies that form our wings; that since we have quitted the vicinity of Moscow, we know nothing more of the enemy, than what is afforded to us by the appearance of a few cossacks. Desire him, in my name, to send towards Smolensko, the greatest possible quantity of provisions.

Inform, likewise, the Governor of Witepsk of the movements of the army, and of the motives of them; direct him to cause an abundance of bread to be baked, because part of the army is to draw its supplies from that place. Acquaint General Baraguay-d'Hilliers with the movement of the army, &c. I have already intimated, that that general should be careful not to commit himself, repeat to him, from me, that opinion.

Inform the Governor of Minsk, that the army is manœuvring to come a hundred leagues nearer to its wings than it is at present, and to approach Poland and a friendly country. Let me have at Dorogobouje by to-morrow night, or the third in the morning, a statement of all magazines of provisions, corn, flour, &c., mounted and dismounted artillery, as well as ammunition of all kinds at Smolensko. Communicate to me, in proportion as you receive it, every information whether of a direct or indirect nature, which you may obtain concerning the movements of the Duke of Belluno, General Saint-Cyr, and Prince Schwarzenberg.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Wiazma, 2d November, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Reggio, that I have learned with the liveliest satisfaction, that his wound was cured, and that he was enabled to resume his duty; that it is, therefore, my intention he should return to the second corps, and again, take the command of it.

Inform the Duke of Belluno, that I learn the events of Polotzk, and his march in that direction; that I hope he will have driven back Wittgenstein and recovered possession of Polotzk. Write to him, in cyphers, that the army is on its march as I have already apprized him of it; that the winter would have been too long to be passed at a distance from my flanks; that I shall probably move the right to the Dwina, and the left to the Boristhenes, and that by this means, we shall come into contact with each other.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.

Mikalewka, 6th November, 1812.

I have just laid before the Emperor your letter of the 2d of November, which is brought to me this moment by an estafet.—His Majesty is at a loss to understand why, having united your troops to the second corps, you should not have vigorously taken the offensive. By remaining in position in front of the enemy, you have every thing to apprehend, owing to the superiority of his light cavalry for cutting off our communications. The Emperor orders you to march upon General Wittgenstein, and drive him beyond the Dwina, retake Polotzk, and compel Wittgenstein to abandon that bank of the river. The Emperor will be after to-morrow at Smolensko; announce to him a victory, which, with the troops you have under your orders, cannot be doubtful.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Milkalewka, 7th November, 1812.

I have laid before the Emperor your letter of the 2d; as the army will have reached Smolensko to-morrow, it is requisite you should manœuvre;—1st, to drive the enemy beyond the Dwina; 2dly, to keep up an interrupted communication with the Emperor, and with the army. You feel the necessity and importance of so doing.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.

Smolensko, 9th November, 1812.

Four o'clock in the afternoon.

I received at Smolensko your letter of the 4th, and submitted it to the Emperor. His Majesty regrets to observe, that you were uncertain of the march you ought to follow. This uncertainty has already created much mischief. I informed you by the adjutant commandant d'Albignac, that it was the Emperor's intention you should march straight up to the enemy, in the direction of Polotzk, and drive him beyond the Dwina. The greater number of Wittgenstein's troops are militias, having only six weeks training. His Majesty waits for intelligence. Let us know what troops occupy Bezenkowiczi and Ula. You must march upon the enemy without a moment's loss; this is of the highest importance. The chief instruction given to you, was to defend Wilna and Minsk, which contain the stores of the army; this is an essential object. The Emperor finds two estafets wanting; this is perhaps occasioned by the retrogarde movement which you made upon Senno, and which has left the whole country open to the enemy.

The prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.

Smolensko, 11th November, 1812.

The adjutant commandant d'Albignac, has brought to you the Emperor's orders of the 7th; an officer of General Charpentier's staff brought you the duplicate of them on the 9th. Your aid-de-camp, Colonel Château, arrives this very moment, and delivers to me your letter of the 9th. His Majesty observes with satisfaction, the advantages which your advanced guard has obtained over the enemy in skirmishes at out-posts; and upon your report, he has appointed General Fournier, a general of division. This proof of the Emperor's favor will enable him to merit fresh ones in the battle which must immediately take place. His Majesty is about to proceed to Orsza with a part of his army; but this movement can only be effected very slowly. The necessity for your attacking Wittgenstein is therefore the more pressing; should that general have selected an advantageous field and position, which would make it difficult for you to offer him battle, you may easily manœuvre, so as to cut off his retreat and his communications upon the Dwina. You must be guided by this principle, that Wittgenstein cannot allow himself to be cut off from that river. The Emperor has no doubt that, with the troops under your orders, your movement will be successful; it must be productive of the most important result if it takes place immediately, and if the Emperor is enabled to occupy Witepsk, and take up winter quarters between that city, Orsza and Mohilow, and along the Dwina towards Polotzk. The winter quarters thus established, must secure to us a peace in the course of the winter, or pave the way for undoubted success in the ensuing campaign, and expose Saint Petersburg to evident danger. If, on the contrary, you delay attacking Wittgenstein, General Kutusoff will have time to form a junction with that officer towards Witepsk, and then it will be impossible to dislodge him from that position, except by a general engagement, which could not be fought this winter; we should, therefore, be obliged to take up winter quarters, and leave the enemy in possession of the Dwina, and a part of Lithuania; and accordingly, the enemy would, for the next campaign, be placed in a better position than ourselves, in a military point of view. You are sensible of how much consequence are those dispositions.

The grand French and Russian armies are tired; they may by their marches, obtain positions for themselves; but, neither the one nor the other are in a condition to fight a great battle for the occupation of a post. Your army, on the contrary, as well as that of General Wittgestein, are under the obligation to fight previously to taking up winter quarters; the sooner the better. Your victory will be complete, if you force Wittgenstein to re-cross the Dwina, and if a French corps can occupy Witepsk. Should your corps be beaten, an improbable occurrence, owing to the composition of the corps of Wittgenstein, which chiefly consists of recruits, his Majesty

would then determine upon taking up his winter quarters, in consequence of such an event. Wittgenstein has every thing to gain by retaining his position, and you every thing to lose by his so doing. Communicate this letter to the Duke of Reggio, and concert with him on the subject of giving battle, a measure of the highest importance towards future operations. The Emperor has every confidence in your attachment, your zeal, and your talents, under circumstances in which your successes over the enemy are of such great importance for the winter quarters of the armies, and in furtherance of the operations of the ensuing campaigns.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Smolensko, 14th November, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that I am proceeding to Krasnoi; that he must continue to form the rear-guard; that the Prince of Eckmühl will support him; that he must retain his present position the whole of this day; that to-morrow 15th, he will take up the position of the convent and suburb, and on the 16th, blow up the town in his retreat, or will merely take a position at the *tête-de-pont*, so as not to blow up the town till the 17th, if every thing should not be prepared; that he must concert measures with the Prince of Eckmühl; recommend especially to him, to cause the cannon and ammunition to be destroyed, and to suffer as few stragglers as possible to remain behind him in the place.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Prince of Eckmühl.

Smolensko, 14th November, 1812,

7 o'clock in the morning.

It is the wish of the Emperor that you should support the Duke of Elchingen in the rear-guard retreat which he is at present effecting. As the Viceroy is to proceed to Krasnoi to-morrow the 15th, your attention will be directed towards relieving and occupying those stations you may think proper, and which the viceroy may have to evacuate.

The Emperor wishes you to fall back upon Krasnoi with your corps and with that of the Duke of Elchingen, and commence that movement upon the 16th or 17th. General Charpentier, with his garrison, consisting of three third battalions of Polish troops, and a regiment of cavalry, will abandon the town.

Before leaving Smolensko, you will blow up the towers of its precincts, by setting fire to the mines already prepared; you will order the destruction of the artillery stores, the caissons, muskets and whatever cannot be carried away. With respect to the cannon, which it will not be possible to remove, the artillery will have their trunnions sawed off, and the cannon afterwards buried. Generals Chasseloup and Lariboisiere will remain here, to carry the above dispositions into effect, each in what may concern him.

You will take care to order patroles to do duty, for the purpose of preventing any French stragglers from remaining here. You will also attend to the object of leaving the smallest possible number of sick in the hospitals.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Abrantes.

Liady, 17th November, 1812,
Eight o'clock at night.

You are to continue your movement in such a manner as to pass the night of to-morrow at Dubrowna, from whence you will send me an officer to the point where the Emperor is to sleep, between Liady and Dubrowna, to enable me to transmit orders to you; should you not, however, receive any, you are to continue your march upon Orsza after to-morrow morning; you will there take up a position, have the bridge properly guarded, and assist in establishing the greatest order in the town; you will have rations distributed in a regular manner to all the men of your corps who may be present under arms; you will detain all stragglers at Dubrowna and at Orsza; you will have them classed by corps, and prevent every species of plunder, and all those excesses which are committed by stragglers; you will cause regular distributions to be made to them, and if any of them should plunder or mis-behave, have them brought before a military commission and shot; the occasion calls for such examples. We are arriving upon a line where the army is going to stop and to re-organize itself; we must, therefore, economize our resources and means of subsistence. Generals d'Alorma and Jomini are at Orsza; their orders are in conformity with the instructions I have given to you above. Be pleased to attend to their execution; the Emperor particularly recommends this object to you.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Dubrowna, 18th November, 1812.

My cousin, write to the governor of Minsk to inform him that I shall be at Orszà to-morrow; apprize him that I have ordered the second corps, with a division of cuirassiers and a hundred pieces of cannon, under the command of the Duke of Reggio, to proceed in all haste and in a straight line to Borisow, to secure that important point, and thence to march upon Minsk. In the meantime General Dombrowski will proceed to that place with his division, and observe the movements of the corps now at Minsk. Recommend him to send native agents to the Duke of Bassano and Prince Schwarzenberg, and to write to you frequently.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.

Dubrowna, 19th November, 1812,
Three o'clock in the morning.

By the Duke of Reggio's aid-de-camp I send the duplicate of the orders I yesterday addressed to you by your aid-de camp.

The Emperor will arrive at noon this day at Orsza. It will be necessary, *M. le Maréchal,* that the position you may take up should be nearer to Borisow, Wilna, and Orsza, than the enemy's army. Endeavor to mask the movement of the Duke of Reggio's, and to make it appear on the contrary that the Emperor is advancing upon General Wittgenstein, a manœuvre which will appear sufficiently probable. His Majesty's intention is to march upon Minsk, and when that place shall have been occupied, to follow the direction of the Beresina. It is, therefore, possible you may receive orders to proceed to Beresino, for the purpose of covering Wilna, and of placing yourself in communication with the sixth corps. Turn your mind to this movement, and let me know your observations respecting it.

As soon as you have acquainted me with the condition of the artillery, which you have it in your power to furnish to the other corps, I shall send you instructions with regard to the point to which the same may be forwarded. I had instructed General Nansouty to send you a cypher; I suppose he will have left it with the Duke of Bassano who may possibly have sent it to you; let me know whether you have received it, in order that I may insert in the letters some words in cyphers, so as to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the letters, if they should chance to fall into their hands. This is an indispensable measure, considering the multitude of cossacks who will be scattered in every direction.

The Prince of Neufchatel to the Duke of Reggio.

Head-quarters near Kokhanow, 22d November, 1812,
Half-past two in the morning.

I receive your letter of the 21st; his Majesty sees with pleasure that you will reach Borisow this day; the Emperor hopes that the Governor General of Minsk will have felt the necessity of defending the *tête-de-pont* which secures the passage. General Dombrowski, who was to arrive on the 20th, will have placed that important point beyond all danger from an attack upon it.

It would be a great misfortune if the enemy had taken possession of the *tête-de-pont* and burned the bridge, so as to prevent the passage across; and much blame would attach to General Dombrowski for giving to his division a wrong direction. It would be necessary for you to ascertain on the spot whether the Beresina can be crossed at some point, and in case this should be attended with great difficulty, we should have to march towards Lepel.—But the Emperor hopes that the Governor of Minsk will not

have surrendered the *tête-de-pont* to the cavalry, and that General Dombrowski and your own corps may have arrived in due succession. Leave some officers behind you, in echelons, in order that the principal intelligence from Borisow may quickly come to our hands.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Bobr, 23d November, 1812.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, who is to reach Kolopeniczi to-night, and inform him that I am at Bobr, and the Duke of Reggio at Borisow; that it is of importance he should intercept the road to Lepel, on the side of Baran, as he intended it, in order to be certain that Wittgenstein is not bringing any force against the Duke of Reggio; and that if he should do so, he must be vigorously attacked; that I trust he will have written to me, and that one of his officers will reach me to-night; that I shall probably proceed to Borisow to-morrow; that as soon as I have received the officer he will not have failed sending to me, I shall again write to him; that our rear-guard has reached Toloczin.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.

Bobr, 23d November, 1812,
At four in the afternoon.

The Emperor has just arrived at Bobr. The Duke of Reggio is in the direction of Borisow. It is of importance that you should intercept the road to Lepel on the side of Baran as you intended to do, in order to be certain that Wittgenstein does not bring any force against Oudinot; if he did, you are to make a vigorous attack upon him. His Majesty hopes you will have written, and that he will receive one of your officers this night. It is probable the Emperor will leave this to-morrow for Borisow. As soon as we shall have received the officer you will not have failed sending to us, I shall write to you, and again acquaint you with his Majesty's wishes. Our rear-guard is at Toloczin.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to Lieutenant-General Baron Eblé.

Bobr, 24th November, 1812,
Half-past four in the morning.

The Emperor desires you will start before six o'clock, and proceed in all haste to the Duke of Reggio's head-quarters at Borisow, for the purpose of constructing several bridges upon the Beresina for the passage of the army; you are to divide into two parties. If your men should not be in sufficient numbers to expedite the work, you will take all those who are best able to keep up with you, so that you may arrive in the night, and commence working at day-break to-morrow morning, and the

other party before mid-day. Be careful to leave workshops on the road for repairing the bridges and the worst passages. I am giving the same order to General Chasseloup; you will act in concert with him and with the Duke of Reggio, respecting the works to be carried on at the Beresina, which the army must unavoidably cross at latest to-morrow.

The Marshal Duke of Reggio to the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.

Borisow, 24th November, 1812,
Half-past five in the morning.

Monseigneur, according to what I had the honor to communicate to your serene highness, I sent to reconnoitre the ford of Studianka, which was occupied by the enemy, as you will perceive from General Corbineau's report.

There are two more fords, the one at Stakow, one mile above Borisow, the other at Ukholoda, two miles below that town. The movements that were discovered last night upon the enemy's two flanks were directed to the occupation of those points, which are all guarded.

It has been found impossible to make reconnoitrings sufficiently exact during the night to enable us to ascertain the most favorable point for throwing a bridge over; I intend to manœuvre about the three points above mentioned, to try a passage, and during the night to throw my bridge at that point I shall have selected.

There are twenty thousand men in front of me, who will no doubt move upon that point where I may attempt to effect a passage; I cannot, therefore, venture to answer for the success of the undertaking, however determined I may be to use every endeavor towards it.

It appears from all the information obtained that the Russians are well persuaded of the Emperor's intention to cross the Beresina at this point; that Langeron's advanced guard arrived yesterday, and that the arrival of Titchagoff is likewise announced; that Wittgenstein has communicated his proximate junction; that Prince Schwarzenberg is in close pursuit of General Muller who commands the three divisions which the enemy left in front of him, and that this pursuit gives uneasiness to the Russians. It is further added that the troops which were at first sent in the direction of Wilna have been recalled.

I am, Monseigneur, your serene highness' respectfully devoted, &c.

The Marshal Duke of Reggio to the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.

Borisow, 24th November, 1812,
One o'clock P. M.

Monseigneur, I have fixed upon the point of Studianka, where I

intend to effect a passage in the ensuing night; and to-morrow morning I shall cause some feigned movements to be made at Ukholoda and Stakow; the enemy is also on the alert; their troops are in constant motion in front of us. They have even made a semblance of bringing forward materials to restore the bridge of Borisow; but the movement which appears to have attracted their most serious attention, is that which is taking place upon their right in the direction of Beresino. I cause them to be closely watched, and do not lose sight of them; but we are all of opinion that this movement, which is purposely made under our own eyes, is intended to conceal some other project, and that it is proper your highness should be apprised of it.

I hope, however, to succeed in gaining the other bank to-morrow, and in maintaining my ground in sufficient strength to protect the passage of whatever his Majesty may think proper to send after me; but there cannot be any doubt that Wittgenstein and Steinheil, who are on the look out, will do all in their power to oppose us. I have sent some officers to the Duke of Belluno for the purpose of obtaining information from him and of informing him of my operations; I have as yet received no answer. I have sent a detachment to him in the direction of Baran, to make him acquainted with the manœuvres which I propose to execute during the night.

The Marshal Duke of Reggio to the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.

Borisow, 24th November, 1812,
Three quarters past four in the afternoon.

Monseigneur, your serene highness will find, by the accompanying report from General Aubry, who was returning from Studianka at the moment of my receiving the last dispatch, that the passage of the Beresina is far from being unattended with danger; the enemy does not appear to be deceived by our manœuvres, and it is quite certain that the troops in front of the ford are those commanded by Steinheil, which have come up by the way of Beresino; this explains the enemy's movement of to-day upon his right. A peasant employed yesterday as a guide to a column of about six thousand Russians, which moved to their left, and who effected his escape, has stated that the above column made to-day an inverse movement; but notwithstanding the obstacles to be encountered by crossing at Studianka, I think we might succeed in overcoming them, were I promptly supported; for, in the course of a few hours, I may find myself placed between two hostile forces. I had already ordered my movement, and it was to take place at six o'clock; but this appears to me to be of too serious a consequence not to delay and await his Majesty's instructions, especially as they may reach me in time to enable me to effect that movement during the night, since we are only at the distance of three leagues from the point where the passage is to take place.

I annex to this letter a hasty sketch of the reconnoitring made at Ukholoda, a village which is situated two miles hence, on the road of Beresino, and which I occupy for the present.

I have caused the ford of Weselowo to be reconnoitred by a detachment; it has been found guarded by cavalry and infantry; this ford is at the distance of only one league above the ford of Studianka.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Losnitza, 25th November, 1812,
One o'clock in the morning.

My cousin, dispatch in all haste your aid-de-camp Flahaut to the Duke of Reggio; desire him to reach the Duke's head-quarters as soon as possible, and to hand to him the following letter:

"By your letter of the 24th, at five in the afternoon, you inform "me that you apprehend you will stand in need of support in your "attempt to cross the river. The Duke of Treviso will arrive at "Borisow early this day with two divisions of the guard. The "Duke of Belluno had yesterday an engagement, which, judging "from the firing, must have lasted some time between Kolopeniezi "and Baran. You will no doubt have had scaffoldings prepared "for at least two or three bridges. General Eblé must have "reached Borisow. If you have not crossed over this night, it "becomes important under present circumstances, that you should "do so to-day."

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.

Losnitza, 25th November, 1812.
Five o'clock in the morning.

I have submitted to the Emperor your letter of the 24th. You make no mention of the strong firing that began at half-past three o'clock yesterday, and you also omit to state whether you have seen any infantry. Your chief object is to prevent General Wittgenstein from coming up with Oudinot, and you had always received instructions to proceed in all haste to Baran, for the purpose of intercepting the road to Lepel; you have failed to do this, so that General Steinheil has already joined Tormasoff's army, and made us suspend our movement of crossing the Beresina, which, in our present situation, it was so important for us to carry at once into effect. You have, as you state, two divisions at the distance of fifteen wrests from Kostritza; march with them in all haste, in order to arrive at Kostritza at an early hour; reconnoitre in every direction from Kostritza to Baran; make a vigorous attack upon whatever comes in your way. Open a communication with Oudinot, who is at Borisow, to which place the Emperor is about to repair. It is necessary you should often dispatch officers to make known several times a day the position you have taken, and that you be enabled to pass the Beresina upon bridges

which are on the point of being thrown over it, between the night from the 25th to the 26th, with the Duke of Reggio, the imperial guard, and your own corps; that passage can no longer be delayed. Your rear-guard being further removed, may continue to cover the army, the rear-guard of which moves to day from Bobr, in the direction of Nacza, and reach the bridge by a forced march; as soon as the passage shall have been opened, if General Fournier should meet with forces inferior to his own, he is to attack them.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.

One league from Borisow, 25th November, 1812.

Two o'clock in the afternoon.

I now receive your letter of the 25th, at ten in the morning.—The Emperor is astonished at your having withdrawn the rear-guard that covered the road from Bobr to Nacza, and entirely abandoned the road from Lepel to Borisow. As you are on the road of Losnitza, there is now no remedy for it; this additional embarrassment will be of serious inconvenience to your troops.—It is to be regretted, as you were in front of the enemy, that you did not give him a sound beating. If he is at your heels, and should incommode you, fall upon him with your rear-guard and with one of your divisions. Proceed to-morrow, before day light, with two of your divisions, on your way to Borisow, and from thence to the point at which you are to cross.

It would be very hazardous to evacuate Ratulicze, if the enemy should be in front of you; in such a case you must face about with a number of divisions equal in strength to the enemy, and defeat him; were you to act otherwise, you would endanger the safety of all the corps which are at Krupki. The Emperor perceives that the enemy has offered you some fine opportunities of beating him, and that you never knew how to take advantage of them. I renew to you the order from the Emperor to attack the enemy, if he should be in sight of you; this is of the highest importance, if his position be such as to enable him to introduce himself into the midst of our columns. The Emperor's head-quarters will be at Borisow this night. The passage of the river is to take place to-morrow morning.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Studianka, 27th November, 1812.

Half an hour after midnight.

My cousin, order the Marshal Duke of Elchingen to cross the river with all the Polish troops, with what he has collected of the third corps, and with Claparede's division which is to arrive at day-break, and which I place under his command, and desire him with those troops to support the Marshal Duke of Reggio, should an attack be made upon him this morning.

As soon as the Duke of Belluno shall have arrived, he will also march to the relief of the Duke of Reggio. I could wish to postpone the latter movement until the troops of the viceroy had arrived here, for fear some of Wittgenstein's troops should make their appearance on this side of the river.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Zaniwhi, 28th November, 1812.

Nine o'clock in the morning.

My cousin, give orders to General de Wrede, who is at Dokszitzi, to repair to Wileika, to collect provisions at that place, take possession of the bridges, send out parties on the road to Ilia, and on the old road to Minsk, and communicate at Smorgoni with d'Albignac, the adjutant commandant of that place. This letter is to be carried by the man who was sent to General de Wrede (to be addressed to General Krasinski). Should it be delivered in fifteen hours hence, he shall have a reward of fifty napoleons, to be given to him the moment he returns to tell us that he has done so.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Viceroy of Italy.

Selitzka, 3d December, 1812.

Half-past one in the morning.

Monseigneur, the Emperor desires you will send a Polish officer to Dolhinow and to Dokszitzi, to meet General de Wrede, and to acquaint him, that yesterday, 1st December, General Wittgenstein was at Pleszeniczi; that, on the 3d, we shall be at Malodeczno; that the order has been repeatedly sent to him to place himself on our left.

As soon as your highness shall have communicated with the adjutant commandant d'Albignac, the Emperor desires you will inform him of the situation of the troops under this adjutant commandant, and direct him to forward to us, under a strong escort, the twenty estafets which must be with him. You will recommend to him to place troops at every out-post, in order that they may not be thrown into a state of disorganization by the marauders; and that the service of estafets and communications with Wilna and Paris, may be carried on with all rapidity.

The Emperor likewise wishes your highness to inform him if the army might halt for a moment on the line of the Wilna which returns upon itself in the direction of Wiezyn and Radoszkowiczi; and if the adjutant commandant has any convoys of provisions with him; it is known that there are some on the march from Wilna.

During those few days of repose, the wounded, the dismounted men of the cavalry, and the unnecessary baggage of the army might be removed; all this, however, depends upon the possibility of obtaining supplies.

The Emperor desires me to ask your highness how many men you have rallied, and if your regiments have been restored to some kind of organization.

I send you an order for General Hogendorp, governor general of Lithuania, and another for General Bourcier. I beg your highness will dispatch an officer in all haste, as the bearer of them.—You will direct him to use the utmost speed.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Viceroy of Italy.

Selitzka, 2d December, 1812.

Two o'clock in the morning.

Monseigneur, I laid before the Emperor your letter, dated on the road to Malodeczno, the 2d instant. The Emperor wishes you to send a strong advanced guard on the road to Minsk, in order to ascertain what is going on in that quarter, and if there are any news of the enemy. The Emperor hopes to find estafets at Malodeczno, upon his arrival there.

His Majesty desires that your Highness will forward on to Wilna, under the escort to be furnished by the troops of the Adjutant Commandant d'Albignac, his heavy baggage, the treasure, and all vehicles or waggons that convey the sick or wounded.

Your Highness will likewise order the Duke of Abrantes, to collect and proceed with all the men of the dismounted cavalry, by common daily marches, and by the most direct road from Malodeczno to Merecz, without going through Wilna.

As to the Polish troops, the Emperor also orders you to send them on from Malodeczno, in the direction of Olita, without going through Wilna.

Send agents to Minsk for the purpose of collecting intelligence. To sum up all, relieve yourself of so much burden, by sending the baggage and wounded men to Wilna, the dismounted men to Mercez, and lastly, the Poles to Olita.

You are to canton your troops in the environs of Malodeczno; the Prince of Eckmühl will continue there with his own troops, in order to rally them, and to take a moment's rest.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to General Count de Wrede.

Selitzka, 3d December, 1812.

One o'clock in the morning.

General de Wrede, I just received your letter of the 2d. Head-quarters will be to-night at Malodeczno, and will fall back by degrees until they reach the place where regular distributions may be made. The army suffers from its long privations.

Transmit a statement to me of the condition of your troops and of your artillery. If you had it in your power to send us provisions, bread, cattle, upon one of the points of the road, this

would be the greatest service you could possibly render us. We have a great number of dismounted men; let me know to what service belong those horses you have to spare. Order your parks of artillery, your moveable hospitals, provisions, cattle, and stores to be transferred to Wilna. Let me also know the present position of the Bavarian troops, and of the ten thousand recruits which left Munich several months ago, in order that measures may be taken for rallying the whole upon one common centre.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Adjutant Commandant Dalbignac.

Malodeczno, 3d December, 1812.

Three o'clock in the morning.

The Emperor does not find your correspondence sufficiently clear; you do not furnish me with a statement of what composes the convoys under your escort, nor do you state the kind of vehicles; I cannot, therefore, give you any orders. Send back to Wilna all articles of clothing; they shall be distributed in that city. Send provisions forward to meet us at the post office, half way on the road to Markowo, in order that they may be distributed to the army on its passing by that place. See that the stores of Smorgoni and Oszmiana are properly stocked. Let the bullocks be sent to Wilna, to save them from being carried away by the cossacks, reserving only what is necessary to the army for two or three days' consumption.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to Count Kreptowicz.

Malodeczno, 4th December, 1812.

Four o'clock in the morning.

The Emperor desires you will take measures for sending to the Duke of Belluno, out of the stores at Smorgoni, ten thousand rations of biscuit, and as many to the Duke of Elchingen who commands the second and third corps. It is his Majesty's wish that you should also send to each of these marshals, twenty thousand rations of meat, and ten thousand rations of brandy. Use every exertion to the end that those provisions may arrive as soon as possible, to-morrow, if practicable, because the retrograde movement will be stopped at the place where they may be received.

It appears by information from Wilna, that there are at Smorgoni sixty thousand rations of biscuit; twenty thousand are to be distributed in the manner above stated; thirty thousand will be given to the guard who are to send for them to-day; five thousand to the Prince of Eckmühl, and as many to the viceroy, each of those corps is to receive a double issue of rations of meat (alive), and the like of brandy. Three hundred and fifty thousand rations of flour are collected at Smorgoni, and it is affirmed that the

government of Lithuania has adopted means for having a large quantity of bread baked in that place. Should all these particulars be correct, and the magazines of Oszmiana be equally well supplied, the army will be rallied there, and receive a regular distribution of meat, bread, and brandy. It is, therefore, necessary that you should inform the Emperor, as soon as possible, of the actual resources to be found in the magazines of Smorgoni and Oszmiana, and furnish me with a statement of them.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to Lieutenant-General Count Hogendorp, Governor of Lithuania.

Miedniki, 7th December, 1812,
Seven o'clock in the evening.

I am to apprize you that the imperial guard will reach Wilna to-morrow. His Majesty would wish it to be provided with cantonments in the suburb of Oszmiana; the cavalry of the guard is also to arrive to-morrow, and will take up temporary cantonments in the quarters it had formerly occupied. The corps of the viceroy and of the Prince of Eckmühl are to stop at Rukoni to-morrow. We hope you have adopted measures for taking from all stragglers and scattered men their *cognats*; let these men be forthwith removed to the convents or quarters you may think proper, for the purpose of being brought together according to the corps to which they originally belonged. The city will require a numerous patrole to prevent there being any stragglers in it. We would wish to have a plan of the villages within a circumference of two miles from Wilna, which might afford the resource of quarters for the troops. The King concludes you do not lose a moment in removing all our sick, and all the obstructions attendant upon the administration of the army. The six millions (of francs) which are at Wilna must be removed, two millions to Warsaw and four to Kœnigsberg. With respect to the dismounted cavalry men, they must be collected together in one spot, and sent off to Kowno and Warsaw in troops of five hundred men. General Bourcier will inform you of their numbers, and what particular description of service is to be sent to each of those points. I have already written to you to send off from Wilna to Kœnigsberg all the horses intended for the dismounted cavalry. Many soldiers will apply to be admitted into the hospitals. You should endeavour to remove them by degrees to Kowno. The quantity of *cognats* and of small carts that are to be taken from the soldiers upon entering the town, will furnish more means than are necessary for the transport of the sick. Draw up for my information exact and detailed statements of whatever is to be found at Wilna.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to General Count de Wrede.

Wilna, 8th December, 1812,
Five o'clock in the morning.

It is his Majesty's wish that you should quit Stob-Chomska, and proceed to Rukoni where you will receive orders from the Duke of Elchingen, to whom his Majesty has confided the command of the rear-guard. You will be supported by the Duke of Elchingen with the troops of the second and third corps. It is of importance that you should reach Rukoni as soon as possible; once arrived there, you will become our rear-guard. If we should leave any stragglers behind, you will afford them protection, and take care to have the country reconnoitred on your right and left, to as great a distance as possible. The troops of the Duke of Elchingen, which are to support you, will take up a position at Niesmicza; they will have the charge of covering and watching the road to Rudomin. The viceroy and the Prince of Eckmühl are to stop to-night at Rukoni, and to leave it to-morrow morning; the corps of the Duke of Belluno is to-day at Miedniki; and will also fall back upon Wilna to-morrow, leaving the duty of the rear-guard to you. His Majesty relies upon your talents and your zeal on this occasion where you have it in your power to render essential services to the army.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Elchingen.

Wilna, 8th December, 1812,
Six o'clock in the evening.

His Majesty thinks proper to confide to you this very night the command of the rear-guard of the army. You will have under your orders the second and third corps and Loison's division which is already in the rear, and also the Bavarian corps of seven or eight thousand men under General de Wrede. I have ordered this General to break up immediately from his position of Stob-Chomska, and repair to Rukoni. I send you herewith a copy of the instructions given to him. I have desired the Duke of Belluno not to quit his position at Rukoni until General de Wrede shall have arrived; with the remainder of your troops you are to take up the position of Niesmicza, and to cover the road of Rudomin.

You will be pleased to issue to General de Wrede all the instructions you may think proper. You are sensible that the safety of the army is in your hands; His Majesty reposes every confidence in you, and requests you will communicate to him any intelligence which the advanced guard may obtain respecting the various movements of the enemy. Our attention will now be directed to rallying the first, fourth, and ninth corps, as well as the guard, for the purpose of affording assistance to you, if it should be called for.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Elchingen.

Wilna, 9th December, 1812.

As General de Wrede has been forced in his positions, and is at the gates of the town, and as Gratien's division* did not afford you the means of supporting him and of driving back the enemy, the King has removed his head-quarters to the gate of Kowno, where he has collected the guard. His Majesty intends to march at four o'clock to-morrow morning, with the imperial guard; in order to reach Kowno as soon as possible, use his endeavours to rally the fugitives and stragglers, and take up a position at that place.

It is the King's intention that you should continue to form the rear-guard, and to protect the retreat, with the aid of de Wrede's and Loison's divisions, and as many soldiers as you can rally and add to those troops. Remove this night, if possible, the artillery and whatever else can be withdrawn, especially the public treasure. His Majesty wishes that some covered carts should be abandoned, and their horses put to the vehicles that convey the treasure. I direct General Eblé to blow up the caissons which we are compelled to leave behind in the arsenal, and to destroy all the muskets this night. Under present circumstances all that the King can do is to proceed in haste to Kowno.

His Majesty leaves it optional with you to march, according as circumstances may require it, and to do the best under this painful situation, when the bitterness of the cold has completed the disorganization of the army. It will be necessary, as much as possible, to set fire to all that we cannot carry away. Caution General Hogendorp not to quit the town except when you are evacuating it. The King authorises you, upon your departure, to write to the general in command of the Russian troops, for the purpose of recommending to him the sick we leave behind.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to Count Daru.

Wilna, 9th December, 1812.

The King has transferred his head-quarters to the gate of Kowno. The Duke of Elchingen closes the retreat, and will quit as late as possible to-morrow. Send off the treasure during the night. I have authorized General Eblé to furnish artillery horses, if they should be required. We must use every means for saving the treasure; let it be removed this night to the head-quarters at the gate of Kowno, where we shall have it placed under proper escort.

Give directions that provisions and clothing be distributed in

---

* The general of brigade Baron Gratien, replaced General Loison who fell ill.

abundance to all those who may ask for them, waving the slow forms of administration in so doing, because the enemy's position does not allow us to hope that we can hold out at Wilna the whole of to-morrow. Return back to head-quarters to-night, and set every thing in motion for removing to Kowno all that can possibly be withdrawn.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Prince Schwarzenberg.

Wilna, 9th December, 1812.

The army is at present at Wilna; but every thing leads to believe that his Majesty will decide upon removing it across the Niemen, so as to enable it to take up winter quarters along that river. This movement will, consequently, impose upon you the necessity of manœuvring with your corps and with that of Reynier, in order that your movements may harmonize with ours in the new line we are about to form on the left bank of the Niemen.—As it was the Emperor's wish that your own corps and the corps of General Reynier should cover the Duchy of Warsaw, his Majesty desires me to request you will manœuvre in the direction of Bialistock; but his Majesty likewise desires me to state to you, that your movement should be effected as slowly as possible, unless the enemy's movements should compel you to act otherwise.

The army is about to march to Kowno, which it is intended to defend as a *tête de pont*; your reports are to be sent to us in that direction: we wish to hear from you as often as possible.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Tarentum.

Wilna, 9th December, 1812.

The army is at this moment in Wilna and its vicinity. It is, therefore, his Majesty's wish, that you should draw nearer to this new line of operations, and approach Tilsit, for the purpose of covering Kœnigsberg and Dantzig. But His Majesty likewise desires me to state to you, that your movement should be effected as slowly as possible, unless the enemy's movements should compel you to act otherwise.

The army is about to march to Kowno, which it is intended to defend as a *tête de-pont*; your reports are to be sent tous in that direction, we wish to hear from you as often as possible.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Elchingen.

Kowno, 12th December, 1812.

At noon.

The King has received the verbal report you sent to him. His Majesty heard with regret, that the enemy is so close in

pursuit of you. I have just sent to you six pieces of artillery belonging to Loison's division; we hope you may be able to oppose a resistance at the defile of Rumsziki; you are aware of what importance it is that we should not be pent up in this place, where we possess immense magazines. Under present circumstances the King has considered that the first thing to be done, was to order the removal of every thing we have at Kowno, and to devote yesterday and to-day to that object; we have here a *tête-de pont*, or a kind of intrenched camp, armed with twelve pieces of artillery, where we shall be able to hold out until the enemy's infantry should make its appearance in superior numbers. The king has ordered the dismounted cavalry, the whole of the imperial guard, both infantry and cavalry, and the first and fourth corps, to provide themselves in this place with provisions for eight days, and cross to the left bank of the Niemen. Twelve pieces of mounted artillery, which were in the town, have been placed upon the heights of the left bank. His Majesty intends that all the troops belonging to the second and third corps, which will include Loison's division, and the legion of the Vistula, both forming part of the third corps, should remain at Kowno, for the purpose of defending the approach to the *tête de pont*, and the town itself which contains artillery, and quantities of ammunition, provisions, and clothing. The King's head-quarters will probably be to-morrow on the left bank, with the troops of the guard, and of the first and fourth corps.

The King imagines that, in this position, he may give the cossacks a lesson if they should press too closely; His Majesty, however, will wait for your reports, previously to his adopting any resolution. Loison's division will find here whatever it may stand in need of; it will then become an imposing force of infantry to us.

Napoleon to the Major-Général.

Moscow, 25th September, 1812.

My cousin, write to General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, that I have given orders to the intendant general, to send two hundred thousand francs in rubles (at the rate of a paper ruble for each franc); along the line of Mojaïsk, Gjatz, Wiazma, Dorogobouje and Smolensko, and that I have authorised him to enter into contracts, at each place, for the supplies of flour and meat, for the service along the road; that I do not find he has yet taken any step towards organizing the government of Smolensko.

THE END.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY G. SCHULZE, 13, POLAND STREET.

00032533

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 16 January, 2016